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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the justifications and regulations for going to war in both 
international and domestic armed conflicts under Islamic law. It studies the various 
kinds of use of force by both state and non-state actors in order to determine the 
nature of the Islamic law of war, specifically, whether Islamic law sanctions “holy 
war”, offensive war or only defensive war. It discusses international armed conflicts, 
i.e., war against non-Muslims, in the first four chapters: Chapters One, Two and 
Three treat the justifications for war in the Sīrah (biographies of the Prophet) 
literature, Tafsīr (exegesis) literature, and classical and modern juridical literature 
respectively. Chapter Four treats the Islamic regulations for war in international 
armed conflicts. Chapter Five is devoted to the justifications and regulations for the 
use of force in internal armed conflicts. It investigates the permissibility under 
Islamic law of resorting to the use of force to overthrow the governing regime and 
discusses the Islamic treatment of terrorism and the punishment of terrorists and their 
accomplices. It also discusses the claim that contemporary acts of domestic and 
international terrorism perpetrated by Muslims are motivated and justified by jihād. 
This study is limited to the four Sunni schools of Islamic law and also refers in some 
cases to the extinct Zāhirī school. It studies the writings of classical and modern 
Muslim jurists and scholars and compares them with the Western literature on the 
subject. 
 This study finds that jihād, in the sense of international armed struggle, as the 
term is currently used, is a defensive war justified in cases of aggression on the 
Muslim nation and fitnah, i.e., the persecution of Muslims. It also finds that the core 
justification in Islamic law for the use of force in domestic armed conflicts, and 
which may give an indication to future conflicts in the Muslim world, is the 
violations of the rules of the sharī‛ah. The study concludes that the Islamic law of 
war as maintained by the majority of mainstream Muslims scholars has great 
potential for contributing to international peace and security in the modern world, 
particularly with regard to the humanization of armed conflicts and the peaceful 
resolution of internal conflicts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A few individuals create ideas, arguments, theories, ideologies, laws or a specific 
understanding or interpretation of an issue. Even when part of a religion is believed 
to be from the Divine, a few individuals still offer their own understanding of such 
divine material and attempt to infer the divine intention that lies behind it. The great 
majority of the rest of the human race and other creatures often become directly or 
indirectly influenced, or sometimes victimized, by either believing in or becoming 
the target of such ideas, arguments, theories, ideologies or interpretations based on 
divine material. Some ideas and theories become a driving force that dictates the 
course of human actions towards other humans and the rest of creation. They also 
regulate, no less importantly, how people deal with themselves – their own desires 
and physical needs. 
Such ideas, arguments and theories, although they may be produced by an 
individual, sometimes develop into widely held strong beliefs, religions, truths and 
ways of life which constitute a core component of what divides humanity into 
different civilizations, cultures, faiths, ideologies and even nations. On the one hand, 
such ideas and theories become products that generate a sense of identity, including 
respect for and acceptance of others or hatred and animosity towards them. On the 
other, they also turn into a commodity which becomes widely accepted among 
certain people while totally rejected by others. Peace, genocide, the Holocaust, 
international and even civil wars are all examples of human actions usually 
motivated by specific ideas, arguments and beliefs about an “other”, and whether this 
“other” is viewed as belonging to a different ethnicity, religion, sect, ideology, 
civilization, etc. 
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In the arena of the study of ideas and theories, researchers – generation after 
generation – sometimes produce particular interpretations or even theories about the 
original ideas or theories they are studying. At a certain point, the true meaning and 
nature of the original theory or idea become disputed, confused and contested, 
depending on which and whose view, interpretation and literature the researchers are 
studying. But throughout its history, a theory or a law sometimes becomes like a 
living creature that develops and changes, first, according to the one who is creating 
it or writing about it and, second, according to the context in which it is applied.  
Among the most important theories are those that shape relations towards the 
others because such theories become either a source of peaceful coexistence, setting 
the rules for just and equitable relations, or a source of hatred and demonization of 
others, which may lead to the use of violence. In a word, theories and ideas about 
others may sometimes become a sort of a weapon of mass destruction, as has been 
witnessed throughout the various stages of human history. Anti-Semitism and racism 
are prime examples.  
This study examines one theory, or more precisely a law, namely, the Islamic 
law governing the use of force in both international and domestic conflicts. One of 
the most complex fields in the study of “others” is the study of their religion. This is 
because an outsider tends to interpret and judge the religion of others through the 
historical, religious and cultural experiences which have formed her/his own 
intellect. Furthermore, the complexity is doubled in case of the study of the law of 
war in the religion of others because outsiders may find themselves to be the enemy 
according to the law of war they are studying. Thus, the insider/outsider 
methodology, as explained below, can be a very useful approach in the study of 
religion, war, history and international relations.                        
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1. Rationale 
For the West, Islam has been for centuries a source of fear and suspicion. Orientalists 
have depicted the religion and culture of Islam as inferior to the religion and culture 
of the West.1 But more importantly, for these and for other reasons, Islam has been a 
source of misunderstanding. According to the words of Reuven Firestone, “Islam is 
perhaps the most misunderstood religion to the West, and many stereotypes still 
hinder clarity about its tenets and practices. Western prejudice toward Islam is as old 
as Islam itself.”2 This misunderstanding has created a yawning gap and even 
contradictory readings between insider/Islamic and outsider/Western scholarship in 
many areas of the study of Islam. But of the many areas of misunderstanding, as 
James Turner Johnson clearly puts it, “between Western and Islamic culture there is 
possibly no other single issue at the same time as divisive or as poorly understood as 
that of jihad.”3 Fortunately, however, one of the main reasons for the 
misunderstanding or lack of understanding of jihād among Western scholars has been 
recognized by some of them. According to Johnson, Western “Scholarship on 
Islamic normative tradition on war is considerably less well developed.”4 He adds 
that “there exist no general histories treating the understanding of normative tradition 
on religion, statecraft, and war in Islamic societies or in Islamic religious thought. 
Many significant subjects remain unexplored for lack of researchers with the 
necessary training and language skills.”5 Fred McGraw Donner describes the 
                                                 
1 James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 21; Edward W. Said, Orientalism, reprinted with new 
afterword (London: Penguin, 2003); Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the 
Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, rev. ed. with a new introduction (London: 
Vintage, 1997). 
2 Reuven Firestone, Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 13. 
3 Johnson, The Holy War Idea, p. 19. 
4 Ibid., p. 22. 
5 Ibid., p. 23. 
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problem in the current state of scholarship on jihād in the West as “a practical one”, 
suffering from the lack of “preliminary work on a vast subject.”6  
However, despite this lack of “preliminary work” and the fact that many 
subjects related to the study of this complex topic are still admittedly unexplored in 
Western scholarship, jihād has generally been portrayed in Western literature as a 
holy war to convert non-Muslims. For centuries, Europe’s image of Islam has been 
associated with its spectacular spread and the wide expansion of its territories. 
Christian Europe was very much alarmed by this phenomenon, especially after the 
Muslim conquest of Spain, which remained under Muslim rule for eight centuries.7 
Moreover, there has been a tendency in the West to conceive of Islam as an 
inherently violent religion. Richard C. Martin confirms that the modern media and 
many Westerners who attempt to characterize Islam and the Arabs have concluded 
that there is a consciously “discernible ethos of violence in Islamic society”.8 
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad states: “The association of Islam with holy war, and of 
Muslims with the propagation of violence, seems to be endemic to Western 
awareness of Muslim faith. This is deeply disturbing to Muslims.”9 
                                                 
6 Fred McGraw Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War”, in John Kelsay and James 
Turner Johnson, eds., Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace 
in Western and Islamic Traditions (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 57. 
7 Firestone, Jihād, p. 13. 
8 Richards C. Martin, “The Religious Foundations of War, Peace, and Statecraft in Islam”, in John 
Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds., Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives 
on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 
108. See also Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle 
East (London: I.B. Tauris, reprinted 2003), p. 35. 
9 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: The Islamist Perspective”, in 
Bhyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck, eds., Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader (New York: 
Olive Branch Press, 1991), p. 256. See also, for example, Jonas Otterbeck, “The Depiction of Islam in 
Sweden” The Muslim World, Vol. 92, Issue 1/2, Spring 2002, pp. 143-156. Margaret Pettygrove 
indicates that “The demonization and reduction of Islam in popular American culture, particularly 
with respect to suicide bombings and Political Islam, suggests that Islam is an inherently violent or 
extremist religion.” Margaret Pettygrove, “Conceptions of War in Islamic Legal Theory and Practice”, 
Macalester Islam Journal, Vol. 2, issue 3, 2007, p. 35. See also Muhammed Abu-Nimer, “A 
Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam”, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 15, No. 
1/2, 2000-2001, p. 221. 
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Furthermore, in 1993 Samuel P. Huntington hypothesized in his “The Clash 
of Civilizations?” that “a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be 
between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.”10 In fact, analysts have 
limited this conflict or clash to one between what is called “Islam” and “the West”, 
and the involvement of the so-called “Confucian states” in this anticipated conflict 
has been totally ignored. Moreover, a few years after Huntington presented his 
theory, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the London and Madrid bombings, suicide 
bombings and hostage taking and beheadings in certain Muslim countries under 
occupation, brought new dimensions to the association of Islam with violence in 
Western literature. In the bulk of post-9/11 literature, the term jihād is used in the 
sense of terrorism. In other words, a line of thought in the West has related the 
causes of these terrorist acts to Islamic religious extremism, and particularly to jihād, 
rather than to specific regional conflicts and the occupation of particular Muslim 
countries, which are the causes stated by the terrorists themselves.  
This research has therefore been driven by the two reasons referred to above, 
namely, first, the poor understanding, and the as yet unexplored subjects related to 
the study of jihād, which have led to the characterization of the current state of 
scholarship on it – particularly in Western literature – as “considerably less well 
developed”; and second, the claim that the law of war in Islam, the religion of one 
fifth of the world’s population, is the cause of acts of terrorism, which is a serious 
claim that requires scholarly investigation. For these reasons, the study of the law of 
war in Islam becomes not only a matter of timely relevance, but also, more 
significantly, a matter of strategic importance to the understanding, and political 
treatment, of both international and domestic conflicts and acts of terrorism in which 
                                                 
10 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, Vol. 72, No. 
3, p. 48. See also Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).  
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Muslims are involved, or, more precisely, in which the teachings of Islam play, or 
are thought to play, a role. 
 
2. Aims of the Study 
This study attempts to examine the nature of the Islamic law of war – the contested, 
misunderstood and inadequately explored jihād. Despite the vast literature written on 
jihād in both Islamic and Western literature, the results of achieving this target varies 
according to how and where it is pursued. This study argues that the best approach is 
to examine both the Islamic jus ad bellum (the justifications for resorting to war) and 
the Islamic jus in bello (the rules regulating the conduct of war) in both international 
and domestic armed conflicts. The examination of each of these contributes to the 
understanding of the other and hence ultimately indicates the nature of jihād. What is 
meant by the nature of jihād here is whether it is a “holy war”, either defensive or 
offensive, or a war of expansion for economic or other purposes. The term “holy 
war” is used here in the sense of a war waged either in order to convert a people to a 
certain religion by force, or solely because the opponents hold different beliefs. In 
other words, this study attempts to find out whether or not jihād is a just war. The 
meaning of a just war here is a war fought in self-defence that complies with the 
United Nations restrictions on the use of force.  
Thus, the aim of this study is to examine the justifications for and the 
regulations of the use of force under Islamic law in both international and domestic 
armed conflicts. It examines all the varieties of the use of force, either by state or 
non-state actors, that are treated under Islamic law. In other words, it examines why 
and how Muslims resort to the use of force. The significance of studying the 
treatment of the use of force by non-state actors under Islamic law is fourfold. First, 
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it tests the claim that jihād is the cause of contemporary acts of terrorism perpetrated 
by Muslims. Second, in case of rebellion against the Islamic government, it discovers 
the degree of tolerance or intolerance Islamic law provides for the internal opponents 
of an Islamic government. Third, studying the regulations in Islamic law for the use 
of force in both international and domestic armed conflicts can provide pointers for 
possible measures for humanizing armed conflicts in which the followers of one fifth 
of the world’s population may be involved. It also presents the Islamic positions on 
certain acts committed by a few Muslims, such as targeting non-combatants, 
beheadings, kidnapping journalists and humanitarian aid workers in specific Muslim 
countries, and acts of terrorism such as blowing up airplanes, trains and buses. 
Fourth, this study investigates the potential contribution the legal system of one of 
the world’s largest religions may provide for the world’s discussions on war and thus 
the impact it may have on the attainment of world peace and stability.  
In the light of the findings of this examination, first, it can be decided 
whether Muslim calls for the recourse to jihād in international and domestic armed 
conflicts at the present time is justified or not, and second, and no less importantly, it 
can be judged whether or not these contemporary calls for jihād comply with the 
teachings of Islam on the use of force. In this way, the practices of Muslims can be 
judged according to their theory, i.e., the teachings of Islam, and thus the major error 
of confusing the practices of Muslims with the teachings of Islam can be avoided.  
 
3. Research Questions 
To achieve the above aims this study attempts to answer the following main 
questions: 
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1) What are the Islamic justifications for the use of force in international armed 
conflicts, namely, going to war against non-Muslims? (See Chapters One, 
Two and Three). 
2) What are the justifications of both the Islamic state authorities and its citizens 
for the resort to war against each other? (See Chapter Five). 
3) What are the main rules in Islamic law regulating the conduct of Muslims 
with regard to the lives and property of enemies during and after hostilities in 
international armed conflicts? (See Chapter Four). 
4) What are the Islamic rules regulating the conduct of the Islamic state during 
and after hostilities in the various kinds of domestic armed conflicts, and 
what are the differences between the rules regulating these various domestic 
conflicts and the rules regulating the conduct of Muslims in international 
armed conflicts with non-Muslims? (See Chapter Five). 
5) After examining the Islamic justifications and regulations for the use of force 
in both international and internal conflicts, this study investigates whether or 
not the classical Muslim jurists treat the issues of international and domestic 
terrorism? (See Chapter Five). 
6) If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, what then constitutes 
an act of terrorism and what is the punishment for terrorists and their 
accomplices under Islamic law? (See Chapter Five). 
 
4. Scope and Limitations 
This study is confined to the Sunni literature and does not include the Shi‛ite 
literature on the subject. More specifically, it is limited to the four Sunni schools of 
Islamic law, i.e., the Hanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi‛ī and Hanbalī schools. In some cases it 
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refers to the extinct Zāhirī school, namely, the opinions of Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064). 
It includes the literature written in both Arabic and English. With a few exceptions, 
the study deals with mainstream Islamic and Western literature and does not focus on 
hate literature or the writings of extremists on either side. The Islamic literature 
surveyed includes the writings of both classical and modern Muslim jurists and 
scholars. The term “modern Muslim scholars” refers to the scholars who lived during 
the period extending from the last quarter of the nineteenth century up to the present, 
while the term “classical Muslim jurists/scholars” refers to those who lived during 
the period preceding that time.  
This study examines the Islamic normative sources on the justifications and 
regulations for war and thus it is not a historical study. In other words, it does not 
follow the occasions when Muslims resorted to war, or their conduct in war 
throughout history, apart from the incidents of armed conflict that took place 
between the Muslims and their enemies during the lifetime of the Prophet. The 
reason of this exception is that the incidents of fighting that took place during the 
Prophet’s lifetime which are treated in the Sīrah (biographies of the Prophet) 
literature, along with the Qur’ān, are the bases for the formulation of the Islamic law 
of war, as explained below. 
      
5. Literature Review 
Despite the vast extent of the literature written on jihād since the first century of 
Islam in insider and, later, in outsider literatures, much disagreement and 
misunderstanding still exist about the subject, mainly regarding the Islamic 
justifications for going to war. This is partly attributed to the fact that classical 
Muslim jurists give scant attention to the justifications for going to war compared 
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with their extensive treatment of the rules regulating the conduct of Muslims during 
war. It is ironic that, contrary to the classical Muslim jurists, Western scholars have 
focused mainly on the justifications for jihād and almost disregarded the Islamic 
regulations for the conduct of war. Most probably the reason why classical jurists did 
not adequately address the justifications for going to war is that a state of hostility 
was already the norm in international relations in their times.  
In fact, it took classical Muslim jurists about seven centuries until a 
manuscript devoted to the treatment of the justifications for war was written by the 
encyclopaedic Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328). This manuscript, 
unfortunately not so far widely available, was edited and personally published in 
2004 by the Saudi scholar ‛Abd al-‛Azīz ibn ‛Abd Allah ibn Ibrāhīm al-Zayd Āl 
Hamad under the title Qā‛idah Mukhtasarah fī Qitāl al-Kuffār wa Muhādanatihim 
wa Tah rīm Qatlihim li-Mujarrad Kufrihim (A Concise Rule for Fighting against 
Unbelievers and Making a Truce with Them and the Prohibition of Killing Them 
Solely because of their Unbelief).11 Ibn Taymiyyah, as is clear from the title, first, 
discusses at some length and persuasively explains the evidences from the Qur’ān 
and the tradition of the Prophet supporting the position of the majority of his Muslim 
predecessors, the Hanafī, Mālikī and Hanbalī jurists, that jihād is permissible only in 
case of aggression by the enemy against Muslims. Second, he rejects the position 
maintained mainly by al-Shāfi‛ī (d. 204/820) and some Hanbalī jurists that unbelief 
in itself is a justification for jihād. 
Another major contribution on the discussion of the subject came from 
Shaykh Muh ammad Abū Zahrah (1898-1974), another prolific author, who supports 
                                                 
11 Ahmad ibn ‛Abd al-Halīm ibn Taymiyyah, Qā‛idah Mukhtasarah fī Qitāl al-Kuffār wa 
Muhādanatihim wa Tahrīm Qatlihim li-Mujarrad Kufrihim: Qā‛idah Tubayyn al-Qiyam al-Sāmiyah 
lil-H adārah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Harb wa al-Qitāl, ed. ‛Abd al-‛Azīz ibn ‛Abd Allah ibn Ibrāhīm al-
Zayd Āl Hamad (Riyadh: N.p., 2004/1424). 
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the permissibility of jihād in cases of aggression against and religious persecution of 
Muslims and when an enemy prevents Muslims from preaching Islam.12 Moreover, 
he shaped a new approach to the subject of international relations in Islam which is 
based on a number of Islamic principles including human dignity, justice, 
cooperation and friendship between all human beings.13 
Ibn Taymiyyah and Abū Zahrah have had a great influence on mainstream 
modern Islamic writings on the subject. Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, a leading Syrian world 
authority on Islamic law, provided a solid contribution on the subject in his PhD 
thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law, Cairo University, in 1963, first published in 
the same year under the title Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām: Dīrāsah Muqāranah (The 
Effects of War in Islam: A Comparative Study). His main contribution is support for 
the defensive nature of jihād.14  
The other main contribution is the encyclopaedic project on international 
relations in Islam sponsored and published in Arabic in fourteen volumes in 1996 by 
the USA-based International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). Unlike other works 
on the subject, this project is conducted by a group of twenty-seven academic 
specialists, mostly of Cairo University, who, interestingly, are not traditionally 
trained in Islamic studies. In addition to defensive war, this project confirms that 
Muslims may also resort to war if they are prevented from preaching Islam.15   
The latest contribution to the subject is the two-volume work by the 
renowned Shaykh Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī published in the second half of June 2009 
under the title Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li-Ahkāmih wa Falsafatih fī Daw’ 
                                                 
12 Muhammad Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām (Cairo: Al-Dār al-Qawmiyyah lil-
Tibā‛ah wa al-Nashr, 1964/1384), pp. 47-52, 89-94. 
13 Ibid., pp. 19-46. 
14 Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām: Dirāsah Muqāranah, 3rd ed. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 
1998/1419), pp. 84, 106-136. 
15 ‛Abd al-‛Azīz Saqr, ‛Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām Waqt al-Harb: Dirāsah lil-Qawā‛id al-
Munazzimah li-Sayr al-Qitāl, Mashrū‛ al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām 6 (Cairo: Al-Ma‛had al-
‛Ālamī lil-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1996), pp. 7-29. 
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al-Qur’ān wa al-Sunnah (Understanding Jihād: A Comparative Study of its Rules 
and Philosophy in the Light of the Qur’ān and Sunnah). This work will have a large 
influence in the future because of the scholarly weight and popularity of the author 
and its coverage of many issues related to the subject. The author follows the same 
line of thought as Ibn Taymiyyah and Abū Zahrah on the subject. He adds that at 
present there are three kinds of jihād: (1) the liberation of occupied Muslim 
countries; (2) peaceful attempts to change the current Muslim regimes that permit 
acts that are absolutely prohibited in Islam; and (3) preaching Islam to the rest of the 
world in their languages via the Internet, radio and satellite channels as well as 
written publications.16 Unlike the previously mentioned contributions, al-Qarad āwī 
also treats the important issue of how internal hostilities are dealt with in Islamic law.      
Concerning the Western literature, it is quite noticeable that Majid 
Khadduri’s (1909-2007) War and Peace in the Law of Islam and his translation of 
Al-Shaybānī’s work under the title The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybānī’s Siyar17 
remain the main sources for Western researchers on the subject. His ideas on jihād 
expressed in the former of these two works and his introduction to the latter have had 
a decisive influence on the current Western literature, despite the fact that he 
discusses mainly classical Muslim jurists and historians and even then not in a 
manner that fairly reflects the diversity of their opinions. It is quite easy sometimes 
to trace the influence of his ideas, and even his vocabulary, in current Western 
literature. Whether this influence is acknowledged or not, many writers have 
accepted without question some of his mistaken ideas and his hostile presentation of 
                                                 
16 Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li-Ahkāmih wa Falsafatih fī D aw’ al-
Qur’ān wa al-Sunnah (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2009), Vol. 2, pp. 1183-1197. 
17 To give an example of the role which translation of Islamic literature into European languages plays 
in shaping Western studies of Islam, David A. Westbrook writes “I concentrate on Shaybani because 
he has been translated into English, and so can be read as a primary source”, David A. Westbrook, 
“Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate Expressions of World Order”, 
Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, 1993, p. 828, footnote no. 15. 
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jihād in particular, and the classical theory of international relations, in general.18 
AbuSulayman and Zawati criticize him for his hostile and stereotyped conclusions on 
jihād.19 Zawati also criticises Bernard Lewis for the same sort of scholarship.20  
The core of Khadduri’s understanding of jihād can be found in the following 
words: “The jihād was therefore employed as an instrument for both the 
universalization of religion and the establishment of an imperial world state.”21 He 
adds that “jihād may be regarded as Islam’s instrument for carrying out its ultimate 
objective by turning all people into believers, if not in the prophethood of 
Muh ammad (as in the case of dhimmis), at least in the belief in God.”22 However, he 
writes in another work that jihād was the instrument for “achiev[ing] Islam’s ultimate 
objective, namely, the enforcement of God’s law (the Shari’a) over the entire 
world.”23 In fact, Khadduri does not explain how and from where he deduced these 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Bernard Lewis, “Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 3 
September 1990, pp. 47-60; Roda Mushkat, “Is War Ever Justifiable? A Comparative Study”, Loyola 
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1987, pp. 302 f.; Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na‛im, “Islamic Law, International Relations, and Human Rights: Challenge and 
Responses”, Cornel International Law Journal, Vol. 20, 1987, pp. 317-336; Christopher A. Ford, 
“Siyar-ization and its Discontents: International Law and Islam’s Constitutional Crisis”, Texas 
International Law Journal, Vol. 30, 1995, pp. 499-533; Johnson, The Holy War Idea, pp. 115-124; 
David Aron Schwartz, “International Terrorism and Islamic Law”, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 29, 1991, pp. 629-652; Rachel Saloom, “Is Beheading Permissible Under 
Islamic Law? Comparing Terrorist Jihad and The Saudi Arabian Death Penalty”, UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 10, 2005, pp. 228, 230; Robert Spencer, “Majid Khadduri 
and George W. Bush”, [article online]; available from 
http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/017169.php; Internet; accessed 9 July 2007; Daniel Pipes, “Jihad 
and the Professors”, [article online]; available from http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/301 
Internet; accessed 9 July 2007.  
19 See ‛AbdulHamid A. AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations: New 
Directions for Methodology and Thought, 2nd & rev. ed. (Herndon, VA: International Institute of 
Islamic Thought, 1993/1414), pp. 20-24; Hilmi M. Zawati, Is Jihad a Just War? War, Peace, and 
Human Rights under Islamic and Public International Law, Studies in Religion and Society, Vol. 53 
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), pp. 13, 37, 39, 49 f., 72 f., 75 f., 80 f. 
20 Hilmi M. Zawati, “Just War, Peace and Human Rights under Islamic and International Law” (MA 
Thesis, McGill University, 1997), pp. 1 f.; Zawati, Is Jihad a Just War?, pp. 13, 15 f., 112.  
21 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1955), p. 51. 
22 Ibid., p. 64. 
23 Majid Khadduri, “Islam and the Modern Law of Nations”, American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 50, No. 2, Apr. 1956, p. 359. In his PhD thesis, Mohamed Mokbel Mahmud Elbakry also argues 
that jihād is the instrument of Islam for carrying out its ultimate objective of the application of the 
sharī‛ah. See Mohamed Mokbel Mahmud Elbakry, “The Legality of ‘War’ in Al-Shari‛a Al-Islamiya 
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various interpretations of jihād. He seems sometimes to be mainly trying to give an 
interpretation for the objectives of what he calls “the expanding Muslim state” during 
the first century of the Islamic era rather than interpreting the jurists’ understandings 
of jihād. In other words, he sometimes confuses Muslim history with Islamic law and 
unfortunately does not adequately refer to the classical Islamic law books of the 
various schools. Perhaps the wide acceptance of his understanding of jihād in 
Western literature relates partly to the way he reduces such complex subject to such 
simple ideas. 
Rudolph Peters, the Dutch expert in the field, disagrees with the earlier 
Western literature on the objective of jihād and argues that its aim was “the 
expansion – and also defence – of the Islamic state.”24 Unlike Khadduri, Peters 
discusses extensively both the classical and modern Muslim literature on jihād and 
his study of the subject makes his work more reliable.25 However, his study of jihād 
focus on international armed conflicts and thus does not treat domestic jihād. 
Reuven Firestone’s Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam attempts to study 
what he calls “the origins of the concept and application of warring that we now 
define as ‘holy war’ in the earliest period of Islamic history.”26 In fact, studying the 
earliest occurrences of fighting between the Muslims and their enemies during the 
Prophet’s lifetime is essential for understanding the nature of the Islamic law of war, 
                                                                                                                                          
(The Islamic Law) and Contemporary International Law: Comparative Study” (PhD thesis, University 
of Glasgow, 1987), pp. 230, 232, 259, 613-616. 
 24 Rudolph Peters, trans. and ed., Jihad in Mediaeval and Modern Islam: The Chapter on Jihad from 
Averroes’ Legal Handbook ‘Bidayat Al-Mudjtahid’ and The Treatise ‘Koran and Fighting’ by The 
Late Shaykh Al-Azhar, Mahmud Shaltūt (Leiden: Brill, 1977), p. 3. See also Rudolph Peters, Islam 
and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (The Hague: Mouton, 1979); Rudolph 
Peters, “Djihad: War of Aggression or Defense?”, in Albert Dietrich, ed., Akten des VII. Kongresses 
Für Arabistik und Islamwissenschaft (Göttingen, Aug. 1974) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1976), pp. 282-289. 
25 This study disagrees with Peters’ opinion that Majid Khadduri’s War and Peace in the Law of Islam 
is “A reliable survey of the classical doctrine of jihad.” See Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and 
Modern Islam (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996), p. 197. 
26 Firestone, Jihād, p. 5. 
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a task Firestone’s book, though promised above, did not achieve. Based on his brief 
reading of the battle of Badr (Ramadān 2/March 624), the first battle in Islam, he 
admits: “Because we have reached the point after Badr where, according to the 
tradition, warring in the path of God was now required virtually without restriction, 
the material following Badr will not occupy us.”27 However, had Firestone studied 
the occurrences of war in the period his book promises to study and found out who 
was the offensive and defensive party and what were the reasons for such incidents, 
the whole thesis of his book may have been different. He assumes that, because Badr 
is considered a war in the path of God, jihād in the period studied in his book 
automatically means “holy war”. In fact, a justification for war couched in religious 
terms does not necessarily make it a holy war. In any case an investigation needed to 
decide, among other things, whether such a war is offensive or defensive. His own 
reading led him to the conclusion that the incidents of war were initiated by the 
Muslims and were initially “materialistic raids” which were transformed into holy 
war or what he calls “total declaration of war against all groups, whether kin or not, 
who did not accept the truth of the hegemony of Islam.”28      
John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson approach the subject from a 
comparative perspective between Western and Islamic traditions. Although this 
approach is very helpful to researchers concerned about the similarities and 
dissimilarities between the Christian/Western and Islamic traditions, their 
dependence on secondary sources, mainly works in English in the case of Islam, has 
limited their conclusions and therefore their contribution to the subject. The 
influence of Khadduri’s works surfaces in their writings particularly in case of 
international armed conflicts, while Khaled Abou El Fadl’s influence emerges with 
                                                 
27 Ibid., p. 114. 
28 Ibid., p. 134. 
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regard to domestic armed conflicts, namely, in cases of armed rebellion. The aims of 
jihād, according to Kelsay, are “extending Islamic hegemony… [and] defending an 
established Islamic polity”.29 Had Kelsay and Johnson studied the primary sources in 
Islamic languages, their contributions to the subject would have been much greater. 
A number of laudable contributions are made by Abou El Fadl, Sherman A. 
Jackson and Sohail H. Hashmi. Because of their training and knowledge of Islamic 
languages, they fulfil the rarely met need for scholars who are experts in both 
Western and Islamic scholarship in the subject. Abou El Fadl’s exhaustive study 
Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law is the most in-depth treatment of its subject 
and thus provides a pioneering investigation of this kind of domestic war, i.e., armed 
rebellion. Jackson’s “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition” is the best 
treatment of its subject, while his “Jihad and the Modern World” is also a laudable 
contribution to the study of the classical and modern Islamic jus ad bellum. Jackson 
insightfully concludes “that a prevailing ‘state of war,’ rather than difference of 
religion, was the raison d'être of jihad and that this ‘state of war’ has given way in 
modern times to a global ‘state of peace’ that rejects the unwarranted violation of the 
territorial sovereignty of all nations.”30 Hashmi’s “Saving and Taking Life in War: 
Three Modern Muslim Views” and “Islamic Ethics and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: An Argument for Nonproliferation” provide insightful analysis into 
some aspects of Islamic international humanitarian law.  
This brief survey of both insider and outsider literatures shows that each of 
the above works has its own approach to and focus on certain aspects of the study of 
the Islamic law of war. This study therefore attempts, as follows, to study the 
                                                 
29 John Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John 
Knox, 1993), p. 53. 
30 Sherman A. Jackson, “Jihad and the Modern World”, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, 2002, p. 25. 
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justifications and regulations for the use of force in both international and domestic 
armed conflicts in the insider and outsider literatures.  
 
6. Methodology 
This study is a library-based research and the material studied here is mainly books, 
articles and in some cases online material. The study utilizes an insider/outsider 
approach. The insider approach refers to what Muslims advocate about their specific 
understandings of the issues in question. The outsider approach in this study refers to 
the understandings of these issues in the Western literature that has been consulted. 
The terms Islamic/insider and Western/outsider literatures refer specifically to the 
works discussed in this study. Thus, the insider/outsider approach adopted in this 
study is simply a comparative method that aims at tracing and analysing when, how 
and why these two literatures agree or disagree on the same issues in question.  
Indeed, this study argues the necessity of utilizing an insider approach when 
it comes to the study of religion and history of others, or in comparative studies, but 
only as a first step to fairly present and understand what is maintained by the 
insiders. Put differently, researchers should refer to the original sources, i.e., the 
insiders, to find out how the issues in question are described by the insiders rather 
than depending on secondary resources, i.e., the outsider, in the description of such 
issues. This does not mean that the conclusions of the insiders should be adopted, but 
rather that a fair, objective presentation of the insiders must be given on the basis of 
how they themselves maintain and advocate their own beliefs and views. This 
methodology also applies to different sects within the same religion, or different 
ethnicities, or any rival within the same entity. Then, only after this initial step, 
scholars can start objective studies and develop their own conclusions. If this process 
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is not followed, outsider scholars may slip into producing theories and conclusions 
which are later developed into widely circulated so-called facts in outsider literature 
that are simply based on misrepresentation, with the insider literature ignored. With 
the passage of time, two different readings of an “other” are created which may often 
be described as negative/outsider and positive/insider.  
Therefore, objectivity remains a relative term that changes according to who 
and which literature (insider or outsider) is dealing with the issues in question. This 
is because researchers are influenced by their own religious, historical, cultural and 
personal experiences, which inevitably dictate how they analyse, study31 and judge 
others. W. Montgomery Watt (d. 2006) writes: 
Normally a person can only reach important levels of religious experience 
through participating in the life of the community in which he has been 
brought up and basing his activity on its ideas. There are exceptions, but this 
is the normal case. It is not easy for a person brought up in a Christian 
environment to appreciate the religious ideas of Islam, far less to make them 
the basis of a satisfactory life. The same is true for the Muslim with Christian 
ideas. This means that it is Christian ideas which give the Christian the best 
chance of attaining a richer and deeper experience, and likewise Muslim 
ideas the Muslim.32  
In fact, Watt’s observation here about the appreciation of the ideas of religions 
different from one’s own also applies to any other set of ideas, whether political, 
social or otherwise, because human beings generally become products of certain 
ideas and thus tend to work, analyse and judge others accordingly. 
                                                 
31 See Jabal Muhammad Buaben, Image of the Prophet Muhammad in the West: A Study of Muir, 
Margoliouth and Watt (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1996/1417), pp. 327, 329. 
32 W. Montgomery Watt, Bell’s Introduction to the Qur’ān, Islamic Surveys 8 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, reprint 1997), p. 182.  
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 All translations of the Qur’ānic texts and Hadīths are mine. An important note 
concerning transliteration: all Arabic words are transliterated according to their 
pausal forms. The point here is to help the non-Arabic speaking reader to know how 
the Arabic word is written. The conversion of Islamic dates to the Christian calendars 
follows G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville’s The Muslim and Christian Calendars.33  
 
7. Structure of the Study  
This study consists of an introduction, five chapters and a conclusion. The first four 
chapters treat international wars, while Chapter Five treats internal hostilities and 
terrorism in Islamic law. The study examines the Islamic justifications for war 
against non-Muslims, i.e., international war according to the classical Islamic state 
system, in the first three chapters. Chapter One studies the Sīrah literature to find out 
the justifications for the incidents of fighting between the Muslims and their enemies 
during the Prophet’s lifetime. Chapter Two studies the interpretations of the Qur’ānic 
justifications for war in some of the most influential classical and modern Qur’ān 
Tafsīr (exegeses) literature. Chapter Three studies the justifications for war and 
Islamic attitudes towards non-Muslims in the classical Islamic juridical theory of 
international law and modern Islamic writings on the subject.  
This specific order of these three chapters is very important because, first, the 
Qur’ānic texts on war address specific contexts so determining the contexts which 
these Qur’ānic texts address is essential before commencing any study of the 
Qur’ānic position on the subject, and, second, because it was on the basis of the 
incidents of fighting between the Muslims and their enemies (discussed in Chapter 
                                                 
33 G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, The Muslim and Christian Calendars: Being Tables for the Conversion 
of Muslim and Christian Dates from the Hijra to the Year A.D. 2000, 2nd ed. (London: Rex Collings 
Ltd, 1977). An easier way for date conversion from Islamic to Christian dates and vice versa is 
available from http://www.islamicfinder.org/dateConversion.php and 
http://www.islamonline.net/calculator/english/hijrigregoriancalculator.asp.  
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One), and the interpretations of the Qur’ānic texts addressing these incidents 
(discussed in Chapter Two) that Muslim jurists developed the Islamic law of war. 
Chapter Four discusses the regulations governing war in international armed 
conflicts under Islamic law and completes the treatment of international armed 
conflicts in this study.  
Chapter Five is devoted to internal armed conflicts and terrorism in Islamic 
law. It studies the justifications and regulations for the use of force in internal armed 
conflicts. In particular, it discusses in some detail the law of fighting against al-
bughāh (rebels, secessionists) and the law of fighting against al-muh āribūn/qutt ā‛ al-
t arīq (bandits, highway robbers, pirates). Following the discussions of these two 
kinds of internal armed conflicts and, before that, the use of force in international 
armed conflicts, Chapter Five discusses the claim that the concept of jihād is the 
cause of acts of terrorism perpetrated by Muslims and addresses the questions of the 
treatment and punishment of terrorism under Islamic law. Chapter Five is longer than 
the other chapters, but this is necessary in order to cover the arguments regarding the 
treatment of terrorism and the punishment of terrorists under Islamic law, which are 
dealt with in the same chapter, following the consideration of the kinds of internal 
hostilities referred to above.  
 21
CHAPTER ONE 
WAR DURING THE PROPHET’S LIFETIME 
1.1 Introduction 
Studies of war are greatly affected by whether the researchers concerned are insiders 
or outsiders. In cases when the participants in a war are followers of a particular 
religion or religions, researchers may be affected by their religious, historical, 
cultural or intellectual view of the religions concerned, even if they themselves do 
not belong to any of the parties to the conflict. This sometimes affects their degree of 
objectivity in deciding what is justified and what is not, as well as what might count 
as defensive and what might not. In the case of holy war, if it is agreed that holy war 
is fighting in the name of religion or fighting for religion, one of the questions to be 
raised is whether holy war includes fighting in self-defence against armed aggression 
or against the persecution of a particular religious group. This chapter uses the term 
“holy war” in the sense of an armed conflict between members of different religions, 
waged to propagate the combatants’ religion.  
The study of the tradition of war in Islam must start by investigating relations 
between the earliest Muslims and their communities, including how non-Muslims 
reacted to the emergence of the religion of Islam and, more importantly, the 
occasions when fighting took place between the Muslims and their enemies during 
this period, i.e., during the lifetime of the Prophet. The significance of starting with 
the occurrences of fighting during this period is that it is on the basis of these 
incidents and the Qur’ānic texts addressing them that the classical Muslim jurists 
developed the Islamic law of war. Therefore, this chapter examines the wars that 
took place during the Prophet’s lifetime – specifically after the Prophet received the 
message of Islam – and which are referred to in the early Sīrah (biographies of the 
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Prophet) literature, with the goal of discovering the reasons and justifications for 
these wars, as well as their aims. It attempts to interpret these incidents in their 
historical, cultural and geographical context in order to offer an explanation of their 
aims and justifications and their nature. This analysis leads to an understanding of 
how far these conflicts correspond to the concept of “holy war” as defined above 
and, more importantly, to a definition of the nature and meaning of jihād in this 
period, i.e., the lifetime of the Prophet. It will therefore necessarily relate to the 
history, culture, religion, economy, language and even geography of those involved 
in the wars concerned. In particular, this chapter argues that studying the first thirteen 
years in the history of Islam, known as the Meccan period, is essential for 
understanding the nature of the conflict between the Muslims and their enemies in 
the later period known as the Medinan period. 
 
1.2 Problems in the Study of Sīrah  
The early biographers of the Prophet basically collected the available reports about 
the period of his life. The reliability of the biographers is judged on the basis of their 
scrutiny of the sources and on the completeness of the isnād (chain of narrators) for 
each report they collected, which would ideally go back to a narrator who witnessed 
the events. Many Western scholars doubt the reliability of the early biographies of 
the Prophet and some recognize only the Qur’ān as a reliable source of knowledge 
for the early period of Islam. This amounts to a rejection of authentic sources on the 
life of the Prophet, as W. Montgomery Watt (d. 2006) remarks, and the theories 
based on these sources. Watt, like Muslim scholars, recognizes the reliability of the 
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early biographical material, unless there are specific reasons why particular parts 
should be discredited.1 
The majority of Muslim scholars give much credence to the biography by Ibn 
Ishāq (d. 150/767-8).2 His biography, edited by Ibn Hishām (d. 218/833), is one of 
the main sources for an account of the life of the Prophet. However, Ibn Ishāq’s 
authority as a jurist writing on legal issues is discredited by Ah mad ibn Hanbal (d. 
241/855).3 Western scholars often rely on the work on the early period of Islam by 
al-Wāqidī (d. 207/822-3), entitled Kitāb al-Maghāzī.4 However, al-Wāqidī’s 
authority is discredited by many Muslim scholars and he is even denounced as 
“kadhdhāb”5 (a liar) by Ibn Hanbal. However, his Al-Maghāzī is the main source 
used by Western scholarship with regard to the incidents of war in the period covered 
in this chapter. It is worth mentioning here that early Muslim scholars did not 
scrutinize reports on matters related to the biography of the Prophet and early Islamic 
history as much as they did reports on matters related to theology and jurisprudence. 
Biographers generally refer to the incidents of fighting between Muslims and 
their enemies during the Prophet’s lifetime as al-ghazawāt or al-sarāyā. Ghazawāt, 
(sing. ghazwah), which has the same meaning as maghāzī,6 means raids. Here it 
refers to any of the missionary and military campaigns, and in fact other trips, in 
                                                 
1 See W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Medina (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 
336-338; W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1961), pp. 241 f. 
2 Muhammad ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah, ed. ‛Abd al-Malik ibn Hishām, annotated by Fu’ād 
ibn ‛Alī Hāfiz (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 2000). 
3 See Ismā‛īl ibn ‛Umar ibn Kathīr, Al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‛Arabī, 1997), 
Vol. 1, p. 24.     
4 Muhammad ibn ‛Umar al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, ed. Muhammad ‛Abd al-Qādir ‛Atā (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 2004/1424).  
5 M. Hinds, “Maghāzī”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., Vol. V, p. 1163. According to al-Ghunaimi, 
al-Wāqidī is considered one of “the most famous four, among the many, fabricators of hadīth”, see 
Muhammad Talaat al-Ghunaimi, Qānūn al-Salām fī al-Islām (Alexandria, Egypt: Munsha’ah al-
Ma‛ārif, 2007), p. 150. 
6 According to Lane, maghāzī means “The memorable deeds of… those who engage in warring, or 
warring and plundering, expeditions”, see Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (Beirut: 
Librairie Du Liban, 1968), Vol. 6, p. 2257. 
 24
which the Prophet took part. Sarāyā (sing. sariyah) refers to expeditions allegedly 
sent by the Prophet but in which, unlike the ghazawāt, he did not take part.7  
Martin Hinds remarks that the purpose of the study of maghāzī from the 
second half of the second/eighth century onwards requires further research.8 A 
meticulous study of this issue in the biographies of Ibn Ishāq, al-Wāqidī, Ibn Sa‛d (d. 
230/845) and al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348) reveals that the aim of the biographers was to 
record all the accounts relevant to the life or the person of the Prophet. They merely 
aimed at transferring tens of thousands of reports and organizing them 
chronologically according to topic. They give different chronologies and in some 
cases details that could lead to different conclusions on the reasons for and objectives 
of some of these ghazawāt and sarāyā. They did not attempt to examine the various 
reports in order to inform the reader of what they considered to be the reasons or 
justifications for these incidents.  
This attitude seems to be the result of the biographers’ desire to avoid taking 
responsibility for adopting a particular account when conflicting reports existed. 
Adopting specific accounts would mean discrediting the authenticity of other 
reporters and their accounts. This job was left to another category of Islamic 
scholars, i.e., the muh addithūn (specialists in Hadīth), who invented a number of 
disciplines to evaluate the authenticity of reports. By simply recounting the various 
reports, the biographers put the responsibility on the shoulders of the narrators and it 
is left to the readers to decide about such incidents. Although this attitude is in some 
cases troubling and perplexing to the researchers who want to answer particular 
                                                 
7 Muhammad Sayyid Tantāwī, Al-Sarāyā al-Harbiyyah fī al-‛Ahd al-Nabawī (Cairo: Al-Zahrā’ lil-
I‛lām al-‛Arabī, 1990/1410), p. 21; Husayn Mujīb al-Masrī, Ghazawat al-Rasūl Bayn Shu‛arā’ al-
Shu‛ūb al-Islāmiyyah: Dirasah fī al-Adab al-Islāmī al-Muqāran (Cairo: Al-Dār al-Thaqāfiyyah lil-
Nashr, 2000/1420), pp. 32 f.; Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, “Islamic Rulings on 
Warfare”, [article online]; available from 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=588; Internet; accessed 21 
April 2009, p. 6. 
8 Hinds, “Maghāzī”, p. 1162. 
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questions about justifications for war in the period studied here, it prevents any 
biographer’s personal inclination from influencing the acceptance of a particular 
version.  
This means that contemporary researchers need to struggle through these 
thousands of reports to find out the justifications for going to war in this period. 
Furthermore, they sometimes even need to reconstruct the situation and find out 
which party to a conflict initiated the aggression. In the light of the diverse answers 
to these questions, various theories on the tradition of war in Islam have been 
formulated, as will be shown below. This explains the controversy among Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike about the Islamic justifications for war, as will be explained 
below. Inevitably, discrepancies appear in the Sīrah literature simply because earlier 
reporters were recounting only the part of the incident they witnessed or knew about. 
Moreover, a painstaking study of the ghazawāt and sarāyā reveals that the intention 
of the reporters, as well as the biographers, was not to address the incidents they 
were reporting or writing about for their own sake, but rather to record the life, 
character and example of the Prophet. Hence, slight differences exist in the 
presentation of some incidents as a result of the different perceptions or evaluations 
of the reporters or biographers. These differences have been kept to a minimum 
because the biographers have confined themselves throughout history to simply 
reporting the events. This explains the omission of any statement about the reasons 
for and objectives of some ghazawāt and sarāyā and the writers’ satisfaction with 
merely describing the incidents. It is worth mentioning here that differing reasons for 
and accounts of the same incident are sometimes found. 
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1.3 The Meccan Period 
One of the few books that studies the “origins” of the concept of jihād in the period 
studied here is Reuven Firestone’s Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. In his 
reading of the Meccan period, Firestone constructs a particular version in order to 
support his theory on war in Islam. He portrays the Muslims as determined to initiate 
aggression towards the Meccan idolaters, claiming that the Meccans “did not oppose 
him [the Prophet] until he began berating their gods and insulting their ancestors who 
died as unbelievers.”9 Moreover, he proposes that it was the Prophet, not the 
Meccans, who initiated the battles.10  
As for the sources, he states that all the available literature is written by “the 
winning Muslims, whose very success was predicted by their willingness (or desire) 
to engage actively in war.”11 Moreover, he confirms that some of the Sīrah was 
“forged” in order to fill the gaps in the Prophet’s life, to extol his miracles, or to give 
an appropriate context for particular Qur’ānic verses.12 However, he also claims that 
Qur’ānic verses were provided to sanction a particular historical account.13  
An examination of the sources Firestone uses gives exactly the opposite 
reading. It is interesting to note that these sources explain that the Prophet refrained 
from preaching the call for three years out of fear of the reaction of the Meccans, 
until he received the Qur’ānic revelations (15:94; 26:214-215) that commanded him 
to declare the message he received.14 In one incident, Abū Bakr is reported to have 
saved the Prophet from a group of men who encircled him; when he saw that one of 
                                                 
9 Reuven Firestone, Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 106. 
10 Ibid., p. 110. 
11 Ibid., p. 107. 
12 Ibid., p. 105. 
13 Ibid., p. 131. 
14 Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 1, p. 190; A. Guillaume, trans. The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of 
Ishāq’s Sīrat Rasūl Allāh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 117. 
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them had seized the Prophet’s robe, he “interposed himself weeping and saying, 
‘would you kill a man for saying Allah is my Lord?’”.15  
Sīrah literature describes the kinds of torture to which al-mustad‛afīn 
(oppressed, socially weak Muslims) were subjected.16 Bilāl, a slave who performed 
the call to prayer, is described as having been severely tortured by his master to force 
him to abandon the new religion and worship the famous Quraysh idols al-Lāt and 
al-‛Uzzā. Bilāl is reported as saying during his torture “ahad ahad” (“One, One”, 
meaning that there is only one God).17 The whole family of Yāsir, including ‛Ammār 
ibn Yāsir, his father and his mother Sumayyah the daughter of al-Khayyāt, are also 
reported to have been brutally tortured. The Prophet passed by them as they were 
being tortured and, being unable to save them, he said, “Sabrā āl Yāsir! Maw‛idukum 
al-jannah”18 (“Patience, O family of Yāsir! Your meeting-place will be paradise”).19 
The mother, Sumayyah, known as the first female martyr in Islam, and her husband, 
Yāsir, were killed under torture because of their adamant refusal to abandon the 
religion of Islam.20 It is worth mentioning here that these two phrases are very 
present in the Muslim mind and Muslims still use them. For example, they say 
“Sabrā āl Yāsir! Maw‛idukum al-jannah” in situations when asking someone to be 
patient and to bear the injustice or difficulties of a situation in order to achieve 
something desirable. 
                                                 
15 Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 1, p. 211; Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, p. 131. 
16 Sohail H. Hashmi, “Islam, Sunni”, Encyclopedia of Religion and War, ed., Gabriel Palmer-
Fernandez (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 217. On the religious persecution and torture of the 
Muslims during the Meccan period see, Nādiyah Husnī Saqr, Falsafah al-Harb fī al-Islām (Cairo: 
Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 1990/1410), pp. 9-21.  
17 Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 1, pp. 233 f.; Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, p. 144. 
18 Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 1, p. 235; Muhammad Rashīd Rid ā, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-Hakīm: Al-Shahīr 
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19 Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, p. 145.  
20 Adil Salahi, Muhammad Man and Prophet: A Complete Study of the Life of the Prophet of Islam 
(Leicestershire: Islamic Foundation, 2002/1423), p. 132; Rid ā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 2, p. 317; ‛Abd 
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Abū Jahl (d. 2/624), the influential Qurayshite leader,21 had various ways of 
fighting Islam. Whenever he discovered that a noble and well-connected person had 
embraced the new religion, he reprimanded, scorned and threatened to defame that 
person. When a merchant embraced Islam, Abū Jahl threatened to boycott and 
destroy his business. He also beat weak Muslims and incited others against them.22 
Some Meccan idolaters were even determined to kill those who embraced Islam. For 
example, a group of men from al-Makhzūm clan agreed to kill some new converts to 
Islam, including al-Walīd ibn al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah. Being afraid of his violent 
temper, they could not tell Hishām ibn al-Walīd that they wanted to kill his brother. 
They told him that they sought to convince his brother to forsake the religion of 
Islam. Hishām agreed that they could admonish his brother but warned them that if 
they killed him, he would kill the noblest man among them. For this situation, 
Hishām recited the following verse, translated by A. Guillaume as: 
“My brother ‛Uyays shall not be killed, 
Otherwise there will be war between us forever”23 
The Meccan idolaters’ systematic collective torture of anyone who followed Islam is 
described as follows: “every clan which contained Muslims attacked them [the 
Muslims], imprisoning them, and beating them, allowing them no food or drink, and 
exposing them to the burning heat of Mecca, so as to seduce them from their religion. 
Some gave way under pressure of persecution, and others resisted them, being 
protected by God.”24 Under all these kinds of torture and the threat of murder, some 
Muslims were forced to abandon the religion of Islam and to declare that their gods 
                                                 
21 See W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprint 1968), p. 134; 
W. Montgomery Watt, “Abū Djahl”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., Vol. I, p. 115. 
22 Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 1, p. 236; Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, p. 145. See also Bruce B. 
Lawrence, The Qur’ān: A Biography (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), p. 41. 
23 Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, p. 145; Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 1, pp. 236 f. Where direct 
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24 Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, p. 143; Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 1, p. 233. 
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were the idols al-Lāt and al-‛Uzzā, and not God.25 The Qur’ān (16:106) addressed 
this by affirming that such cases of apostasy under torture are excusable.  
 Facing all these tortures and persecution and with no hope of stopping this 
aggression, the Prophet asked some Muslims to flee to Abyssinia because its king, 
the Negus, was a righteous man who would not allow anyone to be oppressed in his 
territory. Thus, “being afraid of apostasy and fleeing to God with their religion”,26 
about eighty-three Muslims fled to Abyssinia, and can thus be described as the first 
asylum seekers in the history of Islam. This is known as the first hijrah (flight) in 
Islam. In fact, the Meccan idolaters were determined to get the emigrants back and 
sent ‛Abd Allah ibn Abū Rabī‛ah and ‛Amr ibn al-‛Ās ibn Wā’il, described as two 
determined men, with presents to the Negus in order to bring them back to Mecca. 
The justification these two men gave to the Negus was that the emigrants were a 
group of people who rejected idol-worship and did not accept his religion, i.e., 
Christianity but had invented a new religion, i.e., Islam. After the Negus heard from 
the emigrants, he refused to give them back and promised to continue to protect 
them.27  
 The number of those who accepted Islam increased inside and outside Mecca, 
so the Quraysh decided to boycott the clans of Banū Hāshim and Banū al-Mutt alib. 
They issued a document and hung it up on the Ka‛bah to the effect that members of 
the Quraysh should not inter-marry with these two clans, or sell to them or buy from 
them.28 Persecution of the Prophet and the Muslims increased after the death of both 
the Prophet’s protector, his uncle Abū Talib, and the Prophet’s wife Khadījah in 
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619.29 The Prophet continued preaching Islam to the neighbouring tribes and those 
who came to the fairs at Mecca, calling them to God and asking them for their 
protection. Many rejected his call to Islam and humiliated him, but others believed 
and agreed to protect the Prophet from any aggression.30  
Support for Islam at this time came from al-Ans ār (lit. the helpers or 
supporters), the name given to the new Muslims from Yathrib (Medina), who hosted 
the Muslims from Mecca and the Prophet after they fled there (the second hijrah). 
Several new Muslim delegations also pledged to support Islam and to protect the 
Prophet and the Muslims.31 Thereupon, after finding a second secure place, the 
Prophet commanded the Muslims in Mecca to flee to Yathrib. They all did so with 
the exception of ‛Alī ibn Abī Tālib (d. 40/ 661) and Abū Bakr (d. 13/634) and those 
who had been imprisoned or forced to apostatize.32 
 When the Meccan idolaters recognized that Islam had started to gain 
protectors outside Mecca, they assembled in order to stamp out the new religion and 
put an end to the issue. After listening to some suggestions on how to get rid of the 
Prophet, they unanimously agreed “that each clan should provide a young, powerful, 
well-born, aristocratic warrior; that each of these should be provided with a sharp 
sword; then each of them should strike a blow at him [the Prophet] and kill him.”33 
This plot appealed to all the conspirators because the Prophet’s clan would not be 
able to seek revenge from all of these warriors’ clans. While the warriors were 
waiting by the Prophet’s door to assassinate him during his sleep, the Prophet 
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survived the plot by miraculously passing through the warriors without their being 
able to see him.34 Then the Prophet received a divine command to flee to Yathrib. He 
ordered ‛Alī ibn Abī Tālib to stay in Mecca for three days to return all the valuable 
properties and goods the people at Mecca had deposited with the Prophet because of 
his honesty35 and then, accompanied by his companion Abū Bakr, he left by the back 
door of the latter’s house and hid for three days in Thawr cave, on a mountain below 
Mecca. Their plot having been foiled, the Meccans offered a reward of one hundred 
female-camels for the return of the Prophet.  
Studying this period indicates, on the one hand, that the Meccan idolaters 
initiated a state of war against the followers of the new religion. In the words of 
Watt, the influential “Abū Jahl was bent on crushing the new religious movement.”36 
One of the reasons for their aggression towards the Muslims was religious, because 
the Muslims had abandoned idolatry, the religion of the leaders of the Quraysh and 
their ancestors, so, in a sense, this state of aggression could be described as a holy 
war against the Muslims. Moreover, they saw in this new monotheistic religion a 
profound challenge to their religious, economic and political power37 because 
Islam’s call to the worship of God necessitated the destruction of their businesses, 
which depended on the revenues from the pilgrims’ visits to the shrines, and this in 
turn would lead to the destruction of the honour in which the Meccans were held 
among the Arab tribes. According to T. W. Arnold (d. 1930), the spread of the new 
religion meant for the Meccans “the destruction of the national religion and the 
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national worship, and a loss of wealth and power to the guardians of the sacred 
Ka‛bah”.38 
On the other hand, there are many examples of how determined the Prophet 
and the Muslims were to live by their own beliefs: for example, Bilāl’s “ahad ahad”, 
Abū Bakr’s plea to the Meccan idolaters to stop their assault on the Prophet: “would 
you kill a man for saying Allah is my Lord?”, Sumayyah’s murder because of her 
refusal to abandon Islam and worship the idols of the Quraysh and the first and 
second flights, when Muslims were forced to leave behind their houses, businesses 
and properties. This determination to live by Islam is clearly expressed in a poem 
written by ‛Abd Allah ibn al-Hārith during his flight to Abyssinia in which he 
celebrates that the Muslim emigrants were safely settled and able to worship God 
without fear.39  
The importance of the Meccan period in the study of the tradition of war in 
Islam has not been given adequate attention in Western scholarship. Although no 
fighting took place in this period, in fact, a state of war already existed, and the 
enmity escalated, especially after the Muslims and the Prophet were forced to leave 
Mecca, with the consequent confiscation of their land and properties by the 
Meccans.40 The failure of Western scholarship to recognize that the hijrah signifies a 
state of war seems to be the result of a cultural misunderstanding. According to Watt, 
who appears to be influenced in this idea by the Dutch Orientalist Snouck Hurgronje 
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(d. 1936), hijrah means for Europeans “a change of location”, but the Arabs have 
thought of it “as a change of relationship to one’s tribe - to make the hijrah was to 
leave one’s tribe and attach oneself to the ummah.”41 But even Watt does not seem to 
recognize that this change of relationship meant a change in the stance towards one’s 
tribe. In other words, for the Prophet and the Muslims, being forced to leave their 
beloved Mecca, the holiest of all places, meant the initiation of war. Thus, H. 
Lammens clearly states: “In the old Arab law, the Hijra did not merely signify 
rupture with his [Prophet Muhammad] native town, but was equivalent to a sort of 
declaration of war against it. The Me[cc]an guild were under no misapprehension 
[about this old Arab law].”42  
It should be added here that the political system in Arabia was characterized 
by tribal or clan affiliation.43 The tribe or the clan were the sources of the 
individual’s security and sense of belonging. Thus, anyone expelled from a tribe was 
compelled to find another with which to ally himself.44 “Each tribe or clan formed a 
separate and absolutely independent body.”45 A state of war was the norm between 
all tribes unless there was a peace treaty.46 This explains the pre-Islamic practice of 
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weaker tribes having to make payments to stronger tribes for their protection.47 Thus, 
the fact that they had been persecuted and driven out of their homes and tribes solely 
because of their beliefs was the Qur’ānic justification for permitting the Muslims to 
fight in their own defence against their oppressors (Qur’ān 22:39-40), as will be 
shown in Chapter Two. The enmity here was between a group known as Muslims 
and their Meccan persecutors, called in the Islamic sources al-mushrikūn or al-Kuffār 
(polytheists, idolaters or unbelievers). All the relevant Qur’ānic texts should be read 
in this context. 
 
1.4 The Medinan Period 
The Prophet’s invitation to Yathrib (later known as Medina, lit. city) by a number of 
delegations, including a delegation of women, and their pledge of allegiance and 
support,48 had both religious and political aspects, according to Watt. From the 
religious perspective, it meant accepting the new religion, while politically it meant 
accepting the Prophet as arbiter between the opposing factions of the then troubled 
Medina.49 Justifying their invitation to the Prophet, they told him that they hoped that 
“God would unite them [the opposing factions at Medina] through you [the 
Prophet]”.50 The point to be noted here is that the Muslims had fled from Mecca to 
another troubled place, which was inhabited by several Jewish clans, idolaters and a 
few people who became Muslims. There was no recognized form of judicial or 
political authority in the “hostile city”51 of Medina, as was the case throughout 
Arabia at that time. Each clan or tribe recognized only the authority of its leader. 
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This is why the Muslim delegates hoped that the Prophet would bring about peace in 
Medina. It is important for researchers into the tradition of war in Islam to study how 
the Prophet organized the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in the 
newly established state system.  
The Prophet began his stay at Medina by building a mosque. A reflection on 
the first two extant Friday sermons indicates that the Prophet addressed monotheism 
and piety and called upon the people to love one another.52 He mentions nothing 
about the nature of relations between the followers of different religions who were 
living in Medina. A document attributed to this period called Sahīfah al-Madīnah 
(translated in Western scholarship as the Constitution of Medina), is of paramount 
importance because it answers many questions about the nature of this newly 
established state system and its conception of nationhood, including war and peace. 
There is general agreement on the authenticity of this document, although 
some Western scholars disagree about whether it was written before or after the 
battle of Badr (Ramadān 2/March 624). Some suggest that it may consist of more 
than one document.53 Concerning its dating, as the biographers place it, the 
document must necessarily pre-date the battle of Badr, i.e., it must date to the first 
few weeks after the Prophet’s arrival in Medina.54 Biographers agree that the 
Prophet’s first achievements there were building a mosque, forming a brotherhood 
between the Meccan Emigrants (muhājirūn) and the Helpers (al-Ans ār) and 
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‘Constitution of Medina’ Some Notes”, Studia Islamica, No. 62, 1985, p. 18; Mohammad Hashim 
Kamali, A Textbook of Hadīth Studies: Authenticity, Compilation, Classification and Criticism of 
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concluding a treaty of peace and rapprochement with the Jews.55 Forming the 
brotherhood between the Muslims and concluding peace with the Jews are what the 
document precisely attempts to achieve. The fact that it addresses the relationship 
between the Emigrants and the Helpers in the first half and the Jews and the Muslims 
in the second may support the claim that it was originally two documents, especially 
since there is a reference to the Jews at the end of the first part, but this evidence is 
not conclusive, for the purpose may have been to address first the relationship 
between the Muslims and second the relationship between the Muslims and the Jews 
in one document. Moreover, the part addressing the relationship of the Muslims with 
the Jews seems to be a continuation of the preceding articles of the document. As a 
result, biographers of the Prophet and Muslim scholars seem never think of it as 
more than a single document.  
Furthermore, a report in al-Wāqidī’s Maghāzī confirms that this document 
was written before Badr. It states that the Prophet concluded a written peace treaty 
with all the Jewish clans upon his arrival in Medina and that the Jewish clan of Banū 
Qaynuqā‛ was the first clan to break this treaty in the twentieth month after the 
Prophet’s arrival.56 Despite the importance of such an authentic document, it has not 
been given due “prominence”57 by “Muslim writers or Western orientalists”,58 
particularly in the formulation of the tradition of war in Islam. 
 The first sentence of the document contains a reference to the past form of the 
term jihād. It reads: “This is a writing from Muhammad the Prophet between the 
believers and Muslims from Quraysh and Yathrib [Medina] and those who followed 
them, joined them and jāhad with them that they are one ummah (community or 
                                                 
55 See Hammīdullāh, Battlefields, pp. 16 f. 
56 Al-Wāqidī, Al-Maghāzī, Vol. 1, p. 165. 
57 See Watt, Muhammad at Medina, pp. 225-228. 
58 R.B. Serjeant, “The ‘Constitution of Medina’”, The Islamic Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 182, 
1964/1384, p. 3. 
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nation) from among the people.”59 Guillaume translates jāhad here as “laboured”,60 
R.B. Serjeant as “strive”,61 and Watt as “crusade”.62 At this point no fighting had 
taken place and the situation here involves Jews, since the document stipulates one 
nation formed from Jews and Muslims together. The whole context supports the 
meaning of the word jāhad as “strove” or “made an effort” to live peacefully 
together in this new ummah system. 
The main points here are that the Constitution of Medina first stipulates a 
state system which makes the Prophet the head of state and, second, affirms that 
Medina is a haram (a sanctuary) for all the parties to this document.63 Significantly, 
this designation of Medina as a haram means there is a total prohibition of violence 
or bloodshed in it. Thus, in the words of Uri Rubin, Medina “was made sacred, with 
strict rules against bloodshed, and its inhabitants were expected to protect and be 
devoted to it just as Quraysh were devoted to their own haram.”64 Moreover, it 
affirms that if any disagreement or serious dispute arises, it should be referred to God 
and the Prophet.65 The first half of the document enumerates a number of clans from 
Medina and makes them one ummah along with the Muslim immigrants from 
Quraysh. The second half enumerates a number of Jewish clans and makes one 
ummah of them with the Muslims. The inclusion of the Jews in this new ummah state 
and the affirmation that “the Jews have [the right to practise] their religion and the 
                                                 
59 Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 2, p. 85; Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, pp. 231 f. 
60 Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, p. 232. 
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62 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 221. See also Iqbal, Diplomacy in Early Islam, p. 36. 
63 Haykal, The Life of Muhammad, p. 182; Hammīdullāh, Battlefields, p. 17. 
64 Rubin, “The ‘Constitution of Medina’ Some Notes”, p. 11. See also Hammīdullāh, Battlefields, p. 
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Muslims have their own religion”66 indicates that this ummah state, which emerged 
inside the tribal political system, “is no longer a purely religious community.”67  
Furthermore, the Constitution of Medina stipulates a collective defence 
agreement between the Jews and the Muslims in the case of an attack on either of 
them. Thus, the document makes Medina a haram for all the parties mentioned in it 
and stipulates that none of the Jews should initiate a war without the permission of 
the Prophet unless it is in revenge. The document even calls for a form of mutual 
cooperation between Jews and Muslims by affirming that wa inna baynahum al-nus h 
wa al-nasīhah (indeed, mutual advice and consultation should exist between them, 
i.e., Muslims and Jews).68 It also affirms the need for loyalty and for helping those 
who were wronged and confirms, as is argued above, that the state of relations 
between the Muslims and the Quraysh was a one of war following the persecution of 
the Muslims to the extent of forcing them to flee their home town twice. In one of its 
articles, the document stipulates that “no covenant of protection is given to the 
Quraysh or any of its helpers”.69 It is worth recalling here that, by the time the 
document was written, no battles between the armies of the Muslims and the 
Quraysh had yet taken place. 
 
1.5 The Prophet’s Ghazawāt  
The harsh natural conditions of the Arabian Peninsula led to the pre-Islamic practice 
of ghazw (raiding), aimed at the acquisition of camels and other animals for their 
                                                 
66 Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 2, p. 86; Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, p. 233. 
67 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 241. 
68 This article is incorrectly translated by Serjeant as “There is good will and sincerity of intention 
between them”, see his “The Sunnah Jāmi‛ah, Pacts with the Yathrib Jews”, p. 183; Firestone 
translates it as “There must be friendly counsel and mutual guidance between them”, see Firestone, 
Jihād, p. 122. 
69 Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 2, p. 87; Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, p. 233. 
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milk and meat.70 Although it is difficult for the contemporary reader to conceive the 
exact culture of ghazw, especially because of the meaning its English translation 
carries, the whole practice of ghazw “was governed by elaborate protocol”.71 
According to Watt, it was “a normal feature of Arab desert life. It was a kind of sport 
rather than war. The Arabs had their wars indeed”.72 Fred McGraw Donner also 
describes it as a “game” and states that this intertribal raiding at the time of the rise 
of Islam was “a frequent, almost routine part of life”73 among the Northern Arabian 
tribes. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to give a satisfactory explanation 
of this pre-Islamic Arabian custom, it is believed that “in practice it [ghazw] operated 
as a fairly effective means of redistributing economic resources in a region where the 
balance could easily be upset by natural calamities”.74  
Speaking about “war and peace” in his The Political Language of Islam, 
Bernard Lewis gives the “Oxford English Dictionary” definition of the word razzia, 
English for ghazw, as “a hostile incursion, foray or raid, for purpose of conquest, 
plunder, capture of slaves, etc., as practiced by the Mohammedan peoples in Africa”. 
He adds that the word ghazw “dates back to pre-Islamic Arabic, when it was used 
with much the same meaning”.75 Giving this definition in the context of his 
discussion of fighting in jihād and the terms given to those whom he describes as its 
“frontiersmen, the march warriors who defended the far-flung frontiers of Islam and 
                                                 
70 See Watt, “Badw”, pp. 889-892. 
71 T.M. Johnstone, “Ghazw”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., Vol. II, p. 1055. 
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carried the war, by invasion or by raiding parties, into the territory of the enemy”,76 
is misleading and distorts the entire tradition of war in Islam. The discussion of 
Lewis here leads to the conclusion that the meaning of jihād is included in this 
“Oxford English Dictionary” definition of the word razzia, mentioned above. 
In fact, biographers used the words ghazwah and sariyah to describe many 
crucial events in the period of the Prophet’s life at Medina, which are, however, not 
defined. This results in a considerable degree of misunderstanding as embodied in 
the definition quoted by Lewis above. Biographers used the word ghazwah to denote 
all the Prophet’s travels as well as many of his encounters with non-Muslims and 
give different figures for the total number of these ghazawāt, such as 18, 19, 26, and 
27. Different names are also given to the same incident, referring either to the name 
of the clan or tribe involved or to the locality in which it took place. It is common for 
the biographers to give different chronologies.77 They even differed on what 
constitutes a ghazwah, in the sense that, if the Prophet left Medina and encountered 
two tribes before returning to Medina, some considered this one ghazwah, while 
others considered it two. They almost all agree that the Prophet was engaged in nine 
incidents of fighting. 
 A meticulous study of the Prophet’s ghazawāt reveals that the meaning of the 
word has been confused with its pre-Islamic meaning. Biographers used the word 
ghazwah to refer to all the Prophet’s journeys from Medina, whether to make peace-
treaties and preach Islam to the tribes, to go on ‛umrah, to pursue enemies who 
attacked Medina, or to engage in the nine battles. It is worth recalling here that the 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 See J.M.B. Jones, “The Chronology of the Maghāzī-A Textual Survey”, in Uri Rubin, ed., The Life 
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main concern of the biographers was merely to collect accounts about the life of the 
Prophet, not to study the tradition of war for its own sake. 
 Guillaume noticed that Ibn Ishāq included the ‛umrah performed by the 
Prophet in 7/629 among the Prophet’s 27 ghazawāt. Guillaume remarked in his 
translation that the number of ghazawāt is 26 and writes in a footnote that Ibn Ish āq 
“has counted the Pilgrimage [‛umrah] as a raid”.78 Indeed, Ibn Ishāq was not 
mistaken here because this was one meaning of the word ghazwah at the time when 
he was writing. Moreover, al-Wāqidī also called it ghazwah al-Qadiyyah79 (i.e., the 
fulfilled ‛umrah ghazwah), referring to the ‛umrah the Prophet performed the year 
after he was prevented from entering Mecca, because, according to the treaty of al-
Hudaybiyah (6/628), the Prophet was permitted to enter Mecca only the following 
year. In this case, the Prophet’s journey for ‛umrah is called a ghazwah. Thus, the 
word ghazwah can mean a journey and does not necessarily mean a raid or a razzia. 
To conclude: in this context, this meaning of the word ghazwah is one of the 
meanings the biographers had in mind when they attempted to describe every single 
instance of the Prophet’s travels or encounters with non-Muslims. But this meaning 
is not found in Lane’s Lexicon or any standard Arabic lexicon.  
The nature of ghazawāt may be classified into the following two main 
categories:  
     
1.5.1 Preaching and Making Peace Treaties 
Nine of the Prophet’s 27 ghazawāt discussed in what follows were expeditions to 
preach Islam and make peace treaties with the tribes, which were successful in two 
cases. In ghazwah al-Abwā (1), the Prophet made a written peace treaty with the clan 
                                                 
78 Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, p. 659. 
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of Banū Damarah80 and in ghazwah al-‛Ushayr (3) he made peace treaties with the 
clan of Banū Mudlaj. Watt notes that “Some small clans or tribes made alliances with 
Muh ammad in the course of his expeditions [ghazawāt], probably pacts of non-
aggression.”81 However, Firestone portrays the early ghazawāt of the Prophet as 
marauding attacks against the Quraysh and quotes a sentence from Ibn Ishāq which 
leads to this misinformation. He quotes: “[Muhammad] then went out to raid82 in 
[the month of] Safar, the beginning of the twelfth month from his arrival in 
Medina.”83 However, one sentence later the source he quotes reads: “The B. Damra 
there made peace with him through their leader Makhshī b. ‛Amr al-Damrī.”84 This 
example shows that using the word “raid” to translate ghazwah in the context of the 
incidents studied in this chapter is sometimes inaccurate and indeed misleading.   
 In six of these nine ghazawāt, the Prophet did not meet the clans or tribes 
who were his targets. No explanation is given and this might mislead readers about 
the nature and objectives of these ghazawāt. The reason contemporary readers are 
left to conclude from the geography of the region and culture of these tribes is that 
they were mobile nomads, so when the Prophet knew that they would be at a certain 
place, usually where their animals could find water, he went there to meet them, but, 
by the time the Prophet reached these places, they had already moved on. The 
Prophet did not make contact with the clans in any of the following ghazawāt: Buwāt  
(2), Banū Sulaym in al-Kudr (8), Dhū Amarr, also called Ghatafān (9), al-Furū‛ of 
Buhrān (10), Dhāt al-Riqā‛ (14) and Dūmah al-Jandal (16). In Dhāt al-Riqā‛, as the 
Prophet was travelling to meet three clans, he met one on his way, but the two parties 
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were fearful of each other. They made no contact and the Prophet prayed with the 
Muslims “the prayer of fear”. In some of these ghazawāt, biographers add that the 
Prophet stayed at these places for a period of a few days, a month or even two 
months. The Prophet’s stay for a period of up to two months might suggest that he 
was involved in preaching.  
 Although Muslims study the accounts of the life of the Prophet to learn from 
his example and way of life, early biographers confined themselves to merely 
describing events. Modern biographers, however, give very brief explanations for 
these incidents. Mahmūd Shākir indicates that the aim of such early ghazawāt was to 
learn about each new place and preach Islam to the surrounding tribes, and to ensure 
that the tribes would not support the Quraysh if a war took place between the 
Quraysh and the Muslims.85 In his encyclopaedic two-volume Sīrah Khātam al-
Nabiyyīn (Biography of the Seal of the Prophets), Shaykh Abū Zahrah (1898-1974) 
writes only one sentence affirming that the Prophet’s expeditions were aimed at 
introducing Islam to the tribes: “calling [such expeditions] ghazawāt or the like does 
not mean war but preaching the call [i.e., the religion of Islam]”.86 The reason that 
biographers do not give adequate explanatory information about these incidents is 
that they are addressed to Muslims, who could be expected to be aware of the 
relevant background. 
 
1.5.2 Attacks on the Muslims and Series of Incidents 
In the first ghazwah of Badr (4), “Kurz ibn Jābir al-Fihrī raided the pasturing camels 
of Medina.”87 The Prophet, along with thirteen of the emigrants, searched for him 
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until they reached the neighbourhood of Badr, but in vain; they then returned to 
Medina. This incident is counted as one of the Prophet’s ghazawāt simply because 
the Prophet took part in a search for the attacker, even though no encounter at all 
took place.   
The state of war that had existed in Mecca between the Quraysh and the 
Muslims culminated in a series of attacks on the Muslims in Medina. The alleged 
intention of the Muslims to take the property of a Quraysh caravan in compensation 
for the property they had been forced to leave in Mecca was met by Abū Jahl’s 
determination to prove the unchallengeable power of the Quraysh over Arabia. The 
reason for his determination to fight the Prophet (quoted below) is very important in 
understanding the nature of the conflict at this period. The leader of the caravan sent 
a messenger to the Quraysh to inform them that the caravan had passed Medina and 
was returning safely to Mecca. Hence, “two clans, Zuhrah and ‛Adī, withdrew 
completely”88 from the march to Medina once they were sure that the caravan was 
safe. Abū Jahl, however, “forced Quraysh to advance” to Badr.89 In his words, Abū 
Jahl wanted “the Arabs to hear about the Quraysh’s march and huge gathering [army] 
so that they [the Arabs] would always be in awe of us [Quraysh] forever after”.90 
Watt, however, argues that Abū Jahl “was presumably hoping to get rid of 
Muh ammad once for all.”91 However, the defeat of the Quraysh at the hands of a tiny 
group of Muslims was humiliating and catastrophic. For the Quraysh, the death of 
seventy men, including some of their leaders such as Abū Jahl, “was a disaster of the 
first magnitude”.92 Therefore, the Quraysh launched a series of attacks on the 
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Muslims at Medina following their defeat in this battle known as ghazwah Badr al-
kubrā (the great battle of Badr, (Ramadān 2/March 624) (5). 
 In al-Sawīq (7), Abū Sufyān, accompanied by two hundred (or, in some 
versions, four hundred) riders from the Quraysh, murdered two farmers and burnt 
some palm trees and houses on the outskirts of Medina. The Prophet went out after 
them but they had already returned to Mecca.93 Some months later, to avenge the 
death of their distinguished relatives who had been killed in the great battle of Badr 
referred to above, a group from the Quraysh collected money from the revenues of 
the caravan after it had returned safely; this was the one for which they had gone to 
war at Badr (Ramadān 2/March 624). They prepared an army of three thousand men 
and marched to Medina in Shawwāl 3/March 625, where they defeated the Muslims 
at ghazwah Uh ud (11).94 The next day, the Prophet went out with the Muslims in 
pursuit of the enemy until they reached a place called Hamrā’ al-Asad. They stayed 
there for three days and then returned to Medina without meeting the Quraysh. This 
incident is called ghazwah Hamrā’ al-Asad (12). The aim of this incident, according 
to Ibn Ishāq, was to let the Quraysh know that the Muslims had not been weakened 
by their defeat.95 It is worth noting here that, despite the enmity which was emerging 
between the Muslims and the Jews in Medina, a wealthy Jewish Rabbi called 
Mukhayriq fought and died with the Muslims in the battle against the Quraysh at 
Uh ud. He is even reported as asking other Jews to support the Prophet against the 
Quraysh attack.96  
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 At the battle of Uhud, Abū Sufyān vowed to fight the Muslims again at the 
fair of Badr the following year. Thus, in what is known as the last ghazwah of Badr 
(15) the Prophet and Muslims attended the fair while Abū Sufyān and the men 
accompanying him turned back before reaching Badr.97 Calling such an incident a 
ghazwah of the Prophet, even though the parties did not see each other, thus confirms 
that the word ghazwah was used to refer to any trip or expedition the Prophet made 
and does not necessarily mean a “raid” or “fighting”.  
 In ghazwah Banū Lih yān (19), the Prophet went out against the clan of Banū 
Lihyān, who had assassinated the Muslim preachers at al-Rajī‛. When the Prophet 
did not manage to meet them, he returned to Medina.98 In ghazwah Dhū Qarad (20), 
‛Uyaynah ibn His n from the clan of Fazārah “with the cavalry of Ghatafān raided the 
apostle’s milch-camels in al-Ghāba [on the outskirts of Medina].”99 They killed the 
man who was in charge of them and captured his wife. The Prophet with some 
Muslims followed them and freed the woman and some of the camels. Two Muslims 
were killed, with one of the raiders.  
 The emerging ummah state system in Medina, which included Jews along 
with the Muslims, was a new form of affiliation that replaced the clan or tribal 
affiliation system. This ummah system required abiding by the political, economic 
and judicial system stipulated in the Constitution of Medina. While this Constitution 
makes every clan responsible for its financial obligations,100 it made the Prophet the 
political and judicial authority of the community of Medina.  
 According to Ibn Ishāq and Ibn Sa‛d, the Jewish clan of Banū Qaynuqā‛ 
broke the treaty with the Prophet and fought against him between Badr and Uhud. 
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According to a report in al-Wāqidī and al-Dhahabī, fighting broke out in the market 
and a Jew and a Muslim were killed in this incident because a Jew “stealthily pinned 
[a Muslim woman’s] skirt to the back of her upper garments so that when she stood 
up she exposed herself.”101 The Prophet therefore besieged this clan in what is called 
ghazwah Banū Qaynuqā‛ (6), until they were deported from Medina without fighting, 
“in accordance with Arab custom”.102  
In another incident, ‛Amr ibn Umayyah al-Damarī from the Jewish clan of 
Banū al-Nadīr, killed two men from the clan of Banū ‛Āmir. The Prophet therefore 
went to the man’s clan asking them to pay the blood-money for the two men, in 
accordance with the pact between the two clans. After the Banū al-Nadīr plotted “to 
assassinate”103 the Prophet, he sent them an order to evacuate Medina “because of 
their perfidy and violation of the”104 Constitution of Medina. They “refused to 
comply and announced hostility. Upon this the Prophet marched and besieged”105 
them until they were deported from Medina without fighting after a siege that lasted 
for six nights in what is called ghazwah Banū al-Nadīr (13).106 Medina has a long 
history of internecine struggles. “It is noteworthy that, before Islam, the Medinan 
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Leader ‛Amr ibn Annu‛man seriously thought of deporting a[l]-Nadir and Qurayzah 
because of their hostility to the other Arabs of Medina.”107 
Because of their deportation from Medina to Khaybar, a group from the Banū 
al-Nadīr went to the Quraysh and urged them to join in war against the Prophet. 
After receiving four thousand men from Quraysh in support, this group invited the 
clans of Ghatafān, Banū Sulaym, Banū Fazarah, Ashja‛, Banū Asad and Banū 
Murrah, who together formed an army of ten thousand men. Because of this 
gathering of clans, this attack is called ghazwah al-Ah zāb (the parties). It is also 
called the ghazwah of the Ditch (17) because the Muslims “dug a trench around 
Medina”108 which prevented their being massacred since they numbered less than 
one third of their attackers. This coalition of clans besieged Medina for about a 
fortnight.109  
Because of their support for the attackers at the battle of the Ditch, the 
Prophet besieged the clan of Banū Qurayz ah in their fortresses for more than two 
weeks. Eventually they agreed to put an end to this issue by choosing110 Sa‛d ibn 
Mu‛ādh, who was their ally, to arbitrate in this dispute. Ibn Mu‛ādh, who was 
suffering from an arrow wound received at the ghazwah of the Ditch and died shortly 
afterwards, was called on for arbitration. He decreed that all the muqātilah (the men 
who were able to fight) should be put to death. The sources give various numbers for 
the men who were executed as a consequence of this decree, putting it at two 
hundred,111 four hundred, six hundred, seven hundred, eight hundred or nine 
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hundred.112 One woman was also put to death because she killed Khallād ibn 
Suwayd.113 Strangely enough, there is no indication in the sources that there was any 
resistance to this sentence.114 This incident is known as ghazwah Banū Qurayz ah 
(18).115 It is pointed out that this sentence was given according to the rules of Banū 
Qurayz ah’s own religion, specifically the Book of Deuteronomy (20:10-15).116  
The Prophet marched to Khaybar because they had joined in the attack at the 
battle of the Ditch.117 In ghazwah Khaybar (23), biographers mainly confine 
themselves to describing the incident, rather than explaining the reasons for it. 
According to one report, while the Prophet was preaching at Khaybar, one among a 
group of fighters declaimed some verses of poetry about himself, calling for a 
warrior to fight him.118 According to a report in Al-Tabaqāt, the Prophet told ‛Alī ibn 
Abī Tālib to fight against Khaybar until they believed that there is no god but God 
and that Muhammad is a Messenger of God. While this report suggests fighting for 
                                                                                                                                          
lil-H adārah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Harb wa al-Qitāl, ed. ‛Abd al-‛Azīz ibn ‛Abd Allah ibn Ibrāhīm al-
Zayd Āl Hamad (Riyadh: N.p., 2004/1424), p. 103. 
112 See, for example, Mahdī Rizq Allah Ahmad, Al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah fī Daw’ al-Masādir al-
Asliyyah: Dirāsah Tahlīliyyah (Riyadh: Markaz al-Malik Faīsal lil-Bih ūth wa al-Dirāsat al-
Islāmiyyah, 1992/1412), pp. 459-464; ‛Abd al-Hamīd Shākir, Ghazawāt al-Rasūl (Tripoli, Lebanon: 
Jarrūs Press,  1996/1416), pp. 80-82. 
113 Ahmad, Al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah fī Daw’ al-Masādir al-Asliyyah, p. 462; Muhammad ibn al-Hasan 
al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar al-Kabīr, ed. Salāh  al-Dīn al-Munjid (Cairo: Ma‛had al-Makhtūtāt, n.d.), Vol. 4, 
p. 1420. See also Shākir, Ghazawāt al-Rasūl, p. 82. 
114 See Armstrong, Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet, pp. 203-209. 
115 Ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 3, pp. 134-145; Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, pp. 461-469. 
116 See Muhammad Hammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of State: Being a Treatise on Siyar, That is 
Islamic Notion of Public International Law, Consisting of the Laws of Peace, War and Neutrality, 
Together with Precedents from Orthodox Practice and Preceded by a Historical and General 
Introduction, rev. & enl. 5th ed. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), pp. 241 f.; Hammīdullāh, 
Battlefields, p. 3, footnote no. 1; Ahmed Zaki Yamani, “Humanitarian International Law in Islam: A 
General Outlook”, Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies, Vol. 7, 1985, p. 203; Marcel A. 
Boisard, Jihad: A Commitment to Universal Peace (Indianapolis, Ind.: American Trust Publications, 
1988), p. 38; Martin Lings, Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources (Cambridge: Islamic 
Texts Society, 1991), p. 232; P.J. Stewart, Unfolding Islam, 2nd ed. (Reading, Berkshire: Garnet 
Publishing, 2008), p. 85.  
117 Shākir, Al-Tārīkh al-Islāmī, p. 286. 
118 Shams al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn ‛Uthmān al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām wa Wafayāt al-
Mashāhīr wa al-A‛lām: Al-Māghazī, ed. ‛Umar ‛Abd al-Salām Tadmurī, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb 
al-‛Arabī, 1990/1410), p. 415. 
 50
religion until the people of Khaybar became Muslims, this incident, in fact, resulted 
in an agreement that stipulated that they were to pay half the produce of the land.119  
As for ghazwah Banū al-Mustaliq (21), the Prophet received news that al-
Hārith ibn Abī Dirār was gathering the clan of al-Mustaliq to fight against him. The 
Prophet sent Buraydah ibn al-Hus ayb al-Aslamī to verify this news. When Buraydah 
confirmed that al-Hārith was preparing for war, the Prophet went out against him. 
Fighting occurred and one Muslim is said to have been killed. Al-Wāqidī states that 
ten from al-Mustaliq were killed, but according to Ibn ‛Abd al-Bar not one of them 
was killed.120 
 In ghazwah al-Hudaybiyah (22), the Prophet set out for Mecca to perform 
‛umrah in (6/628). He put on the ihrām garb so that the Quraysh would not think that 
he had come to wage war.121 At al-Hudaybiyah, eight miles from Mecca, 
negotiations were held between the Prophet and the Quraysh and they concluded a 
written pact.122 According to it, the Prophet was not permitted to enter Mecca for 
‛umrah that year, but could go for three days the following year. Significantly, they 
justified this refusal by their fear that the Arabs might think that the Prophet had 
forced his way into Mecca.123 This reflects the same way of thinking shown by Abū 
Jahl in his justification for forcing the Quraysh to advance to Badr, mentioned above. 
That is to say, the Quraysh wanted to show that they had unchallengeable power over 
Arabia.  
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The Prophet stipulated that there should be an armistice for ten years and 
added that anyone who wanted to form an alliance with him or with the Quraysh 
might do so. Thereupon, the clan of Khuzā‛ah formed an alliance with the Prophet 
while the clan of Banū Bakr formed an alliance with the Quraysh. After two years (in 
8/630), the Quraysh broke this armistice by arming and fighting with the clan of 
Banū Bakr against Banū Khuzā‛ah in the vendetta between these two clans, so the 
Prophet marched in ghazwah fath Makkah (24)124 to take control of Mecca.  
Chapter 48 of the Qur’ān, significantly entitled “al-Fath” (the victory) 
considers this armistice secured at al-Hudaybiyah “fathā mubīnā” (lit. a great 
opening, i.e., a great victory) for Islam.125 It is worth adding here that, two years after 
this ceasefire, the number of Arabs who had embraced Islam outnumbered those who 
embraced Islam over the period of the first nineteen years, i.e., since the advent of 
Islam.126 So while the Muslims accompanying the Prophet at al-Hudaybiyah (6/628), 
nineteen years after the advent of Islam, numbered one thousand four hundred, 
within two years the men accompanying him in the march to Mecca (8/630) 
numbered ten or twelve thousand. Ibn Ishāq states: “No previous victory in Islam 
was greater than this. There was nothing but battle when men met; but when there 
was an armistice and war was abolished and men met in safety and consulted 
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together none talked about Islam intelligently without entering it.”127 Thus, Karen 
Armstrong considers the treaty of al-Hudaybiyah a turning-point that made 
“conversion to Islam even more of an irreversible trend”.128 The reason, as explained 
by Ibn Ish āq above, is that the armistice put an end to war, the normal state of 
relations between clans in Arabia, and gave people the chance to know about the 
religion of Islam.129 However, Donner interprets this truce as a turning point in the 
Prophet’s life that brought about political “power and prestige”.130   
After the Prophet entered Mecca in 8/630, Mālik ibn ‛Awf al-Ansārī gathered 
the clan of Hawāzin to fight the Prophet and “assembled to him also all Thaqīf and 
all Nasr and Jusham; and Sa‛d b. Bakr, and a few men from B. Hilāl.”131 According 
to another account in al-Tabarī, these groups had already gathered to fight against the 
Prophet when he left Medina for Mecca. They assumed that he was coming out 
against them. But when they knew that he had settled in Mecca, they marched to 
fight him at Hunayn, three miles from Mecca. When the Prophet heard about their 
march, he sent ‛Abd Allah ibn Abī Hadrat al-Aslamī to confirm the news. After 
confirmation that they had marched to fight, the Prophet borrowed weapons from 
Safwān ibn Umayyah, a Meccan idolater. It is worth mentioning here that eighty 
idolaters, including Safwān, fought on the Prophet’s side in this battle.132 In the 
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words of Watt, the Prophet “had no hesitation about accepting non-Muslims as allies. 
Moreover, apart from the pagan Meccans [who fought] at Hunayn, there are several 
instances of men fighting under Muhammad before they became Muslims.”133 At 
ghazwah Hunayn (25), the Muslims defeated Thaqīf who then retreated to their 
fortresses at al-Tā’if. The Muslims besieged them for some days in what is called 
ghazwah al-T ā’if (26). Twelve Muslims were shot dead by arrows and hot iron and 
fighting stopped soon afterwards.134  
In ghazwah Tabūk (27), the Prophet marched to Tabūk to confront the 
Byzantines, Lakhm, Judhām, Ghassān and ‛Āmilah, who were gathering to attack 
him. The Syrian traders who brought this news told the Muslims that this army had 
reached al-Balqā’ and was camping there.135 It is probable that the story of this 
gathering was only a rumour, as al-Wāqidī remarks,136 because there is no indication 
of any confrontation or preparation for war. Moreover, Ibn Ishāq adds: “When the 
apostle reached Tabūk Yuhanna b. Rū’ba governor of Ayla came and made a treaty 
with him and paid him the poll tax. The people of Jarba and Adhruh also came and 
paid the poll tax.”137 
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1.6 The Sarāyā 
The word sariyah refers to expeditions allegedly sent by the Prophet for several 
objectives, such as to preach Islam, get news of what the Quraysh were planning, 
return stolen property, fight against those who were preparing to attack Medina, kill 
an individual for the same reason, fight those who killed one of the Prophet’s 
messengers and, in five instances, to destroy Quraysh idols after the taking of Mecca. 
In most instances, biographers give their account in the form of a narration of the 
incidents, without explaining the background and objectives of these expeditions, 
and they give different totals for these incidents, such as 35, 38, 47, and 56. These 
differences indicate that each biographer arrived at his own conception of what 
constituted a sariyah. For example, Ibn Sa‛d at the beginning of his book, following 
his teacher al-Wāqidī, states that the number of sarāyā sent by the Prophet was forty-
seven, while the present study finds that he ends up referring to fifty-six sarāyā. 
Some biographers used the word ghazwah to refer to incidents others called sariyah, 
while some used the word ba‛th (delegation) in the same context. In many incidents, 
no encounter at all occurred with the clans. A number of incidents involved fighting 
and in some cases the number of victims is not given. According to the numbers that 
are given, eighty Muslims were killed, including sixty-nine preachers who were 
assassinated in one incident, while sixty-five non-Muslims were also killed. These 
accounts of sarāyā are a much less credible source than those of the ghazawāt, not 
only because of the lack of clarity and details about the reasons for and objectives of 
such minor incidents, but also because the narrations are not scrutinized and in some 
cases are unconvincing as stories.  
 Three of these sarāyā are briefly discussed below. One gives an example of 
the difficulties facing researchers on war in Islam, while two shed some light on the 
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situation in Medina. In sariyah ‛Abd Allah ibn Jahsh, the Prophet sent eight Muslims 
to Nakhlah,138 a place between Mecca and al-Tā’if. The point to be addressed here is 
the objective of this sariyah. Ibn Ishāq’s wording of the phrase expressing the 
objective of this sariyah: ārsud bihā Qurayshā, hattā ātīh minhum bi-khabar139 is 
translated by Guillaume as “Lie in wait there [at Nakhlah] for the Quraysh and find 
out for us what they are doing.”140 But Watt and many Western researchers base their 
study of this incident on al-Wāqidī’s wording of the phrase expressing the aim of this 
sariyah as fatarass ad bihā ‛aīr Quraysh.141 They incorrectly understand this phrase 
to mean “ambush a Meccan caravan.”142 It is worth adding here that all the 
biographical sources use the former phrase and even al-Wāqidī, the source of the 
second phrase, mentions a narration which confirms the first report. Because of these 
linguistic and contextual difficulties for researchers in their study of such incidents, 
Watt, in his attempt to construct an account of what happened in this one, admits that 
“among the probabilities and uncertainties through which we have been wading there 
is a little firm ground.”143 Unfortunately, many Western theories on the tradition of 
war in Islam have been constructed upon these admittedly flimsy “probabilities and 
uncertainties”, as explained below.   
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The point here is that biographers were not primarily concerned with 
describing what happened but rather with reporting what was said about what 
happened, and contradictory or inaccurate reports are unreliable sources for 
constructing theories on the tradition of war in Islam. In dealing with such narrations, 
researchers use their imagination to determine what actually happened so that they 
can construct their theories. These imaginative approaches to interpreting, and then 
assessing, these incidents are the origin of the many polemical theories on the 
tradition of war in Islam, which are determined, to a great extent, by whether the 
researchers interpret and assess these incidents within their contexts and according to 
the norms, culture and mentality of the people involved in the incidents, or whether 
they approach them with the mindset of the 21st century.           
The following incidents give some insights into the culture in which Islam 
emerged. In sariyah Bi’r Ma‛ūnah,144 ‛Āmir ibn Mālik ibn Ja‛far asked the Prophet 
to send some Muslims to preach Islam to his people in Najd. After receiving 
confirmation that they would be protected, the Prophet sent forty (or according to Ibn 
Kathīr seventy) qurrā’ (Muslim preachers who had memorized the Qur’ān).145 When 
they reached a place called Bi’r Ma‛ūnah, all the Muslims were assassinated except 
for Ka‛b ibn Zayd, who was left for dead.  
In a similar incident, called ghazwah al-Rajī‛,146 the Prophet sent six (or ten) 
preachers at the request of a group from the clans of ‛Adal and al-Qārah to teach 
Islam to their peoples. On their way, they were betrayed to the clan of Banū Lihyān, 
who told the Muslims that they would not be killed but would be handed over to the 
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Quraysh as part of an exchange. Four of these Muslims were killed and, in return for 
two captives, two were given to people from the Quraysh whose relatives had been 
killed at Badr. When these two Muslims refused to recant,147 they were brutally 
murdered.148 Thus, this incident gives a picture of the vendetta situation in Arabia 
and how it contributed to the series of hostile actions discussed above.   
 
1.7 Building a Theory of the Prophet’s Wars 
Muslim and non-Muslim scholars have developed various theories about the nature 
of the hostilities referred to above that took place between the Muslims and their 
enemies during the Prophet’s lifetime. Despite the difficulties facing modern scholars 
of this period, it is of paramount importance to study the incidents that led to the 
wars and to analyse the objectives of the people involved in them. This is why the 
above discussion of the so-called ghazawāt and sarāyā focuses on the circumstances 
that led to these incidents rather than on the theories developed by later generations 
of researchers. 
The reports about the life of the Prophet are a very rich source has and have 
been used to construct various theories and assumptions, depending on the 
researchers’ own interpretations and their use or abuse of the sources. The challenge 
facing the researchers here is to distinguish between the authentic reports and the 
dubious and fabricated ones. Unlike their Western counterparts, Muslim scholars 
have developed complex and specialized methodologies for this purpose. One of the 
major differences between Western and Muslim scholarship on the study of Islam is 
their approach to the nature of the Qur’ān and the acts of the Prophet. Furthermore, 
based on the diverse interpretations of the hostile incidents discussed above, a 
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number of contradictory theories on the tradition of war in Islam have been 
developed in outsider literature, as will be shown below.  
For example, in an “interpretive approach” to building a theory about the 
occurrences of hostilities in early Islam discussed above, Firestone explains that the 
emigrants had to resort to the old, pre-Islamic custom of tribal raids in order to 
improve their difficult economic situation. He affirms that these wars were not “holy 
wars” but “mundane wars”, apart from the fact that those engaged in them 
considered themselves to be acting in accordance with God’s design.149 In his 
attempt to read the mind of the emigrants, Firestone imagines that their immediate 
problem was “whom should they raid?”150 No indication is given of how he reaches 
this reading, but he replies to the question by saying that the “natural prey”151 for the 
emigrants was their own kin, the tribe of Quraysh because, first, the emigrants saw 
that the Meccans’ caravans were lucrative targets and second, and more importantly, 
he adds, contradicting his earlier portrayal of the Muslims as initiators of aggression, 
that the emigrants sought revenge because “they had been treated so abusively by 
their own Meccan kith and kin.”152 He also admits that Muslims “avoided physical 
aggression at almost any cost and suffered physical and emotional abuse as a 
consequence.”153 Otherwise, he imagines, the emigrants “could have decided to raid 
unrelated tribes, or that other schemes could have been attempted.”154 To complete 
this portrayal, Firestone claims that justifications were needed for these raids 
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“perhaps”155 in order to justify the violation of the prohibition of attacking one’s kin 
or “perhaps, because transcendent sanction was felt needed to engage in organized 
violent acts of any kind.”156  
Firestone starts his discussion of the battle of Badr by remarking that it was a 
“victorious expedition [that] brought Muhammad and his followers great distinction 
and success in the acquisition of spoils and prestige.”157 Here, he adds that the 
Prophet is “depicted in the Sīrā as inciting his warriors with the promise that martyrs 
slain in battle will enter paradise.”158 Firestone concludes that, after Badr, “according 
to the tradition, warring in the path of God was now required virtually without 
restriction, [for this reason Firestone admits that] the material following Badr will not 
occupy us.”159 To give some logic to this theory, he argues that this swift transition 
from what he calls mundane war to holy war “occurred neither linearly nor 
smoothly.”160 He explains that the munāfiqūn (hypocrites), which term he wrongly 
translates as “dissenters”, were condemned for not engaging in the fighting at Uhud 
and in other instances.161 In other words, his point of departure is that not all the 
Muslims were willing to engage in war.162 
 He concludes his theory as well as his book with the following: “[these wars 
developed into] the total declaration of war against all groups, whether kin or not, 
who did not accept the truth of the hegemony of Islam.”163 However, he gives 
another interpretation of these wars earlier in his book, asserting that the pre-Islamic 
responsibility to go to war in order to protect the viability and honour of one’s 
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kinship group was replaced by the new Islamic responsibility to go to war in order to 
“protect the viability or honour of the new community of believers by fighting in the 
path of God.”164 He even sketches a third theory of what he calls holy war, and 
claims that these wars developed eventually to include “anyone who opposed 
Muh ammad and his divinely guided following”.165 
 Firestone’s theory is reviewed in a number of Western academic journals. It 
is interesting to note that he avoids direct reference to the Prophet in the development 
of war in Islam and seems not to link the Prophet directly to what he portrays as 
marauding attacks on the Meccans, unless he meant to include the Prophet among the 
emigrants. Nonetheless, all the sources make it clear, as Firestone himself notes, that 
the Prophet was the judicial and political leader of the whole community of Muslims 
and Jews in Medina.166   
 Firestone’s serious mistake, which is commonly found in many outsider 
studies, is that he constructs his theories on the early wars in Islam without studying 
those wars. In other words, he does not substantiate his theory by referring to specific 
hostile incidents, explaining why and where they took place and who initiated them, 
and constructing his theory on that basis. In his chapter “The Sīra”, he discusses only 
the sariyah of ‛Abd Allah ibn Jah sh and the battle of Badr. It is, indeed, 
disappointing that Firestone bases his theory on a biased presentation of only one 
battle in Islam and admits that he disregards all the other material. While the way he 
distorts the incidents during the Meccan period and the battle of Badr may be 
understandable, he ends his book without explaining his concluding idea of a 
declaration of total war against all mankind.  
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 Thus, Firestone bases his whole theory on the incorrect idea that the Prophet 
launched marauding attacks against the Quraysh, while in fact it was Quraysh who 
launched a series of attacks against the Muslims in Medina, as explained above. 
Although no fighting took place between the Muslims and their oppressors in Mecca, 
Emmanuel Sivan also claims that the Prophet fought “for dominance in Arabia 
against the pagans, first against the city of Mecca (622-28) and then against the 
nomadic Arabian tribes (628-32)… in the struggle over limited resources (above all 
water and grazing ground), and transformed it and the warrior ethos it produced into 
an integral part of its creed”.167  
Firestone’s idea that the munāfiqūn were not willing to engage in what he 
portrays as offensive action is misinformation. His theory on munāfiqūn seems to be 
an overdevelopment of Watt’s discussion of what he calls “the Muslim 
opposition”.168 Firestone gives no explanation to substantiate the idea that their 
refusal to engage in fighting was based on a rejection of the new ethos of war. In 
putting forward this idea, he expresses his distrust of the sources, but still argues that 
“we must remain content to note that, for whatever reason, a large and powerful 
enough segment of the Muslim community refused, at least for an important period, 
to engage in fighting.”169  
Strangely enough, he admits that “the exact identity and motivations of these 
dissenting groups cannot be reconstructed, but their existence is clear.”170 Ironically, 
some of the verses he uses to construct his theory (Qur’ān 48:11, 16) speak of the 
munāfiqūn who refused to join the Prophet in his journey to perform ‛umrah in 
6/628. Al-Wāqidī points out that their refusal to join the Prophet was not because 
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they were busy, as they claimed, but because of their criticism of the Prophet for 
going to the Quraysh unarmed.171 It was because of such behaviour, in addition to 
their occasional treason, that they were called hypocrites. As for those who were 
criticized for not fighting at Uhud, it is clear that they were obliged to defend their 
city against the attack of the Quraysh, as stipulated in the Constitution of Medina.  
In the Qur’ān, Chapter 63, Al-Munāfiqūn (The Hypocrites) and many other 
verses speak about this issue. Ibn Ish āq devotes a considerable part of his book to the 
issue of the munāfiqūn in the early period in Medina.172 He lists many names from 
various clans who hypocritically claimed to be Muslims, with a subtitle; “The Rabbis 
who accepted Islam hypocritically”.173 Ibn Ishāq states that in one incident some of 
these hypocrites were ejected from the mosque.174 It is worth adding here that the 
first few months after the Prophet’s arrival in Medina witnessed theological 
confrontations between Jews and Muslims. Ibn Ishāq indicates that the first hundred 
verses of Chapter Two of the Qur’ān, “The Cow”, were revealed “in reference to 
these Jewish rabbis and the hypocrites of Aus and Khazraj”.175 In 9 A.H. the Prophet 
ordered the destruction of a new mosque built by twelve of the munāfiqūn.176 So 
Firestone’s point of departure for constructing his theory that the munāfiqūn were 
Muslims who rejected fighting because of the new ethos of offensive or holy war, is 
a false assumption. These wars were waged by the Quraysh on Medina and all of 
those labelled munāfiqūn were condemned because they failed to meet their 
obligation to defend the city as stipulated by the Constitution of Medina.     
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Rudolph Peters points out that Firestone, specifically in his treatment of 
Qur’ānic texts, “uncritically” applies a method used by Morton Smith in his 1957 
PhD thesis on the Old Testament. Peters explains that “the differences in textual 
history between the Hebrew Bible and the Qur’ān make it difficult to transfer 
methods developed in one field to another…The interpretation of the Qur’ān as a 
historical source therefore requires a totally different approach.”177 This indicates 
that there is a line of thought in Western scholarship that approaches Islam with a 
tendency to study and interpret it through the historical and religious experiences of 
Judaism and Christianity. This approach has necessarily led to distorted judgements 
and even to the creation of readings of the history and texts of Islam that are totally 
different from those of the Muslims’.  
Muslim and Western scholarship agree that a state of war was the normal 
state of relations between the various tribes in Arabia at the time of the advent of 
Islam. Outbreaks of war in Medina during the Prophet’s lifetime have been a rich 
source for constructing various, and sometimes contradictory, theories on the nature 
and objectives of war in Islam. Watt’s Muhammad at Mecca and Muhammad at 
Medina and their abridgement in his Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman are 
laudable efforts in the study of the life of the Prophet,178 because Watt bases his 
study of hostile incidents during the Prophet’s time on the biographical material. 
Many Western scholars are influenced by some of Watt’s ideas and some of his ideas 
have been further developed or reinterpreted.  
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Although Watt’s three-volume study on the life of the Prophet contains many 
insightful ideas, this study disagrees with some of his interpretations of the incidents, 
such as his idea that the Prophet’s seven early expeditions “were directed against 
Meccan caravans.”179 It is worth adding that he explains that these expeditions “are 
of slight importance, in that nothing seemed to happen”.180 He even recognizes that 
two of these expeditions resulted in peace treaties.181 Watt formed this opinion about 
the seven early expeditions by accepting the phrase in a report mentioned above in 
al-Wāqidī’s Al-Maghāzī which he understands to mean that the objective of the 
sariyah of Ibn Jahsh was “to ambush a Meccan caravan”. The present study argues 
that al-Wāqidī’s wording here was not intended to give the meaning understood by 
Watt. Al-Wāqidī in fact gives another report which explains that the objective of this 
sariyah was to bring news of what the Quraysh was planning.182 As explained above, 
these early expeditions aimed at introducing Islam to the tribes and making peace 
treaties with them, thus ensuring that they would not support the Quraysh in any 
attack on the Muslims.183 A dozen or two of the three hundred Muslim men at 
Medina went on reconnoitring missions to find out whether the Quraysh were 
preparing for any attack. The number of the Muslims who went into these missions 
(in one mission they numbered only eight) proves that such ghazawāt and sarāyā 
were reconnoitring missions and obviously not raids as commonly assumed.184 
Hence, Shākir titles his discussion of these early expeditions al-ghazawāt wa al-
sarāyah al-istitlā‛iyyah (reconnaissance ghazawāt and sarāyā).185  
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Watt’s mistaken idea of presenting these expeditions as offensive attacks has, 
unfortunately, been expanded upon by some theorists. Firestone develops this idea to 
speak of what he calls “mundane attacks” on the Quraysh and then transforms this 
into a theory of Muslim holy war against all mankind.186 Armstrong accepts the idea 
that the Muslims resorted to the then “national sport” of ghazw against the caravans 
of the Meccans because the Meccans persecuted and expelled them from their 
homes. Nonetheless, concerning the spread of Islam, she explains that all the Arab 
tribes had either converted to Islam or joined the Muslim ummah as confederates, 
especially after the treaty of al-Hudaybiyah. In fact, the ninth year of the hijrah is 
called the “year of the delegations” because delegations from all over Arabia came to 
the Prophet declaring their acceptance of Islam.187 This meant the collapse of the 
religion of the Meccans and thus the destruction of their economy and prestige 
position among all the Arabs. It is this, Ibn Ishāq explains, that was the reason for 
which the Quraysh waged aggression against the Prophet.188 Thus, Armstrong 
concludes her succinct balanced reading of the Prophet’s lifetime by saying that, 
before the Prophet’s death, “the ghastly cycle of tribal warfare, of vendetta and 
counter-vendetta, had ended. Single-handedly, Muhammad had brought peace into 
war-torn Arabia.”189 This shows the extent of the contradictions between the 
readings of these wars in Western scholarship. While Firestone portrays them as all-
out holy wars against all mankind, Armstrong maintains that the Prophet brought 
peace to the already “war-torn Arabia”.   
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In his chapter “Foundations of Conquest”, Donner relates the rise of the 
Islamic state in Medina to the Prophet’s “highly successful pursuit of political 
power”.190 He explains that the Prophet used many methods to establish his power in 
Medina and argues that the incidents that took place in Medina were the result of the 
Prophet’s determination to achieve political power. He believes that the Prophet set 
himself up as a ruler against the opposition of the three Jewish clans of Qaynuqā‛, al-
Nadīr, and Qurayz ah and “struggle[d] to humble the Quraysh in his native city, 
Mecca”.191  
However, Donner bases his theory here on two unfounded assumptions. First, 
the idea that the Prophet established his leadership against the opposition of the three 
Jewish clans is based on the reactions, rather than the actions which led to these 
reactions. In other words, if the Qaynuqā‛ had not fought against the Prophet and if 
al-Nadīr had not attempted to assassinate the Prophet, they would not have been sent 
into exile. And if the Qurayzah had not supported the Quraysh in the battle of the 
Ditch, its male members would not have been sentenced to death by Sa‛d ibn 
Mu‛ādh. Moreover, the Prophet, from his arrival in Medina, had already become the 
leader of the whole community of Muslims and Jews in the city, as stipulated in the 
Constitution of Medina. Second, the idea that the Prophet “struggled to humble 
Quraysh” seems also to be a development of Watt’s mistaken understanding of the 
seven early expeditions. The biographical material proves that the Quraysh launched 
attacks on the Muslims in Medina. Moreover, the treaty of al-Hudaybiyah 
substantiates the fact that the Prophet accepted the inferior position stipulated by the 
Quraysh negotiators in this treaty. It is worth adding that the Prophet accepted the 
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unfair and arbitrary articles of the treaty, despite the disagreement of his 
Companions. 
Thus, there are two main, unfounded, contradictory, speculative 
interpretations192 of the outbreaks of hostilities in this period: while Firestone gives a 
holy-war-like interpretation of the Prophet’s wars, Donner advocates a secular 
interpretation, portraying the Prophet as a “genius politician and strategist”193 who 
was ambitious for political power. Nonetheless, Bruce B. Lawrence maintains: “The 
war Muhammad waged against Mecca was not a struggle for prestige or wealth, but 
for the survival of God’s Word and his own person.”194 
But the present study argues that the following important questions should be 
addressed in any attempt to theorize on the tradition of war in Islam: would there 
have been any outbreaks of hostility in early Islam if the Prophet and the Muslims 
had not been persecuted and had been permitted to practise their new religion freely 
in Mecca? And would there have been any war in Medina if Abū Jahl had not forced 
the Quraysh to go to war at Badr, or if the three Jewish clans had abided by the 
Constitution of Medina and not attempted to assassinate the Prophet or supported the 
Quraysh in the battle of the Ditch? Thus, Watt remarks here that “it is interesting to 
speculate on what would have happened had the Jews come to terms with 
Muh ammad instead of opposing him.”195 This study argues that, as concluded by Ibn 
Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328), the hostile actions referred to above were not initiated by 
                                                 
192 To show the highly speculative nature of the interpretations of these period, Donner concludes his 
“Muhammad’s Political Consolidation” with the following: “The interpretations proposed here cannot 
be considered decisively proven, of course, and in view of the state of our sources they may remain 
forever beyond decisive proof or disproof. ” See Ibid., p. 247. 
193 Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, p. 69; Donner, “Muhammad’s Political Consolidation”, pp. 
229-247.  
194 Lawrence, The Qur’ān, p. 42. 
195 Watt, Muhammad at Medina, p. 219. 
 68
the Prophet or motivated by Islamic teachings to engage in offensive attacks against 
non-Muslims because of their unbelief in Islam.196   
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This study finds that the attempts of the early biographers to refer to all the Prophet’s 
travels and engagements with others as ghazawāt or maghāzī and expeditions sent by 
him as siyar, without differentiating between the preaching and fighting missions, 
have caused considerable misunderstanding about the tradition of war in Islam, 
although they agree that fighting took place in nine of the Prophet’s twenty-seven 
ghazawāt, namely, Badr, Uh ud, The Ditch, Qurayzah, al-Mustaliq, Khaybar, fath 
Mecca, Hunayn, and al-Tā’if. 
As pointed out above, Badr, Uh ud, and the Ditch were defensive 
engagements against offensive attacks on the Muslims in Badr and Medina by the 
Quraysh and a number of other clans who joined in the attack at the battle of the 
Ditch. The exiled Jews of Nadīr were behind the mobilization of several other clans 
in this attack and offered as an inducement “half the date harvest of Khaybar … to B. 
Ghat afān if they would join in the attack.”197 Qurayz ah should not be considered an 
act of war as it was the implementation of the arbitration against the traitors at the 
battle of the Ditch. Al-Mustaliq was a response to an attack already in progress. As 
for Khaybar, it is significant that, first, Khaybar numbered ten thousand while the 
Muslims numbered about three thousand. Second, it ended in an agreement that 
Khaybar were to pay half the produce of their lands. Watt explains that the reason for 
this incident was Khaybar’s “use of their wealth to induce the neighbouring Arabs 
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and especially the strong tribe of Ghatafān to join them against the Muslims.”198 
Hence, the aim of the Prophet’s march to Khaybar was to put an end to their hostility 
after they had violated the Constitution of Medina. Accepting Islam or making this 
payment signifies peaceful coexistence and recognition of the authority of the state 
system stipulated in the Constitution of Medina. As for Fath Mecca, as stated above, 
the Prophet’s march to Mecca with at least ten thousand men from the Arab tribes, 
was a successful, popular, bloodless attempt to take control of his home city of 
Mecca after eight years in exile. The Prophet confirmed to the huge crowd 
accompanying him that their march was a peaceful one and no fighting was to take 
place and no fighting did in fact ensue between the two parties, although Khālid ibn 
al-Walīd fought in self-defence when arrows were shot at him as he was destroying 
an idol. Hunayn and al-T ā’if are two incidents of fighting with the clans of Hawāzin 
and Thaqīf that took place when they marched to Hunayn to fight the Prophet after 
he took control in Mecca.        
This study thus finds that the Muslims’ engagements in all these hostilities 
during the Prophet’s lifetime were defensive.199 Their occurrence was the result of 
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Islām”, in Fārūq Hamādah, ed., Al-Tashrī‛ al-Dawlī fī al-Islām, Nadawāt wa Munāzarāt, No. 70 
(Rabat: Kulliyyah al-Ādāb wa al-‛Ulūm al-Insāniyyah, 1997), p. 199; al-Sayyid Sābiq, Fiqh al-
Sunnah (Cairo: Al-Fath lil-I‛lām al-‛Arabī, n.d.), Vol. 3, pp. 18 f.; Muhammad al-Sādiq ‛Afīfī, Al-
Mujtama‛ al-Islāmī wa al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah (Cairo: Mu’assasah al-Khānjī, 1980), p. 148; al-
Ghunaimi, Qānūn al-Salām fī al-Islām, p. 59; Ghunaym, Al-Jihād al-Islāmī, pp. 32 f.; T abliyyah, Al-
Islām wa Huqūq al-Insān, p. 72; ‛Umar Ahmad al-Firjānī, Usūl al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām, 
2nd ed. (Tripoli, Libya: Dār Iqra’, 1988/1397), pp. 77, 82 f.; al-Shaykh al-Rikābī, Al-Jihād fī al-Islām: 
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Tanzīl wa al-Sunnah (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1997/1418), pp. 125 f.; ‛Uthmān al-Amīn al-Amīn, 
“Mawqif al-Islām min Zāhirah al-Irhāb”, Islam and the 21st Century, Researches and Facts, the Tenth 
General Conference of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic 
Affairs, 1999/1420), p. 311; C.G. Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. 147; Stewart, Unfolding Islam, p. 92; Alsumaih, “The Sunni 
Concept of Jihad”, pp. 41, 271, 276. Rudolph Peters indicates that modern Muslim writers “show that 
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normal developments of events arising from the political and cultural systems in 
place in the war-torn Arabia of the time. Shaykh Alī Jum‛ah, the current Muftī of 
Egypt (2003-present), adds that all these incidents occurred between the Prophet and 
his relatives, namely, the various tribes of the clan of Mudar, and the Jewish clans 
who allied with Quraysh.200 He suggests that, as was natural for the Arabs of the 
time, Mudar fought these battles because of the leadership and authority the Prophet 
was gaining at the time. In fact, the spread of Islam and the growth of the Prophet’s 
leadership were undermining their religion and thus their economy, power and 
prestige in Arabia. This explains Abū Jahl’s motive, quoted above, for forcing the 
Meccans to fight the Prophet in the first battle in Islam, the battle of Badr, and 
therefore supports Watt’s reading that Abū Jahl wanted to eliminate the Prophet for 
ever. Their defeat at Badr necessitated revenge to restore their leadership, and the 
subsequent occurrences of fighting that ensued as a result. It was for the same reason  
– to strengthen the Meccans’ leadership - that the Meccans dictated arbitrary articles 
in the negotiations of the armistice of al-Hudaybiyah intended to show the inferior 
position of the Prophet and requiring him to return to Medina without entering 
Mecca to perform ‛umrah that year.      
Moreover, the cases of the Jews of Banū Qaynuqā‛ who fought alongside the 
Prophet after Badr,201 the Jewish Rabbi who fought and called upon his fellow Jews 
to fight alongside the Prophet against the attack by the Quraysh at the battle of Uhud, 
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the group of Jews who fought with the Prophet and received a share of the war 
spoils,202 and the many idolaters who fought with the Prophet at Hunayn and al-
Tā’if, are all examples that mitigate against the idea that these were wars fought for 
the spread of a certain religion. On the basis of these incidents, most of the classical 
Muslim jurists advocated that it was permissible for polytheists to fight alongside the 
Muslims against the dār al-harb.203 Furthermore, on the basis of the above incidents 
and the jurists’ consequent agreement on the permissibility of non-Muslims’ fighting 
alongside a Muslim army, contemporary Muslim scholars have strongly advocated 
the Islamic permissibility of seeking the support of the non-Muslim forces for the 
liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi ghazw (invasion) of August 1990-February 
1991.204 The Islamic Fiqh Council Journal, affiliated to the Saudi-based Muslim 
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World League, devoted its fifth issue to the discussion of this question and, more 
importantly, to justifying the Islamic permissibility of hosting American forces in 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.205 This fifth issue also includes statements to 
this effect from important Islamic institutions such as al-Azhar al-Sharīf and Dār al-
Iftā’ of Egypt, as well as the Committee of the Senior Saudi Scholars. Interestingly, 
these Muslim scholars are advocating here the permissibility of military support from 
non-Muslim forces in a war against another Muslim country.       
Thus, none of the incidents of war studied in this chapter could be described 
as “holy war” in the sense of a war waged to propagate a religion or because the 
opponents held different beliefs. However, the confusion about the tradition of war in 
Islam arises from the fact that the decision to join in these defensive just wars was 
given religious justification. In the next chapter, this confusion in the exegetes’ 
interpretations of the Qur’ānic justifications for engaging in fighting in the incidents 
discussed here will become obvious. It is worth recalling here that the whole struggle 
between the Meccans and the Muslims arose after the Muslim minority were 
persecuted and forced to flee Mecca because of their new religion. 
Concerning the extent of the use of force in the wars studied here, according 
to Muhammad ‛Imārah, the number of fatalities in all these incidents totals 384 (181  
Muslims and 203 among their enemies),206 while according to Ahmed Shalabī it 
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totals 251 (139 Muslims and 112 among their enemies).207 However, the differing 
numbers of fatalities given in the biographical material discussed in this study 
estimate that the total number in all the incidents is between a minimum of 367 (170 
Muslims and 197 among their enemies) and a maximum of 514 (222 Muslims and 
292 among their enemies). In fact, there is no way to ascertain the accuracy of these 
numbers, so researchers have to choose one of the biographers’ accounts. However, 
‛Abd al-Sabūr Marzūq, the Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Affairs in Egypt, affirms that the number of fatalities, including both Muslims and 
their enemies, is less than four hundred.208 These figures indicate the degree of force 
used in these incidents and the insignificance of the disagreement over the numbers 
caused by referring to different biographical material. Those executed in ghazwah 
Banū Qurayz ah are not included in these figures because they were sentenced by 
Sa‛d ibn Mu‛ādh for their treason and are therefore not counted among the war dead.     
The Prophet’s expeditions, accompanied by Muslims, to the nomadic tribes in 
such an insecure region, whether to preach Islam or to make pacts of non-aggression 
with the tribes or to engage in defensive actions, were efforts that they hoped would 
be rewarded by God and can all be considered as one form of the Islamic concept of 
jihād. Muslim deaths in these activities are considered by Muslims as acts of 
martyrdom.  
The Qur’ānic texts and the sayings of the Prophet calling upon Muslims to 
join in these defensive wars and extolling the reward for those who took part in them 
have been misrepresented by some as Islamic textual justifications for holy war to be 
initiated against non-Muslims. Unfortunately, the study of jihād in outsider literature 
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 74
has been limited to this distorted reading of such texts, which creates a totally 
different impression according to which Muslims are transformed from fighters in a 
just and defensive war into initiators of offensive holy war. In other words, these 
texts have been introduced as the Islamic justification for the initiation of the wars 
that took place during the Prophet’s lifetime, and the tradition of war in Islam in 
general, and not with a view to clarifying the diverse reasons for these incidents, as 
detailed above. Any study of these Qur’ānic texts and prophetic sayings on jihād that 
does not take into account whether they address a defensive or offensive, or a just or 
unjust war, will reach erroneous conclusions on the tradition of war in Islam.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE JUSTIFICATIONS OF WAR IN THE QUR’ĀN 
2.1 Introduction 
A number of Qur’ānic verses address the relationship between the Muslims and their 
enemies during both the Meccan and Medinan periods discussed in Chapter One. In 
the Meccan period, over one-hundred-and-fourteen verses command Muslims to 
forgive their persecutors and be patient in the face of the religious oppression and 
execution of some of their fellows. In the Medinan period, however, certain verses 
give the Muslims permission to defend themselves in the face of aggression from the 
Meccans. In several of the Medinan chapters of the Qur’ān, many verses address the 
Muslims’ struggle with their enemies and some of these verses command the 
Muslims to fight the enemy.  
 This chapter considers the Qur’ānic texts that address the issue of war. It 
discusses the interpretations of these texts in some of the most influential classical 
and modern Qur’ān exegeses, specifically the exegeses of al-Tabarī (d. 310/923), al-
Qurt ubī (d. 671/1272), Rashīd Rid ā (1863-1935) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). The 
exegetes’ interpretations reflect their understanding of the nature of the conflict 
between the Muslims and their enemies. More importantly, these interpretations 
provide the basis of the jus ad bellum (the justifications for resort to war) in the 
tradition of war formulated by the Muslim jurists, as shown in Chapter Three. 
Therefore, the aim of the present chapter is to discover the ways in which the Qur’ān 
justifies warfare and to investigate whether the Qur’ān sanctions offensive war in 
order to propagate Islam.  
Muslim scholars have developed a number of exegetical disciplines for the 
study of the Qur’ān, some of which have crucially shaped Muslim understandings of 
 76
the Qur’ānic position on war. Using these exegetical disciplines and in the light of 
their diverse understandings of the Qur’ānic position, Muslim scholars, specifically 
the jurists, have formed the Islamic laws regulating the relationship of Muslims with 
others. 
However, Fred McGraw Donner concludes that “We [Western scholars] are 
not in a position to catalog unequivocably the main elements contributing to the way 
[emphasis added] Muslims thought about war and its limitations…The reason for this 
is mainly a practical one: too little preliminary work on a vast subject.”1 Moreover, 
Andrew Rippin notes that the science of Qur’ān exegesis “still remains a vast, 
virtually untapped field of investigation [in Western scholarship… because 
unfortunately] Orientalists continue to gloss over its importance as a historical record 
of the Muslim community, as revealed in comments that declare the material to be 
‘dull and pettifogging’ and the like.”2 These statements succinctly diagnose some of 
the problems that arise in the study of the Islamic tradition of war in outsider 
literature. Despite the importance of the subject and the vast literature on it, many 
areas and methodologies that contributed to the development of the Islamic law of 
war still remain largely under-explored. That is to say, quoting certain Qur’ānic 
phrases or verses or even an exegete’s interpretation of such phrases or verses, or 
worse – simply depending on translations of the Qur’ān, to explicate the Qur’ānic 
position on war, merely adds to the confusion in the area. But to find out both 
classical and contemporary Muslim understandings of the Qur’ānic position on war, 
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the best approach is to examine the exegetical disciplines that the exegetes 
themselves apply. 
It is important to note here that it is generally characteristic of Islamic 
scholarship that Muslim scholars, whether exegetes, jurists or otherwise, were all 
individual researchers who worked independently without any formal relationship 
with state authorities, except when scholars accepted the position of qādī (judge). 
Moreover, as H.A.R. Gibb notes, they “were hesitant or unwilling to become 
involved in the practical affairs of government.”3 Their works present their 
individual intellectual efforts to conceive an Islamic framework for relating to others 
in times of peace and war. Their frameworks derive from their readings of the 
injunctions found in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah (tradition) of the Prophet. It is 
undeniable, however, that these scholars were influenced, throughout Islamic history, 
by the socio-political conditions of their times.4 
 
2.2 The Text and Context of the Qur’ān 
It goes without saying that the Qur’ānic verses on the issue of war must be read in 
their socio-political and linguistic contexts. More importantly, they must be 
understood in the context of the specific incidents they address.5 As Mustansir Mir 
rightly points out, “a study of the Qur’anic view of war will have to take into account 
both the Qur’anic text and Muhammad’s conduct of war.”6 It is therefore a major 
error to study these Qur’ānic verses without, or, equally misleadingly – as this study 
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6 Mustansir Mir, “Islam, Qur’anic”, Encyclopedia of Religion and War, ed., Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez 
(New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 207. 
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argues – before, determining their context. Studying the Qur’ānic verses on war 
requires, first, deciphering the rules of Qur’ānic textual discourse by defining the 
meaning of the words describing the warring parties, i.e., Muslims versus their 
enemies, the Meccan mushrikūn/kuffār (Meccan polytheists/unbelievers), munāfiqūn 
(the hypocrites, the Medinans who outwardly claimed to be Muslims while actively 
supporting the Muslims’ enemies) and ahl al-kitāb (lit. family of the scripture, 
generally translated as People of the Book) and, second, reconstructing the situation 
in which the parties involved went to war, including deciding the reasons and 
justifications for the initiation of a particular act of war and also who initiated it. 
A problem of war studies is that any disagreement in reconstructing the 
situation in which war arises leads to totally different descriptions of the same 
incidents. For example, what some see as an offensive action may be seen by others 
as a defensive action, the aggressor in the eyes of some may be the victim in the view 
of others, and diverse judgements on what is justifiable will arise. However, if 
agreement is reached on the reconstruction of the situation, it should be possible, at 
least theoretically, to negotiate or disagree on what is just and what is not or who was 
the aggressor and who was not. The current state of the study of war explored in the 
present research is full of contradictory readings of the context of the incidents of 
war in the insider/Islamic and the outsider literatures. Consequently, there are widely 
differing readings of the same Qur’ānic texts addressing these incidents. 
On the one hand, the previous chapter shows that the battles of Badr, Uhud, 
the Ditch, Khaybar, Hunayn and al-Tā’if were defensive and just wars. The first 
three, one of which, the Ditch, involved a number of Jewish tribes, were launched by 
the Meccans on the Muslims in Medina. The march to Khaybar was intended to put 
an end to its inhabitants’ hostility after they had fought in the battle of the Ditch. The 
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Hunayn and al-Tā’if incidents were initiated by the Hawāzin and Thaqīf tribes. With 
regard to the Tabūk incident, although no encounter took place, the Muslims 
marched as a result of a rumour circulated by Syrian traders about a Byzantine army 
camping in Tabūk on its way to make war upon the Muslims in Medina. Reading the 
context in this way, Muslims throughout history have seen the Muslims involved in 
these incidents as the victims of their enemies’ aggression. 
On the other hand, these incidents are generally portrayed in outsider 
literature either as holy wars launched by the Prophet against non-Muslims, or as 
military and strategic operations to “master”, “dominate”, or “conquer” the Hijāz.7 
Some even argue that the Prophet was acting according to the dictates of an 
apocalyptic interpretation which made him attempt to “stamp out kufr 
[unbelief]…wherever it appeared”.8 In these readings, researchers speak of the 
Prophet as the only one responsible for these events. David Cook, for example, 
thinks that the Prophet launched campaigns during the last nine years of his life in 
order to conquer territories. He concludes that the aim in the battles of Badr, Uhud, 
the Ditch, Mecca, and Hunayn was to dominate Medina, Mecca and al-Tā’if.9 This 
interpretation is an example of the construction of a context for these incidents 
wholly different from that traditionally accepted by Muslims, though, strangely 
enough, Cook does not discuss these “campaigns” per se. Furthermore, Cook here 
even constructs a contrary geographical context for these incidents, because the first 
three so-called “campaigns” were in fact offensive attacks launched against the 
Muslims in and around Medina, their town. He omits to mention that, after his arrival 
in Medina, the Prophet was made the leader of the community in Medina by the 
                                                 
7 See David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), p. 6; 
Reuven Firestone, “Disparity and Resolution in the Qur’ānic Teachings on War: A Reevaluation of a 
Traditional Problem”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 56, No. 1, Jan. 1997, p. 19. 
8 Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conception of War”, pp. 47 f. 
9 Cook, Understanding Jihad, p. 6. 
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Constitution of Medina. Given this context, it is inconceivable that the Prophet could 
have “conquered” Medina. 
Another example of creating a different context is Firestone’s designation of 
the Muslims’ enemies as the Muslims’ “detractors”10 or “nonbelievers”.11 The use of 
the words “detractors” and “nonbelievers” here indicates that the Muslims went to 
war against those who were merely critical of Islam, thus implying that Muslims 
launched holy wars against those who did not accept Islam. In fact these enemies 
were physically hostile and aggressive as shown above.  
 
2.2.1 Speech-Act Theory 
In his article “Understanding the Qur’ān in Text and Context”, Richard C. Martin 
discusses a new approach to the study of the Qur’ān, one aspect of which is the 
“speech-act theory”. As explained by Mary Louise Pratt, a speech-act can consists of 
two or three things. First, a locutionary act is the act of making a recognizable 
utterance. Second, an illocutionary act is the message conveyed in the locutionary 
act such as “ordering”, “promising”, “rewarding”, “warning”, etc. Third, a 
perlocutionary act refers to the result which may be effected on the addressee by the 
illocutionary act. For example, as a result of “ordering”, the addressee may obey, or 
by “warning”, the addressee may be frightened and so on.12 
 It appears that this theory has not been applied to the study of the Qur’ānic 
verses on war, though it could be helpful to look for the perlocutionary acts of these 
Qur’ānic verses on their addressees in the period limited to this study. Specifically, it 
                                                 
10 Reuven Firestone, Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 53, 67, 69; Firestone, “Disparity and Resolution in the Qur’ānic Teachings on War”, pp. 2, 
6, 18, 19. 
11 Reuven Firestone, “Jihād”, in Andrew Rippin, ed., The Blackwell Companion to the Qur’ān 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p. 318. 
12 Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1977), pp. 81 f.; Richard C. Martin, “Understanding the Qur’ān in Text and 
Context”, History of Religions, Vol. 21, No. 4, May 1982, p. 365. 
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could be helpful for understanding the Islamic position on war, particularly if a war 
were launched by the Muslim addressees as the perlocutionary act of a certain 
Qur’ānic text. An attempt is made below to apply this theory whenever possible, with 
the aim of better understanding the Qur’ānic verses studied in this chapter. 
 
2.2.2 Others in the Eyes of Muslims 
The word “Islam” means submission and obedience to God, as well as peace. The 
word “Muslim” denotes a follower of and a believer in the religion of Islam. Thus 
Muslim identity is characterized by a religious belief. To become a Muslim, a person 
needs to utter the formula of belief in Islam: “There is no God but God and 
Muh ammad is the messenger of God.”13 Thus, a Muslim is one who submits to, and 
obeys, God. In this sense, earlier prophets, such as Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, 
Moses and Jesus, are also referred to in the Qur’ān as Muslims.14 Thus, Jews, 
Christians, Sabaeans and Zoroastrians share with Muslims at least their belief in, and 
submission to, God. They are referred to in Islamic discourse as ahl al-kitāb, People 
of the Book. Therefore, contrary to what Martin claims,15 Islam treats specifically 
Judaism and Christianity “not as ‘other religions’ but as itself”. Ismail R. al-Faruqi 
confirms this.16    
The Qur’ān addresses Muslims as al-muslimūn (“Muslims”, “those who 
submit”) or al-mu'minūn (“believers”) and refers to their enemies throughout the 
                                                 
13 See ‛Abd al-Karīm Zīdān, Ahkām al-Dhimmiyyn wa al-Musta’minīn fī Dār al-Islām (Beirut: 
Mu’assasah al-Risālah; Baghdad: Maktabah al-Quds, 1982/1402), p. 10. 
14 Qur’ān 2:128-140. See Nasr Farīd Wāsil, “Al-Islām Dīn Salām: Mafhūm al-H arb wa al-Salām fī al-
Islām”, Islam and the 21st Century, Researches and Facts, the Tenth General Conference of the 
Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 1999/1420), pp. 
267-269.  
15 Richard C. Martin, “The Religious Foundations of War, Peace, and Statecraft in Islam”, in John 
Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds., Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives 
on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 
98.  
16 Ismail R. al-Faruqi, “Islam and Other Faiths: The World’s Need for Humane Universalism”, in 
Altaf Gauhar, ed., The Challenge of Islam (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1978), p. 108. 
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period of the revelation of the Qur’ān as mushrikūn (“polytheists”), kuffār 
(“unbelievers”), munāfiqūn (“hypocrites”), and ahl al-kitāb (“People of the Book”),17 
all of which terms have religious connotations. Reading the Qur’ānic texts that 
discuss fighting against these religious groups without deciphering the contextual 
meanings of these classifications leads to the misjudgement of the nature of the 
conflicts the texts refer to. In other words, the Qur’ānic justifications for fighting 
against the Muslims’ enemies who were given these various religious descriptions 
can be mistakenly understood to be based on their religious identity alone, as is in 
fact assumed by many researchers.  
 The context of these Qur’ānic verses, as discussed in the biographical 
literature on the life of the Prophet, indicates that Islam was born in a culture of inter-
tribal conflicts. The hostility that existed between the Muslims and their enemies 
during the period of the Qur’ānic revelations was a normal product of the socio-
political culture of the time. The fact that the Muslims emerged as a group identified 
by their religious beliefs generated the Meccans’ hostility towards them to the extent 
that they were twice forced to flee from Mecca, first to Abyssinia and later to 
Medina. Throughout the thirteen years of the Muslims’ stay in Mecca, the Qur’ān 
instructs them to forgive their enemies and to be patient. In brief, the battles that 
were fought after the flight to Medina were mainly the result of the culture of 
vendetta, after the Meccans’ defeat at Badr and the participation of certain Jewish 
tribes in the battle of the Ditch. 
                                                 
17 For the meaning of the term kufr (unbelief in God) and its derivatives in the Qur’ān see Marilyn 
Robinson Waldman, “The Development of the Concept of Kufr in the Qur’ān”, Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, Vol. 88, No. 3, Jul.- Sep., 1968, pp. 442-455; and on the word kuffār see, 
Mbaye Lo, “Seeking the Roots of Terrorism: An Islamic Traditional Perspective”, Journal of Religion 
and Popular Culture, Vol. 10, 2005, available from http://www.usask.ca/relst/jrpc/art10-
rootsofterrorism-print.html, Internet; accessed 9 June 2007. 
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 Thus, although it is true that the warring parties in these incidents did usually, 
though not always, belong to different religions, it was not the difference in religion 
that was the cause of the conflict. A state of war between the Muslims and, in 
Qur’ānic terms, the idolaters/unbelievers/polytheists of Mecca was the norm until 
6/628, when the armistice of al-Hudaybiyah was concluded. The reasons for this 
enmity were hostility, persecution and aggression, not the holding of different beliefs 
and the religious definitions that identified the enemy combatants were not a 
justification for acts of war.  
Shaltūt, Sachedina and Sherman A. Jackson have reached the same 
conclusion. Writing in 1940, Shaltūt explains that the word “unbelievers” in the 
Qur’ān refers to “those hostile polytheists who fight the Moslems, commit 
aggression against them, expel them from their homes and their property and practise 
persecution for the sake of religion”.18 Referring to the Qur’ānic justification for the 
use of force against the unbelievers, Sachedina states: “It is not unbelievers as such 
who are the object of force, but unbelievers who demonstrate their hostility to Islam 
by, for example, persecution of the Muslims.”19 Moreover, there is not a single 
instance of fighting between Muslims and non-Muslims arising from a Qur’ānic 
revelation. The fact that the Qur’ānic phrases calling upon Muslims to fight “the 
polytheists” have not been read in this context has led to the common, erroneous 
conclusion found in outsider literature and in the writings of certain classical Muslim 
scholars that these verses call upon Muslims to wage an offensive war against non-
                                                 
18 Rudolph Peters, trans. and ed., Jihad in Mediaeval and Modern Islam: The Chapter on Jihad from 
Averroes’ Legal Handbook ‘Bidayat Al-Mudjtahid’ and The Treatise ‘Koran and Fighting’ by The 
Late Shaykh Al-Azhar, Mahmud Shaltūt (Leiden: Brill, 1977), note by Shaltūt, p. 50. 
19 Sachedina, “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History”, p. 43. Elsewhere, 
Sachedina reaffirms: “It is not all unbelievers who are the target of force, but unbelievers who 
demonstrate their hostility to Islam by persecution of the Muslims.” See his, The Islamic Roots of 
Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 115; see also Sherman A. Jackson, 
“Jihad and the Modern World”, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2002, pp. 14 f.; 
Margaret Pettygrove, “Conceptions of War in Islamic Legal Theory and Practice”, Macalester Islam 
Journal, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 2007, p. 37. 
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Muslims if they refuse to accept Islam or pay the jizyah (tax levied to exempt eligible 
males from conscription).20  
 
2.2.3 The Order of the Qur’ān    
Approaching the Qur’ān to study its position on war is highly problematic for any 
researcher who is not trained in a number of Qur’ānic studies disciplines. The first 
obstacle arises because the Qur’ān is not arranged chronologically or according to 
subject. Thus, Martin concludes: “literary criticism and traditional exegesis… have 
not brought us [Western scholars] much closer to understanding or even appreciating 
the Qur’ān as a speech act formed within the present order of suras and ayas.”21 But 
for Muslims, at least those who are familiar with the Qur’ān and its context, Martin 
adds that the Qur’ān “has identifiable contextual circumstances within which 
Muslims render and interpret meaning. The Qur’ān does not ‘mean’ something 
outside of socio-cultural contexts”.22  
Muslim scholars agree that the order of the text of the Qur’ān was determined 
by the Prophet. The Angel Gabriel directed the Prophet about the order of each verse 
and chapter throughout the Qur’ān and the Prophet instructed the kuttāb al-wahī 
(scribes of the revelation) accordingly. This means that the order of the Qur’ān is 
                                                 
20 Jizyah, according to T.W. Arnold, “released [non-Muslims] from the compulsory military service 
that was incumbent on their Muslim fellow-subjects”. See T.W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam: A 
History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith, 2nd ed. rev. & enl. (London: Constable & Company, 
1913), p. 59; see also Niaz A. Shah, Self-Defense in Islamic and International Law: Assessing Al-
Qaeda and the Invasion of Iraq (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 19 f.; George W. 
Gawrych, “Jihad, War, and Terrorism”, available from 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/gawrych.pdf; Internet; accessed 21 March 2009, p. 5. On the 
rules of jizyah in Islamic law, see, for example, Muhammad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, 
Ahkām ahl al-Dhimmah, ed. Abī Barā’ Yūsuf ibn Ahmad al-Bakrī and Abī Ahmad Shākir ibn Tawfīq 
al-‛Ārūrī (Al-Dammam: Ramādī lil-Nashr, 1997/1418), Vo. 1, pp. 79-111, 119-245. See also Andrew 
G. Bostom, ed., The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2008), pp. 29-37. 
21 Martin, “Understanding the Qur’ān in Text and Context”, pp. 374 f. See also Michael Bonner, Jihad 
in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practices (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 23 f. 
22 Martin, “Understanding the Qur’ān in Text and Context”, pp. 367, 374. 
 85
tawqīfī, i.e., arranged according to divine ordinance.23 Gabriel used to revise the 
Qur’ān with the Prophet once a year, and twice in the year of the Prophet’s demise. 
Moreover, several hadīths refer to the same order of some verses in the Qur’ān as 
obtains today.24 
Although Kamali says that “no particular order can be ascertained in the 
sequence of its text”,25 it is obvious that, in general, the short chapters have one 
subject, while long chapters have more than one. Each chapter is named after its 
main subject. For this reason, a few chapters have more than one name.26 The Qur’ān 
was revealed piecemeal27 since many Qur’ānic verses were revealed in response to 
particular incidents or questions directed to the Prophet. Some of the Qur’ānic verses 
on peace and war were addressed to the Prophet and the Muslims, to tell them 
directly what to do with their enemy throughout the twenty-three-year period of the 
revelation of the Qur’ān.  
It is a characteristic of the Qur’ān that several chapters throughout the Qur’ān 
contain references, narrations or injunctions related to many subjects, with references 
to the same subject sometimes being found in several different places in the same 
chapter. References to “war”, “fighting”, “jihād”, and “murder” exist in thirty-four 
chapters throughout the Qur’ān. While some of these references address the struggle 
between the Muslims and their enemies, many address stories about prophets and 
nations prior to Islam, as well as murder and the pre-Islamic custom of female 
infanticide. 
                                                 
23 Zāfir al-Qāsimī, Al-Jihād wa al-Huqūq al-Dawliyyah al-‛Āmmah fī al-Islām (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1982), pp. 14, 53-55. 
24 See Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 3rd rev. & enl. ed. 
(Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2003), p. 17; ‛Abd al-Badī‛ Abū Hāshim Muh ammad, “Al-Suwar 
al-Qur’āniyyah”, in ‛Alī Jum‛ah, ed., Al-Mawsū‛ah al-Qur’āniyyah al-Mutakhasis ah (Cairo: Supreme 
Council for Islamic Affairs, 2003/1423), pp. 232 f.  
25 Kamali, Principles, p. 18. 
26 Watt, Bell’s Introduction to the Qur’ān, p. 59. 
27 Qur’ān 17:106. 
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One of the challenges facing researchers on the Qur’ānic position on war is 
determining the chronological order of these scattered references to the Muslims’ 
struggle with their enemies. A rough chronology of some of these incidents could be 
determined in the light of the known sequence of the incidents, as well as in cases of 
agreement among reporters about the context and timing of a certain revelation. 
Otherwise, the only way to determine the chronology of the rest of the verses is by 
speculation. This means it is impossible to determine a definite chronology and the 
context of a few verses that would pinpoint the Qur’ānic position on war is therefore 
also uncertain.28 This leads to diverse interpretations of such verses and hence 
different theories on the Qur’ānic position on war.        
 
2.2.4 Meccan and Medinan Revelations 
Muslim scholars divide the Qur’ān into Meccan and Medinan revelations, i.e., verses 
and chapters. However, they adopt three different approaches to identifying each 
genre. The first is to identify as “Meccan revelations” those verses revealed in Mecca 
and its surroundings before the hijrah (flight) to Medina, while the “Medinan 
revelations” are the verses revealed after the hijrah, even if they were revealed in 
Mecca. The second is to call the verses revealed in Mecca and its surroundings both 
before and after the hijrah “Meccan revelations”, while the “Medinan revelations” 
are only the verses revealed in Medina. The third, is to regard as “Meccan 
revelations” the verses addressing the people of Mecca, while the “Medinan 
revelations” are the verses addressing the people in Medina. Scholars agree on 
identifying eighty-two Meccan and twenty Medinan chapters, but differ on the 
                                                 
28 See Sayyid Qutb, Fī Zilāl al-Qur’ān (Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq, 1982), Vol. 3, p. 1429. 
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remaining twelve chapters.29 The significance for the study of war of identifying the 
Meccan and Medinan revelations is that it helps researchers to follow the Qur’ānic 
positions vis-à-vis the Muslims’ enemies through these two stages. 
Researchers into the issue of war in the Qur’ān should consider all the 
relevant verses and interpret each verse in its own context. Moreover, all the verses 
should be read in the light of the general message of the Qur’ān concerning the 
Islamic worldview and the relationship of Muslims towards others. Muslim scholars 
affirm that the Qur’ān is an “indivisible whole” so that “any attempts to follow some 
parts of the Qur’ān and abandon others will be totally invalid”.30 For this reason, 
Muslim scholars advocate that the best tool for the interpretation of the Qur’ān is the 
Qur’ān itself,31 so, in order to reach a conclusion on the Islamic position on a 
particular subject it is a prerequisite to study all the relevant Qur’ānic verses and the 
disciplines invented by Muslim jurists and exegetes, which will now be discussed.  
 
2.3 Qur’ānic Disciplines 
In order to derive rulings based on the Qur’ān, Muslim jurists classified the texts of 
the Qur’ān into the following disciplines: 
a) Al-‛Āmm wa al-Khās  (the general and the specific): a text that is ‛āmm refers to a 
general category of people,32 while a text that is khās  refers to a particular individual 
or category of people. 
b) Al-Muh kam wa al-Mutashābih (definite and obscure): a text that is muh kam is a 
definite; clearly understood text, while a text that is mutashābih is obscure or liable 
                                                 
29 Muhammad Bakr Ismā‛īl, “Al-Makkī wa al-Madanī”, in ‛Alī Jum‛ah, ed., Al-Mawsū‛ah al-
Qur’āniyyah al-Mutakhasis ah (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2003/1423), pp. 588-593.  
30 Kamali, Principles, p. 18. 
31 ‛Abdur Rahmān I. Doi, Sharī‛ah: The Islamic Law (London: Ta Ha, 1984/1404), p. 7; Jamal 
Badawi, “Muslim/Non-Muslim Relations: Reflections on some Qur’ānic Texts”, Scientific Review of 
the European Council for Fatwa and Research, No. 6, January 2005/Dhū al-Hijjah 1425, p. 281. 
32 For example Qur’ān 2:82; 7:158; 34:28; 46:17-18; 55:26. 
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to various interpretations. Some scholars hold, however, that muhkam refers to 
abrogating texts, while mutashābih refers to abrogated texts. 
c) Asbāb al-Nuzūl (reasons of revelation, occasions of revelation): since many verses 
were revealed in response to particular incidents or questions directed to the Prophet, 
knowing the occasion or reason of revelation of these verses helps clarify their 
meanings and, more importantly, is essential in deriving juridical rulings from these 
verses, as explained in the following discipline. 
d) ‛Umūm al-Lafz wa Khus ūs  al-Sabab: texts that have asbāb al-nuzūl are divided 
into three forms: (1) ‛umūm al-lafz wa ‛umūm al-sabab: those that refer to a general 
category of people in a general context;33 rulings included in this category of texts 
are applicable in law; (2) khusūs  al-lafz wa khus ūs  al-sabab: those that refer to 
particular individuals and/or a specific incident;34 rulings included in this category of 
texts are applicable only to the addressee(s) and the particular incident referred to. 
(3) ‛Umūm al-lafz wa khusus al-sabab: those that refer to people in general but in 
relation to a specific circumstance.35 Jurists disagree about how rulings included in 
this category of texts should be applied. The majority argue that the application 
should extend to everyone in the same situation as the original addressees and not 
restricted to those for whom the text was originally revealed unless the text itself 
indicates otherwise. A minority of jurists argue the opposite: that rulings included in 
this category of texts were only meant to be applied to those for whom the text was 
originally revealed. The jurists who argue the first position differ on whether the 
                                                 
33 For example Qur’ān 2:220. 
34 For example Qur’ān Chapter 111.  
35 For example Qur’ān 24:6-9. 
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extension of the application of such a ruling should be strictly on the basis of the text 
itself or by drawing an analogy from the text.36 
e) Al-Nāsikh wa al-Mansūkh (abrogating and abrogated): The theory of naskh 
(abrogation) of some of the Qur’ānic texts is the most important of all the Qur’ānic 
disciplines for determining juridical rulings in many issues. It crucially developed a 
position in the classical theory of war in Islam, as explained in the next chapter. The 
jurists’ approach to this theory determines the framework for discerning the Qur’ānic 
position on war. However, this is a most controversial theory. Although jurists differ 
on the nuances of its definition, abrogation may be defined as the termination of a 
hukm shar‛ī (legal ruling) and its replacement by another. It occurs in legal rulings, 
i.e., commands, prohibitions, and injunctions regarding recommended, reprehensible 
and permissible acts. It cannot occur in texts that narrate past events or discuss 
beliefs and moral questions. 37 
 In fact, Muslims disagree over the very existence of abrogation in the Qur’ān. 
Those who say that it exists quote two verses (2:106; 16:101) to support their view 
that God abrogates some ayāt (verses) by others. Those who deny its existence argue 
that these verses mean that the Qur’ān abrogates earlier revelations.38 Another 
controversy over abrogation relates to the meaning of the term, and thus to the nature 
                                                 
36 Muhammad al-Sayyid Jibrīl, “‛Umūm al-Lafz wa Khusūs al-Sabab”, in ‛Alī Jum‛ah, ed., Al-
Mawsū‛ah al-Qur’āniyyah al-Mutakhassisah (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 
2003/1423), pp. 51-57.  
37 See Kamali, Principles, p. 202; ‛Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Sa‛īd ibn Hazm, Al-Nāsikh wa al-Mansūkh fī 
al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, ed. ‛Abd al-Ghaffār Sulaymān al-Bindārī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 
1986/1406), p.8; ‛Alī ibn Muhammad al-Āmidī, Al-Ihkām fī Usūl al-Ahkām, ed. Sayyid al-Jimīlī 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‛Arabī, 1983-4/1404), Vol. 3, pp. 111-199; ‛Abbās Husnī Muhammad, Al-
Fiqh al-Islāmī: Āfāquh wa Tatawwuruh, Da‛wah al-Haq, Issue 10, October/November 
1981/Muharram 1402, 2nd ed. (Mecca: Muslim World League, 1993-4/1414), p.105; Richard Bonney, 
Jihād: From Qur’ān to bin Laden (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 24 f.; Muhammad 
Talaat al-Ghunaimi, Qānūn al-Salām fī al-Islām (Alexandria, Egypt: Munsha’ah al-Ma‛ārif, 2007), 
pp. 129-141; Muhammad Abdel Haleem, The ‘Sword Verse’ Myth (London: School of Oriental and 
African Studies, 2007), p. 26; Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li-Ahkāmih wa 
Falsafatih fī Daw’ al-Qur’ān wa al-Sunnah (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2009), Vol. 1, pp. 271 f. 
38 Muhammad Talaat al-Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western 
Approach (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 111; al-Ghunaimi, Qānūn al-Salām fī al-Islām, pp. 
131-141; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 275-284. 
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of abrogation itself. For some scholars, abrogation is the gradual development of 
Islamic legislation, which had to take into consideration the reality of changes in 
circumstances throughout the period of Qur’ānic revelation. The aim of abrogation 
was, therefore, to ensure the interests of the community by adapting the law to the 
different circumstances.39 Abrogation also exemplifies the Islamic philosophy of 
gradually adapting people to the laws, as in the case of the gradual prohibition of 
wine. 
For other scholars, abrogation is a new ruling that God introduced in order to 
abrogate a previous one. When they find a Qur’ānic verse, or even a phrase in a 
verse, that they consider gives a different ruling, instruction or guidance from that in 
another verse(s), they attempt to reconcile them by arguing that the later verse(s) 
abrogate the earlier one(s).  
However, John Burton gives a conspiratorial explanation of the theory of 
abrogation in Islam. He maintains that the idea of “conflicting statements” in the 
Qur’ān and the Sunnah “spurred the [Muslim] scholar to discover a way of removing 
embarrassment and problem at one and the same time. The concept of naskh was the 
Muslim’s ingenious response to the stimulus of embarrassment.”40 However, he 
refers elsewhere to the verse 4:82, which states that the Qur’ān “cannot contain 
contradictions”.41 
Muslim scholars advocating the existence of abrogation in the Qur’ān differ 
sharply in identifying instances of it. The determining factor in deciding which verse 
abrogates another/others is that the most recently revealed abrogates that revealed 
                                                 
39 Muhammad Bakr Ismā‛īl, “Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’ān”, in ‛Alī Jum‛ah, ed., Al-Mawsū‛ah al-
Qur’āniyyah al-Mutakhasis ah (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2003/1423), pp. 649 f. 
See also Kamali, Principles, p. 203. 
40 John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1990), p. 4. 
41 John Burton, “Naskh”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., Vol. VII, p. 64.  
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earlier. It is worth noting here that deciding an instance of abrogation in the Qur’ān 
and determining which verse or phrase abrogates the other/s if a chronological order 
cannot be determined is left to the discretion of each individual scholar. Since it is 
impossible to determine an accurate chronology of all the Qur’ānic verses, the theory 
of abrogation has been applied unwarrantedly to too many Qur’ānic texts.42 It is 
applied even to consecutive verses. For example, two instances of abrogation 
allegedly occur in four consecutive verses on fighting. Chapter Two, verse 191 
allegedly abrogates verse 190 and verse 193 abrogates verse 192.43 Commenting on 
this allegation, al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) remarks: “It is improbable that the Wise One 
[God] brings some verses together in pairs of which one verse abrogates the other.”44  
Moreover, a phrase may be alleged to abrogate a preceding phrase in the 
same verse. For example, Ibn al-Bārizī (d. 738/1338) maintains that the phrase of the 
so-called “sword verse” (9:5): “but if they repent and perform prayer and give the 
poor-due, then leave them their way”, abrogates the immediately preceding phrase in 
the same verse: “When the Sacred Months have passed, kill the polytheists wherever 
you find them and capture them and besiege them and await for them in every place 
of ambush.” Strangely enough, he even maintains that part of the ruling included in 
this verse is abrogated by the verse that follows it (9:6), though he maintains that 9:5 
abrogates one hundred and fourteen texts in fifty-two chapters in the Qur’ān.45  
Scholars give considerably different numbers for the occurrences of 
abrogation in the Qur’ān, ranging from 5 to 21, 66, 213, 214, 247, and even 500.46 
                                                 
42 See al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 272, 305-310. 
43 Peters, trans. and ed., Jihad in Mediaeval and Modern Islam, p. 53. 
44 Quoted in Ibid., p. 54. 
45 Hibah Allah ibn ‛Abd al-Rahīm ibn al-Bārizī, Nāsikh al-Qur’ān al-‛Azīz wa Mansūkhih, ed. Hātim 
S ālih  al-Dāmin, 4th ed. (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 1988/1408), p. 22. 
46 According to Kamali, these numbers are given respectively by Shāh Wālī Allāh, al-Suyūtī, ‛Abd al-
Qādir al-Baghdādī, Wahbatullāh ibn Salamah, Ibn Hazm, Jamāl al-Dīn ibn al-Jawzī and the 
Mu‛tazilah. See Kamali, Principles, p. 220. See also Abdel Haleem, The ‘Sword Verse’ Myth, pp. 27 
f. 
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Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) points out that what prompted him to write his Nawāsikh 
al-Qur’ān (The Abrogated [texts] of the Qur’ān) was the confusion and errors 
committed by scholars in identifying the incidents of abrogation.47 
In fact, some scholars point out that the reason for the unwarranted use of 
abrogation, apart from the fact that determining its occurrence is left to the discretion 
of each scholar, is that scholars confused it with the disciplines of al-‛āmm wa al-
khās . In other words, they alleged that one text abrogates other/s when it actually 
specifies a general text.48 
Some contemporary scholars criticize the classical approach to abrogation 
and tend to see its occurrence as limited. They view abrogation as a historical and 
circumstantial phenomenon, or part of a gradual process of legislation, which must 
be read in context and in the light of the general message of the Qur’ān. It should not 
have been turned “into a juridical doctrine of permanent validity”,49 as happened at 
the hands of early scholars. They argue that “This classical concept of permanent 
abrogation is oblivious of the space-time element which, if taken into account, would 
have restricted the application of naskh to those circumstances alone.”50 
 
2.4 Approaching the Qur’ān  
This chapter identifies three approaches to, or levels of readings of, the Qur’ān, 
discussed below. Muslim scholars enumerate fifteen disciplines which an individual 
must master to be qualified as an exegete of the Qur’ān, and seven of these are 
                                                 
47 ‛Abd al-Rahman ibn ‛Alī ibn Muhammad ibn al-Jawzī, Nawāsikh al-Qur’ān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-‛Ilmiyyah, n. d.), pp. 12 f. 
48 See Ismā‛īl, “Al-Naskh fī al-Qur’ān”, p. 649; Kamali, Principles, p. 221; al-Ghunaimi, The Muslim 
Conception, p. 111; Badawi, “Muslim/Non-Muslim Relations”, p. 279; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, 
Vol. 1, p. 272. 
49 Kamali, Principles, p. 223; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 269-310. 
50 Kamali, Principles, p. 223. 
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Arabic language disciplines.51 The contemporary, average, educated native speaker 
of Arabic cannot understand the meaning of several Qur’ānic texts without reference 
to exegetical works. That is to say that it is no easy task to understand the Qur’ānic 
position on war and, indeed, it largely depends on the researchers’ approaches to the 
text. Their conclusions vary according to their own understanding of the texts and 
their context, and whether they apply any exegetical disciplines in their research or 
merely base their conclusion on a superficial understanding of the texts. In addition, 
their conclusions vary according to the intermediary they refer to in studying the 
Qur’ān, i.e., the exegetes’ interpretations of the Qur’ān or the jurists’ rulings on the 
verses in question. Furthermore, conveying the contextual meanings of some of the 
Qur’ānic texts in translation is impossible, leaving aside the fact that many Qur’ānic 
words are variously understood.  
In the light of the above discussion of text and context with regard to the 
Qur’ān and its disciplines, it can be said that there are the following three approaches 
to studying the Qur’ān and its position on war.  
 
2.4.1 Superficial Approach 
In his post 9/11 War, Terror and Peace in the Qur’ān and in Islam: Insights for 
Military and Government Leaders, Schwartz-Barcott “offers dozens of suggestions 
about how [US] leaders in government and military can use our [Schwartz-Barcott’s] 
growing knowledge of the Qur’ān and its proponents to help sustain peace, defuse 
terrorism, and if necessary, wage war in effective and just ways.”52 He presents more 
than a hundred passages from the Qur’ān which he sometimes mistakenly claims to 
concern war and peace and refers to more than 230 wars and battles from the first 
                                                 
51 Muhammad, “Al-Suwar al-Qur’āniyyah”, pp. 252 f.  
52 T.P. Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror and Peace in the Qur’ān and in Islam: Insights for Military 
and Government Leaders (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Foundation Press, 2004), p. xxiv. 
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battle in Islam, the battle of Badr (Ramadān 2/March 624), up to the US invasions of 
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.53  
Using a concordance, he selects Qur’ānic texts on war and peace from 
Pickthall’s translation of the Qur’ān and his reading of these texts leads him to 
believe that the Qur’ān does not call for peace with non-Muslims. Peace in the 
Qur’ān, for him, is an inner spiritual state in the Muslim individual and seen more as 
a state “of non-hostility between two or more Muslim individuals or Muslim groups 
than as an esteemed condition of non-belligerence between a Muslim and a non-
Muslim nation.”54 In his study of the “causes of war” in the Qur’ān, Schwartz-
Barcott quotes four verses, among others, which are in no way related to war (7:30, 
34, 38, 40).55 These are among a number of verses in which God tells the children of 
Adam not to follow “the Satan” who seduced their parents. Thus humankind is 
enjoined in these verses to observe justice and refrain from “wrongful oppression”.  
He confuses verses giving accounts about events prior to Islam with those 
referring to incidents that took place during the Prophet’s lifetime. For example, he 
quotes two verses from the chapter “Children of Israel” (17:16-17) in which God, 
speaking in the first person plural, narrates the destruction of “a township” pre-dating 
Islam. It seems that because of the title of the chapter and the pronoun “We”, the 
author believes that these verses contain a Qur’ānic admission that “Muslims under 
Muhammad annihilated entire communities of Jews because ‘they commit 
abomination.’”56  
His reading of a pre-Islamic incident mentioned in chapter 10557 leads him to 
express his hope that this chapter “will not be used in order to promote biological, 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., p. 46. 
55 Ibid., pp. 47 f. 
56 Ibid., p. 67. 
57 Qur’ān 105:1-5. 
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chemical, or nuclear warfare.”58 Although he remarks that this observation “might 
seem to be too speculative, morbid, and even a little paranoid”,59 he suggests that, in 
the light of his reading of the Qur’ān and the Prophet’s behaviour as a warrior, these 
fears are worthy of consideration,60 but Schwartz-Barcott bases his knowledge of the 
life of the Prophet solely on Maxime Rodinson’s Muhammad, a biography of the 
Prophet written from the sociological viewpoint of a Communist author.61  
Although Schwartz-Barcott’s work does not represent mainstream Western 
scholarship, it shows how the Qur’ān can be bizarrely distorted, and he also imposes 
his military background as a former member of the US Marine Corps on some areas 
of his book.62 Schwartz-Barcott’s work is put forward here merely as an example of 
the superficial approach in order to show the necessity for researchers who attempt to 
study the Qur’ānic position on war to refer to the Qur’ānic exegetical literature and 
disciplines. 
 
2.4.2 Selective-Intermediary Approach 
The second approach is by studying the Qur’ān through intermediaries, i.e., the 
exegetes’ interpretations of the Qur’ān. Because of the diverse interpretations of 
many of the Qur’ānic texts by the exegetes, researchers should specify the exegetes 
whose work they are studying, in order to take account of their methodologies for 
                                                 
58 Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror and Peace in the Qur’ān and in Islam, p. 82. 
59 Ibid., p. 82. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Maxime Rodinson, Muhammad, trans. Anne Carter, 2nd English ed. (London: Penguin, 1996). For a 
critique of Rodinson’s Muhammad see, Muhammad Mu hammad Abū Laylah, Muhammad bayn al-
Haqīqah wa al-Iftrā’: Fī al-Radd ‛alā al-Kātib al-Yahūdī al-Firinsī Maxime Rodinson (Cairo: Dār al-
Nashr lil-Jāmi‛āt, 1999/1420).   
62 It is worth adding here that this book is prefaced by General Anthony C. Zinni, former Commander 
in Chief, United States Central Command. General Zinni writes in his preface: “a remarkable work 
that analyzes the cultural, religious, and historical aspects that influence decisions and actions taken 
by the enemy we face today. It is an insightful tool in helping us understand the nature of this current 
conflict and in interpreting and predicting actions of the enemy. For decision makers in this conflict, 
this is a vital guide to analyzing these challenges”. p. xvii. 
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interpreting the texts and the socio-political factors affecting their interpretations of 
the Qur’ānic position on war throughout Islamic history. Verses may be quoted out 
of context and the interpretations of exegetes may be selectively presented if the 
researcher wishes to support a particular view on the Qur’ānic attitude to war. This is 
one of the major problems in the study of Islam, i.e., the problem of the 
representation of Islam: who represents Islam?  
 
2.4.3 Discipline-Based Approach 
What is meant here by a discipline-based approach is that scholars use the Qur’ānic 
exegetical disciplines mentioned above, or they may use others, in order to present 
the position of the Qur’ān on war, and then use their own ijtihād (exertion of 
intellectual efforts) to arrive at their own understanding of the position of the Qur’ān. 
Here scholars also support their positions by referring to other exegetes or jurists to 
support their understanding of the Qur’ānic position. The main difference between 
this approach and the selective-intermediary approach is that in this approach 
scholars depend on their own understanding of the Qur’ānic position, while in the 
selective-intermediary approach they depend on the understanding of their 
intermediaries. These intermediaries are usually the earliest exegetes of the Qur’ān, 
who in turn depend for their interpretations on other intermediaries, i.e., the opinions 
of the Companions of the Prophet or their successive generations. Exegetes 
sometimes mention a variety of opinions given by these earliest Muslims about the 
reasons of revelation and the meaning of particular Qur’ānic texts. They may merely 
mention these different opinions or advocate a “preferred opinion”, or what is called 
in Islamic scholarship “the majority opinion”, and they always end by adding the 
phrase wa Allah a‛lam (God is the knower [of the truth]). This process of interpreting 
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the Qur’ān exemplifies the independence of Muslim scholars and the absence of 
institutionalized interpretation of the Qur’ān in Islam. 
 
2.5 Qur’ānic Texts on War 
The three words (with their derivatives) used in the Qur’ān context of war are: qitāl 
(fighting, murder, killing, infanticide), jihād (struggle, striving, war) and harb (war). 
Sixty-nine derivatives of qitāl occur altogether one-hundred-and-seventy times in the 
Qur’ān – ninety-five times in Medinan texts addressing the context of the 
relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, and seventy-five times in the 
contexts of accounts about nations prior to Islam, or retaliation for murder, or the 
pre-Islamic custom of female infanticide.  
Seventeen derivatives of jihād occur altogether forty-one times in eleven 
Meccan texts and thirty Medinan ones, with the following five meanings: striving 
because of religious belief (21),63 war (12),64 non-Muslim parents exerting pressure, 
i.e., jihād, to make their children abandon Islam (2),65 solemn oaths (5)66 and 
physical strength (1).67  
Three derivatives of the word harb occur altogether six times, all in Medinan 
texts, with the following four meanings: war with non-Muslims (3),68 banditry as war 
against society (1),69 figurative punishment by God in the Hereafter or by the 
                                                 
63 Qur’ān 2:218; 5:35-54; 8:72-74-75; 9:19-20-73; 16:110; 22:78-78; 25:52-52; 29:6-6- 69; 47:31; 49: 
15; 60:1; 66:9. 
64 Qur’ān 3:142; 4:95-95-95; 9:16-24-41-44-81-85-88; 61:11. 
65 Qur’ān 29:8; 31:15. 
66 Qur’ān 5:53; 6:109; 16:38; 24:53; 35:42. 
67 Qur’ān 9:79. 
68 Qur’ān 8:57; 9:107; 47:4. 
69 Qur’ān 5:33. See Chapter Five. 
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Prophet in this world for dealing by usury (1)70 and war in a pre-Islamic context 
(1).71  
 Firestone maintains that when the phrase fī sabīl Allah (in the path of God) 
qualifies the word jihād, it identifies jihād as “furthering or promoting God’s 
kingdom on earth.”72 He does not, however, give a reference or example to illustrate 
this meaning, although the phrase fī sabīl Allah occurs sixty-eight times in the 
Qur’ān. In fact, none of the texts where the word jihād occurs in the Qur’ān in 
conjunction with the phrase fī sabīl Allah gives this meaning of “furthering or 
promoting God’s kingdom on earth.” There are also three occurrences of the word 
sabīlī (My way, i.e., God’s way), eleven occurrences of the word sabīlih (His way, 
i.e., God’s way) and one occurrence of the word subulinā (Our ways, i.e., God’s 
ways). They occur in eleven Meccan and fifteen Medinan chapters in the following 
five senses in the Qur’ān: debarring people from God’s religion or violating God’s 
religion or referring to God’s religion in general (35),73 warring or fighting in God’s 
cause (20),74 fleeing persecution for following God’s religion or struggling for God’s 
religion (17),75 giving money for God’s cause, either for preparing the army or as 
charity to the poor (10)76 and preaching the religion of God (1).77 Some of these 
senses, such as fighting in God’s cause and debarring people from following God’s 
religion, address pre-Islamic contexts.78  
                                                 
70 Qur’ān 2:279. 
71 Qur’ān 5:64. 
72 Firestone, Jihād, p. 17.  
73 Qur’ān 2:217; 3:99-195; 4:160-167; 6:116-117-153; 7:45-86; 8:36-47; 9:9-34; 11:19; 12:108; 14:3-
30; 16:88-94-125; 22:9-25; 29:69; 31:6; 38:26-26; 39:8; 47:1-32-34; 53:30; 58:16; 63:2; 68:7. 
74 Qur’ān 2:154-190-244; 3:13-146-157-167-169; 4:74-74-75-76-94-95; 9:24-111; 47:4; 73:20; 60:1; 
61:4. 
75 Qur’ān 2:218; 4:89-100; 5:35-54; 8:72-74; 9:19-20-38-41-81-120; 22:58; 24:22; 49:15; 61:11. 
76 Qur’ān 2:195-261-262-273; 4:84; 8:60; 9:34-60; 47:38; 57:10.  
77 Qur’ān 16:125. 
78 Qur’ān 3:146; 7:86; 38:26-26. 
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 The phrase fī sabīl Allah therefore indicates an act done for, or because of the 
religion of, God. In other words, as Muhammad Abdel Haleem explains, the phrase fī 
sabīl Allah in the Qur’ān indicates “the way of truth and justice, including all the 
teachings it gives on the justifications and the conditions for the conduct of war and 
peace”.79 Thus when people flee their homes, support their army, tolerate 
persecution, preach the religion of God, or give charity to the poor, they have in 
mind that they are doing all these acts for the protection/defence and spread of 
religion and/or the reward of God. While it has been maintained “that religion as a 
casus belli leads inevitably to total war”,80 it is obvious that any war to defend 
religion, or in modern terms, for freedom of religion, is a just war. The crucial point 
in the study of the tradition of war in Islam is deciding whether jihād or fighting fī 
sabīl Allah is a “holy war” or a “just war” in the Western sense. This necessitates 
finding out whether jihād or fighting in Islam is permitted only in self-defence 
against persecution of, or aggression on, Muslims or whether it is permitted to 
initiate offensive wars on non-Muslims for the sake of spreading Islam.   
 In Islamic discourse, at least theoretically or for some of the Muslims, the 
lives of Muslims are centred around God, since the word “Islam” indicates 
submission and obedience to God, and everything is viewed in terms of what is halāl 
(permitted) and what is harām (prohibited) by God. In other words, everything that is 
done or avoided is done or avoided with the intention of pleasing God or avoiding 
His displeasure. Thus, everything that Muslims do is done in the way of God, or 
according to the way of God, or at least not against the ordinances of God, so that 
                                                 
79 Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Understanding the Qur’ān: Themes and Style (London: Tauris, 1999), 
p. 62; see also al-Qāsimī, Al-Jihād wa al-Huqūq al-Dawliyyah, pp. 107-109. See also on the concept 
of jihād fī sabīl Allah, Abdulrahman Muhammad Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad in Classical 
Fiqh and Modern Islamic Thought” (PhD thesis, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1998), pp. 35-
47.  
80 John Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John 
Knox, 1993), p. 55. 
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being good to one’s neighbours, smiling on seeing someone’s face, giving charity to 
the poor, loving one’s friends fī Allah (in God), being good to one’s spouse, having 
sexual relation with one’s spouse and avoiding sexual relations outside marriage, 
working to support one’s dependents, seeking knowledge, etc., are all acts done “in 
God” or “in God’s way”.81 According to hadīth, a woman’s well-performed 
pilgrimage is jihād fī sabīl Allah82 and travelling in pursuit of knowledge is 
considered an act fī sabīl Allah until one returns.83 If they lack understanding of this 
Muslim mindset, outsiders may conclude that jihād fī sabīl Allah is the Islamic 
equivalent of the Western concept of holy war.  
Another characteristic of Islam that is often misunderstood by contemporary 
researchers is that, in Islam morality, legality, and even etiquette are intertwined.84 
Thus it is disturbing to the Western mind to find that justifications of war in Islam 
are religiously based. However, these Islamic justifications need to be investigated to 
find out whether they correspond with Western “holy war” or “the just war” theories, 
irrespective of whether or not they are religiously motivated.  
 
2.6 The Qur’ānic Casus Belli 
The Qur’ānic justifications for war can be examined in the following texts: 2:190-
194, 216-217; 4:75-76; 8:38-39, 61; 9:5, 29; 22:39-40; 60:8-9, all of which are 
                                                 
81 See Muhammad Hammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of State: Being a Treatise on Siyar, That is Islamic 
Notion of Public International Law, Consisting of the Laws of Peace, War and Neutrality, Together 
with Precedents from Orthodox Practice and Preceded by a Historical and General Introduction , 
rev. & enl. 5th ed. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), p. 98. 
82 See h adīths numbers 2720 and 2721 in Muhammad ibn Ismā‛īl al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‛ al-Sahīh  al-
Mukhtasar, ed. Mustafā Dīb al-Baghā, 3rd ed. (Damascus; Beirut: Dār ibn Kathīr, 1987/1407), Vol. 3, 
p. 1054. 
83 See hadīth number 20870 in Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī, Jāmi‛ al-Ahādīth: Al-Jāmi‛ al-Saghīr wa 
Zawā’iduh wa al-Jāmi‛ al-Kabīr (N.p.: n.d.), Vol. 7, p. 61; h adīth number 2647 in Muhammad ibn 
‛Isā al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmi‛ al-Sahīh Sunan al-Tirmidhī, ed. Ahmad Muhammad Shākir et al. (Beirut: 
Dār Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‛Arabī, n.d.), Vol. 5, p. 29. 
84 See Sobhi Mahmassani, “The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine”, 
Recueil des Cours, Vol. 117, 1966, pp. 228, 319. 
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Medinan revelations. The first Qur’ānic revelation permitting recourse to war in 
Islam85 explains the casus belli as follows:  
“Permission to [engage in fighting] is given to those against whom war is 
waged because they have been wronged; verily God is able to give them 
victory. Those who have been expelled from their homes unjustly and only 
for saying: God is our Lord; had not God permitted people to defend 
themselves against [the aggression of] others, monasteries, churches, 
synagogues and mosques, wherein the name of God is oft-mentioned, would 
be pulled down; certainly God will support those who support Him; indeed 
God is All-Strong, All-Mighty.” (Qur’ān 22:39-40)  
This text explains that the Islamic casus belli is defence against aggression. It adds 
that Muslims were expelled from their homes unjustly only because of their belief in 
God.86 That is to say that the Islamic casus belli here, as John Kelsay puts it, is “a 
                                                 
85 See, for example, Ismā‛īl ibn ‛Umar ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‛Azīm (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 
1980-1/1401), Vol. 3, p. 226; Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Ansārī al-Qurtubī, Al-Jāmi‛ li-Ahkām al-
Qur’ān (Cairo: Dār al-Sha‛b, n.d.), Vol. 12, p. 68; ‛Abd al-Rāziq ibn Hammām al-S ana‛ānī, Tafsīr al-
Qur’ān, ed. Mustafā Muslim Muhammad (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Rushd, 1980-1/1401), Vol. 3, p. 39; 
Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1993), Vol. 6, pp. 57 f.; Muhammad 
ibn Muslim ibn ‛Ubayd Allah ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī, Al-Maghāzī al-Nabawiyyah, ed. Suhayl Zakkār 
(Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1981), p. 105; Mahmūd Shaltūt, Al-Islām wa al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah: Fī al-
Silm wa al-Harb ([Cairo]: Maktab Shaykh al-Jāmi‛ al-Azhar lil-Shu’ūn al-‛Āmmah, n.d.), p. 29; 
Nādiyah Husnī S aqr, Falsafah al-Harb fī al-Islām (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 
1990/1410), p. 71; Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Sayyid al-Nās, ‛Uyūn al-Athar fī 
Funūn al-Maghāzī wa al-Shamā’il wa al-Siyar, ed. Muhammad al-‛Īd al-Khatrāwī and Muhyī al-Dīn 
Mito (Medina: Maktabah Dār al-Turāth; Damascus; Beirut: Dār ibn Kathīr, n.d.), Vol. 1, p. 352; ‛Abd 
al-‛Azīz Zahrān, Al-Silm wa al-Harb fī al-Islām, Kutub Islāmiyyah, Issue no. 164 (Cairo: Supreme 
Council for Islamic Affairs, 1974/1394), p. 35; Muhammad al-Sādiq Afīfī, Al-Mujtama‛ al-Islāmī wa 
al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah (Cairo: Mu’assasah al-Khānjī, 1980), p. 128; Muhammad ‛Izzat Darwazah, 
Al-Jihād fī Sabīl Allah fī al-Qur’ān wa al-Hadīth, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Al-Nāshir, 1990), p. 45; Ahmad 
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defense of human rights”.87 In other words, this verse supports the protection of 
religious freedom88 in general since the protection of monasteries, churches, 
synagogues and mosques is given as a justification for defensive war.89  
A few years after the flight from Mecca, the persecution of al-mustad‛afīn 
(the oppressed socially weak Muslims who were unable to flee Mecca) is advocated 
as a casus belli:  
“Would not you fight in the way of God for al-mustad‛afīn (the oppressed 
socially weak Muslims) from men, women and children who pray: Our Lord! 
Take us from this city of the oppressive people and appoint for us from Your 
side a guardian and appoint for us from Your side a protector. Those who 
have believed fight in the way of God and those who disbelieve fight in the 
way of Satan, so fight the allies of Satan; surely the plot of Satan is weak.” 
(Qur’ān 4:75-76) 
This text is not connected with any specific incident of war, but justifies having 
recourse to war in order to stop the religious persecution of the Muslim minority in 
Mecca at that time.90 Here, fighting to stop the religious persecution of Muslims is 
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given as another reason for fighting fī sabīl Allah. Ridā states that fighting in the way 
of God was permitted to stop the persecution of Muslims who were prevented from 
fleeing Mecca to follow Islam.91 Thus, according to the words of Ridā and al-
Marāghī, war in Islam was permitted in order to protect hurriyyah al-dīn (freedom of 
religion).92 In addition to stopping the religious persecution of Muslim minorities 
and liberating Muslim and dhimmi prisoners of war, al-Qarad āwī adds in the light of 
this text that the Islamic state should also go to war to rescue non-Muslim minorities 
if they require its help and if it is able to rescue them.93 
 Some exegetes consider that it is not Qur’ān 22:39-40 that is the first 
revelation permitting war in Islam, but Qur’ān 2:190-194, although the majority 
maintain that these verses were revealed in connection with the incident of al-
Hudaybiyah (6/628), discussed in the previous chapter.94 The text reads as follows:  
“And fight in the way of God those who fight against you but lā ta‛tadūā (do 
not transgress); indeed God does not like transgressors. (190) And fight them 
wherever you find them and expel them from wherever they expelled you, 
and fitnah [persecution] is more grievous than killing, and do not fight them 
at the Sacred Mosque until they fight you therein; but if they fight you, then 
kill them; such is the recompense of the unbelievers. (191) But if they 
intahaūā (cease) then, indeed, God is Most Forgiving, Most Merciful. (192) 
And fight them so that/until there is no fitnah [persecution] and religion 
[without fitnah] is for God, but if they intahaūā (cease), then there is no 
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fighting/hostility except against the persecutors. (193) [Fighting in] The 
Sacred Month is for [fighting against you] in The Sacred Month and 
[violation] of the prohibitions [subject to the law of] retaliation; therefore 
whoso commits aggression against you, then respond within the same degree 
of aggression waged against you; and fear God and know that God is with 
those who fear Him.” (194) 
The locutionary act in this text: “fight in the way of God” is clarified by four 
conditions.  
(1) “Those who fight against you”. This indicates permission to fight in the way of 
God against those who initiate aggression against Muslims. Thus, if this text was 
revealed in relation to the incident of al-Hudaybiyah, it gave its addressees 
permission to defend themselves if the Meccans attacked them, while if it is intended 
for wider application, it permits Muslims to defend themselves against any 
aggression in general.  
(2) “Lā ta‛tadūā” is understood by some to mean a prohibition against the initiation 
of aggression,95 while most exegetes interpret this phrase as the Islamic jus in bello 
(rules regulating the conduct during war). They explain that this phrase indicates the 
prohibition of targeting non-combatants,96 such as women, children, the aged and the 
clergy, or those with whom Muslims have a peace agreement, and also that it 
amounts to the prohibition of mutilation, unnecessary burning and destruction, 
cutting down trees, killing animals except for food, surprising the enemy with an act 
of war without a declaration of war, and fighting for personal gain or glory.97  
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This jus in bello concept is reinforced in the phrase faman i‛tadā ‛alaykum 
(whoso commits aggression against you), fā‛tadūā ‛alayh bi-mithl mā i‛tadā 
‛alaykum (then respond within the same degree of aggression waged against you). (3) 
Prohibition of fighting at the Sacred Mosque, unless they are attacked therein. (4) 
Cessation of fighting if the enemy intahaūā (desist). Most exegetes interpret this 
word to mean that cessation of fighting is conditional upon the enemy ending their 
aggression against, and religious persecution of, Muslims and ceasing their unbelief 
in God.98 Al-Qurt ubī interprets it to mean ending their unbelief in God, if they were 
pagans, or paying the jizyah if they were People of the Book.99 So it is apparent that 
some exegetes did not distinguish between ending aggression against Muslims and 
ending unbelief in God as the condition for the cessation of fighting, and this could 
significantly confuse what this text stipulates as the justification for the recourse to 
fighting. That is to say that it is not clear here whether Muslims are permitted to fight 
their enemies either until they stop their aggression or until they end their unbelief in 
God. Qut b clarifies this by stating that Muslims are to have peaceful relations with 
their enemies if they stop their aggression on, and persecution of, Muslims, but the 
forgiveness and mercy of God is conditional upon their ending their unbelief.100     
The meaning of the term fitnah in the locutionary act, “fitnah is more 
grievous than killing”, is very significant for understanding the Qur’ānic 
justifications for war in this text. While exegetes sometimes refer to fitnah as 
unbelief in God, they interpret this locutionary act to mean that abandoning Islam 
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under torture is worse for a Muslim than being put to death under torture.101 This 
refers to Bilāl ibn Rabāh, the Companion of the Prophet, who was tortured to make 
him recant, and Sumayyah and her husband Yāsir, who were killed under torture 
because of their refusal to abjure Islam.102 Other exegetes interpret it to mean that the 
Meccans’ unbelief is worse than the incident of the killing of ‛Amr ibn al-Hadramī, 
who was killed by Wāqid ibn ‛Abd Allah al-Tamīmī.103 In this context, al-
Zamakhsharī and al-Nasafī refer to situations in which a person suffers to the extent 
of preferring to die rather than tolerating the persecution or its consequences; for 
example, it was considered preferable to die rather than suffering the persecution of 
being expelled from one’s home.104  
 This concept of fitnah105 in the sense of religious persecution and torture to 
make Muslims abjure Islam is reinforced again in Qur’ān 2:216-217:  
“Fighting has been enjoined on you though it is hateful to you; but you may 
hate a thing while it is good for you and you may like a thing while it is bad 
for you; and God knows and you do not know. (216) They ask you about 
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fighting in the Sacred Month: say fighting therein is [a] grave [sin], and/but106 
debarring from God’s way and unbelief in Him and the Sacred Mosque and 
expelling its people from it are/is graver [sin] in the sight of God; and fitnah 
is graver than killing; and they will continue to fight you until they turn you 
into renegades from your religion, if they can; whoever of you reneges from 
his religion and dies as a unbeliever, such are those whose actions become in 
vain in this world and the Hereafter, and they are the inmates of Fire; therein 
they eternally abide.” (217)  
The phrase “fighting has been enjoined on you” indicates the lifting of the 
prohibition of any militant response to the Meccans’ aggression, which was in place 
during the Meccan period. But more importantly, the phrase “fitnah is graver than 
killing; and they will continue to fight you until they turn you into renegades from 
your religion” shows that the term fitnah indicates the religious persecution and 
torture of the Meccans, still a minority, who embraced the religion of Islam.107 It 
adds that the Meccans were determined to continue their aggression against the 
Muslims until they recant their belief in Islam, even after their flight from Mecca.    
In the chapter of the Qur’ān entitled “The Spoils of War”, revealed after the 
battle of Badr (Ramadān 2/March 624), defensive war to liberate Muslims from the 
persecution of the unbelievers is reinforced as a casus belli. The text of Qur’ān 8:38-
39 (below) indicates that the cessation of fighting is conditional upon the 
unbelievers’ ending their persecution. However, some exegetes interpret it to mean 
that the cessation of fighting is conditional upon their ending their unbelief. 
“Say to those unbelievers: if they intahaūā (cease), their past will be 
forgiven; but if they return (to fighting you) then there are already precedents 
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of earlier nations. (38) And fight them until there is no fitnah (persecution) 
and yakūn al-dīn kulluh lillah (religion is wholly for God); and if they 
intahaūā (cease), then indeed God is aware of what they are doing.” (39) 
The main point here is the explanations given to justify the command to fight the 
unbelievers “until there is no fitnah and yakūn al-dīn kulluh lillah”. If fitnah means 
unbelief (in God), the Muslim addressees of this text are required to fight the 
unbelievers until unbelief is eradicated from Mecca and its surroundings, as 
interpreted by al-Rāzī, or from the rest of the world.108 This means that jihād, 
according to this interpretation of fitnah, is an offensive war waged against non-
Muslims because of their refusal to believe in Islam. But if fitnah is interpreted to 
mean the persecution of Muslims until they recant, Muslims are required to fight 
their persecutors until they enjoy complete freedom to worship God without fear or 
the need to hide their beliefs.109 According to this interpretation, jihād is a defensive 
war justified as being necessary to protect Muslims from the religious persecution of 
their non-Muslim enemies.  
During war, if the enemy decides to make peace, then the Qur’ān commands 
that peace be made. It reads: “And if they incline to peace, then incline to it; and put 
your trust in God, it is He who is the All-Hearing, the All-Knowing” (Qur’ān 8:61). 
Furthermore, a later revelation (Qur’ān 60:8-9) states clearly that God specifically 
forbids Muslims from entering into friendly relations or alliances with those who 
fight against Muslims because of their religious beliefs and expel them from their 
homes: 
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“God does not forbid you from dealing kindly and justly towards those who 
did not fight you because of your religion and did not expel you from your 
homes; verily God loves the just. (8) But God forbids you from allying with 
those who fought you because of your religion and expelled you from your 
homes and aided in your expulsion; and whoso allies with them, those are the 
wrongdoers.” (9) 
However, exegetes give several interpretations of who is indicated in the phrase 
“those who did not fight you because of your religion”. Some exegetes maintain that 
it refers to particular tribes with whom the Prophet had secured non-aggression pacts, 
such as the tribes of Khuzā‛ah and Banū al-Hārith, or a group from the tribe of Banū 
Hāshim. Others maintain that this verse refers to women and children, while yet 
others argue that it was revealed in relation to the mother of Asmā’, daughter of Abū 
Bakr or that it refers to the relatives of the Muslims in Mecca. It is also contended 
that it refers to non-combatants and the Meccans who did not oppress the Muslims 
and it is even believed by some that it refers to the Muslims who did not flee from 
Mecca. Al-T abarī reports most of the above opinions and prefers the view that this 
phrase refers to all enemy non-combatants no matter what their religion or belief. He 
adds that it is not prohibited to enter into friendly relations with non-combatants from 
the enemy side, unless it is to the detriment of Muslims or strengthens the enemy 
combatants.110 
 These numerous interpretations exemplify the variety of ways in which the 
Qur’ān can be interpreted. Most of the exegetes simply refer to some of these diverse 
interpretations, while others advocate one of them in particular. However, the most 
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obvious difficulty in identifying the Qur’ānic justification for the recourse to war in 
the texts discussed above is the disagreement among the exegetes over the meaning 
of the term fitnah. The two interpretations of the term fitnah referred to above, i.e., 
the persecution of the Muslims to make them abandon Islam, or the unbelief of the 
pagans, give contradictory rulings on the justification for the recourse to war in the 
Qur’ān: if fitnah means the persecution of Muslims to make them abandon their 
belief in the religion of Islam, the Qur’ān justifies a defensive war to protect freedom 
of religion, but if fitnah means unbelief, the Qur’ān justifies offensive war against the 
Meccan unbelievers referred to in the above texts. Indeed, these different 
interpretations of the texts might lead to the formulation of different Islamic theories 
of war, depending on the way these verses are interpreted. It is worth adding here 
that the above texts have been considered in roughly chronological order, though any 
other ordering of the texts would not particularly change the Qur’ānic justifications 
for war.  
 In fact, the revelations that crucially formulated a position in the classical 
theory of war in Islam are Qur’ān 9:5 and 9:29, because these texts, dated to the year 
9/631, are believed to be the last of the revelations regarding war and so, in 
accordance with the theory of abrogation, they contain the last divine statement on 
war in Islam.111 Verse 9:5 addresses the relationship with the Meccan idolaters and 
9:29 addresses the relationship with the People of the Book in relation to the incident 
of Tabūk.   
The first twenty-eight verses of the same chapter address the relationship with 
the Meccan idolaters. The context of this revelation is that the Prophet did not 
perform the pilgrimage in that year because the Meccan idolaters used to 
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circumambulate the Ka‛bah naked. The Prophet therefore sent the first thirty or forty 
verses of this chapter to be proclaimed in the 9th day of the month of Dhū al-
Hijjah/roughly 18 March 631, during the pilgrimage. These verses gave those 
Meccans who had no agreement with the Muslims four months, and those who had 
peace agreements with the Muslims, and had not broken their terms or supported 
others in attacks against the Muslims, until the end of the term of their agreement. 
Then the text reads:  
“When the Sacred Months have passed, kill the polytheists wherever you find 
them and capture them and besiege them and wait for them in every place of 
ambush; but if they repent and perform prayer and give the poor-due, then 
leave them their way; surely God is Oft-Forgiving, Oft-Merciful.” (Qur’ān 
9:5) 
Exegetes differ on the meaning of the sacred months referred to in this verse: 
while some argue that it refers to the four established sacred months of the lunar 
calendar, others argue that it refers to a four-month period starting from the day of 
the proclamation of this text.112 Although the preceding verse commands that the 
peace agreement with the idolaters be observed until the end of its term, and the 
same command is reinforced in a following verse (9:7), some exegetes hold that this 
verse refers to all the idolaters, while others maintain that it refers only to the Arab 
idolaters who have no peace agreements with the Muslims.113 Still others hold that it 
                                                 
112 See, for example, al-Tabarī, Jāmi‛ al-Bayān, Vol. 10, p. 78; Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, Vol. 2, pp. 336 f.; 
al-Suyūtī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr, Vol. 4, p. 131; al-Qurt ubī, Al-Jāmi‛, Vol. 8, p. 72; al-Shawkānī, Fath  
al-Qadīr, Vol. 2, p. 337; Ridā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 10, pp. 197 f.; Abū Zahrah, Zahrah al-Tafāsīr, 
Vol. 6, p. 3231; Abdel Haleem, The ‘Sword Verse’ Myth, pp. 7 f. 
113 Ridā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 10, pp. 200 f.; Ahmad Mah mūd Krīmah, Al-Jihād fī al-Islām: Dirāsah 
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Für Arabistik und Islamwissenschaft (Göttingen, Aug. 1974) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1976), pp. 286 f.; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 287 f. 
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refers only to the Meccan idolaters who violated the armistice of al-Hudaybiyah by 
killing some from the tribe of Khuzā‛ah inside the Sacred Mosque.114  
This text indicates that there should be a cessation of fighting if the idolaters 
“repent” and perform two Islamic obligations – performing the prayer and giving the 
poor-due. In contrast with the preceding texts, most exegetes interpret the word 
“repent” here to mean abandoning their unbelief, not ending their persecution of the 
Muslims.115 While this interpretation indicates that the justification for fighting here 
is the unbelief, verse 9:12 makes fighting conditional upon the enemy’s breaking of 
their agreement with the Muslims.116 Ridā points out that it is their unbelief that 
arouses their aggression against the Muslims.117 He believes that the fighting after 
the passing of the sacred months referred to in this verse has resumed because the 
relationship between the Muslims and the idolaters has returned to the state of war 
that existed prior to the cessation of hostilities.118 
 Verse 9:7 denies the possibility of securing a peace agreement that would be 
honoured by the idolaters, except those with whom the Muslims concluded a peace 
agreement at the Sacred Mosque. Exegetes interpret this verse as a reference to the 
various tribes, such as Kenānah, Damarah, Bakr, Quraysh, Juzaymah, Mudlaj and 
Khuzaymah119 because they did not break their agreement with the Muslims. 
Muslims are therefore to fulfil their agreement with them as long as they abide by it, 
                                                 
114 Al-Hifnī, Mawsū‛ah al-Qur’ān, Vol. 2, p. 1876; al-Qarad āwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, p. 244. 
115 See, for example, al-Suyūtī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr, Vol. 4, p. 132; al-Qurt ubī, Al-Jāmi‛, Vol. 8, p. 
74; Nasr ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad Abū al-Layth al-Samarqandī, Tafsīr al-Samarqandī al-
Musammā Bahr al-‛Ulūm, ed. Mahmūd Matrajī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 2, p. 40; al-Shawkānī, 
Fath al-Qadīr, Vol. 2, pp. 337, 340. 
116 See Zahrān, Al-Silm wa al-Harb, p. 42; Tabliyyah, Al-Islām wa Huqūq al-Insān, p. 54; Troy S. 
Thomas, “Jihad’s Captives: Prisoners of War in Islam”, U.S. Air Force Academy Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 12, 2003, pp. 90 f. 
117 Ridā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 10, p. 201. See also al-Marāghī, Tafsīr al-Marāghī, Vol. 10, p. 58. 
118 Ridā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 10, p. 198. See also al-Marāghī, Tafsīr al-Marāghī, Vol. 10, pp. 58, 61. 
119 See al-Suyūtī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr, Vol. 4, p. 134; al-Qurtubī, Al-Jāmi‛, Vol. 8, p. 78; al-
Samarqandī, Bahr al-‛Ulūm, Vol. 2, p. 40; al-Shawkānī, Fath al-Qadīr, Vol. 2, pp. 337-339; al-
Marāghī, Tafsīr al-Marāghī, Vol. 10, p. 62; Abū Zahrah, Zahrah al-Tafāsīr, Vol. 6, pp. 3234 f. 
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though these tribes did not all become Muslims. However, it is argued that this so-
called “sword verse” abrogates all the Qur’ānic revelations that prescribe any other 
form of relationship with idolaters.120 It is worth adding here that scholars differ in 
identifying this “sword verse”: most hold that it is 9:5, while others maintain that it is 
9:29, 9:36 or 9:41.121 In addition, exegetes differ concerning the number of texts that 
are abrogated by this verse, suggesting that the number of verses might be 70, 114, 
124, 140, 145 or 200.122 Those who consider that this verse abrogates all the other 
Qur’ānic injunctions on this issue have partly developed their theory of war in Islam 
on the basis of this view. Nevertheless, it is worth adding here that al-Dahhāk, ‛Atā’ 
and al-Suddī argue that this verse is abrogated by verse 47:4, which commands the 
Muslims, after the cessation of fighting with the unbelievers, to “set them free either 
graciously or by ransom”.123 According to this position, the final Qur’ānic injunction 
concerning enemy idolaters is that they should be freed or exchanged for Muslim 
captives.  
 The verse addressing the campaign against Tabūk (9:29) formulates the 
classical theory of war with respect to the People of the Book. The exegetes’ 
approach to this verse differs from the historians’ approach to the incident to which it 
refers: while the biographers document the accounts of the event, most exegetes 
interpret the meaning of the text and the ordinances included in it without discussing 
the facts leading to this incident. This may lead to the misconception that the 
campaign against Tabūk was a perlocutionary act of this verse; though the historical 
                                                 
120 David S. Powers, “The Exegetical Genre Nāsikh al-Qur’ān wa Mansūkhuhu”, in Andrew Rippin, 
ed., Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Qur’ān (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), pp. 130 
f. For an excellent discussion of verse 9:5, see Abdel Haleem, The ‘Sword Verse’ Myth, pp. 1-34. 
121 Al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 268 f., 284-300. 
122 See, for example, al-Samarqandī, Bahr al-‛Ulūm, Vol. 2, p. 39; Ibn al-Bārizī, Nāsikh al-Qur’ān, p. 
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123 See al-Tabarī, Jāmi‛ al-Bayān, Vol. 10, pp. 80 f.; al-Qurtubī, Al-Jāmi‛, Vol. 8, p. 73. 
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reports maintained that the Muslim army marched to Tabūk to face the Byzantine 
army on its way to attack Medina, as indicated in the previous chapter. This verse 
thus addresses the context of a particular would be confrontation and the enemy are 
described in the verse. The enemy of the Muslims in this incident was not all the 
People of the Book, but a hostile group of them. Al-Qaradāwī adds that there is no 
justification for going to war against those, whether unbelievers or People of the 
Book, who are not hostile to Muslims.124     
 These two different approaches certainly affect the Islamic theory of war. 
While the historical reports explain this incident as a defensive act to stop the 
Byzantine advance from reaching Medina, the exegetical account could be 
misunderstood as a Qur’ānic injunction to launch a war against People of the Book, 
who are described as follows: 
“Fight those who do not believe in God, nor the Last Day, nor prohibit what 
God and His messenger prohibited, nor follow the religion of the truth, from 
among those who were given the scripture until they pay the jizyah ‛an yad 
(willingly) and they are s āghirūn (submissive to the Islamic rule).” (Qur’ān 
9:29)  
According to a classical Islamic theory described by Firestone as “the 
classical evolutionary theory of war”, the Qur’ānic legislation on war developed in 
four stages: the first stage, “nonconfrontation”, is based on revelations 15:94-95 and 
16:125; the second stage, “defensive fighting”, is based on revelations 22:39-40 and 
2:190; the third stage, “initiating attacks allowed but within the ancient strictures”, is 
                                                 
124 Al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 296 f. 
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based on revelations 2:217 and 2:191; and the fourth stage, “unconditional command 
to fight all unbelievers”, is based on revelations 2:216, 9:5 and 9:29.125  
In fact, the texts attributed to the first stage do not relate to the issue of war: 
while verses 15:94-95 command the Prophet to preach the message he received and 
disregard the harassment of the Meccans, verse 16:125 describes the manner of 
preaching the religion. The formulation of this theory on the basis of these verses has 
no logical or even chronological basis in the Qur’ān and shows how texts can be 
quoted selectively to formulate theories on the Qur’ānic perception of war. The fact 
that two consecutive pairs of verses from the same chapter are selected to explain 
three stages of this so-called evolutionary theory indicates that these texts are 
invoked to support a theory rather than to illustrate the Qur’ānic position on war. It is 
irrational that verse 2:190 (stage two), supports defensive fighting and verse 2:191 
(stage three), supports initiating limited attacks. Moreover, it is even more irrational 
that verse 2:216 (stage four), supports an unconditional command to fight all 
unbelievers, while verse 2:217 (third stage) supports limited attacks. 
While this theory was developed two or three centuries after the emergence 
of Islam, jihād during the period covered in this study meant defence against 
religious persecution and aggression against Muslims. Over the last three centuries, 
jihād has meant the liberation of almost all the Muslim world from European 
occupation. The repercussions of the Western colonization of the Muslim world on 
contemporary Islamic thought and the political situation in the Muslim world are 
totally ignored in Western scholarship. This crucial period of Islamic history 
witnessed the Anglo-French “fragmentation” of the Muslim world and the creation of 
Muslim countries under new names. In this context, Abū al-A‛lā al-Mawdūdī (1903-
                                                 
125 See Firestone, Jihād, pp. 50-65; Firestone, “Disparity and Resolution in the Qur’ānic Teachings on 
War”, pp. 4-17. See also Freamon, “Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War”, pp. 314 f.    
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1979) introduced a new conception of jihād as a revolutionary struggle aimed at 
implementing the Islamic principles of fairness and justice in place of unjust 
systems.126  
Although Qut b states that jihād is only permitted to defend the religion of 
Islam and protect its laws,127 he adopts al-Mawdūdī’s conception of jihād and 
advocates that it is not only defensive.128 It aims to abolish the “oppressive political 
systems under which people are prevented from expressing their freedom to choose 
whatever beliefs they want, and after that it gives the complete freedom to decide 
whether to accept Islam or not”.129 However, this conception of jihād as “a 
permanent revolution”130 is often mistakenly attributed to Qutb rather than to its 
originator, al-Mawdūdī. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The Qur’ānic texts on war indicate that the Qur’ānic justification for war is the 
defence or protection of freedom of religion. The aggressors or oppressors of 
Muslims are identified in the Qur’ān by their religious beliefs, i.e., the kuffār, 
mushrikūn and ahl al-kitāb. This identification of the warring parties according to 
their religious beliefs, let alone the persecution of the Muslims because of their new 
religious beliefs and their flight from Mecca, may lead to the misconception that the 
warring parties were fighting holy wars in the sense that each was fighting for the 
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propagation of their religion. However, the Meccan idolaters’ hostility was initially 
motivated by economic and political causes, as well as by religion. 
Reading the Qur’ānic texts on war in their contexts requires facing the 
problem of reconstructing the details of the warring incidents addressed in these 
texts, which are needed if the nature of this particular conflict is to be identified. That 
is to say, identifying the nature of wars between the Muslims and their enemies 
during the Prophet’s lifetime necessitates studying both the incidents themselves and 
the relevant Qur’ānic texts. The various interpretations of the Qur’ānic texts and the 
use of the exegetical disciplines for the study of the Qur’ān can produce different 
conclusions on the Islamic position on war. Thus, Donner points out that determining 
whether the Qur’ān sanctions only defensive war or offensive war too “is really left 
to the judgement of the exegete”.131 
The diverse interpretations show that there is a lack of clarity between 
aggression and kufr/shirk (unbelief/polytheism) as the Qur’ānic casus belli. While 
the Meccan oppression of the Muslims was a corollary of the Meccan idolaters’ 
unbelief, it is crucial to find out exactly what were the Qur’ānic justifications for war 
against oppressive polytheists. Examination of the incidents of war that took place 
between the Muslims and their enemies during the lifetime of the Prophet, i.e., the 
period of the revelation of the Qur’ān, shows that no act of hostility was initiated by 
the Muslims against an enemy simply because of the latter’s religious beliefs. 
However, exegetes, as explained above, give a variety of interpretations of the 
Qur’ānic justification for war. For example, while the concept of fitnah in the 
locutionary act “fight them until there is no fitnah” is interpreted by some as 
referring to oppression and persecution of Muslims because of their beliefs, others 
                                                 
131 Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conception of War”, p. 47. 
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interpret it to mean unbelief, and still others consider that the oppression is a result of 
the enemy’s unbelief.  
These divergent interpretations produce widely differing understandings of 
the Islamic casus belli and indeed have given rise to diverse positions on the Islamic 
attitudes towards peace and war with others. More importantly, of the Qur’ānic 
disciplines discussed above, the theory of abrogation, by which it is claimed that 
verses 9:5 and 9:29 abrogated all the earlier Qur’ānic texts on relations with the 
idolaters and the People of the Book, also shaped a position in the Islamic classical 
juridical theory of war. 
Contemporary Muslim scholars clarify the distinction between unbelief and 
aggression as casus belli. Regarding religious beliefs, they emphasise the Qur’ānic 
principle that “there is no compulsion in religion”.132 Shaltūt states that there is not a 
single verse in the Qur’ān that justifies war to bring about conversion to Islam, 
otherwise jizyah would not have been accepted from non-Muslims.133 He explains 
that the Islamic casus belli are the prevention of aggression and religious 
persecution, and so fighting must cease once religious freedom is secured, and the 
mission to preach Islam is protected.134 Shaltūt reiterates the same three casus belli  
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as those set out by Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) in the fourteenth century. Ridā adds 
that if preachers are killed or prevented from preaching, Muslims should go to war to 
protect the mission to preach Islam. Furthermore, he also advises that Muslims 
should flee any country where they suffer from fitnah (religious persecution) because 
of their beliefs, or if they cannot express their beliefs freely, even if such a country is 
ruled by Muslims. 
Thus, the Islamic justifications for war are closely linked to, and based on, 
the religion of Islam, but apart from defence against military aggression, the religious 
persecution of Muslims and the need to secure freedom of religion, there is no text in 
the Qur’ān that supports force of arms, let alone for the purpose of compelling others 
to accept Islam. Even those who interpret the unbelief of the idolaters as the 
justification for fighting them say this action was meant to be restricted to the male 
idolaters of Quraysh, according to Malik, or of Arabia, according to Abū Hanīfah.135 
This is why jizyah is accepted from non-Arab idolaters. This distinction between 
Arab and non-Arab idolaters proves that the justification for war here is the 
aggression, not the religious beliefs per se. Also, with reference to verse 9:29, even if 
the justification for fighting the People of the Book is interpreted as arising from 
their beliefs and not to the fact that the Byzantines were on their way to attack the 
Muslims associated with this incident, Islam guarantees their religious freedom and 
defends them against foreign aggression in return for the payment of the jizyah to the 
Muslim authorities, which also proves that conversion was not the intention here, but 
the subjection of the Byzantines to the authority of the Islamic state.  
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Whether jihād is purely defensive or, as Qut b has it, offensively defensive, it 
aims to establish what is deemed by Muslims to be a just cause. However, the 
determination of whether a cause is just has varied throughout history according to 
the circumstances. Since the traditional hostility to those belonging to different 
religions is no longer considered a motive for enmity,136 and after the agreement of 
the member states of the United Nations, as stipulated in Article One of the UN 
Charter, to “maintain international peace” and to settle disputes according to 
International Law,137 no justification is left for any form of war if member states 
abide by the dictates of international law. At present, the religious freedom of 
Muslims is more secure in some non-Muslim countries than in a few Muslim 
countries, transforming the classical paradigm of Muslims versus non-Muslims. Thus 
in the light of the above discussion and the contemporary world situation, it can be 
concluded that the Qur’ānic justifications for recourse to war remain aggression and 
religious persecution, irrespective of the oppressor’s religion.  
                                                 
136 See Karl-Wolfgang Tröger, “Peace and Islam: In History and Practice”, Islam and Christian-
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CHAPTER THREE 
JURIDICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR WAR 
3.1 Introduction 
The outbreaks of hostilities between the Muslims and their enemies in Medina during 
the Prophet’s lifetime and the different interpretations of the Qur’ānic casus belli, 
studied in Chapters One and Two above respectively, were the basis on which the 
jurists of the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries developed the Islamic law of 
war. This chapter studies the justifications for war and Islamic attitudes towards non-
Muslims in the classical Islamic juridical theory of international law and modern 
Islamic writings on the issue. It also examines how the Islamic justifications for war 
in classical and modern writings are presented in Western literature. The significance 
of studying how the Islamic justifications for war are dealt with in Western literature 
is that it indicates how Western scholars and policy makers view the nature of 
conflicts where Islam plays, or is thought to play, a role. 
The area of Islamic international law is part of the science of fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence) dealt with in the literature under various headings such as Siyar, 
Jihād, Maghāzī (campaigns) and Amān (safe conduct). Fiqh covers seven main areas: 
(1) acts of worship; (2) family law; (3) financial transactions; (4) governance; (5) 
criminal law; (6) morality and (7) international law. The major but very common 
error in Western scholarship in the area of Islamic international law is the confusion 
between sharī‛ah and fiqh. Apart from the diverse assessments of the historical 
instances of war during the Prophet’s lifetime, and the various interpretations of the 
Qur’ānic texts on war, confusing sharī‛ah with fiqh, has made the area of Islamic 
international law in Western literature the most blatant area of conflict between 
Islamic/insider and Western/outsider scholarship. Moreover, the Islamic law of war 
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was formulated by individual jurist-scholars according to their differing 
interpretations of the sharī‛ah texts and their use of exegetical disciplines and 
juridical methodologies. No less importantly, as John L. Esposito points out, this 
formulation of the tradition of war in Islam occurred “in specific historical and 
political contexts.”1 The failure to take into consideration the nature of the 
formulation of the Islamic law of war and to relate it to specific periods in history 
and the paradigm of international relations during which it emerged, explains much 
of the confusion about the justifications for war in Islam. Thus, this chapter argues 
that, in the absence of a codification of applicable Islamic law of war by a body of 
international Muslim jurist-scholars, much of the confusion about the justifications 
for war in Islam, and the nature of jihād in general, will remain. 
 
3.2 Sharī‛ah or Fiqh 
Sharī‛ah is defined as the set of laws given by God to His messengers.2 Thus, Islamic 
sharī‛ah is confined to the laws given in the Qur’ān, as the revealed word of God, 
and in the Sunnah/Hadīth of the Prophet, by virtue of some of his acts being divinely 
inspired. Therefore, sharī‛ah “contained in God’s revelation ([Q]ur’ān and hadīth), is 
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Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993/1414), p. 2; Muhammad Talaat al-Ghunaimi, The Muslim 
Conception of International Law and the Western Approach (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 
106; N. Calder, “Sharī‛a”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., Vol. IX, p. 322; ‛Abbās Husnī 
Muhammad, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī: Āfāquh wa Tatawwuruh, Da‛wah al-Haq, Issue 10 October/November 
1981/Muharram 1402, 2nd ed. (Mecca: Muslim World League, 1993-4/1414), pp. 7-11; Hamdī ‛Abd 
al-Mun‛im Shalabī, Fiqh al-‛Ibādāt (Damanhur: Behera Press, 2003/1424), p. 5; Muhammad al-
Disūqī, Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī (Beirut: Dār al-Madār al-Islāmī, 2006), pp. 20-23; ‛Abdur 
Rahmān I. Doi, Sharī‛ah: The Islamic Law (London: Ta Ha Publishers, 1984/1404), pp. 2-6; Irshad 
Abdal-Haqq, “Islamic Law: An Overview of its Origin and Elements”, Journal of Islamic Law and 
Culture, Vol. 7, Issue 1, Spring/Summer 2002, pp. 33-36. 
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explained and elaborated by the interpretative activity of scholars, masters of fi[q]h, 
the fu[q]ahā’”,3 i.e., the jurists.  
 The word fiqh literally means “understanding”. Hence, the science of fiqh is 
defined as “the practical rules derived by the mujtahids (independent legal thinkers) 
from particular sources or proofs.”4 This means that, in this “academic discipline”,5 
jurists, on the one hand, attempt to discover, understand,6 explore, describe, explain, 
elaborate, interpret7 and derive8 the rules of the sharī‛ah and, on the other, exercise 
their independent reasoning and judgement to formulate Islamic rules for all 
contemporary, practical activities. In the words of Kamali, fiqh “is a product largely 
of the juristic interpretation of scholars and their understanding of the general 
guidance of wahy [revelation]”.9   
 In the process of making Islamic rules, jurists refer to (1) the Qur’ān, (2) the 
Sunnah and (3) ijmā‛ (consensus of opinion),10 that is, the primary sources of Islamic 
law. If they do not find specific guidance in these sources, they exercise their own 
                                                 
3 Calder, “Sharī‛a”, p. 322. 
4 Hassan, An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Law, p. 1. See also Ann K.S. Lambton, State and 
Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists, 
London Oriental Series Vol. 36 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 4; Mohammad Hashim 
Kamali, “Fiqh and Adaptation to Social Reality”, The Muslim World, Vol. LXXXVI, No. 1, January, 
1996, p. 62; Shalabī, Fiqh al-‛Ibādāt, pp. 9 f.; Subhī al-Sālihī, Ma‛ālim al-Sharī‛ah al-Islāmiyyah 
(Beirut: Dār al-‛Ilm lil-Malāyyn, 1975), p. 13; Muhammad Mustafā Shalabī, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī bayn 
al-Mithaliyyah wa al-Waqi‛iyyah (Beirut: Al-Dār al-Jāmi‛iyyah, 1982), p. 112; Muhammad, Al-Fiqh 
al-Islāmī, pp. 31-36, 208; al-Disūqī, Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, p. 16; Abdal-Haqq, “Islamic Law”, 
pp. 36-39; Robert D. Crane, “The Essence of Islamic Law”, The Journal of Islamic law, Vol. 3, 
Fall/Winter, 1998, p. 186. 
5 Calder, “Sharī‛a”, p. 322. 
6 Al-Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception, p. 106. 
7 Calder, “Sharī‛a”, p. 322. 
8 Bernard Weiss, “Interpretation in Islamic Law: The theory of Ijtihād”, American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1978, pp. 199 f.  
9 Kamali, “Fiqh and Adaptation to Social Reality”, p. 64. 
10 See, on ijmā‛, for example, A.M. Naqeshbandi, “The Doctrine of Consensus (Ijmā‛) in Islamic 
Law” (PhD thesis, The Faculty of Law, University of London, 1958); Ahmad Hasan, The Doctrine of 
Ijmā‛ in Islam, 2nd reprint (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1991); Lambton, State and 
Government in Medieval Islam, pp. 10-12; Mahdi Zahraa, “Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the 
Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science Research Methods for Islamic Research”, Arab Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3/4, 2003, pp. 234-236; ‛Abd al-Karīm Zīdān, Al-Wajīz fī Us ūl al-Fiqh, 5th ed. 
(Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 1996/1417), pp. 179-193; ‛Abd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, ‛Ilm Us ūl al-Fiqh 
(Cairo: Dār al-Hadīth, 2003/1423), pp. 50-58; Muhammad Talaat al-Ghunaimi, Qānūn al-Salām fī al-
Islām (Alexandria, Egypt: Munsha’ah al-Ma‛ārif, 2007), pp. 155-167.  
 124
ijtihād (reasoning or judgement in making laws).11 Here, jurists have developed a 
number of methods and methodologies for applying what are called secondary 
sources: (4) qiyās (analogy); (5) istihsān (juristic/public preference); (6) masālih 
mursalah (public interest); (7) sadd al-dharā’i‛ (blocking the means, that is, 
preventing the occurrence of something evil, though it also extends to include 
facilitating the occurrence of something good); (8) shar‛ man qablanā (sharī‛ahs of 
religions before Islam); (9) qawl al-sahābī (i.e., the opinions of the Companions of 
the Prophet); (10) ‛urf (custom) and (11) istishāb (the continuation of the 
applicability of a rule which was accepted in the past, unless new evidence supports a 
change in its applicability).12  
 Thus, in the words of N. Calder, fiqh “designates a human activity, and 
cannot be ascribed to God or (usually) the Prophet.”13 Indeed, fiqh, as insightfully 
observed by Schacht, is “the interpretation of a religious ideal not by legislators but 
by scholars, and the recognized handbooks of the several schools are not ‘codes’ in 
the Western meaning of the term. Islamic law is a ‘jurists’ law’ par excellence: 
Islamic jurisprudence did not grow out of an existing law, it itself created it.”14 
Therefore, Islamic law uniquely developed as an accumulation of scholarly 
                                                 
11 See Wael B. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihād Closed?”, International Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, Mar. 1984, pp. 3 f. 
12 See, for example, ‛Abd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, Masādir al-Tashrī‛ al-Islāmī fīmā lā Nass fīh, 6th ed. 
(Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1993/1414), pp. 19-176; Hassan, An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Law, 
pp. 138-243; Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 3rd rev. & enl. ed. 
(Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2003), pp. 16-409; Zahraa, “Unique Islamic Law Methodology”, 
pp. 236-248; Doi, Sharī‛ah: The Islamic Law, pp.  21-84; Shalabī, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 115-206; 
Abdal-Haqq, “Islamic Law”, pp. 54-58. 
13 Calder, “Sharī‛a”, p. 322. 
14 Joseph Schacht, “Fikh”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., Vol. II, p. 891. See also Joseph Schacht, 
“Problems of Modern Islamic Legislation”, Studia Islamica, No. 12, 1960, pp. 108, 110; Joseph 
Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarenon Press, 1964, reprint 1996), p. 5; G.M. 
Badr, “A Survey of Islamic International Law”, Proceedings of the American Society of International 
Law, Vol. 76, 1982, p. 56; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “The Sharī‛ah: A Methodology or a Body of 
Substantive Rules?”, in Nicholas Heer, ed., Islamic Law and Jurisprudence (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1990), pp. 177-198; Sherman A. Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic 
Legal Tradition”, The Muslim World, Vol. 91, Issue 3-4, September 2001, p. 294; Sherman A. 
Jackson, “Jihad and the Modern World”, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2002, p. 
3. 
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contributions by individual jurists who did or did not belong to different, equally 
authoritative schools of law (madhāhib, sing. madhhab) and thus it was not created 
by the Islamic state.15 The emergence of several schools of law, some of which 
survive to the present day, and the formulation and adoption of diverse rules, testify 
to this fact. But it was left for the Islamic state and judges, as well as to individual 
Muslims, in the various parts of the Muslim world throughout history, to follow a 
certain school of law or to select rules from more than one school and from the 
contributions of a number of jurists.  
 One of the reasons for the confusion in the current literature on the Islamic 
law of war is that it makes no distinction between the laws that are part of the 
sharī‛ah and the laws based on an interpretation of the sharī‛ah, or the set of laws that 
are purely the jurists’ judgements based on juridical methodologies or made in 
accordance with the interests of the circumstances of the Islamic state at the time. 
The significance of the simple, but crucial, mistake of confusing sharī‛ah with fiqh is 
that it turns the individual contributions of the jurists of certain periods and historical 
circumstances, who developed the body of Islamic rules that govern relations with 
non-Muslims, into an allegedly sacred and unchangeable sharī‛ah, i.e., divine law, as 
                                                 
15 According to the words of Sherman A. Jackson, “Islamic law represents what some scholars have 
referred to as an extreme case of ‘jurists’ law.’ Being neither the product nor the preserve of the early 
Islamic state, it developed in conscious opposition to the latter. Private Muslims in pious devotion to 
the study of scripture, during the first two centuries of Islam, succeeded in gaining the community’s 
recognition for their interpretive efforts as constituting the most authentic representation of divine 
intent.” See Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition”, p. 294. It is also worth 
quoting here Muhammad Abdel Haleem who explains that “Any opinions arrived at by individual 
scholars or schools of Islamic law, including the recognised four Sunni schools, are no more than 
opinions. The founders of these schools never laid exclusive claim to the truth, or invited people to 
follow them rather than any other scholars. Western writers often take the views of this or that 
classical or modern Muslim writer as ‘the Islamic view’, presumably on the basis of assumptions 
drawn from the Christian tradition, where the views of people like St Augustine or St Thomas 
Aquinas are often cited as authorities.” See Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Understanding the Qur’ān: 
Themes and Style (London: Tauris, 1999), p. 59. See also David Bonderman, “Modernization and 
Changing Perceptions of Islamic Law”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 6, April, 1968, p. 1174; 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‛im, “Sharī‛a in the Secular State: A Paradox of Separation and Conflation”, 
in Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. Weiss, eds., The Law Applied: Contextualizing 
the Islamic Sharī‛a, A Volume in Honor of Frank E. Vogel (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), pp. 325 f. 
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if this were the Muslim position. Thus, Irshad Abdal-Haqq rightly warns that 
“designating [fiqh] as part of the Shari‛ah, per se, certainly blurs the line between the 
infallibility of revealed knowledge (Qur’ān) and its demonstration by Muhammad 
(Sunnah), [i.e., Sharī‛ah] and fallible attempts by man to infer, deduce and apply the 
principles of revealed knowledge through ijtihad or otherwise [i.e., fiqh].”16 This 
stark contradiction and confusion could have been avoided to a great extent if 
Schacht’s observation that the jurists’ interpretations and rules are scholarly 
judgements, not “codes” in the Western sense, had been taken into consideration. 
Unfortunately, that has not been the case. 
 To give a few examples of this confusion in the writings of two renowned 
scholars, Majid Khadduri (1909-2007) repeatedly refers to siyar (the classical 
juridical theory of international law) as “part of the sharī‛a[h]”17 or “an extension of 
the sacred law, the sharī‛a[h]”.18 He confirms that siyar “was the sharī‛a[h] writ 
large.”19 He even adds that, because of his extensive writing on siyar, “Shaybānī 
made a contribution to the sharī‛a[h]”.20 Nevertheless, Khadduri contradicts this 
statement twice. First, he says: “The classical theory of Islamic law of nations is 
found neither in the Qur’ān nor in the Prophet’s utterances, though its basic 
assumptions were derived from these authoritative sources; it was rather the product 
of Islamic juridical speculation at the height of Islamic power.”21 And in addition 
                                                 
16 Abdal-Haqq, “Islamic Law”, p. 37. On al-Mawdūdī’s warning of the confusion between sharī‛ah 
with fiqh, see Anis Ahmad, “Mawdūdī’s Conception of Sharī‛ah”, The Muslim World, Vol. 93, No. 3 
& 4, July/ October, 2003, p. 540. 
17 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1955), p. 47. 
18 Majid Khadduri, trans., The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybānī’s Siyar (Baltimore, MD.: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 6. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p. 56. 
21 Ibid., p. 19. This statement is almost worded the same as follows: “The Islamic theory of 
international relations is to be found neither in the Qur’ān nor in the Prophet Muhammad’s utterances, 
though its basic assumptions were derived from these authoritative sources. It was rather the product 
of Muslim speculation at a time when the Islamic Empire had reached its full development”, see 
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Khadduri indicates that the rules of Islamic international law consist of the 
formulations of the Islamic state’s relations with non-Muslim states, including 
treaties, official decrees of Muslim leaders and the opinions of jurists. This leads him 
to conclude that the sources of Islamic international law “conform to the same 
categories defined by modern jurists and [identified in Article 38 of] the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, namely, agreement, custom, reason, and 
authority”.22 Since these methods of formulating the basic theory of international law 
inevitably lead to changes in the law because of the changes in international society 
arising from states of peace and war, Khadduri indicates that such modifications 
were “derived not from religious doctrine but from common interest”.23 Thus, Mahdi 
Zahraa rightly states that siyar “is not ab initio representative of Islamic law, but 
rather is a collection of views and opinions that should be assessed in the light of the 
Qur’ān, the Sunnah and the contingencies of time and place.”24  
 Another typical example of this confusion in the study of “war and peace” in 
Islam is the following statement by Bernard Lewis: “The sharī‛a[h] is simply the 
law, and there is no other [emphasis added]. It is holy in that it derives from God, 
and is the external and unchangeable expression of God’s commandments to 
                                                                                                                                          
Majid Khadduri, “The Islamic Theory of International Relations and Its Contemporary Relevance”, in 
J. Harris Proctor, ed., Islam and International Relations (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 29. 
22 Khadduri, War and Peace, pp. 47 f. See also Ali Raza Naqvi, “Laws of War in Islam”, Islamic 
Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 1, March 1974, p. 26; Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, “Islam and International 
Law”, in Altaf Gauhar, ed., The Challenge of Islam (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1978), p. 
199; Seif Ahmed El-Wady Romahi, Studies in International Law and Diplomatic Practice: With 
Introduction to Islamic Law (Tokyo: Data Labo Inc., 1980), p. 49; Karima Bennoune, “As-Salāmū 
‛Alaykum? Humanitarian Law in Islamic Jurisprudence”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 15, Winter 1994, pp. 613 f.; Hilmi M. Zawati, “Just War, Peace and Human Rights under Islamic 
and International Law” (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1997), p. 7; Yassin El-Ayouty, “International 
Terrorism under the Law”, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5, 1999, p. 488; 
Troy S. Thomas, “Jihad’s Captives: Prisoners of War in Islam”, U.S. Air Force Academy Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol. 12, 2003, p. 89.  
23 Khadduri, “The Islamic Theory of International Relations and Its Contemporary Relevance”, p. 33. 
24 Mahdi Zahraa, “Characteristic Features of Islamic Law: Perceptions and Misconceptions”, Arab 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2000, p. 191. 
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mankind.”25 In the next sentence, he discusses what he calls “holy war”, referring to 
jihād, which for him is a war commanded by the Islamic faith “to convert or at least 
to subjugate those who have not [been converted].”26 Until Muslims fulfil this 
obligation, he adds, the world is divided in two: the house of Islam (dār al-Islām) 
and the house of war (dār al-harb).27 Therefore, according to Lewis’ definitions of 
sharī‛ah and jihād, and it is to be noted that he ignores here the third division, 
namely, the house of peace (dār al-sulh) or the house of covenant (dār al-‛ahd),28 
non-Muslims will be the permanent target of Muslim aggression.  
 Moreover, Lewis’ remark in his definition of sharī‛ah as “simply the law, and 
there is no other”, ignores the whole process of Islamic legislation, and the eleven 
sources of law referred to above. While these sources include divine laws, as given in 
the Qur’ān or the Prophet’s Sunnah, it also includes, among other sources, the 
consensus of opinion of the jurists/the nation,29 analogy, custom, the public interest 
of the nation, and even the divine laws of both Judaism and Christianity, etc. In other 
words, it includes almost all the possible sources for any legal system.  
 Here Lewis mistakes sharī‛ah for fiqh, the main body of Islamic law. For 
example, while he is right in referring to sharī‛ah as derived from God, as Muslim 
scholars define it, it is not clear how he would then reconcile this with another of his 
definitions of sharī‛ah as: “the Holy Law, which deals extensively with the 
acquisition and exercise of power, the nature of legitimacy and authority, the duties 
                                                 
25 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 
72. 
26 Ibid., p. 73. See also Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, p. 201. 
27 Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, p. 73; see also his The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and 
Unholy Terror (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), p. 31. 
28 In page 80 of his The Political Language of Islam, Lewis says: “Some-by no means all-jurists even 
recognize an intermediate zone”, and in page 42 of his The Crisis of Islam, he says: “In certain 
periods, jurists recognized an intermediate status”. 
29 Some Scholars argue that the consensus refers to the consensus of opinions of the Muslim scholars 
and others restrict it to the mujtahids, although maintain that it refers to the consensus of ahl al-hall 
wa al-‛aqd (the body of those who bind and loose). However, al-Ghunaimi argues that it means the 
consensus of the whole ummah, see al-Ghunaimi, Qānūn al-Salām fī al-Islām, pp. 156-165. 
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of ruler and subject, in a word, with what we in the West would call constitutional 
law and political philosophy.”30 This unreasonable claim that God deals extensively 
with all these matters of constitutional and political philosophy shows the extent of 
his misunderstanding of the basics of Islamic law. 
 In fact, Islamic jurisprudence is the culmination of Islamic thought31 in 
matters relating to the practical aspects of religious, economic, civil and political 
issues. It reflects the religious, legal, moral and ethical thought of Muslims 
throughout history.32 Nonetheless, it does not necessarily reflect the full reality of 
Muslim history. More importantly here, although different approaches have been 
taken to the discussion of particular aspects of war in various Islamic genres, such as 
the Sīrah, Tafsīr, Hadīth and historical literatures, it is the classical Muslim jurists 
who developed the formulation of the law of war in Islam. Therefore, as Hashmi 
rightly points, it is fiqh that “has historically defined Muslim discourse on war and 
peace.”33 However, writing in 1964, Schacht states: “The [Western] scholarly 
                                                 
30 Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. 8. In stark contradiction to Lewis, Bonderman states that sharī‛ah 
“was virtually silent in the field of public law”. See Bonderman “Modernization and Changing 
Perceptions of Islamic Law”, p. 1175. 
31 See Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī bayn al-Asālah wa al-Tajdīd, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Maktabah 
Wahbah, 1999/1419), p. 5; Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li-Ahkāmih wa 
Falsafatih fī Daw’ al-Qur’ān wa al-Sunnah (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2009), Vol. 2, p. 880; Ali 
Ahmad, “The Role of Islamic Law in the Contemporary World Order”, Journal of Islamic Law and 
Culture, Vol. 6, 2001, p. 161. According to the words of Hashmi, “The [Islamic] legal tradition has 
historically dominated Islamic intellectual life”, see Sohail H. Hashmi, “Islam, Sunni”, Encyclopedia 
of Religion and War, ed., Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 218. 
32 Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History”, in James 
Turner Johnson and John Kelsay, eds., Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation 
of War in Western and Islamic Tradition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 48; see also Khaled 
Abou El Fadl, “Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam”, in James 
Turner Johnson and John Kelsay, eds., Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation 
of War in Western and Islamic Tradition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 151. 
33 Sohail H. Hashmi, “Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace”, in Sohail H. Hashmi, ed., 
Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002), p. 195; Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (The 
Hague: Mouton, 1979), p. 9; Muhammad, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, p. 206; Fred McGraw Donner, “The 
Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War”, in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds., Just War 
and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic 
Traditions (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 32; Louay M. Safi, Peace and the Limits of 
War: Transcending the Classical Conception of Jihad, 2nd ed. (London: International Institute of 
Islamic Thought, 2003), p. 5; Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, “A Reassessment of Some Medieval and Modern 
Perceptions of the Counter-Crusade”, in Hadia Dajani-Shakeel and Ronald A. Messier, eds., The 
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investigation of Islamic law is still in its beginnings. This comes partly from the 
infinite variety and complexity of the subject.”34 Moreover, in 2000 Zahraa 
concluded that there was a lack of sufficient materials written in English which could 
“giv[e] non-Muslims an understanding of what Islamic law really is and to 
familiarise non-Muslims with it.”35 These statements indicate some of the other 
problems in the study of war in Islamic law in Western literature, in addition to the 
confusion between sharī‛ah with fiqh. Understanding the nature and methodologies 
of Islamic law, as well as the paradigm of international relations in the period when 
classical Islamic law was formulated are prerequisites for studying the justifications 
for war in Islam.  
 
3.3.1 Jihād  
The word jihād, which is the term generally used for ‘war’ in Islamic legal texts, is 
derived from the verb jāhad (present, yujāhid) meaning to exert great effort or strive 
to achieve a laudable goal, either by doing something good or by abstaining from 
doing something bad. Jihād is thus a broad concept that refers to acts related to both 
oneself and others. Advising rulers to stop their tyranny is the highest degree of 
jihād. The Prophet Muhammad said: “The best [type of] jihād is a word of truth to a 
tyrant ruler.”36 According to another hadīth, supporting one’s parents is also an 
                                                                                                                                          
Jihād and its Times: Dedicated to Andrew Stefan Ehrenkreutz, Michigan Series on the Middle East, 
No. 4 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, 1991), 
p. 44. 
34 Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p. 5. 
35 Zahraa, “Characteristic Features of Islamic Law”, p. 168. 
36 See, for example, Ahmad ibn ‛Alī ibn Hajar al-‛Asqalānī, Fath al-Bārī Sharh Sahīh al-Bukhārī. ed. 
Muhib al-Dīn al-Khatīb (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‛rifah, n.d.), Vol. 13, p. 53; Hadīths numbers 5510, 5511 
and 5512 in ‛Alā al-Dīn ‛Alī al-Muttaqī ibn Husām al-Dīn, Kanz al-‛Ummāl fī Sunan al-Aqwāl wa al-
Af‛āl, ed. Mahmūd ‛Umar al-Dumyātī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1998/1419), Vol. 3, p. 30; 
Hadīth number 18850 in Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (Cairo: Mu’assasah 
Qurtubah, n.d.), Vol. 4, p. 315; Badr al-Dīn Mahmūd ibn Ahmad al-‛Aynī, ‛Umdah al-Qārī: Sharh 
Sahīh  al-Bukhārī (Beirut: Dār Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‛Arabī, n.d.), Vol. , p. 224, Vol. 15, p. 166; Hadīth 
number 7834 in Ahmad ibn Shu‛ayb al-Nasā’ī, Sunan al-Nasā’ī al-Kubrā, ed. ‛Abd al-Ghaffār 
Sulaymān al-Bindarī and Sayyid Kasrawī Hasan (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1991/1411), Vol. 
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example of jihād.37 Therefore, Justice Jamāl al-Dīn Mah mūd, former deputy chief 
justice of the Court of Cassation of Egypt and member of the Islamic Research 
Council, proudly points out that Islam is the only religion that calls just war “jihād”, 
i.e., striving to establish a just cause.38 Jurists of the four schools of Islamic law 
expressed their definitions of jihād in the context of the Islamic law of war in 
different words.  According to the Hanafī jurists, jihād means exerting one’s utmost 
effort in fighting in the path of God either by taking part in battle or by supporting 
the army financially or by the tongue.39 For the Mālikīs, jihād means exerting one’s 
utmost effort in fighting against a non-Muslim enemy with whom Muslims have no 
peace agreement in order to raise the word of God, i.e., to convey or spread the 
                                                                                                                                          
4, p. 435; Hadīth number 4209 in Ahmad ibn Shu‛ayb al-Nasā’ī, Al-Mujtabā min al-Sunan, ed. ‛Abd 
al-Fattāh Abu Ghuddah, 2nd ed. (Aleppo: Maktab al-Matbū‛āt al-Islāmiyyah, 1986/1406), Vol. 7, p. 
161; Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Ihyā’ ‛Ulūm al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‛rifah, n.d.), Vol. 2, p. 343;  
Ahmad ibn ‛Alī al-Rāzī al-Jas ās, Ahkām al-Qur’ān, ed. Muhammad al-Sādiq Qamh āwī (Beirut: Dār 
Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‛Arabī, 1984-5/1405), Vol. 1, p. 328, Vol. 2, p. 287, Vol. 4, p. 43; Muhammad ibn 
Muflih, Al-Furū‛, ed. Abī al-Zahrā’ Hāzim al-Qādī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1997/1418), 
Vol. 1, p. 516.   
37 According to Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, seeking to excel in one’s education and work are also examples of 
jihād, see Muhammad Hashim Kamali, “Issues in the Understanding of Jihād and Ijtihād”, Islamic 
Studies, Vol. 41, No, 4, 2002/1423, pp. 622 f. See also Abdulrahman Muhammad Alsumaih, “The 
Sunni Concept of Jihad in Classical Fiqh and Modern Islamic Thought” (PhD thesis, University of 
Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1998), pp. 6, 257, 369; Radwan A. Masmoudi, “Struggles Behind Words: 
Shariah Sunnism, and Jihad”, SAIS Review, Vol. XXI, No. 2, Summer-Fall 2001, p. 23; Yahiya 
Emerick, “What is the Position of Islam on War and Conflict?”, available from 
http://www.themodernreligion.com/jihad/def-emerick.html; Internet; accessed 21 July 2008. 
38 Jamāl al-Dīn Mahmūd, “Al-Jihād wa Akhlāqiyyāt al-H arb fī al-Islām”, Tolerance in the Islamic 
Civilization, Researches and Facts, the Sixteenth General Conference of the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2004/1425), p. 847. 
39 See, for example, ‛Alā al-Dīn al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛ fī Tartīb al-Sharā’i‛, 2nd ed. (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kitāb al-‛Arabī, 1982), Vol. 7, p. 97; Zayd al-Dīn ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq Sharh Kanz al-
Daqā’iq, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‛rifah, n.d.), Vol. 5, p. 76; al-Shaykh Nizām, and a group of Indian 
scholars, Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah: Fī Madhhab al-Imām al-A‛zam Abī Hanīfah al-Nu‛mān (N.p.: Dār 
al-Fikr, 1991/1411), Vol. 2, p. 188; ‛Abd Allah Ghawshah, “Al-Jihād Tarīq al-Nasr”, Kitāb al-
Mu’tamar al-Rābi‛ li-Majma‛ al-Buhūth al-Islāmiyyah (Cairo: Majma‛ al-Buhūth al-Islāmiyyah, 
1968/1388), p. 184; Muhammad ‛Abd al-Latīf al-Subkī, “Al-Jihād fī al-Islām”, Kitāb al-Mu’tamar al-
Rābi‛ li-Majma‛ al-Buhūth al-Islāmiyyah (Cairo: Majma‛ al-Buhūth al-Islāmiyyah, 1968/1388), pp. 
277-280; Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām: Dirāsah Muqāranah, 3rd ed.,  (Damascus: 
Dār al-Fikr, 1998/1419), p. 33; Muhammad Khyr Haykal, Al-Jihād wa al-Qitāl fī al-Siyyāsah al-
Shar‛iyyah, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Bayāriq, 1996/1417), Vol. 1, p. 44; Ahmad Mah mūd Krīmah, Al-
Jihād fī al-Islām: Dirāsah Fiqhiyyah Muqāranah (Cairo: Al-Dār al-Handasiyyah, 2003/1424), p. 110; 
Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, p. 14. 
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message of Islam.40 The Shāfi‛īs define jihād as fighting in the path of God,41 while 
the Hanbalīs simply define it as fighting against unbelievers.42  
In fact, the terms used in the definitions above such as “fighting against 
unbelievers”, “in the path of God” or “to raise the word of God”, have all contributed 
to the misrepresentation of jihād by some as holy war against non-Muslims. But the 
jurists agree that there are two kinds of jihād: jihād al-daf‛ (defensive war) which is a 
fard ‛ayn (personal duty of every capable person) and jihād al-talab (offensive or 
pre-emptive war initiated by Muslims in non-Muslim territories) which is a fard  
kifāyah (collective duty on the Muslims, which may be fulfilled if sufficient numbers 
perform it). Jihād becomes a fard ‛ayn when the enemy invades Muslim territory, 
while it is a fard kifāyah if it occurs outside Muslim territory.43 The decision to 
initiate war must be taken by the legitimate authority.44  
                                                 
40 Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn ‛Abd al-Rahmān al-Hattāb, Mawāhib al-Jalīl li-Sharh Mukhtasar 
Khalīl, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1977-8/1398), Vol. 3, p. 347; Ah mad ibn Ghunaym ibn Sālim al-
Nafarāwī, Al-Fawākih al-Dawānī ‛alā Risālah Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1994-
5/1415), Vol. 1, p. 395; al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām, p. 33; Haykal, Al-Jihād wa al-Qitāl, 
Vol. 1, p. 44; Krīmah, Al-Jihād fī al-Islām, p. 110; Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, p. 14. 
41 Al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām, p. 33; Haykal, Al-Jihād wa al-Qitāl, Vol. 1, p. 44; Krīmah, 
Al-Jihād fī al-Islām, p. 110; Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, p. 14. 
42 Mans ūr ibn Yūnus ibn Idrīs al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛ ‛an Matn al-Iqnā‛, ed. Hilāl Mis īlh ī 
Mustafā Hilāl (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1981-2/1402), Vol. 3, p. 32; Mustafā al-Suyūtī al-Rahaybānī, 
Matālib Ulī al-Nuhā fī Sharh Ghāyah al-Muntahā (Damascus: Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1961), Vol. 2, p. 
497; Abd al-Rahman ibn ‛Abd Allah al-Ba‛lī, Kashf al-Mukhaddarāt wa al-Riyād al-Muzhirāt li-
Sharh Akhsar al-Mukhtasarāt, ed. Muhammad ibn Nāsir al-‛Ajamī (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā’ir al-
Islāmiyyah, 2002/1423), Vol. 1, p. 343; Krīmah, Al-Jihād fī al-Islām, p. 110; Alsumaih, “The Sunni 
Concept of Jihad”, p. 14. 
43 See, for example, Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, Minhāj al-Tālibīn wa ‛Umdah al-Muftīn, ed. 
Muhammad Muhammad Tāhir Sha‛bān (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2005/1426), p. 518; Yūsuf ibn ‛Abd 
al-Barr, Al-Kāfī fī Fiqh Ahl al-Madīnah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1986-7/1407), p. 205; 
Zakariyyā ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Zakariyyā al-Ansārī, Fath al-Wahhāb bi-Sharh Manhaj al-
T ullāb (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1997-8/1418), Vol. 2, pp. 296-298; Zakariyyā ibn 
Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Zakariyyā al-Ansārī, Manhaj al-Tullāb (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
‛Ilmiyyah, 1997-8/1418), pp. 130 f.; Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Al-Wasīt fī al-Madhhab, ed. Ahmad 
Mahmūd Ibrāhīm and Muhammad Muhammad Tāmir (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 1997/1417), Vol. 7, pp. 
5-12; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 2, p. 07; Mansūr ibn Yūnus ibn Idrīs al-Buhūtī, Al-Rawd al-Murbi‛: 
Sharh Zād al-Mustaqni‛ (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Riyadh al-Hadīthah, 1970-1/1390), Vol. 2, p. 3; al-
Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 3, pp. 33 f.; Mohamed Mokbel Mahmud Elbakry, “The Legality of 
‘War’ in Al-Shari‛a Al-Islamiya (The Islamic Law) and Contemporary International Law: 
Comparative Study” (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1987), pp. 241 f.; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-
Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 54 f., 64-114, 240, 411 f.  
44 See, for example, Muhammad Sa‛īd Ramadān al-Būtī, Al-Jihād fī al-Islām: Kayf Nafhamuh? Wa 
Kayf Numārisuh?, 5th ed. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2006/1427), pp. 112, 114-117; Jamal Badawi, 
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3.3.2 Types of Jihād  
Jihād in the sense of personal moral struggle is called al-jihād al-akbar (the greater 
jihād). It is divided into what is called “jihād against the self” and “jihād against the 
devil”.45 Jihād in the sense of an armed, state struggle is called al-jihād al-asghar 
(the lesser jihād) and falls into two main kinds: international and domestic jihād. 
International jihād, the most commonly referred to, is what the jurists sometimes 
called jihād against al-kuffār (unbelievers) or jihād fī sabīl Allah (jihād in the path of 
God), i.e., war with the non-Muslim states. In fact, by the very nature of the structure 
of the Islamic state, any armed jihād against al-kuffār is an international war. This is 
because, until the abolition of the caliphate on 3 March 1924, Muslims had been, at 
least theoretically united under one state. Thus, historically and/or theoretically, any 
jihād which occurred between the Islamic state and its enemies was a war between 
Muslims and their enemies, misleadingly labelled kuffār. But this does not mean that 
such war was necessarily motivated by the enemies’ kufr (unbelief) because, 
historically and/or theoretically, kuffār were part of the Islamic state, which had 
legalized and practised the conclusion of peace treaties and non-aggression pacts 
with these kuffār, i.e., non-Muslim states and other forms of political or religious 
entities.  
Domestic jihād, the subject of Chapter Five, is divided into four types: (1) 
fighting against bughāh (rebels, secessionists); (2) fighting against muh āribūn/quttā‛ 
al-tarīq (bandits, highway robbers, pirates); (3) fighting against ahl al-riddah 
                                                                                                                                          
“Muslim/Non-Muslim Relations: Reflections on some Qur’ānic Texts”, Scientific Review of the 
European Council for Fatwa and Research, No. 6, January 2005/Dhū al-Hijjah 1425,  p. 269; 
Katerina Dalacoura, “Violence, September 11 and the Interpretations of Islam”, in Mashood A. 
Baderin, ed., International Law and Islamic Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 236. 
45 See al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 52, 143-168. 
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(apostates) and (4) fighting against khawārij (roughly translated as violent religious 
fanatics).46 
The concern of this chapter is with the Islamic justifications for international 
war, i.e., jihād against non-Muslim states. Two factors explain much of the 
controversy over the justifications for war in Islam between the insider and outsider. 
First, as several scholars have pointed out, classical Muslim jurists paid little 
attention to the Islamic jus ad bellum (justifications for resorting to war).47 Second, 
there has been much misunderstanding of the role of the religion of Islam in the 
justifications for war, let alone the terms used in the definitions of jihād above. As 
indicated above, all the various practical aspects of life were discussed by Muslim 
jurists within Islamic jurisprudence. The five types of the armed jihād, whether 
within the Islamic state or against other states, are based on either religious, political 
or criminal grounds. Even when a war in these cases is waged on religious grounds, 
an investigation is still to be made to determine whether it is just or not. In other 
words, as Johnson points out, “Despite the invoking of religious authority of war, the 
causes of the wars in question were essentially temporal; despite being termed jihad, 
they were wars of the state, not wars of religion.”48  
                                                 
46 See al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām, pp. 59 f.; Khadduri, War and Peace, pp. 74- 82; Hilmi M. 
Zawati, Is Jihad a Just War? War, Peace, and Human Rights under Islamic and Public International 
Law, Studies in Religion and Society, Vol. 53 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), pp. 29-39; 
Muhammad Ibrāhīm ‛Abd Allah al-Twijrī, Mukhtasar al-Fiqh al-Islāmī (Riyadh: Dār al-Ma‛rāj al-
Dawliyyah, 2000/1421), pp. 837 f.; Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, p. 211. See 
Chapter Five. 
47 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996), p. 119; 
Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into Classical Sources”, The Muslim 
World, Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2, April, 1999, p. 150; Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Islam and the Theology of 
Power”, Middle East Report, No. 221, Winter 2001, p. 30; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “War and Peace in 
the Islamic Tradition and International Law”, in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds., Just 
War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic 
Traditions (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 197; Sohail H. Hashmi, “Saving and Taking 
Life in War: Three Modern Muslim Views”, The Muslim World, Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2, April, 1999, p. 
158. 
48 James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 96. 
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Concerning the first factor, the classical Muslim jurists’ discussions, although 
scant, can still give a fair understanding of the Islamic justifications for war, again 
especially in the light of the contexts of their time. Thus, comparing contemporary 
Muslims’ discussions of the same issue with their classical counterparts’ is important 
in order to give the Islamic perspective on the justifications for war in the modern 
world. In addition, comparing these classical and modern insider discussions with the 
outsider literature is also necessary in order to find out the reasons of the 
controversies and misunderstandings about jihād. Furthermore, examining the basis 
of the classical Muslim jurists’ three conceptual divisions of the world into the dār 
al-Islām (lit. house of Islam), dār al-harb (house of war) and dār al-sulh (house of 
peace) also gives some insights into the Islamic justifications for war and the Islamic 
attitudes towards relations with non-Muslim states. This chapter will therefore 
attempt to study these two points, i.e., the insider/outsider justifications for war and 
the classical Muslim jurists’ division of the world.  
 
3.4.1 Classical and Contemporary Insider Justifications for War    
At the outset, it should be mentioned here that Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) was the 
first scholar to pay adequate attention to the question of sabab qitāl al-kuffār 
(justifications for war against unbelievers).49 Although this question is the central 
point for understanding the nature of the Islamic law of war, classical and even many 
contemporary Muslim scholars fail to expound on it in their various approaches to 
the study of war in Islam. Ibn Taymiyyah’s analysis of the classical Muslim jurists’ 
positions on this question, which is reiterated by many modern Muslim scholars, 
                                                 
49 See Ahmad ibn ‛Abd al-Halīm ibn Taymiyyah, Qā‛idah Mukhtasarah fī Qitāl al-Kuffār wa 
Muhādanatihim wa Tahrīm Qatlihim li-Mujarrad Kufrihim: Qā‛idah Tubayyn al-Qiyam al-Sāmiyah 
lil-H adārah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Harb wa al-Qitāl, ed. ‛Abd al-‛Azīz ibn ‛Abd Allah ibn Ibrāhīm al-
Zayd Āl Hamad (Riyadh: N.p., 2004/1424). 
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reflects the diverse interpretations of the Qur’ānic casus belli, which were considered 
in Chapter Two. The disagreement over whether it is kufr (unbelief), or acts of 
aggression against Muslims, that is the Qur’ānic casus belli results in two different 
juridical positions being taken on the justifications for war against non-Muslims.  
 The first position, according to the majority of jurists,50 the Hanafī, Mālikī, 
and Hanbalī schools, is that the Qur’ānic casus belli are restricted to aggression 
against Muslims and fitnah, i.e., persecution of Muslims because of their religious 
belief (Qur’ān 2:190; 2:193; 4:75; 22:39-40). War and coercion are not means by 
which religion may be propagated because belief in a religion is only a matter of the 
conviction of the heart (Qur’ān 2:256; 10:99; 16:93; 18:29). Fighting non-Muslims 
solely because they do not believe in Islam contradicts the Qur’ānic injunction 
(Qur’ān 2:256). These jurists therefore maintain that only combatants are to be 
fought; non-combatants such as women, children, clergy, the aged, the insane, 
farmers, serfs and the blind, etc., are not to be killed in war,51 as discussed in the next 
                                                 
50 Ibn Taymiyyah, Qā‛idah Mukhtasarah fī Qitāl al-Kuffār, p. 87; Muhammad ibn Ismā‛īl al-Sana‛ānī, 
“Bahth fī Qitāl al-Kufār”, in Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li-Ahkāmih wa 
Falsafatih fī Daw’ al-Qur’ān wa al-Sunnah (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2009), Vol. 2, p. 1202; 
Muhammad Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām (Cairo: Al-Dār al-Qawmiyyah lil-
Tibā‛ah wa al-Nashr, 1964/1384), p. 52; al-Būtī, Al-Jihād fī al-Islām, p. 94; Muhammad al-Sādiq 
‛Afīfī, Al-Mujtama‛ al-Islāmī wa al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah (Cairo: Mu’assasah al-Khānjī, 1980), p. 
146; ‛Abd al-Latīf ‛Āmir, Ahkām al-Asrā wa al-Sabāyā fī al-H urūb al-Islāmiyyah (Cairo: Dār al-
Kitāb al-Misrī; Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 1986/1406), p. 63; ‛Umar Ahmad al-Firjānī, Usūl al-
‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām, 2nd ed. (Tripoli, Libya: Dār Iqra’, 1988/1397), p. 85; Nādiyah Husnī 
S aqr, Falsafah al-Harb fī al-Islām (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 1990/1410), pp. 95 f.; 
Abou El Fadl, “Islam and the Theology of Power”, p. 29; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 376 
f., Vol. 2, p. 1038. 
51 Ibn Taymiyyah, Qā‛idah Mukhtasarah fī Qitāl al-Kuffār, pp. 90-219; al-S ana‛ānī, “Bahth fī Qitāl 
al-Kufār”, pp. 1202-1211, 1215; Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islam: Muqāranah 
bi-al-Qānūn al-Dawlī al-Hadīth (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 1981/1401), pp. 101 f.; Wahbah al-
Zuhaylī, “Majālāt al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām”, in Fārūq Hamādah, ed., Al-Tashrī‛ al-Dawlī fī 
al-Islām, Nadawāt wa Munāzarāt, No. 70 (Rabat: Kulliyyah al-Ādāb wa al-‛Ulūm al-Insāniyyah, 
1997), p. 198; al-Būtī, Al-Jihād fī Al-Islām, pp. 94-102; Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybānī, Al-
Siyar al-Kabīr, ed. Salāh al-Dīn al-Munjid (Cairo: Ma‛had al-Makhtūtāt, n.d.), Vol. 4, pp. 1415-1417, 
1429-1447; Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar, ed. Majid Khadduri (Beirut: Al-Dār al-
Muttahidah, 1975), p. 249; Ahmad ibn Idrīs al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, ed. Muhammad Būkhubzah 
(Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1994), Vol. 3, pp. 387-393, 397-401; Ibn ‛Abd al-Barr, Al-Kāfī fī 
Fiqh Ahl al-Madīnah, p. 208;  Muwaffaq al-Dīn ‛Abd Allah ibn Qudāmah, Al-Kāfī fī Fiqh al-Imām 
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, ed. Muhammad Fāris and Mus‛ad ‛Abd al-Hamīd al-Sa‛danī (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 2004), Vol. 4, pp. 125 f.; Ahmad ibn ‛Abd al-Halīm ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Siyāsah 
al-Shar‛iyyah fī Is lāh al-Rā‛ī wa al-Ra‛iyyah (N.p.: Dār al-Ma‛rifah, n.d.), p. 104; ‛Abd Allah ibn 
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chapter. This prohibition means that fighting is permitted only against those whom 
Ibn Taymiyyah calls ahl al-mumāna‛ah wa al-muqātilah (combatants) and not 
against unbelievers per se.52 Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Sana‛ānī (d. 1768) 
point out, after the cessation of hostilities, non-Muslim prisoners of war are to be 
released freely or in exchange and are not to be forced to adopt Islam.53 This 
indicates that their unbelief in itself is not the justification for war, otherwise they 
would not be released without accepting Islam. Thus, the Hanafī jurist Ibn Najīm 
explicitly states: “the reason for jihād in our [the Hanafīs] view is kawnuhum harbā 
‛alaynā [literally, their being at war against us], while in al-Shāfi‛ī’s view it is their 
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Shihābī, Mafhūm al-Harb wa al-Salām fī al-Islām: Sirā‛āt wa Hurūb amm Tafā‛ul wa Salām? (N.p.: 
Manshūrāt Mu’assasah Maī, 1990/1399), p. 76; Muh ammad Sayyid Tantāwī, “Al-Hukm al-Shar‛ī fī 
Ahdāth al-Khalīj”, The Islamic Fiqh Council Journal, Issue No. 5, [1991/1411], pp. 58-60; al-
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the Light of Islamic Doctrine”, Recueil des Cours, Vol. 117, 1966, pp. 301-304; Muhammad 
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Warfare (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 183-185; Hashmi, “Islam, Sunni”,  p. 219; 
Esposito, Unholy War, p. 32; Mustansir Mir, “Islam, Qur’anic”, Encyclopedia of Religion and War, 
ed., Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 209; John Kelsay, “Islamic Law of 
War”, Encyclopedia of Religion and War, ed., Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez (New York: Routledge, 
2004), p. 224; John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), p. 106; Khadduri, War and Peace, pp. 103 f.; ‛Alī Muhyī al-Dīn al-Qarah Dāghī, “Al-
Usus wa al-Mabādi’ al-Islāmiyyah lil-‛Alāqat al-Dawliyyah”, Scientific Review of the European 
Council for Fatwa and Research, May 2007, Issues 10-11, Part 1, p. 182; Reza Simbar, “The 
Changing Role of Islam in International Relations”, Journal of International and Area Studies, Vol. 
15, No. 2, 2008, pp. 58-60; Salāh al-Sāwī, “Al-Judhūr al-Fikriyyah lil-‛Amaliyyāt al-Irhābiyyah”, 
available from http://www.amjaonline.com/ar_d_details.php?id=16#; Internet; accessed 8 April 2009, 
pp. 4-6. 
52 Ahmad ibn ‛Abd al-Halīm ibn Taymiyyah, Fiqh al-Jihād li-Shaykh al-Islām al-Imām Ibn 
Taymiyyah, ed. Zuhayr Shafīq al-Kabbī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-‛Arabī, 1992/1412), pp. 74, 197 f.; Ibn 
Taymiyyah, Al-Siyāsah al-Shar‛iyyah, p. 104. See also Muhammad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyyah, Ahkām ahl al-Dhimmah, ed. Abī Barā’ Yūsuf ibn Ahmad al-Bakrī and Abī Ahmad Shākir 
ibn Tawfīq al-‛Ārūrī (Al-Dammam: Ramādī lil-Nashr, 1997/1418), Vol. 1, p. 110; Ibn Mawdūd, Al-
Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 128.  
53 Ibn Taymiyyah, Qā‛idah Mukhtasarah fī Qitāl al-Kuffār, pp. 129 f.; al-Sana‛ānī, “Bahth fī Qitāl al-
Kufār”, pp. 1206 f. It is interesting to add here that Troy S. Thomas’s study of the prisoners of war in 
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unbelief.”54 In fact, what Ibn Najīm means here is that the justification for jihād is 
the enemy’s hostility and aggression.55 But the classical Muslim jurists add a 
peculiar dimension to what constitutes this hostility and aggression, which is a core 
justification for war in Islam, as explained below. The Hanafī jurists al-Shaybānī (d. 
189/804-5) and al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090-1) emphasise that “although kufr [unbelief 
in God] is one of the greatest sins, it is between the individual and his God the 
Almighty and the punishment for this sin is to be postponed to the dār al-jazā’, (the 
abode of reckoning, the Hereafter)”.56  
The hadīth narrated by Abū Hurayrah in which the Prophet says, “I have been 
ordered to fight against the people [emphasis added] until they say: There is no God 
but God”,57 refers only to the Arab idolaters, according to “the majority of the 
Muslims”,58 including the H anafīs and Ibn Hanbal, while for the Mālikīs, it refers 
only to the tribe of Quraysh.59 That is because non-Arab/non-Qurayshite idolaters 
                                                 
54 Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq, Vol. 5, p. 76. 
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Prisoner of War in Classical Islamic Law: Concepts formulated by Hanafi Jurists of the 12th 
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fī Fiqh al-Imām Ahmad Ibn Hanbal al-Shaybānī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984-5/1405), Vol. 9,  p. 173; 
‛Alī ibn Muhammad ibn Habīb al-Māwardī, Al-Hāwī al-Kabīr: Fī Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‛ī 
Radī Allah ‛anh wa huwa Sharh Mukhtasar al-Muznī, ed. ‛Alī Muhammad Mu‛awwad and ‛Ādil 
Ahmad ‛Abd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1999) Vol. 14, p. 153; Muh yī al-Dīn ibn 
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may either accept Islam or pay jizyah60 (the tax levied to exempt eligible males from 
conscription).61 More importantly, this hadīth means, as Ibn Taymiyyah explains it, 
that if non-Muslim enemy combatants during the conduct of war accept Islam, the 
war must cease, but this does not mean that all people have to be fought until they 
accept Islam.62 Concerning the reason why jizyah was not to be accepted from 
Arab/Qurayshite idolaters, according to those who maintain that jizyah was not 
accepted from them, it is argued that this was because they had already accepted 
Islam before jizyah was introduced.63 
It is therefore clear, according to this interpretation of the Qur’ān and hadīth, 
that peace should characterise the normal and permanent relationship with non-
Muslims.64 This conclusion is drawn from the view of these jurists that recourse to 
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war is only justified in defence against enemy hostility and aggression. In line with 
this position, Ibn Taymiyyah emphasised that jihād is “a defensive war against 
unbelievers whenever they threatened Islam.”65 This means that Khadduri’s 
description of Ibn Taymiyyah’s emphasis on the defensive nature of jihād as a 
“concession to reality”66 is unwarranted. Khadduri argues that Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
changing the meaning of jihād to a war which is only defensive occurred after the 
decline of Muslim power when “it was no longer compatible with Muslim 
interests”.67 He adds that by the fourth/tenth century, the meaning of jihād had 
undergone a change from permanent war to “dormant war” because of the decline of 
Muslim power and the “process of evolution dictated by Islam’s interests and social 
conditions.”68 Many Western researchers have taken this claim at face value.69 
However, Ibn Taymiyyah here is not changing the meaning of jihād but is advocating 
his interpretation of the meaning of jihād as given by the majority of eighth-century 
jurists. He espouses this position on the basis of his conviction that all the Prophet’s 
engagements with the Muslims’ enemies were defensive. In addition to this, the 
Qur’ānic emphasis on the prohibition of “compulsion in religion” reinforces the 
majority’s position that non-acceptance of Islam is not a justification for war. The 
idea that the Muslim jurists changed the meaning of jihād after the Islamic state 
                                                                                                                                          
Islām: Al-Asās al-Shar‛ī wa al-Mabādi’ al-Hākimah lil-‛Alāqāt al-Khārijiyyah lil-Dawlah al-
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Mashrū‛ al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām 1 (Cairo: Al-Ma‛had al-‛Ālamī lil-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1996), 
pp. 145-152; Krīmah, Al-Jihād fī al-Islām, pp. 35-41.   
65 Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, p. 59; see also al-Zuhaylī, “Islam and International Law”, p. 
281. On Ibn Taymiyyah’s understanding of jihād see, Mohammad Farid ibn Mohammad Sharif, 
“Jihād in Ibn Taymīyyah’s Thought”, The Islamic Quarterly, Vol. 49, Issue 3, pp. 183-203. 
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67 Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 65. See also A. Abel, “Dār al-H arb”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New 
ed., Vol. II, p. 126. 
68 Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 66. 
69 See, for example, David Aaron Schwartz, “International Terrorism and Islamic Law”, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 29, 1991, pp. 645 f. 
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became weak, because war was no longer in their interests, undermines the thesis 
upon which Western studies on jihād are based, namely, that jihād, and even the 
classical paradigm of international relations developed by the jurists of the 
second/eighth century, were based on the permanent laws of the sharī‛ah, for it 
indicates that the jurists interpreted or formulated the law of war on the basis of their 
interests and not on the dictates of the sharī‛ah.  
Nonetheless, Khadduri himself notes that, long before Ibn Taymiyyah, the 
second/eighth century jurist Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) headed what Khadduri 
calls a pacifist school, which maintained that jihād was only a defensive war, basing 
its argument on the Qur’ānic verse: “And fight in the way of God those who fight 
against you but lā ta‛tadūā (do not transgress)” (Qur’ān 2:190).70 Furthermore, he 
also states that the jurists who held this position, among whom he refers to Hanafī 
jurists, al-Awzā‛ī (d. 157/774), Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795)71 and other early jurists, 
“stressed that tolerance should be shown unbelievers, especially scripturaries and 
advised the Imām to prosecute war only when the inhabitants of the dār al-h arb came 
into conflict with Islam.”72 This means that, long before Ibn Taymiyyah stressed the 
defensive nature of jihād, a line of thought among the earliest Muslim jurists had 
already advocated this position and thus Ibn Taymiyyah did not originate this so-
called change in the meaning of jihād.  
                                                 
70 Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace, pp. 36 f. 
71 On the life, education, students and works of Mālik ibn Anas see, Mustafā al-Sibā‛ī, Al-Sunnah wa 
Makānatihā fī al-Tashrī‛ al-Islāmī, 4th ed. (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1985/1405), pp. 430-438; 
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72 Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, p. 58. This phrase is also stated almost literally in his The 
Islamic conception of Justice (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 165. See 
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Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 51. 
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  However, as Khadduri rightly points out, Abū Hanīfah (d. 150/767-8)73 and 
his students, including al-Shaybānī, formulated their rules of international law on the 
assumption that a state of war existed between the Islamic and non-Muslim states. It 
is important to add here that this assumption was not based on an interpretation of the 
Islamic sources but on the reality of their current situation. In fact, a state of war, in 
the absence of a peace treaty, characterizes the pattern of international relations 
during the periods in which Islam emerged. In the words of John L. Esposito, the 
classical Muslim jurists formulated the Islamic law of war in a world “where war 
was the natural state.”74 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‛im also notes: “the first three 
centuries of Islam was an extremely harsh and violent environment, where the use of 
force in intercommunal relations was the unquestioned norm.”75 In the words of 
Sherman A. Jackson, “a prevailing ‘state of war,’ rather than difference of religion, 
was the raison d'être of jihad”.76 Furthermore, Khalid Yahya Blankinship adds that a 
pattern of a permanent state of war had existed throughout history. For example, he 
writes, “The Assyrians, like the Romans under the Republic, used to take to the field 
every year against someone. Frequently, if a treaty did not exist, a state of war was 
assumed. Even the United States and its allies in modern times have preferred a 
policy of obtaining the unconditional surrender of the enemy where possible, as in 
the Second World War.”77    
The second position, founded by al-Shāfi‛ī (d. 204/820)78 and maintained by 
some Hanbalī jurists and Ibn H azm (d. 456/1064) of the extinct Zāhirī school, is that 
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Muslims are to wage war against unbelievers if they refuse to accept Islam or submit 
to Muslim rule. Al-Shāfi‛ī here bases his opinion on the theory that the Qur’ānic 
texts 9:5 and 9:29 abrogated all the other texts and the above hadīth narrated by Abū 
Hurayrah. However, he differentiates between Arab and non-Arab idolaters: Arab 
idolaters are to be fought if they do not accept Islam, while non-Arab idolaters and 
the people of the book are to accept Islam or pay jizyah; otherwise Muslims are to 
fight them.79 Since al-Shāfi‛ī maintains that it was unbelief, not aggression, that was 
the casus belli in these texts, he permits fighting some categories of non-combatants 
“such as the peasants, the crippled and the aged until they become Muslims or pay 
jizyah”, although he does not include women and children.80 However, he adds that 
Muslims are to cease fighting in cases of necessity, for example, when they are weak. 
According to this position, therefore, jihād is not only a defensive war but also an 
offensive war against non-Muslims, and Khadduri points out here that it “was Shāfi‛ī 
who first formulated the doctrine that the jihād had for its intent the waging of war 
on unbelievers for their disbelief and not merely when they entered into conflict with 
Islam.”81 According to this minority position, a permanent state of war exists until 
non-Muslims accept Islam or submit to Muslim rule. Although based on the 
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pp. 108, 498-502. Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064), of the extinct Zāhirī school, also accepts that these 
categories could be killed, see ‛Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Sa‛īd ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq 
al-Jadīdah, n.d.), Vol. 7, p. 296, see also on Ibn H azm’s position on these categories, for example, 
Haykal, Al-Jihād wa al-Qitāl, Vol. 2, p. 1269; Mahmassani, “The Principles of International Law in 
the Light of Islamic Doctrine”, p. 302; Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 22; ‛Abd al-‛Azīz Saqr, ‛Al-
‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām Waqt al-Harb: Dirāsah lil-Qawā‛id al-Munazzimah li-Sayr al-Qitāl, 
Mashrū‛ al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām 6 (Cairo: Al-Ma‛had al-‛Ālamī lil-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1996), 
p. 49; Abū ‛Īd, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Khārijyyah, p. 182; Copinger-Symes, “Is Osama bin Laden’s ‘Fatwa 
Urging Jihad against Americans’ dated 23 February 1998 Justified y Islamic Law?”, p. 223.  
81 Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, p. 58; Khadduri, The Islamic conception of Justice, pp. 165 
f. See also Abou El Fadl, “Islam and the Theology of Power”, p. 29; Copinger-Symes, “Is Osama bin 
Laden’s ‘Fatwa Urging Jihad against Americans’ dated 23 February 1998 Justified y Islamic Law?”, 
pp. 51 f.  
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interpretations of the same sources, these two classical positions give two opposite 
Islamic legal justifications for recourse to war.  
It is interesting to note here that modern Islamic writings on this point, 
though based on the interpretation of the same sources, take a different approach. 
While al-Shāfi‛ī bases his position on the theory that the Qur’ānic texts 9:5 and 9:29 
abrogated all other texts, while the majority of classical jurists based their position on 
the interpretation of Qur’ānic texts on war, as well as peace, overall, a growing trend 
among the majority of mainstream modern scholars takes an even wider approach 
that includes the totality of the Islamic message. It is based on the Qur’ānic 
principles that take into account the Islamic wisdom concerning human existence on 
earth, the Islamic worldview, and the principles of justice, human dignity and 
equality, as well as the interpretation of the Qur’ānic texts on war and peace in their 
context.82 
 This modern approach produces a diametrically opposite position to al-
Shāfi‛ī’s. Modern scholars restrict the Islamic casus belli to the same categories 
given by the majority of classical jurists, namely, defence against aggression and 
fitnah (religious persecution). Furthermore, they affirm that, in Islam, peace is 
                                                 
82 See, for example, Mahmassani, “The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic 
Doctrine”, pp. 242-248; al-Zuhaylī, “Islam and International Law”, pp. 270-276; ‛Alī Jum‛ah, “Al-
Tasāmuh al-Islāmī fī Nusūs al-Shar‛ al-Sharīf”, Tolerance in the Islamic Civilization, Researches and 
Facts, the Sixteenth General Conference of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme 
Council for Islamic Affairs, 2004/1425), pp. 57-80; Sūfī Hasan Abū Tālib, “Al-Islām wa al-Ākhar fī 
al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah: Nazrah ‛Ammah”, Tolerance in the Islamic Civilization, Researches and 
Facts, the Sixteenth General Conference of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme 
Council for Islamic Affairs, 2004/1425), pp. 365-402; ‛Abd al-Sabūr Marzūq, “Al-Islām wa al-Jihād”, 
Tolerance in the Islamic Civilization, Researches and Facts, the Sixteenth General Conference of the 
Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2004/1425), 
pp.789-810; Ahmad Farrāj, “Al-Islām wa al-Ākhar fī al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah: Mawqif al-Muslimīn fī 
al-‛Ālam, al-Ta‛āūn al-Islāmī min Ajl Salām al-‛Alam”, Tolerance in the Islamic Civilization, 
Researches and Facts, the Sixteenth General Conference of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs 
(Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2004/1425), pp. 403-432; Muh ammad al-Disūqī, “Usūl 
al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah bayn al-Islām wa al-Tashrī‛āt al-Wad‛iyyah”, Tolerance in the Islamic 
Civilization, Researches and Facts, the Sixteenth General Conference of the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2004/1425), pp. 575-610; Shitā, “Al-
‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām”, pp. 172-222; Badawi, “Muslim/Non-Muslim Relations”, pp. 271-
279.     
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intended to be the normal and permanent state of relation with the non-Muslims.83 
They advocate that, according to the Qur’ān (49:13; 60:8), Muslim relations towards 
non-Muslims are based on cooperation, justice and rapprochement.84 Unlike the 
classical jurists, who formulated their theory in a time when a state of war already 
existed in the absence of a specific peace treaty, modern scholars advocate their 
position in a post-United Nations (UN) world. It is worth recalling here the new 
conception of jihād, discussed in Chapter Two, introduced by Abū al-A‛lā al-
Mawdūdī (1903-1979) and adopted by Sayyid Qut b (1906-1966), which sees it as a 
permanent revolutionary struggle to abolish “oppressive political systems”,85 
                                                 
83 See, for example, Sobhi Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām (Beirut: 
Dār al-‛Ilm lil-Malāyīn, 1972/1392), pp. 77, 178-180; Mahmassani, “The Principles of International 
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Jihād fī al-Qur’ān al-Karīm” (PhD thesis, al-Azhar University, Faculty of Usūl al-Dīn, Cairo, 1972), 
pp. 406 f.; ‛Afīfī, Al-Mujtama‛ al-Islāmī, pp. 126 f.; al-Firjānī, Usūl al-‛Alāqāt, pp. 31 f., 48, 187, 
191; Saqr, Falsafah al-Harb, pp. 107-109; Tantāwī, “Al-Hukm al-Shar‛ī fī Ahdāth al-Khalīj”, p. 57; 
Muhammad Ra’fat ‛Uthmān, Al-Huqūq wa al-Wājibāt wa al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām, 4th ed. 
(Cairo: Dār al-Diyā’, 1991), p. 189; ‛Umar Mukhtār al-Qādī, “Al-Islām wa al-Qānūn: Dawābt wa 
Ma‛āyyr al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah al-‛Ammah ‛alā Daw’ al-Mabādi’ al-Islāmiyyah”, in Fārūq 
Hamādah, ed., Al-Tashrī‛ al-Dawlī fī al-Islām, Nadawāt wa Munāzarāt, No. 70 (Rabat: Kulliyyah al-
Ādāb wa al-‛Ulūm al-Insāniyyah, 1997), p. 60; Sāmī al-Saqqār, “Nizām al-Amān fī al-Sharī‛ah al-
Islāmiyyah wa Āwdā‛ al-Musta’minīn”, in Fārūq Hamādah, ed., Al-Tashrī‛ al-Dawlī fī al-Islām, 
Nadawāt wa Munāzarāt, No. 70 (Rabat: Kulliyyah al-Ādāb wa al-‛Ulūm al-Insāniyyah, 1997), p. 83; 
Mustafā al-Sibā‛ī, Min Rawā’i‛ H adāratinā (Cairo: Dār al-Warrāq; Dār al-Salām, 1998/1418), pp. 73 
f.; al-Zuhaylī, “Majālāt al-‛Alāqāt”, p. 198; Nasr Farīd Wāsil, “Al-Islām Dīn Salām: Mafhūm al-H arb 
wa al-Salām fī al-Islām”, Islam and the 21st Century, Researches and Facts, the Tenth General 
Conference of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 
1999/1420), p. 277; Dāghī, “Al-Usus wa al-Mabādi’ al-Islāmiyyah lil-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah”, p. 169; 
Zawati, “Just War”, p. 15; Zayd ibn ‛Abd al-Karīm al-Zayd, Muqaddimah fī al-Qānūn al-Dawlī al-
Insānī fī al-Islām (N.p.: Comité International Genève, ICRC, 2004), pp. 12, 75; Krīmah, Al-Jihād fī 
al-Islām, pp. 35-41; ‛Abd al-Mun‛im al-Hifnī, Mawsū‛ah al-Qur’ān al-‛Azīm (Cairo: Maktabah 
Madbūlī, Vol. 2, 2004), Vol. 2, p. 1901; Muhammad Fahād al-Shalāldah, Al-Qānūn al-Dawlī al-
Insānī (Alexandria, Egypt: Munsha’ah al-Ma‛ārif, 2005), pp. 21 f.; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 
1, pp. 401 f., 407, 423-447; Hashmi, “Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace”, p. 214; 
Badawi, “Muslim/Non-Muslim Relations”, p. 279; Anisseh Van Engeland, “The Differences and 
Similarities between International Humanitarian Law and Islamic Humanitarian Law: Is there Ground 
for Reconciliation?”, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 2008, p. 83; Simbar, 
“The Changing Role of Islam in International Relations”, pp. 57, 65. According to Farhad Malekian, 
“Islamic law basically promotes peaceful relations between all mankind and this theory should not be 
modified by the causes of war.” See Farhad Malekian, The Concept of Islamic International Criminal 
Law: A Comparative Study (London: Graham & Trotman, 1994), p. 49; Alsumaih, “The Sunni 
Concept of Jihad”, pp. 272, 305. 
84 See, for example, Sābiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, Vol. 3, pp. 10-16. 
85 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, rev. trans. with a foreword by Ahmed Zaki Hammad (Indianapolis: 
American Trust Publication, 1993), p. 46. See also Sayyid Qutb, Fī Zilāl al-Qur’ān (Beirut: Dār al-
Shurūq, 1982), Vol. 3, pp. 1446 f.; Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global 
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although it is not clear how and by whom this specific concept of jihād could be 
practically applied in reality in the contemporary world. Interestingly, moreover, the 
large part of this oppression, especially after the liberation of Muslims countries in 
the twentieth century, has been committed by Muslims regimes against their own 
people. This has partly contributed to the formulation of the concept of jihād against 
“the near enemy”, i.e., Muslim regimes, discussed in Chapter Five.    
 Shaykh Muh ammad Abū Zahrah (1898-1974), a prominent and prolific 
twentieth-century author, in his Al-Mujtama‛ al-Insānī fī Zill al-Islām (Human 
Society in the Shade of Islam) and Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām (International 
Relations in Islam) shaped a modern approach to the subject of international relations 
in Islam. Abū Zahrah states that his study of this area is based on the texts of the 
Qur’ān and the Sunnah, i.e., sharī‛ah, and the practice of those who abided by it, not 
on the “practices of [Muslim] kings who distorted the facts of the religion of Islam 
and [thus] from whom Muslims suffered more than the enemies of the Muslims.”86 
Thus, he makes a clear distinction here between the normative theoretical laws of 
Islam and the un-Islamic practices of Muslims rulers throughout history. By making 
this important distinction at the beginning of his study, Abū Zahrah avoids a 
common major error in the study of Islamic international law, i.e., a confusion 
between the theory of Islam and the practice of the Muslims. 
 Before studying the Islamic laws of peace and war, Abū Zahrah states that 
Islamic international law, in times of both peace and war, is based on the following 
ten Islamic principles of human relations: (1) Human dignity;87 (2) all humans are 
                                                                                                                                          
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 4. See also on this new concept of jihād 
maintained by al-Mawdūdī and Qutb, al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 393-404. 
86 Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islam, p. 18. 
87 Abū Zahrah refers to both Qur’ānic and Hadīth texts as well as examples from the life of the 
Prophet; though only Qur’ānic references are given here. Qur’ān 17:70; 2:30-33; 45:12-13. 
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one nation;88 (3) human cooperation;89 (4) forbearance;90 (5) freedom (liberty), 
which includes personal or group freedom, freedom of religion and freedom of self-
determination;91 (6) virtue either in time of peace or, specifically, during the conduct 
of war;92 (7) justice;93 (8) reciprocity; (9) pacta sunt servanda94  and (10) friendship 
and preventing tyranny.95  
 Abū Zahrah thus confirms that, in Islam, peace is the normal and permanent 
state of international relation. According to the Qur’ān and Sunnah, war is permitted 
only in defence against aggression or fitnah.96 All the Qur’ānic texts prohibit the 
initiation of aggression and violation of the Islamic jus in bello (rules regulating the 
conduct during war).97 He likens war to surgery that must be performed – and 
restricted – to a certain diseased part of the body.98 This position sums up the 
approach to, and core of, the modern theory of Islamic international law.  
 Two highly important recent contributions to the study of Islamic 
international law/relations have not been, unfortunately, referred to in Western 
                                                 
88 Qur’ān 4:1; 7:189; 30:22; 49:13. 
89 Qur’ān 5:2. 
90 Qur’ān 41:34; 7:199; 16:126-127. 
91 Qur’ān 2:256; 10:99. 
92 Qur’ān 2:190; 2:194. 
93 Qur’ān 5:8; 16:90; 57:25.  
94 Qur’ān 16:91-94. 
95 Qur’ān 60:8-9; 28:5. Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām, pp. 19-46. On the Islamic 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, see also, for example, Muhammad Abū Zahrah, Tanzīm al-Islām lil-
Mujtama‛ (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‛Arabī, n.d.), pp. 41-43; Saqr, Falsafah al-Harb, p. 111-124; ‛Afīfī, 
Al-Mujtama‛ al-Islāmī, p. 226; ‛Abd al-Bāqī Ni‛mah ‛Abd Allah, Al-Qānūn al-Dawlī al-‛Āmm: 
Dirāsah Muqāranah bayn al-Sharī‛ah al-Islāmiyyah wa al-Qānūn al-Wad‛ī (Beirut: Dār al-Adwā’, 
1990/1410), p. 43; Hans Wehberg, “Pacta Sunt Servanda”, American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 53, 1959, p. 775; Pirzada, “Islam and International Law”, pp. 210-215; Weeramantry, Islamic 
Jurisprudence, pp. 132 f.; El-Ayouty, “International Terrorism under the Law”, p. 491; Malekian, The 
Concept of Islamic International Criminal Law, pp. 12 f.; Javaid Rehman, Islamic State Practices, 
International Law and the Threat from Terrorism: A Critique of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in the 
New World Order (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 46; Emilia Justyna Powell and Sara 
McLaughlin “The International Court of Justice and the World’s Three Legal Systems”, The Journal 
of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 2, May 2007, pp. 400 f. 
96 Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām, pp. 47-52, 89-94. 
97 Ibid., pp. 89-106. 
98 Muhammad Abū Zahrah, Al-Mujtama‛ al-Insānī fī Z il al-Islām (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‛Arabī, n. d.), 
p. 148. Al-Sayyid Sābiq uses the same metaphor to describe war in Islam, see Sābiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, 
Vol. 3, p. 44.   
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literature. The first is a ten-year research project on international relations in Islam99 
conducted by a group of twenty-seven academic specialists, mostly of Cairo 
University, in international relations, positive international law, Islamic history and 
political science. This encyclopaedic project, sponsored and published by the USA-
based International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), was published in Arabic in 
fourteen volumes in 1996. The second neglected contribution is the recent series of 
annual conferences of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in Egypt (SCIA).100 
Muslim and non-Muslim academics and religious officials from all over the world 
contribute to this annual conference. The publication of these annual conference 
proceedings includes a number of papers and the recommendations, both in English 
and French. 
The IIIT project on Islamic international relations settles the controversy 
between the classical exegetes and jurists over what determines the Islamic position 
with regard to non-Muslims. According to the project’s findings, the Islamic position 
towards non-Muslims, namely peace or war, is determined by their response to 
Islamic da‛wah (the preaching of Islam). In other words, Muslims may resort to the 
use of force against their enemies if they prevent Muslims from preaching Islam,101 
as was also argued by the late Shaykh al-Azhar, Mahmūd Shaltūt (see Chapter 
Two).102 The last revealed Qur’ānic texts on fighting (9:5 and 9:29) show this 
                                                 
99 See on this project, Ali Ghanbarpour-Dizboni, “Islam and War: The Disparity between the 
Technological-Normative Evolution of Modern War and the Doctrine of Jihad” (PhD thesis, 
Université de Montréal, 2000), pp. 15-22. 
100 This observation has been noted in Ralph H. Salmi, Cesar Adib Majul and George K. Tanham, 
Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practices (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
1998), p. 81. 
101 S aqr, ‛Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah, pp. 7-29. See also Ghanbarpour-Dizboni, “Islam and War”, pp. 
28-30. 
102 See, for example, ‛Abd al-Halīm Mah mūd, “Al-Jihād”, Kitāb al-Mu’tamar al-Rābi‛ li-Majma‛ al-
Buhūth al-Islāmiyyah (Cairo: Majma‛ al-Buhūth al-Islāmiyyah, 1968/1388), p. 36; Isma‛īl R. al-
Faruqi, “Islam and Other Faiths: The World’s Need for Humane Universalism”, in Altaf Gauhar, ed., 
The Challenge of Islam (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1978), p. 100; ‛Abd al-Salām Bilājī, 
“Sharī‛ah al-Harb fī al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah al-Sharīfah”, in Fārūq Hamādah, ed., Al-Tashrī‛ al-Dawlī 
fī al-Islām, Nadawāt wa Munāzarāt, No. 70 (Rabat: Kulliyyah al-Ādāb wa al-‛Ulūm al-Insāniyyah, 
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connection between Islam and war by stating that the casus belli are enemy hostility 
towards Islam and the breaking of a peace treaty with the Muslims.103 Preaching the 
message of Islam to non-Muslims is an obligation of the Islamic state and includes 
several means such as: oral104 or written preaching,105 using all the modern means of 
communication, as well as patience in the face of religious persecution,106 i.e., jihād 
in its wider sense.  
It is obvious that Muslims have the intrinsic right to self-defence against 
aggression, but here lies the peculiar dimension of the Islamic conception of enemy 
hostility and aggression, which is considered a justifications for war in Islam: the 
non-Muslims’ use of force to prevent the preaching of Islam is considered a 
justifications for the recourse to war, i.e., jihād in its limited sense, as Shaltūt states. 
Put differently, jihād’s nature as either peaceful missionary activity or military 
struggle – as argued by Muhammad Sa‛īd Ramadān al-Būtī (b. 1929) – depends on 
the attitude of others towards the preaching of Islam.107 This peculiar dimension and 
the fact that the Islamic state is required, theoretically, or as was the case at least in 
the first century of Islam, to introduce Islam to non-Muslims, have added to the 
confusion about jihād. This confusion also comes from the facts that the Islamic 
position towards others is derived from the normative sources of Islam and is 
determined by the attitude of non-Muslims towards the religion of Islam. 
                                                                                                                                          
1997), pp. 117 f.; Rudolph Peters, trans. and ed., Jihad in Mediaeval and Modern Islam: The Chapter 
on Jihad from Averroes’ Legal Handbook ‘Bidayat Al-Mudjtahid’ and The Treatise ‘Koran and 
Fighting’ by The Late Shaykh Al-Azhar, Mahmud Shaltūt (Leiden: Brill, 1977), pp. 45, 51; Mah mūd, 
“Al-Jihād wa Akhlāqiyyāt al-Harb fī al-Islām”, p. 852. See also ‛Afīfī, Al-Mujtama‛ al-Islāmī, pp. 
149-151; Wahbah, Al-Harb fī al-Islām, pp. 21 f.; Mahmūd Fayyād, “Al-Siyāsah Al-Khārijiyyah lil-
Islām”, Majalah al-Azhar, December 1951/Rabī‛ al-Awwal 1371, pp. 204, 206; al-Qarad āwī, Fiqh al-
Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 54 f., 241. 
103 Shitā, “Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām”, pp. 160-171.  
104 Like the expeditions the Prophet sent to preach Islam to the neighbouring tribes and in two of them 
-  Mu’atah and al-Rajyy‛ - the preachers were assassinated. 
105 The Prophet’s letters to kings and rulers inviting them to Islam is considered here a form of written 
preaching. 
106 An example of this is the thirteen years of patience in the face of religious persecution in Mecca.   
107 Muhammad Sa‛īd Ramad ān al-Būtī, Hurriah al-Insān fī Z il ‛Ubūdiyyatih li-Allah, Hadhā Huwa al-
Islām (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Mu‛āsir; Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1992/1413), pp. 109-112.  
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Applying this theoretical Islamic paradigm of international relations to 
today’s world would call for different means of introducing Islam to non-Muslims. 
Some have advocated that jihād at present takes the form of preaching through the 
Internet, the mass media and other missionary activities.108 More importantly, 
relations between Muslims and others will be peaceful, on the basis of the facts that, 
in the post-UN world, no country is permitted to resort to unjustified force against 
Muslims and non-Muslim countries do not use force against the preaching of Islam, 
let alone protecting the religious freedom and accommodating the religious needs of 
Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries. 
The recent annual conferences of the SCIA have focused on Islamic 
international law following the Lewis-introduced, Huntington-developed, 
anticipatory theory of the “clash of civilizations”. The titles of the 8th, 9th, 14th and 
16th conferences sum up the main two themes of the current discussion of Islamic 
international law: first, advocating that – because of its just, peaceful, humane and, 
unlike positive international law, religiously and morally self-imposed principles109– 
Islamic international law is superior to international law110 and, therefore, could 
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al-Islām”, p. 859; Muhammad al-Atawneh, “Shahāda versus Terror in Contemporary Islamic Legal 
Thought: The Problem of Suicide Bombers”, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 10, No. 1, 
April 2008, p. 21. On the utilization of the Internet by contemporary Muslims see, Gary R. Bunt, 
iMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam, Islamic Civilization and Muslim Networks (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009).  
109 See, for example, al-Saqqār, “Niz ām al-Amān”, p. 76; al-Disūqī, “Usūl al-‛Alāqāt”, p. 604; Mufīd 
Shihāb, “Al-Qānūn al-Dawlī wa al-Sharī‛ah al-Islamiyyah”, Islam and the Future Dialogue between 
Civilizations, Researches and Facts, the Eighth General Conference of the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Affairs (Cairo: N.p., 1998/1418), p. 335. See also, for example, al-Zuh aylī, Āthār al-Harb fī 
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Nations, pp. 6, 41; Khadduri, The Islamic conception of Justice, p. 164; Mahmassani, “The Principles 
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pp. 23, 75 f.; Romahi, Studies in International Law, p. 44. Also on Islamic international humanitarian 
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International Legal Studies, Vol. 7, 1985, pp. 191, 215; Saleem Marsoof, “Islam and International 
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Shari‛a Al-Islamiya”, p. 234; Sa‛īd Muhammad Ahmad Bānājah, Al-Mabādi’ al-Asāsiyyah lil-‛Alāqāt 
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better achieve world peace and security, and, second, refuting hostile and prejudiced 
Western scholarly attacks on Islam and its attitude towards non-Muslims. 
Modern Muslim scholars of Islamic international law have to deal with new 
circumstances, which have rendered the classical theory “inoperative or even 
irrelevant”,111 because many essential concepts and rules of the classical theory of 
Islamic international law have become obsolete because of changes in the many 
                                                                                                                                          
al-Dawliyyah wa al-Dublūmāsiyyah waqt al-Silm wa al-Harb: Bayn al-Tashrī‛ al-Islāmī wa al-Qanūn 
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International Law, 4, 1956, quoted in Bennoune, “Humanitarian Law in Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 
639. Concerning Islamic international humanitarian law, Bennoune notes: “more than a millennium 
before the codification of the Geneva Conventions, most of the fundamental categories of protection 
which the Conventions offer could be found, in a basic form, in Islamic teachings.” See Bennoune, 
“Humanitarian Law in Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 623; See also Ghanbarpour-Dizboni, “Islam and 
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Jihād fī Daw’ al-Sunnah: Asbābuh wa Kayfiyyatuh wa Natā’ijuh” (PhD thesis, Al-Azhar University, 
Cairo, 1976), p. 462; ‛Uthmān, Al-Huqūq, p. 211; S.K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War (Lahore: 
Wajidalis, 1979), pp. 48 f.; Saqr, Falsafah al-Harb, p. 159. Roger C. Algase points out that “Islamic 
law is now being recognized by western writers in its true context as the oldest legal system 
containing detailed rules for warfare.” See Roger C. Algase, “Protection of Civilian Lives in Warfare: 
A Comparison between Islamic Law and Modern International Law Concerning the Conduct of 
Hostilities”, Revue de Droit Pénal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre, Vol. 16, 1977, p. 247.  Marcel 
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the Protection of the Victims of Armed Conflict in Islam”, Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. 1, No. 2, Autumn 
1978, p. 13; Zawati concludes that “the substantive postulates of Islamic humanitarian law exceed the 
norms decreed by the Hague and the Geneva Conventions”, see Zawati, Is Jihad a Just War?, p. 112; 
Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, former Member of the International court of Justice, describes Islamic 
International law as “incredibly ahead of its time, so that its principles and rules, in particular so far as 
the conduct of war is concerned, fully stand comparison with those of present-day humanitarian law”, 
see Mohammed Bedjaoui, “The Gulf War of 1980-1988 and the Islamic Conception of International 
Law”, in Ige F. Dekker and Harry H.G. Post, eds., The Gulf War of 1980-1988: The Iran-Iraq War in 
International Legal Perspective (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), p. 282; also Saleem Marsoof, 
Judge, Court of Appeal, Sri Lanka, concludes that Islamic “rules relating to the conduct of war, the 
treatment of civilians, refugees and prisoners are more elaborate and just than even the rules contained 
in modern international conventions and protocols containing the principles of the modern 
International Humanitarian Law.” See Marsoof “Islam and International Humanitarian Law”, p. 27. 
Mahmasani concludes that “This defensive war [jihād], when permissible, is moreover subjected by 
Islamic jurisprudence to strict regulations and rules. In their humane character they were unparalleled 
in their time and are comparable in content only to modern regulations recognized to-day by 
international conferences and treaties.” Mahmassani, “The Principles of International Law in the Light 
of Islamic Doctrine”, p. 321; Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, p. 246.   
111 Salmi, Majul and Tanham, Islam and Conflict Resolution, p. 76. See also, for example, John 
Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 
1993, pp. 107 f. 
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circumstances upon which these rules were based. The most important of these 
circumstances is the abolition of the Islamic government system (caliphate) in 1924 
and the “fragmentation” of the Muslim world into colonized or later, apart from 
Palestine, independent, sovereign, nation states. The second most important change 
is the establishment of the UN and agreement by all the countries of the world, for 
the first time in the history of the human race, to abide by one set of laws and to 
obligate themselves to “live together in peace”.112  
Since all Muslim countries have chosen to settle international disputes 
according to international law,113 modern Islamic writings on Islamic international 
law merely make theoretical contributions which are not intended either to be applied 
in international society114 or even, unfortunately, unlike the classical jurists’ 
scholarly efforts, to give religiously-based rules for the conduct of the Islamic state 
in times of war. One of the reasons why Muslim countries have welcomed 
international law is that nothing in it contradicts the basic principles of Islamic 
international law,115 namely, peace, justice and equality; indeed, it satisfies them. 
Furthermore, it puts Muslim countries, theoretically, on an equal legal footing with 
the colonial powers and provided legal justification for the liberation of their 
countries.116 Nonetheless, Mufīd Shihāb,117 a prominent Egyptian professor of 
international law and currently cabinet minister for the second time, criticised the 
organization of the United Nations at the eighth conference of the SCIA, arguing that 
                                                 
112 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(Geneva: United Nations, reprint, 1997), p. 3. 
113 Ibid., p. 5. 
114 See Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 163.  
115 See Maurits Berger, “Islamic Views on International Law”, in Paul Meerts, ed., Culture and 
International Law (Hague: Hague Academic Press/T.M.C. Asser Press; West Nyack, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), pp. 105-117.  
116 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‛im, Towards an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, 
and International Law (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1992), p. 152.  
117 Mufīd Shihāb was former President of Cairo University, Member of the Egyptian Society of 
International Law,  former Minister of Egypt’s Higher Education and the State for Scientific Research, 
and at present Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Councils.  
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it had failed as yet to achieve the most important principle it committed itself to 
achieve, i.e., “the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”118 The 
power of veto held by the five permanent members of the Security Council 
undermines the principle of equality among the member states. He therefore 
advocates that Islamic principles and teachings could bring a humane and moral 
dimension to international relations.119 
Modern Muslim writers also argue that history proves that Muslims have a 
superior and more peaceful record in their relations with others in comparison with 
that of the Christian/Western world. Gustave Le Bon is often quoted in this context 
as one of the fair-minded Western scholars who have acknowledged the fact that 
“history has never known a merciful and a just conqueror as the Arabs and that they 
left their conquered peoples free with their religion”.120 Historical examples are often 
given to show this superiority and the tolerance of Muslims towards others, such as 
the Constitution of Medina, the peaceful taking over of Mecca and the amnesty given 
to the Meccans (8/630), the pact of ‛Umar (17/638) safeguarding the religious 
freedom of the Christian of Jerusalem,121 the model behaviour of the noble warrior 
                                                 
118 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, p. 6. 
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396; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, p. 484.  
121 ‛Abd al-Rahman Sālim, “Bayn al-‛Uhdah al-‛Umariyyah wa ‛Ahd Muhammad al-Fātih  li-Ahālī al-
Qustantīniyyah: Dirāsah Tahlīliyyah Muqāranah”, Tolerance in the Islamic Civilization, the Sixteenth 
General Conference of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic 
Affairs, 2004/1425), pp. 1067-1077; Charis Waddy, The Muslim Mind, 3rd ed. (London: Grosvenor, 
1990), p. 101; David Dakake, “The Myth of a Militant Islam”, in Aftab Ahmad Malik, ed., The State 
We Are in: Identity, Terror and the Law of Jihad (Bristol: Amal Press, 2006), pp. 76 f.; al-Zuhaylī, Al-
‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah, pp. 164 f. It is interesting to add here, as an example of the disparity between 
the insider and outsider approach in Islamic studies, that Western literature often refers to another 
completely different version of this pact imposing severe and bizarre restrictions on the religious 
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refuting the possibility of concluding a pact that imposes such bizarre restrictions and attributing it to 
‛Umar see, al-Ghunaimi, Qānūn al-Salām fī al-Islām, pp. 416-418. See also on this pact, Michael 
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Saladin (1138-1193) compared with the atrocities committed by the Crusaders,122 the 
Christian persecution of Jews and Muslims in Spain,123 the atrocities committed by 
European colonialists, the Native American genocide, the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki,124 the atrocities committed in World War One and World War Two and 
the atrocities committed by the Israelis against the Palestinians.       
 Sūfī Abū Tālib, a law professor and ex-speaker of the People’s Assembly of 
Egypt (4 November, 1978 - 4 November, 1983), distinguishes the misinterpretation 
of some Biblical texts and the practice of some Christians throughout history, from 
the true Christian teachings of peace and love.125 In Judaism, (Numbers 31:1-11; 
33:50-53; Deuteronomy 2:16-17; 13:12-16; 20:10-16; Joshua 8:21-24; 1 Samuel 
27:8-12; 2 Samuel 8:1-2; 13:26-31), he concludes, “the texts of the Old Testament 
indicate that the goals of war between the Jews and the other peoples are to capture 
other peoples’ lands, expel them from their territories, and destroy them.”126 The 
Zionists after World War One, he adds, and “the contemporary leaders of the State of 
Israel are acting according to the texts of the Torah in expelling the Palestinians from 
their land, building Jewish settlements on it and perpetrating massacres such as ‘Byer 
Sab‛’ and ‘Qānā’”.127  
                                                                                                                                          
Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practices (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006), p. 88. 
122 Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, pp. 232 f.; al-Sibā‛ī, Min Rawā’i‛ Hadāratinā, pp. 79-81; 
al-Shihābī, Mafhūm al-Harb, pp. 87 f.; Ibrāhīm Ah mad al-‛Adawī, “Namādhij Tārīkhiyyah min al-
Tasāmuh  al-Islāmī: S alah  al-Dīn wa Mu‛āmalah al-S alībiyyn wa Dustūr Hukm Madīnah al-Quds”, 
Tolerance in the Islamic Civilization, Researches and Facts, the Sixteenth General Conference of the 
Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2004/1425), pp. 
1125-1142; Farrāj, “Al-Islām wa al-Ākhar”, p. 424. See Abū Tālib, “Al-Islām wa al-Ākhar”, pp. 373 
f.; Wahbah, Al-Harb fī al-Islām, pp. 87 f.; ‛Āmir, Ahkām al-Asrā, p. 148 
123 See Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, p. 232; al-Sibā‛ī, Min Rawā’i‛ Hadāratinā, p. 83; 
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The line of thought does not distinguish between the teachings of Judaism 
and Christianity and the practice of the followers of these religions, whether a 
disparity is believed to exist between the theory and practice in the case of 
Christianity and its followers, or a link is believed to exist in the case of Judaism and 
its contemporary followers in Israel, as argued above by Abū Tālib and reiterated by 
al-Qaradāwī in 2009.128 Moreover, limiting the history of America to the genocide of 
the native Americans and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or the history of 
the Western Christian world to the Crusades and colonialism, and arguing that the 
atrocities committed against the Palestinians are perpetrated in accordance with the 
laws of the Torah, are examples of confusion among Muslims between the theory 
and practice of Judaism and Christianity.  
 
3.4.2 Outsider Readings of Jihād 
Unfortunately, a similar confusion between the teachings of Islam and the practices 
of some Muslims throughout history, and presenting these practices as being in 
conformity with Islamic teachings, is very common in current mainstream Western 
scholarly literature. The Islamic teachings on war, as presented in Western literature, 
are often limited to the Qur’ānic phrases calling upon Muslims to kill the polytheists 
wherever they find them,129 without any study of the contexts or the interpretations 
of these phrases, even within their locutions or along with the rest of the relevant 
Qur’ānic texts on peace and war. This approach resembles the line of thought which 
                                                 
128 Al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1. pp. 470-472, 591. 
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attributes the Israeli atrocities committed against the Palestinians to the teachings of 
Judaism130 or at best to Jewish religious extremism.131 In addition, modern Western 
literature is still influenced by the old Western school which portrayed Islam, in 
Rudolph Peters’ words, as “a violent and fanatical creed, spread by savage warriors, 
carrying the Koran in one hand and a scimitar in the other.”132 Hence, portraying the 
Muslims as “bloodthirsty, lecherous fanatics” was used by Western colonialists to 
justify “their colonial expansion by the idea of a mission civilisatrice”, Peters 
adds.133  
Three contradictory motives for jihād are mainly given in outsider literature. 
First, jihād has been commonly presented in Western literature as the “equivalent to 
the Christian concept of the Crusade”,134 and thus has been always termed as “holy 
war” against non-Muslims.135 This presentation and translation of jihād are based on 
an understanding of the aim of jihād, expressed by Khadduri, as “the universalization 
of religion [Islam] and the establishment of an imperial world state.”136 Put 
differently, quoting (Qur’ān 2:191), US Navy Lieutenant Commander John F. 
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Whalen maintains that, “The highest duty of Islam, then, was to vanquish those who 
did not believe [in Islam].”137 
Second, and in contradiction, Watt argues that, “Most of the participants in 
the [early Islamic, jihād] expeditions probably thought of nothing more than booty… 
There was no thought of spreading the religion of Islam.”138 Similarly, Edward J. 
Jurji argues that the motivations of the Arab conquests were certainly not “for the 
propagation of Islam… Military advantage, economic desires, [and] the attempt to 
strengthen the hand of the state and enhance its sovereignty… are some of the 
determining factors.”139 In his Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to 
the 21st Centuries, Paul Fregosi claims that, “Even more than Allah, the prime 
motives for fighting that inspired the Arabs were plunder, slaves, women and the 
eagerness for death fighting for Islam.”140 He concludes by emphasizing his bizarre 
claims that the pursuit of sex “helped them [Muslims] to conquer half the known 
world in less than one hundred years”.141  
Third, in 1977 Peters concluded that, “The primary aim of the jihād is not, as 
it was often supposed in the older European literature, the conversion by force of 
unbelievers, but the expansion – and also defence – of the Islamic state”,142 and he 
points out that the translation of jihād as “holy war” is therefore “strictly speaking, a 
wrong translation.”143 
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The first/seventh century wars of the Islamic state are also a source of 
contradictions between Islamic and Western scholarship. While these wars are 
presented in the Western literature as holy wars against infidels or, recently, as wars 
of expansion for the Islamic state, the aims of these wars, as described by some 
Muslim scholars, were to “emancipate peoples, defend freedoms, establish human 
equality and spread justice”.144 Although ascertaining this description of the aims of 
these wars requires an investigation into every single instance, al-Qaradāwī states 
that throughout Islamic history no single incident of forced conversion has been 
recorded.145 Despite Khadduri’s hostile presentation of jihād as an “instrument” to 
“universalize” both Islam and the Islamic state,146 he states that, “Islam as a religion 
was spread by trade and cultural connections beyond the frontiers of the state”.147 
Furthermore, Khadduri even indicates that non-Muslim Arabs, including Christians, 
“joined the Muslim forces against their Persian and Byzantine masters”.148 Thus, 
Abū Zahrah and al-Qaradāwī maintain that these wars were just wars that liberated 
these peoples from the Roman and Persian tyranny.149 
Nevertheless, on 12 September 2006, Pope Benedict XVI gave a lecture on 
faith and reason at the University of Regensburg in which he quoted the following 
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words of the fourteenth-century Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus to a 
Persian scholar: “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there 
you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the 
sword the faith he preached.”150 The Pope quotes this statement to argue that Islam is 
against reasoning, because “for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His 
will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality.”151 The 
remark about the spread of Islam by force triggered a massive reaction throughout 
the Muslim world.152 This remark indicates that this mediaeval portrayal of Islam is 
still accepted at the highest levels of Western Christian circles.153 Furthermore, it 
shows that this perception of the history and religion of Islam influences the current 
relationship between Islam and the West. But more significantly here, Muslim 
reaction to this remark indicates that Muslims reject the claim that Islam accepts 
spreading religion by force and even feel offended and that their history is being 
distorted by the claim that Islam was spread by force.   
Thus, it is still being said that jihād is the Muslims’ “instrument”, or, for 
some, the Islamic equivalent of the Western Christian idea of holy war, to convert or 
subject non-Muslims. This shows that a disparity still exists between the insider and 
outsider understandings of jihād. It is interesting to quote here an American academic 
                                                 
150 Benedict XVI, Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections. A lecture given at the 
University of Regensburg, 12 September, 2006, available from 
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151 Ibid. 
152 See a response of thirty eight worldwide Muslim leading religious figures to the Pope’s remarks 
titled “Open Letter to His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI”, available from http://www.dar-
alifta.org/Viewstatement.aspx?ID=19; Internet; accessed 27 May 2007. 
153 For a survey of the Western Medieval views of Islam see, for example, R.W. Southern, Western 
Views of Islam in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); David R. 
Blanks and Michael Frassetto, eds., Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: 
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Prophet Muhammad see, Jabal Muhammad Buaben, Image of the Prophet Muhammad in the West: A 
Study of Muir, Margoliouth and Watt (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1996/1417). 
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who expressed this outsider’s understanding in his comparison of Muslim and 
Christian recourse to war. Bruce Lawrence states that, “warfare remains a nefarious 
by-product of historical circumstances…an incidental mythomoteur for Christians, 
while it has been, and will continue to be, a foundational mythomoteur for Muslims 
of every generation.”154 Lawrence claims that for Muslims, as he says Ibn Khaldūn 
(d. 808/1406) maintains, warfare is intrinsic to history. Lawrence bases this claim 
about warfare in Islam on an obvious misunderstanding of Ibn Khaldūn’s 
observation.155 Khadduri explains that Ibn Khaldūn was “perhaps” the first Muslim 
to recognize that “wars were not, as his Muslim predecessors thought, casual social 
calamities. He maintained that war has existed in society ever since its 
‘Creation.’…Ibn Khaldūn’s observation, which shows keen insight in understanding 
human history, is corroborated by modern research, which has demonstrated that 
early societies tended to be more warlike and that peace was by no means the normal 
state of affairs.”156 Thus Ibn Khaldūn, as Mahmassani also notes,157 is here 
describing a human psychological phenomenon that has existed since the creation of 
                                                 
154 Bruce Lawrence, “Holy War (Jihad) in Islamic Religion and Nation-State Ideologies”, in John 
Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds., Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives 
on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 
144; see also the same statement in his “Reconsidering ‘Holy War’ (Jihād) in Islam”, Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2, Dec. 1990, p. 265. See also Copinger-Symes, “Is Osama 
bin Laden’s ‘Fatwa Urging Jihad against Americans’ dated 23 February 1998 Justified y Islamic 
Law?”, p. 218. For another example of such sweeping oversimplification, Daniel Brown maintains 
that in Islam: “War is justified at the macro level as a means of bringing humankind into proper 
relation to God, and at the individual level as a shortcut to paradise.” See Daniel Brown, “Islamic 
Ethics in Comparative Perspective”, The Muslim World, Vol. LXXXIX, Nol. 2, April, 1999, p. 190. 
155 Ibn Khaldūn states: “War and different kinds of fighting have always occurred in the world since 
God created it… It is something natural among human beings. No nation and no race (generation) is 
free from it.” See ‛Abd al-Rahman ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. 
Franz Rosenthal (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958) Vol. 2, p. 73. 
156 Khadduri, War and Peace, pp. 70-72; Khadduri, The Islamic conception of Justice, p. 173. 
157 Mahmassani, “The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine”, p. 277. See 
also Noor Muhammad, “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction”, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 
3, No. 2, 1985, p. 384. 
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humankind, not, as Lawrence claims, that the “cessation of warfare” is unthinkable to 
Muslims.158     
Lawrence’s statement actually contradicts the Muslim understanding of 
warfare. Khadduri refers to al-Turtushī (d. 520/1126-7) as describing wars as “social 
anomalies” and al-Hasan ibn ‛Abd Allah, who in 708/1308-9 compared wars “to 
diseases of society”.159 Moreover, Abū Zahrah’s figurative reference to the recourse 
to jihād as “surgery”, mentioned above, means that warfare is an exceptional 
necessary measure to stop an ongoing aggression (Qur’ān 2:251).160 Jihād, thus, is 
not an act of warfare against the rest of mankind, as it is portrayed in some outsider 
literature,161 since Abū Zahrah uses the simile of “surgery”, which cannot be 
performed on, and is not needed by, the whole of the human body. Justice Jamāl al-
Dīn Mah mūd states that warfare is an exceptional necessity and, as the Qur’ān 
explains (2:216), it is hateful to human nature.162 Other scholars add that warfare is 
considered “a necessary evil in exceptional cases sanctioned by Allah in defence of 
Islam, its protection, and as a deterrent against aggression.”163 In Islam warfare is 
thus, according to ‛Abbās al-Jarārī, advisor of the king of Morocco, “a crime and a 
violation to peace that is prohibited in Islam, unless it has just and legal 
justification”.164 
                                                 
158 Lawrence, “Holy War (Jihad) in Islamic Religion and Nation-State Ideologies”, p. 144. 
159 Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 72. See also Hammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of State, p. 162. 
160 Abū Zahrah, Al-Mujtama‛ al-Insānī, p. 148. 
161 See, for example, Reuven Firestone, Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 134; John Ralph Willis, “Jihad fi Sabil Allah-Its Doctrinal Basis in Islam 
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Draz quoted in Haykal, Al-Jihād wa al-Qitāl, Vol. 1, p. 587.  
164 ‛Abbās al-Jarārī, “Mu‛ādalah al-Silm wa al-Harb fī Manzur al-Islām”, Tolerance in the Islamic 
Civilization, Researches and Facts, the Sixteenth General Conference of the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2004/1425), p. 1192. 
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This sweeping and futuristic vision by Lawrence of warfare in Islam indicates 
a very obvious and practical problem in the study of Islam, namely, that Islamic 
literature is not usually adequately taken into account in Western studies of Islam. It 
is a practical problem in the sense that translations of books from Islamic languages 
into European languages are few and far between. This creates a gap between Islamic 
scholarship and its Western counterpart and studying the same old Western material 
on Islam will continue to produce the same old theories, more or less, with some 
minor modifications or developments. It is an obvious problem in the sense that to 
properly study a religion, a scholar needs to learn, among other disciplines, the 
languages in which the normative sources and materials of the religion are written.   
Peters, a leading Western authority in the field, has studied a vast literature in 
Arabic that reflects the modern discussions of Islamic international law. Although his 
work is basically descriptive, in the sense that it merely summarizes the literature he 
discusses without adequate analysis, it is significant to find that his reaction to 
contemporary Muslim advocacy of jihād as a defensive just war and the superiority 
of the principles of Islamic international law to positive international law is sceptical.   
Peters’ repeated classification of modern writers as “highly apologetic”165 
implies that the motivation of these writers is primarily the defence of Islam, not 
simply advocating its teachings. He holds that both “modernist” and 
“fundamentalist” Muslim writers advocate their positions in reaction to what he calls 
“Western penetration”. He therefore claims that the modernists are “adopting 
Western values and reforming their religion in the light of these newly imported 
ideas. They have transformed Islam into a religion that is well suited for the 
                                                 
165 Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, pp. 148, 110; see also his Islam and Colonialism, p. 
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Westernized elite.”166 In addition, he claims that the fundamentalists “have reacted in 
a self-assertive manner, by rejecting everything Western and emphasizing the real 
Islamic values.”167 These two claims offer untenable interpretations of the so-called 
modernist and fundamentalist positions on Islamic international law. The claim that 
the modernists are reacting, adopting, reforming and further transforming their 
religion to suit Western “imported ideas” is an unjust judgement on the bases of 
these Islamic writings and their motivations. It even contradicts the belief generally 
maintained by Muslim and Western scholars that such writings are based on Islamic 
teachings, whether correctly or incorrectly attributed to the sharī‛ah or the juridical 
judgements, for there is no doubt that these writings are based, as shown above, on 
the teachings of Islam, the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. Had this claim been true, the 
modernists would have been satisfied that such Islamic laws were simply compatible 
with Western laws, and would not also advocate the superiority of Islamic laws and 
Qur’ānic principles and suggest that they could better ensure a more equal and secure 
international society. 
  Moreover, these modern writers are reiterating the same Islamic casus belli 
as that given by the majority of the classical jurists of the second/eighth and 
third/ninth centuries, and, more importantly, any Islamic position, no matter how it is 
classified, is based on an understanding or an interpretation of the Qur’ān and 
Sunnah. The only change, as referred to above, is the introduction of Islamic 
positions corresponding to different sets of circumstances. Furthermore, the mere 
idea that the modernists would mould their religion in conformity to the Western 
model is far-fetched, bearing in mind that neither the modernists nor the 
fundamentalist are well acquainted with Western literature, simply because, again, of 
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the scarcity of translations of works on such subjects from European languages into 
Islamic languages. The familiarity they are claimed to have with Western ideas might 
be true for students of political science and positive law, which would explain why 
many modern Muslim writers on Islamic international law do not come from a 
religious educational background. Indeed, some of these students who have not had a 
religious education take a pride in finding that classical Muslim jurists addressed 
such matters,168 as Peters notes, eight centuries before the birth of Hugo Grotius 
(1583-1645), the Dutch founder of International law,169 who “himself drew heavily 
on Arabic works as is witnessed in Chapter X (article 3) of his Treatise [De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis]”,170 Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada confirms. Professor Christopher 
Gregory Weeramantry, Judge of the International Court of Justice (1991-2000), also 
argues persuasively and calls for further investigation into the question that Grotius 
was influenced by Islamic international law.171 Hence, it is understandable that ‛Abd 
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 165
al-Sattār Abū Ghuddah argues that it is al-Shaybānī, not Grotius, who is to be 
considered “the father of international law”.172  
Furthermore, Peters adds that modern Islamic writers maintain that, 
“European international law has been strongly influenced by the Sharī‛a via 
intercultural contacts during the Crusades and in Spain. E. Nys and Baron Michel de 
Taube were the first to assume a certain influence of Islamic law on Western 
international law.”173 Since many Muslims, as well as a few European scholars,174 
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suggest this Islamic “influence” on international law, it would be contradictory to 
claim that Muslims “have transformed” Islamic laws to suit Western ideas.  
Peters’ remark that the fundamentalists reject “everything Western” and 
emphasise “the real Islamic values” means that it is their rejection of Western ideas, 
and not their genuine belief in their respective interpretations of the Islamic sources, 
that drives them to hold certain positions. Peters’ description of the modernists’ 
writings as “apologetic” and the fundamentalists as “self-assertive”, and his claim 
that both are framing their religious positions in reaction to the West, are therefore 
groundless. Significantly, Peters’ description of the modern authors in phrases such 
as “our Muslim Panglosses”175 implies that their advocacy of a peaceful Islamic 
theory of international law is regarded sceptically and without appreciation.  
Lawrence’s statement describing war in Islam as a hostile permanent doctrine 
and Peters’ scepticism of what he describes as the modern Muslim advocacy of an 
Islamic “adequate legal system for maintaining peace in the domain of international 
relations”176 represent the main two current attitudes regarding war and Islamic 
international law that are found in Western literature. Ignorance of, or failure to 
appreciate, the modern theory of Islamic international law as a potential theoretical 
contribution to the current system of international law, or at least as a laudable 
Islamic contribution to the global ethics of war and peace, undermines the possibility 
of developing such a global ethics.       
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3.5 Divisions of the World 
Muslims jurists of the second/eighth century177 developed a paradigm of 
international relations that divides the world into three conceptual divisions, dār al-
Islām/dār al-‛adl/dār al-salām (lit. house of Islam/house of justice178/house of 
peace), dār al-harb/dār al-jawr (house of war/house of injustice, oppression) and dār 
al-sulh/dār al-‛ahd/dār al-muwāda‛ah (house of peace/house of covenant/house of 
reconciliation). At the time, the “others” as far as Muslims were concerned were 
inevitably non-Muslim countries, for the very obvious reason that all Muslims of that 
time were politically united under one government, the institution of the caliphate, 
though at certain times there was more than one autonomous caliphate, some self-
proclaimed. New territories were annexed to the growing Islamic state and, although 
they were considered to be within it, their Muslims were no more than a minority and 
it took them several centuries to become the majority. 
An analysis of these three conceptual divisions confirms the conclusions of 
this study about the factors determining the nature of the relationship between 
Muslims and ‘others’ and thus specifying when jihād, in the sense of war, is 
permissible. Furthermore, it also clears up the uncertainty surrounding the position of 
religion in determining this relation. 
 
3.5.1 Dār al-Islām/Dār al-‛Adl/Dār al-Salām (house of Islam/house of justice/house 
of peace) 
Scholars give three different definitions of what constitutes the dār al-Islām. First, 
Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798) and al-Shaybānī, the renowned scholars of the Hanafī school 
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of law, Mālik, al-Shāfi‛ī and Ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855),179 the eponymous founders of 
the Mālikī, Shāfi‛ī and Hanbalī schools of law, define it as the territory in which 
Islamic law is applied. It is also defined as the territory in which the ahkām (sing. 
hukm, rules or rituals of Islam) exist or at least, for some, the free proclamation of the 
belief in Islam and the performance of prayers can be practised.180 Others “even 
believe that a country remains dār al-Islām so long as a single provision (hukm) of 
the Muslim law is kept in force there.”181 Second, for al-Shawkānī it is a territory 
ruled by Muslims or in which the sovereignty belongs to Muslims.182 But he 
maintains that “a territory can be considered dār al-Islām, even if it is not under 
Muslim rule, as long as a Muslim can reside there in safety and freely fulfil his 
religious obligations”.183 Third, for Abū Hanīfah, dār al-Islām is a territory in which 
Islamic law is applied and Muslims and ahl al-dhimmah (non-Muslim citizens of the 
dār al-Islām)184 are safe.185 Three criteria are thus proposed to identify dār al-Islām, 
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namely, the application of Islamic law or rituals, the sovereignty of Muslims, and the 
safety of the Muslims and the non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic state. 
 
3.5.2 Dār al-Harb/Dār al-Jawr (house of war/house of injustice, oppression) 
It follows that dār al-harb refers to territories in which these criteria are lacking. 
According to the first definition, it is a territory where Islamic law is not applied or 
where it is not safe to profess belief in Islam or perform prayers.186 According to the 
second definition, dār al-harb is a territory ruled by non-Muslims,187 while for the 
third definition it is a territory in which the laws of Islam cannot be applied or exist 
and in which Muslims and dhimmis are not safe.188 In other words, it is a territory in 
which freedom of religion does not exist and the lives of Muslims and dhimmis are 
not safe. Thus, the classifications of dār al-harb and dār al-Islām refer to the 
existence or non-existence of safety and peace, specifically the freedom of Muslims 
to apply and practice Islamic law.189 It is worth adding here that calling a territory 
dār al-harb “did not mean actual fighting”,190 but it clearly indicated a potential state 
of hostility, enmity or war191 in cases when territories did not belong to the dār al-
Islām and did not have a peace treaty or alliance with it, and specifically if Islamic 
                                                                                                                                          
185 AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, p. 19; Abou El Fadl, 
“Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities”, p. 162, footnote no. 57; Abū ‛Īd, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Khārijyyah fī 
Dawlah al-Khilāfah, pp. 51 f.; Wahbah, Al-Harb fī al-Islām, p. 47; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 
2, p. 889.  
186 Al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām, p. 170; Salmi, Majul and Tanham, Islam and Conflict 
Resolution, p. 73; Fatānī, Ikhtilāf al-Dārīn, pp. 30-35. 
187 See Manoucher Parvin and Maurie Sommer, “Dar al-Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality 
and its Implications for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East”, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, Feb., 1980, p. 3. 
188 AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, p. 20. 
189 Al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām, pp. 172, 195 f. 
190 Salmi, Majul and Tanham, Islam and Conflict Resolution, p. 73. See also al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-
Harb fī al-Islām, p. 172; al-Zuhaylī, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah, p. 116; Marcel A. Boisard, Jihad: A 
Commitment to Universal Peace (Indianapolis, Ind.: American Trust Publications, 1988), p. 8; 
Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 146; Thomas, “Jihad’s Captives”, pp. 89 f.; Elbakry, “The 
Legality of ‘War’ in Al-Shari‛a Al-Islamiya”, pp. 305, 615 f.; Ghanbarpour-Dizboni, “Islam and 
War”, p. 27.   
191 Khadduri, The Islamic conception of Justice, p. 163. 
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law could not be applied, Muslims were not safe to profess their belief in Islam and 
perform prayer, and the lives of Muslims and dhimmis were imperilled. 
 
3.5.3 Dār al-Sulh/Dār al-‛Ahd/Dār al-Muwāda‛ah (house of peace/192house of 
covenant/house of reconciliation) 
Dār al-s ulh or dār al-‛ahd refers to sovereign or semi-autonomous non-Muslim 
countries that entered into peace agreements with the Islamic state.193 Treaties were 
made by which the non-Muslim territories paid kharāj (annual land tax); they did not 
pay jizyah because they were not living under the sovereignty of the Islamic state.194 
This tax was paid in return for the Islamic state’s obligation to defend them from any 
foreign attacks. Alternatively, they were obliged to provide military support for the 
Islamic state. Other treaties stipulated that the two parties should exchange services 
or commodities, as in the treaties with the people of Nubia, Abyssinia, Cyprus and 
Armenia.195 Furthermore, Muslim jurists commonly agreed that the Islamic state 
could give payment to their enemies to secure a truce in cases of necessity.196 
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Harb fī al-Islām, pp. 175 f.; al-Zuhaylī, “Islam and International Law”, p. 278; al-Zuhaylī, Al-‛Alāqāt 
al-Dawliyyah, p. 108; Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 11; Safi, Peace and the Limits of War, p. 15; 
AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, p. 19; Khadduri, “The Islamic 
Theory of International Relations and Its Contemporary Relevance”, p. 26; Parvin and Sommer, “Dar 
al-Islam”, p. 4; al-Hindī, Ahkām al-Harb wa al-Salām, p. 67; al-Ghunaimi, Qānūn al-Salām fī al-
Islām, p. 68. The peace and reconciliation treaty between the Nubians and the Muslims stipulated that 
the Nubians: “pay no tax but offer as a present three hundred slaves per annum; and that the Moslems 
offer them as a present food equivalent to the value of the slaves”, see Ah mad ibn Yahyā ibn Jābir al-
Balādhūrī, The Origins of the Islamic State: Being a Translation from the Arabic Accompanied with 
Annotations Geographic and Historic Notes of the Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān of al-Imām abu-l ‛Abbās 
Ahmad Ibn Jābir al-Balādhuri, Columbia University Studies in the Social Sciences, No. 163, trans. 
Philip Khūri Hitti (New York: AMS Press, 1968), Vol. I, p. 379.     
196 See, for example, Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 239; al-Armanāzī, Al-Shar‛ al-Dawlī, pp. 
158 f.; Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace, p. 36; Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, p. 142; 
al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 2, pp. 822-824.   
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Blankinship notes that “the Umayyad governor even concluded a pact with the 
defeated Byzantine empire by which the Muslims were required to pay a tribute to 
the Byzantines in exchange for a truce”.197  
Thus, the dār al-sulh is a territory with which the dār al-Islām has a peace 
treaty, a non-aggression pact or an alliance. The concept of dār al-sulh or dār al-‛ahd 
was adopted by the Shāfi‛īs in the second/eighth century, though Donna E. Arzt 
strangely claims that, “the practical need of occasional truces gave rise to the 
conceptual development in the sixteenth century of a third ‘territory,’ dar al-sulh or 
the ‘abode of peace,’ also called dar al-ahd, ‘abode of covenant.’”198 According to 
al-Zuhaylī,199 the majority of jurists, including Abū Hanifah, did not accept the third 
conceptual division of the dār al-sulh, arguing that, if a territory concludes a peace 
treaty and pays tax to the dār al-Islām, it becomes a part of the dār al-Islām and thus 
the dār al-Islām is obliged to protect it.200   
 By analysing the three criteria of this conceptual division, it can be concluded 
that the factor determining relations with a non-Muslim state is, for one group of 
scholars, freedom to practise the religion of Islam, while for another group, most 
importantly Abū Hanifah, it is the safety of the Muslims and dhimmis from 
aggression. Concerning those who advocated that sovereignty is what determines 
                                                 
197 Blankinship, The End of the Jihād State, p. 23. Specifically, Blankinship adds that, ‛Abd al-Malik 
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199 Al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām, p. 176. 
200 See Khadduri, “The Islamic Theory of International Relations and Its Contemporary Relevance”, p. 
26; Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 11; Halil İnalcik, “Dār Al-‛Ahd”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New 
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whether a territory is a dār al-Islām or a dār al-harb, it is obvious that, in their 
historical context, in a territory under the rule of Muslims Islamic law would be 
applied and Muslims’ religious freedom and lives would be protected, but the 
religious freedom of Muslims living in territories under non-Muslim rule was 
possibly not protected.  
It thus appears that there were two different theories behind the division of 
the world into two or three conceptual figurative territories. The first theory divides 
the world according to whether there is peace with, or aggression against, Islam and 
the lives of Muslims and dhimmis. This does not allow for the third division because, 
according to this view, if there is no aggression and there is a peace treaty with a 
specific territory, it is designated as dār al-Islām even if it is ruled and inhabited by 
non-Muslims. The criterion for this territorial division is not the belief or unbelief in 
the religion of Islam but, as indicated in the other two names for this territory, dār al-
‛adl/dār al-salām, whether there is justice and peace. The second theory, held by the 
Shāfi‛ī jurists divides the world into Muslims/peace and non-Muslims/war. Thus they 
proposed the third division because, according to their formula, there is be peace 
though with non-Muslims. 
These two theories correspond with the two positions held by jurists on the 
Islamic casus belli. The majority of jurists, who interpreted the Islamic casus belli as 
aggression against, or religious persecution of, Muslims, divided the world into two 
sectors: the territory of war and the territory of peace, depending on whether either of 
these two sorts of aggression existed, irrespective of the religious belief of the rulers 
or inhabitants of the territories concerned. This is in contrast to the Shāfi‛īs, who 
maintained that the Islamic casus belli is unbelief and who therefore envisioned the 
third division for cases when peace agreements were made with unbelievers.   
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Hypothetically applying this historical division to present-day Muslim 
countries, Wahbah al-Zuhaylī and al-Qaradāwī, contemporary leading Muslim 
authorities on Islamic law, espouse Abū Hanīfah’s criterion of safety for Muslims 
living in a given territory for it to be a dār al-Islām, even if Islamic law is not applied 
there. According to this criterion, they advocate that present-day Muslim countries be 
classified as dār al-Islām because Muslims are safe, though not all Islamic laws are 
applied.201 
However, Muh ammad ‛Abd al-Salām Faraj, the author of a pamphlet entitled 
“Al-Farīdah al-Ghā’ibah” (the absent duty, i.e., jihād), argues that modern-day 
Muslim countries are dār al-kufr (territory of unbelief) because of the widespread 
application of laws he calls ahkām al-kufr (laws of unbelief), and that the Muslim 
rulers there are renegades from Islam. Furthermore, he claims that Muslim scholars 
agree that, if a Muslim group refuses to carry out some of the clear and established 
duties of Islam, such as performing the prayers, zakāh, fasting, pilgrimage, judging 
among people according to the Qur’ān and Sunnah, or refusing to prohibit wine and 
usury, they should be fought.202 In fact, this is largely hypothetical and based on 
classical texts from a completely different context. 
Present-day non-Muslim countries would thus be classified as dār al-Islām 
according to Abū Hanīfah’s definition, since Muslims living there are safe, while in 
the opinion of other Hanafī jurists, al-Shaybānī and Abū Yūsuf, non-Muslim, as well 
as most Muslim, countries nowadays would be dār al-harb because some parts of 
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Islamic law are not applied there.203 Moreover, according to the opinion that accepts 
that Muslims should at least be safe to profess their belief in Islam and perform 
Islamic prayer, the whole world would be now dār al-Islām. However, after the 
establishment of the UN and the agreement by all the countries of the world “to live 
together in peace”,204 as Ja‛far ‛Abd al-Salām, the Secretary General of the League 
of the Islamic Universities, points out that this whole theoretical, historical, 
circumstantial division has fallen into abeyance.205    
After deciphering these three overlapping figurative sectors, this study 
therefore reaches the conclusion that what lay behind this division was not a religious 
criterion,206 i.e., between Islam and other religions, as has been commonly and 
wrongly assumed.207 Nor was it a territorial division between the Islamic state and 
the non-Muslim states. It was a division between peace and war, not only war against 
Muslims or the Islamic state, as concluded by al-Zuhaylī,208 but more importantly the 
prohibition of the practise209 and preaching of the religion of Islam. Thus, Khadduri 
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notes that if a Muslim “could safely reside and say his prayers, even though the law 
of the unbelievers was enforced, the territory might still be regarded, at least in 
theory, as a Muslim territory”.210 This further indicates the centrality of the religion 
of Islam in the formulation of the theory of international law in Islam and also 
affirms the conclusion of the IIIT project that it is non-Muslims’ reaction to the 
preaching of the religion of Islam that determines whether Muslims would be in a 
state of peace or war with them.  
It is worth adding here that, as pointed out by ‛Abd al-Rahman al-Hāj, the 
classical jurists coined thirty-four conceptual divisions related to the word dār, 
including dār al-muhājirīn, dār al-hijrah, dār al-baghy, dār al-da‛wah, dār al-
dhimmah, dār al-riddah, dār al-shirk and dār al-‛Arab,211 and all these terms refer 
the historical realities of a broad range of divisions of the world as conceptualized by 
the classical jurists who lived during the period when such terms were being 
formulated. It is therefore unfortunate that all these juridical political concepts are 
ignored, so that the Islamic world view is oversimplified as one of perpetual war 
between Muslims and so-called infidels.            
It is generally believed that this conceptual division of the world developed 
by the jurists of the second/eighth century was the product of their political 
“historical circumstances and context”212 and for this reason – let alone that it had no 
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Khārijyyah, pp. 49 f.; al-Firjānī, Usūl al-‛Alāqāt, p. 22; Sa‛īd ‛Abd Allah Hārib al-Mahīrī, “Al-
Siyāsah wa al-Dīn bayn al-Mabādi’ wa al-Tārīkh”, Scientific Review of the European Council for 
 176
basis in the Qur’ān and the hadīth – 213 this conceptual figurative division soon 
collapsed or, more precisely, soon “became a fiction”, as Hashmi puts it.214 
However, Tibi and Sachedina unwarrantedly assume that the division of the world 
into dār al-Islām and dār al-harb “was based on the jurists’ inference from the 
(implicit) Qur’ānic division of the world into the spheres of ‘belief’ (iman) and 
‘disbelief’ (kufr)”.215 Sachedina does not refer to any Qur’ānic texts from which this 
twofold division of the world could be inferred, leaving aside the third division. It is 
obvious that there is no text that either explicitly or even implicitly divides the world 
between “belief and unbelief”. The Qur’ān addresses certain incidents involving 
relations between people of four different religious affiliations, i.e., Muslims, 
idolaters, people of the book, and those called “the hypocrites”. If there were such 
implicit divisions in the Qur’ān to warrant such an inference, it would not have taken 
classical Muslims over a century to infer it. Moreover, it would have been more 
reasonable that the Muslims would have inferred it when they were the victims of 
aggression during the Prophet’s lifetime in Mecca or Medina and thus such divisions 
would not have collapsed so fast. Khadduri’s definition of the dār al-Islām as “the 
Islamic and non-Islamic territories [emphasis added] held under Islamic 
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sovereignty…[which] included the community of believers as well as those who 
entered into an alliance with Islam”216 goes against this assumption of a division 
between belief and unbelief.  
In fact, the classical Muslim jurists’ mention of these divisions shows that 
their aim was to lay down Islamic rulings to regulate, for example, the actions of 
Muslim individuals residing in dār al-harb, i.e., Muslims who converted to Islam 
without emigrating to dār al-Islām, and Muslims entering dār al-harb to conduct 
business transactions,217 marriage and other related issues between male Muslims 
and the non-Muslim inhabitants of the dār al-harb,218 and the Muslim army and its 
members during and after periods of fighting against the dār al-harb. Jurists also set 
rulings for the non-Muslim residents of the dār al-harb who entered dār al-Islām. 
The main concerns of the jurists who addressed these situations were mainly: first, to 
regulate the conduct of Muslims according to the dictates of the Qur’ān, the Sunnah 
and judgements based on these sources and the secondary sources of Islamic law; 
and second, to ensure that Muslims, especially those living in dār al-harb, were able 
to practise Islam. This led Muslim jurists to discuss two important issues that may 
explain further the meaning of these theoretical divisions. The first is the obligation 
of hijrah (flight) to dār al-Islām for Muslim residents in dār al-harb who were 
unable to practise Islam without persecution, for example, in cases when they were 
unable to perform prayers and fasting, etc.  But if their persecutors forced them to 
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stay, or if they could not emigrate because of illness or, in cases of women, children 
and the elderly, they were exempted from the obligation to emigrate.219 The second 
issue, which led to a controversy among jurists, is the jurisdiction of the dār al-Islām 
over crimes committed by Muslims outside the dār al-Islām220 and crimes committed 
by temporary residents in the dār al-Islām. All this shows that the aim of this 
division was not, as it has been portrayed, an oversimplified formula according to 
which the dār al-Islām is to wage war against the dār al-h arb until the latter “is 
reduced to non-existence.”221 
This shows that discussions of these concepts have been highly superficial, in 
the sense that mistaken assumptions have been simply based on the literal meanings 
of these three figurative concepts, without investigating how they were defined by 
the jurists. As a result, the basic concepts that define the parameters of what 
constitutes peace and war in Islam have not been thoroughly studied and thus wrong 
assumptions have developed into widely believed theories about that subject. These 
concepts are still attracting clichés and, even worse, serious conclusions have been 
based on these assumptions. For example, influenced by Khadduri’s understanding 
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of jihād as permanent war against the dār al-harb,222 Donna E. Arzt concludes that, 
“the doctrine of Jihad and the two ‘abodes,’ war and Islam – to which the vast 
majority of orthodox Muslim scholars still subscribe, at least in theory – are clearly 
incompatible with the fundamental premise of modern international law: peaceful 
coexistence between coequal states.”223 Apart from the strange allegation that 
Muslim scholars still subscribe to these concepts, Arzt here bases this firm 
conclusion on the stereotypical portrayal of the Islamic theory of international law as 
a simple formula of war against unbelievers.  
This proves that, while modern Muslim writings are almost ignored, the 
classical Islamic theory of international law has been widely distorted in Western 
literature. One of the reasons for this is that concepts or theories developed by 
Muslims of any period in Islamic history, no matter how deeply studied or 
understood, have been and probably will be presented in the future, specifically by 
outsider scholars, as permanent Islamic doctrines or laws.224 This is simply because 
this approach confuses divine laws, namely the sharī‛ah, with the scholarly 
interpretations and formulations of theories, laws and concepts. Wrong conclusions 
on Islamic international law are reached when the laws or concepts of particular 
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historical times and contexts are compared or applied to a different and changing 
world.  
Two quotations may illustrate this point. Specialists in international law state 
that the European “Traditional international law was based upon a rigid distinction 
between the state of peace and the state of war. Countries were either in a state of 
peace or a state of war: there was no intermediate state, although there were cases in 
which it was difficult to tell whether the transition to a state of war had been 
made.”225 In 1888, the English jurist and historian Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-
1888) explicitly states, “It is not peace which was natural and primitive and old, but 
rather war. War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern 
invention.”226 Sir Henry thus reiterates in 1888 Ibn Khaldūn’s observation, that 
throughout history war was considered the normal state of relations with others. 
Muslim scholars of the second/eighth century who maintained that war was the 
normal state of relations with others were, therefore, stating a fact227 about their 
historical context, not formulating Islamic beliefs. Furthermore, the fact that modern 
countries, according to traditional international law, used to classify their relations 
with other countries as either in a state of peace or a state of war means that, until 
recently, modern countries considered themselves to be in a state of war whenever 
there was no recognized state of peace with other countries.    
Throughout history, many historical divisions of the world have been 
developed in order to create an “other” or to classify or rank the rest of the human 
race, or to create a conflict between the good/we and the evil/others, in which the 
good prevails over the evil. Zoroaster created the formula of the victory of good/light 
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over evil/darkness three thousand years ago.228 In Christianity, Augustine developed 
a Christian theological division of the world between the civitas dei (the city of God) 
and the civitas terrenae (the city “that ordered to the things of the earth”229). 
Concerning the admissibility of the world to the law of nations, James Lorimer 
writes in 1883 that “As a political phenomenon, humanity, in its present condition, 
divides itself into three concentric zones or spheres – that of civilised humanity, that 
of barbarous humanity, and that of savage humanity”, respectively entitled to 
“plenary political recognition, partial political recognition, and natural or mere 
human recognition.”230 Thus, Lorimer rejects the recognition of Turkey, because 
“The Turks, as a race, are probably incapable of the political development which 
would render their adoption of constitutional government possible.”231 Moreover, he 
claims that “To talk of the recognition of Mahometan [Muslim] States as a question 
of time, is to talk of nonsense. Unless we are all to become Mahometans, that is a 
time which Mahometanism itself tells us can never come.”232 Other European jurists 
such as Thomas Erskine Holland (d. 1926) and William Edward Hall (d. 1894) 
proposed a division of the world according to “the degrees of civilization, not 
religion, as a bar to full recognition… until non-European states would become 
members of the Family of Nations.”233  
Since the Cold War, the world has been divided into numerically descending 
Worlds, the First World, Second World, Third World and Fourth World (or Least 
                                                 
228 Shireen T. Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful 
Coexistence? (Westport. CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 4. 
229 Johnson, The Holy War Idea, pp. 48 f.; Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, pp. 16, 168 
f., 179 f. See also Muhammad Sa‛īd al-‛Ashmāwī, Usūl al-Sharī‛ah, 4th ed. (Cairo: Madbūlī al-Saghīr, 
1996/1416), p. 94. 
230 James Lorimer, The Institutions of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of 
Separate Political Communities (Edinburgh; London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1883), Vol. I, p. 
101. 
231 Ibid., p. 123. 
232 Ibid., pp. 123 f. 
233 Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 283. 
 182
Developed Countries). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Huntington divided 
the world into seven civilizations, Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, 
Slavic-Orthodox and Latin American civilizations, but was unsure of the eighth, i.e., 
the African civilization. 
From Zoroaster’s battle between good and evil to Huntington’s clash of 
civilizations, the question that is worth investigating is how far these theories have 
influenced the attitudes of their proponents towards members of the other 
civilizations. Although there is a thin line, sometimes invisible, between such 
theories or even between laws and the actions prompted by them, the fact remains 
that it is the powers that be which determine what course of action should be taken, 
according to their different interests. Some of the theories referred to above reflect 
racist tendencies, political or economic ideologies, or religious or civilizational 
classifications of all others. These tendencies and classifications depend on the way 
in which their proponents view their own identity, namely, in terms of religion, race, 
political or economic ideology, civilization or simply good versus evil. The result is 
that others who do not share the same identity are alienated, demonized and may 
even be classed as enemies.  
Some of these theories have collapsed because people change the grounds 
upon which they define their own identities, whether in terms of religion, race or 
political ideology. But before the collapse of such theories and before they can be 
judged in a later context, terrible atrocities have been committed in their name by 
those in power and the masses have also been victimized, at least by believing in, or 
interpreting incidents according to, such racist or inimical theories. The conclusion 
here is that such divisions are created by theorists or academics and actions are taken 
accordingly by politicians; and that those in power sometimes impede the 
 183
achievement of justice and, therefore, of world peace and security. Thus world peace 
will only be achieved when differences in the religious, ethnic, ideological or 
civilizational affiliations cease to prevent the pursuit of the rule of international law 
and justice.    
The collapse of the former Soviet Union and Communism has created a 
vacuum in international relations, which prompted Huntington to hypothesise a new 
paradigm of international relations involving a clash between the Islamic and 
Western civilizations.234 Shireen T. Hunter notes, “Bernard Lewis introduced the 
concept of the clash of civilizations before the final collapse of the Soviet Union, but 
it did not capture people’s imaginations. Samuel Huntington popularized it in 
1993.”235 In 1990, Lewis, who introduces himself “as a historian of Islam who is not 
a Muslim”,236 created this theory by framing the relation between Islam and the 
West, in an article entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, as follows: “This is no less 
than a clash of civilizations- [emphasis added] the perhaps irrational but surely 
historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular 
present, and the worldwide expansion of both.”237  
One of the dangers inherent in this theory is that it could turn into a “self-
fulfilling prophecy”.238 Proponents of hostile relations between the West and Islam 
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could simply resort to it to interpret certain acts or to provide justifications for certain 
others. The theory revives the legacy of an old Western literature that presents a 
history of rivalry between Christianity and Islam.239 Huntington states, “Conflict 
along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 
1,300 years.”240 According to this literature, Islam has brought a large part of the 
Christian world under the influence of Islam, allegedly by force, through what is 
described as the “instrument” called jihād. Thus, for this literature, jihād is the 
“instrument” of Islamic international law through which Islam is obliged by the 
permanent and unchangeable divine laws of Islam, i.e., sharī‛ah, to bring the rest of 
the world into Islam. Apparently following Khadduri’s misunderstanding of the 
classical Islamic theory of international law, Lewis makes this misleading connection 
between historical Islamic concepts, but distorts them and contemporary relations 
between Muslims and the West in the following words: “In the classical Islamic 
view, to which many Muslims are beginning to return [emphasis added], the world 
and all mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam, where the Muslim law and 
faith prevails, and the rest known as the House of Unbelief or the House of War, 
which it is the duty of Muslims ultimately to bring to Islam.”241   
Thus Lewis presents Islam as inherently, and determined to be, a religion that 
is violent towards others. Without referring to Lewis, Khaled Abou El Fadl points to 
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this presentation of this historical concept: “Many of the books written by non-
Muslim scholars in the West perpetuate the myth that Islamic law invariably dictates 
that the world should be divided into two abodes forever looked in conflict. Often the 
same books falsely assume that most Muslims today adhere to the same bipolar view 
of the world.”242 In an interview about the theory of the “clash of civilizations” and 
the Western stereotypes of Islam, Edward Said describes this portrayal of the dār al-
Islām versus dār al-harb formula as “largely an invention of orientalists who found it 
somewhere in the eighth century”.243  
The theory of the clash of civilizations unjustifiably restricts the “others” of 
Islam to Western people, and not the rest of the non-Muslims of the world. Lewis 
creates this formula by creating a “We”, referring to “we of the West”, “Americans”, 
“Western civilization”, “we…in the free world”, versus “Islam”, the “Muslim 
world”, “Islamic fundamentalism” and “Muslim fundamentalism”.244 But Western 
civilization, according to this theory, is no longer characterized by Christianity, 
though it has been referred to as a “Judeo-Christian civilization”. The West is 
characterized now by secularism, liberalism, democracy and human rights.    
Akbar S. Ahmed foresaw the current relation between Islam and the West. He 
emphasises the importance of understanding Islam not “in the traditional manner of 
the Orientalists”. Otherwise, he anticipates, “Not being able to understand Islam fully 
and being impatient with it, the West will consider Islam as problematic. It will be 
seen as the main counterforce to Western civilization. Into the 1990s, an opinion is 
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already taking shape of Islam as the major enemy after the collapse of communism. 
There are signs that some of the free-floating hostility directed against communism 
over the last decade will move toward Islam.”245        
The stereotypical portrayal of the Islamic theory of international law as a 
doctrine of offensive war, i.e., jihād against the dār al-harb, or the so-called infidels, 
is imported to interpret current events in order to justify holding Islam responsible 
for the so-called clash with the West’s values of democracy and liberalism. 
Moreover, conflicts, acts of terrorism and suicide bombings are unreasonably linked 
to the teachings of Islam, particularly jihād, and not to their political root causes (see 
Chapter Five). Thus it is no wonder that the recommendations of the eighth 
conference of the SCIA call upon non-Muslim countries to stop spreading hatred 
towards Islam and Muslims and to present Islamic concepts objectively and 
accurately. The recommendations also ask the Western media not to judge Islam or 
Muslims according to the un-Islamic acts of a few individuals.246 This means that 
attributing the causes of conflicts and acts of terrorism to the teachings of Islam and 
particularly jihād, is a serious mistake which in itself could lead to catastrophic 
consequences, specifically in a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected 
and interdependent. This may easily endanger the relationship between Islam and the 
West and particularly the integration of Muslim minorities living in the West. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The Islamic law of war, like the just war theory, has evolved through diverse stages 
in history and, more importantly, in response to varying political and historical 
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situations. Throughout history, classical and modern Muslim scholars have 
advocated that it is an obligation on Muslims to resort to war to defend themselves 
against enemy aggression and invasions. On the basis of the Qur’ānic injunctions,247 
they also advocate that the religious persecution of a Muslim minority, or even non-
Muslim minorities, as argued by al-Qaradāwī248 (see Chapter Two), is another 
justification for war. But concerning the peculiar classical Islamic justification for 
war, namely, to safeguard the freedom of Muslims particularly to preach the religion 
of Islam to non-Muslim countries,249 it can be safely stated here that, at present, 
preaching Islam via an offensive military campaign has become, for Muslims, 
inconceivable. In the words of Hashmi, “Most Muslims today disavow the duty to 
propagate Islam by force and limit jihad to self-defense.”250 Therefore, at present, no 
matter how contemporary Muslims formulate the Islamic casus belli, the 
overwhelming majority advocate the same casus belli as that given by the majority of 
classical jurists, namely aggression against, or religious persecution of, Muslims. In 
other words, they advocate jihād as a defensive just war.251 However, a minority still 
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exists which espouses al-Shāfi‛ī’s understanding of jihād as offensive war against 
non-Muslims because of their rejection of Islam or refusal to submit to the Islamic 
state.252 
The current Western literature on the subject of Islamic international law, and 
jihād in particular, indicates a huge degree of misunderstanding and contradiction 
between the Islamic/insider and Western/outsider traditions of scholarship. The most 
obvious and common error of confusing sharī‛ah with fiqh has led to the mistake of 
regarding the jurists’ interpretations and judgements as divine, permanent laws of 
Islam, i.e., sharī‛ah. In other words, instead of studying these jurists’ rulings as part 
of the consideration of the history of theories of international law, these rulings are 
presented as the divine laws of Islam. The jurists’ interpretations and formulations of 
Islamic laws were purely scholarly juridical works, which inevitably resulted in the 
adoption and introduction of a variety of laws, depending on the exercise of their 
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Yamani, “Humanitarian International Law in Islam: A General Outlook”, p. 190; Alsumaih, “The 
Sunni Concept of Jihad”, pp. 6 f., 266-273, 363; Pirzada “Islam and International Law”, p. 203; 
Masmoudi, “Struggles Behind Words”, p. 23; El-Ayouty, “International Terrorism under the Law”, p. 
489; Ghanbarpour-Dizboni, “Islam and War”, p. 14; Malik Abdulazeez al-Mubarak, “Warfare in Early 
Islam” (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1997), p. 171; Badawi, “Muslim/Non-Muslim Relations”, 
p. 269; Suheil Laher, “Indiscriminate Killing in Light of Islamic Sacred Texts”, in Aftab Ahmad 
Malik, ed., The State We Are in: Identity, Terror and the Law of Jihad (Bristol: Amal Press, 2006), pp. 
48 f.; Mir, “Islam, Qur’anic”, p. 210; Brek Batley, “The Justifications for Jihad, War and Revolution 
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Working paper No. 375, June 2003, available form  
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states.” Malekian, The Concept of Islamic International Criminal Law, p. 49. 
252 See on this minority, al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 256-391. 
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judgement and the surrounding historical circumstances.253 But since these laws are 
ascribed to a religion, and particularly when they are incorrectly presented as part of 
the sharī‛ah, it has been wrongly assumed that they must form a unified permanent 
code of laws.  
 The complexity of the study of the law of war in Islam results from the fact 
that the sources upon which the law has been formulated, i.e., the incidents of 
warfare that took place between Muslims and their enemies during the Prophet’s 
lifetime, and the relevant Qur’ān and h adīth texts, have been variously interpreted by 
Muslim historians, exegetes and jurists. The Islamic literature on the subject could 
therefore be selectively used to advocate any position on the Islamic law of war, or 
any of the various descriptions of jihād referred to above. But the comparison 
between the insider and outsider literatures254 on jihād is striking. The contradictory 
readings of jihād in these literatures make it possible to label studies in this area as 
prejudiced, objective or apologetic depending on whether the writer and readers 
already believe in either of the contradictory readings of jihād, referred to above. 
Thus, studies presenting jihād as unjust war are labelled as prejudiced by some but 
objective by others, while studies presenting jihād as just war are labelled objective 
by one group and apologetic by another. More interestingly, Muslim detractors of 
jihād and Islam in general are labelled fair-minded according to the first reading, 
while non-Muslims who present jihād as a just war are labelled fair-minded 
according to the second.   
                                                 
253 Mustansir Mir argues that “The classical doctrine of jihad is to be understood in its historical 
context: it has a ‘situational’ character and is the product of an ‘atomistic’ approach.” Mustansir Mir, 
“Jihād in Islam”, in Hadia Dajani-Shakeel and Ronald A Messier, eds., The Jihād and its Times: 
Dedicated to Andrew Stefan Ehrenkreutz, Michigan Series on the Middle East, No. 4 (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan, Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, 1991), p. 115. 
254 On this issue see, Bilal Sambur, “The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Islam”, The Islamic 
Quarterly, Vol. XLVI, No. 1 2002, pp. 95-106. 
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 This indicates the importance of judging the Islamic law of war on the basis 
of how it is presented and advocated in the insider literature. Irrespective of how the 
historical incidents of warfare waged by Muslims and the Qur’ānic texts on warfare 
are presented in the outsider literature, it stands to reason that any study of the law of 
war in Islam must present it as it is advocated by Muslims themselves and then judge 
it accordingly. It is important and even simply logical to investigate the law of war in 
Islam as it is advocated by the believers in this tradition, which is what this study has 
attempted to do. The need to use the insider approach in the study of a religion, or the 
followers of a religion, is clear: only in this way can the teachings or laws of a 
religion be judged. More importantly, the followers of a religion should be expected 
to live up to what they themselves advocate in their religion. Concerning issues about 
the regulation of international relations, it is becoming increasingly urgent to reach a 
global ethical framework, particularly as regards war. Indeed, it is also to be highly 
recommended that a global ethical framework be developed on other issues, but in 
these other issues the inevitable variety of values based on diverse cultures must be 
recognized.  
It has been noticed that the Islamic ethical contributions to the current system 
of international relations “are not in proportion to its potential as a source of ethical 
tradition and as a force that could influence the behaviour of states in the 
international arena”.255 This is explained by the fact that the current international 
system is dominated by Western legal systems and ideologies. But this minimal 
Islamic contribution relates to what Abou El Fadl describes as “the undeniable 
                                                 
255 Muhammed Muqtedar Khan, “Islam as an Ethical Tradition of International Relations”, in Abdul 
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 191
traumatic experience of colonialism, which dismantled the traditional institutions of 
civil society.”256 The colonial powers have replaced many areas of Islamic law with 
Western laws, except in the area of family law.257 But the stagnation of Islamic 
jurisprudence dates back to the call to “close the door of ijtihād” at the end of the 
third/ninth century, which has adversely affected the contribution of Islamic 
jurisprudence to Islamic civilization.258  
Moreover, the current autocratic regimes in most Muslim countries have 
taken control of their religious and scholarly institutions. Unlike the classical jurists, 
contemporary Muslim religious scholars have become salaried employees of these 
regimes. The hostile attitudes of secular Muslim nationalist regimes to religion in 
some Muslim countries, and their control of religious institutions on certain issues, 
have weakened trust in these institutions. More importantly, this situation has caused 
Muslim fundamentalists to find their own way into the texts and to apply their 
understanding of the texts to current situations. It must be concluded that it is not 
enough for Western scholars alone to avoid the traditional bias in understanding 
Islam, but, more urgently, Muslim scholars too should present the Islamic positions 
on issues relevant to the current international situation, particularly the Islamic law of 
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war. The declining role of Islamic jurisprudence is one of the reasons of the 
deterioration of Islamic civilization and this explains the present weakness of the 
contribution of Islamic civilization to human civilization. 
The understanding of Islam has today become far more critical than Akbar S. 
Ahmad anticipated in 1991.259 Understanding Islam and thus knowing how to deal 
with it has become a matter of strategic security for some Western countries.260 
Western researchers who have started to study the law of war in Islam should 
therefore start a new line of investigation which directly studies Muslim literature, 
preferably in its own languages, rather than depending on the notorious orientalist 
literature and not taking an approach, as Ahmed points out, “in the traditional manner 
of the Orientalists”.261 At the same time, Muslim scholars should codify262 an Islamic 
law of war, applicable in the contemporary world, which could be adopted by Islamic 
bodies of jurists or scholars. This should include both the Islamic jus ad bellum and 
more urgently, as will be explained in the next chapter, the Islamic jus in bello norms 
in the contexts of modern warfare. Although this codification would not amount to 
more than a theoretical scholarly contribution to the global discussion of the ethics of 
war and peace, it is a contribution that should be recognized as an authoritative 
representation of Islamic law, thus preventing insider or outsider scholarship from 
being accused of selectively representing certain positions. More importantly, as 
explained in the following chapters, this could provide religiously sanctioned jus in 
bello norms that could prevent un-Islamic acts on the part of individual Muslims, 
                                                 
259 Ahmed, “Postmodernist Perceptions of Islam”, p. 231. 
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Mayer, “The Sharī‛ah”, pp. 177-198.   
 193
specifically in cases when the warriors or perpetrators of acts of warfare or terrorism 
are not in regular state armies. Otherwise, although all Muslim countries are 
constrained by the dictates of international law, Muslims and non-Muslims will still 
resort to the use or misuse of their respective understandings of jihād when 
describing acts of war involving Muslims.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
Several scholars have pointed out that the classical Muslim jurists paid the greatest 
part of their attention to the Islamic jus in bello (the rules regulating the conduct of 
war) while paying little attention to the Islamic jus ad bellum (the justifications for 
resorting to war).1 This observation holds true not only for international wars, the 
subject of this chapter, but also for domestic or non-international wars,2 discussed in 
Chapter Five. Contrary to the classical Muslim jurists, however, modern Muslim 
writers focus on the Islamic jus ad bellum partly because, as Hashmi explains, they 
have engaged in “responses to Western apprehensions of jihad”3 while paying no 
attention to addressing the Islamic jus in bello, which can be applied to contemporary 
war contexts.4 Ironically, and significantly, however, Western scholars have focused 
solely on giving various interpretations of the Islamic jus ad bellum, but have almost 
ignored the Islamic jus in bello.5     
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Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law”, Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law, Winter 2005, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 322. On the Islamic jus in bello in Western 
literature, see, for example, Abou El Fadl, “The Rules of Killing at War”, pp. 144-157; Hashmi, 
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War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
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 Islamic law, it should be recognized, is a unique legal system, specifically, in 
the scope of the areas it covers, and in the mechanism and methodologies6 applied by 
its jurist-scholars to pronounce on or deduce Islamic law from specific sources. It is 
also unique in its objectives and enforcement. The objectives are to fulfil the 
requirements of the divine ordinances, Shari‛ah, and to ensure the mas lahah (public 
interest) of the Islamic State. Concerning its enforcement, as explained earlier, with 
regard to the majority of Islamic law, it is left to the Islamic state or Muslim 
individuals to choose from the various rulings given by the jurists, who may have 
belonged to any of several schools of law. Thus, mistaken conclusions will be 
reached if, in comparative legal studies or in studies by non-Muslims, Islamic law is 
framed or judged according to the categories of current Western law.  
 James Cockayne, for example, points out that the Western studies that 
compare international humanitarian law with Islamic international humanitarian law 
“tend to exhibit a subtle orientalism, taking the Western system as a yardstick against 
which the adequacy or compatibility of the oriental Islamic ‘other’ is measured.”7 
This statement indicates the importance of the insider’s approach in such 
comparative studies, simply because each legal system has its particular nature and 
historical context. 
 Therefore, this chapter argues that, apart from the unique methodologies by 
which Muslim jurists deduced the Islamic jus ad bellum, the best way to examine the 
Islamic jus ad bellum is through the study of the Islamic jus in bello. References will 
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be made here to show the prominent areas of agreement and disagreement between 
Islamic international law and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and their 
Additional Protocols when applicable. The intention here is not to judge Islamic 
international law according to the Geneva Conventions or vice-versa, but rather first, 
in the cases when these two agree, to show that Muslims’ commitment to the laws 
that regulate the conduct of war is obligatory on them, not only by virtue of the 
Islamic principle of pacta sunt servanda8 but also by virtue of the “self-imposed” 
nature of Islamic law. More importantly, this provides Islamic criteria by which to 
judge the practice of Muslims during the conduct of hostilities. Second, although 
Muslims are obliged to abide by the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols, the cases of disagreement between these Conventions and Islamic 
international law will indicate the need for further efforts, initially, at least, by 
scholars, to universalize the rules governing the conduct of war.  
This chapter therefore examines the jus in bello according to Islamic law. Its 
main aim is to find out what is permissible and what is impermissible in Islamic law 
concerning the lives and property of enemies during and after the course of the actual 
conduct of hostilities. A secondary aim is to shed some light on the Islamic laws that 
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 197
regulate relations between non-Muslim citizens of the dār al-harb inside the dār al-
Islām while a state of war exists, though not necessarily during the course of 
fighting. This will also provide some insights into the Islamic jus ad bellum. 
Fulfilling these two aims will, it is hoped, explain the position of Islamic law on 
terrorism, discussed in the next chapter. 
Islamic international law and the law of war are widely referred to in Western 
literature as siyar. Although the jurists have discussed this area under different titles, 
such as jihād, siyar, maghāzī (campaigns), amān (safe conduct), qismah al-ghanīmah 
(division of the spoils), hudnah (truce) and jizyah (tax levied to exempt eligible 
males from conscription), the term siyar is widely used in Western sources to refer to 
this area, simply because it has become common usage. But the meaning of the word 
siyar as it is used by the jurists here to refer to this area gives some insights into the 
nature of Islamic international law and its objectives.  
The word siyar, singular sīrah, is derived from the verb sāra (past), yasīr 
(present), which means to walk, follow or adopt. The noun sīrah means the manner, 
the method, the way followed or the tradition.9 In Islamic parlance, this term is used 
to refer to the biography of the Prophet. The plural form of the word, siyar, is used in 
two different literary genres: historical and legal. In the biography (sīrah) of the 
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Prophet, the plural siyar is used to refer to the military expeditions and missionary 
journeys arranged by the Prophet in which he did not participate (see Chapter One). 
In legal texts, siyar refers to the areas of Islamic international law and Islamic 
international humanitarian law that is to the ways and methods followed by the 
Prophet in his dealings with non-Muslim states and individuals in times of peace and 
war. The objective of the jurists was to regulate the conduct of the Islamic state and 
the Muslim individuals vis-à-vis non-Muslim states and their citizens, in accordance 
with the Qur’ānic ordinances and the precedents set by the Prophet. Furthermore, 
according to al-Sarakhsī, siyar also regulate the conduct of the Islamic state in its 
internal conflicts with apostates and rebels.10     
In the process of formulating Islamic international law, the jurists resorted, 
first, to the Qur’ān and, second, to the traditions of the Prophet and in some cases to 
the practices of the Prophet’s Companions, since they had the best understanding of 
the Qur’ān and the Prophet’s tradition. In formulating the laws according to these 
sources, the jurists were not primarily concerned with justifying the adoption of such 
laws. The mere fact that the Qur’ān sets a rule, or that the Prophet acted in a specific 
way, makes it a binding law. But it stands to reason that the Qur’ān gives different 
rulings in different situations and that the Prophet acted in different ways or gave 
different instructions in different contexts. These specific instances gave rise to 
disagreements among the jurists in their interpretations of these incidents and, 
therefore, in the laws they advocated in consequence.  
In this area of disagreement, i.e., the process of formulating Islamic 
international humanitarian law, the majority of jurists weighed these texts and 
precedents against the sanctity of the life and property of the enemy, on the one hand, 
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and the military necessity of winning the war, on the other. Thus, Roger C. Algase 
maintains that the Islamic law of war “strikes a balance between military necessity 
and respect for human life in a manner which gives a higher priority to saving the 
lives of non-combatants than does modern international law.”11 A minority of jurists 
selected a law from the Qur’ānic rulings or the Prophet’s precedents by applying the 
principle of abrogation, arguing that any Qur’ānic text, or precedent set by the 
Prophet, abrogated previous one/s. The formulation of such different laws makes it 
difficult for researchers to present a balanced discussion of these different laws. 
Furthermore, this creates the risk of labelling such studies as either apologetic, 
mainly referring to those who selectively present Islamic international humanitarian 
law as superior to international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, or 
prejudiced, mainly referring to those who selectively present a hostile image of 
Islam.   
Significantly, the objective of Islamic international law and Islamic 
international humanitarian law proves to be in stark contradiction to the genesis of 
the Christian just war theory, international law and the Geneva Conventions. While 
the area of Islamic international law and Islamic international humanitarian law 
started as a law imposed by Muslims upon themselves, irrespective of the behaviour 
of their enemies,12 the just war theory started as an attempt to limit the atrocities of 
war, but only between Christian countries. According to James Turner Johnson, “the 
medieval church’s three major efforts to restrain war in Europe were not understood 
                                                 
11 Roger C. Algase, “Protection of Civilian Lives in Warfare: A Comparison between Islamic Law and 
Modern International Law Concerning the Conduct of Hostilities”, Revue de Droit Pénal Militaire et 
de Droit de la Guerre, Vol. 16, 1977, p. 248. 
12 See, for example, Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, p. 41; Saleem Marsoof “Islam and 
International Humanitarian Law”, Sri Lanka Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, 2003, p. 23; Jamāl 
al-Dīn Mahmūd, “Al-Jihād wa Akhlāqiyyāt al-Harb fī al-Islām”, Tolerance in the Islamic Civilization, 
Researches and Facts, the Sixteenth General Conference of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs 
(Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2004/1425), p. 860; Troy S. Thomas, “Jihad’s Captives: 
Prisoners of War in Islam”, U.S. Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 12, 2003, p. 98; 
P.J. Stewart, Unfolding Islam, 2nd ed. (Reading, Berkshire: Garnet Publishing, 2008), p. 79. 
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to apply to the church’s own just wars, the Crusades.”13 As far as international law is 
concerned, it emerged as a system of law which aimed at regulating relations 
between only the Christian countries of Europe.14 Thus, Marcel A. Boisard says that 
“the founders of international law in Europe excluded the Muslim ‘infidels’ from the 
benefits of the law of war.”15 Even the Geneva Conventions are treaties concluded 
between UN member states and give the contracting parties “the liberty to denounce” 
these Conventions.16 This is to conclude that, because of its “self-imposed” nature, 
Islamic laws may have had the strongest possible influence on the Muslims during 
the conduct of war and may still have it. 
The classical Muslim jurists’ efforts to regulate the conduct of Muslims in 
international war contexts focused mainly on eight major issues, which are the 
subject of discussion in this chapter. The other issue that attracted much of the 
jurists’ efforts is the division of the spoils of war. Although these eight issues address 
extremely different war contexts from those of war in the modern world, they 
primarily satisfy the concerns of the jus in bello in any war context. The importance 
of discussing these eight specific issues is that they are relevant to contemporary 
issues of world security. The classical jurists’ discussions of them convey the 
position of Islamic law on contemporary issues in which some Muslims are involved, 
such as targeting non-combatants, let alone kidnapping journalists and humanitarian 
aid workers in specific Muslim countries, beheadings and acts of terrorism such as 
blowing up airplanes, trains and buses. These eight issues are as follows: 
                                                 
13 Johnson, The Holy War Idea, p. 109. 
14 See, for example, Seif Ahmed El-Wady Romahi, Studies in International Law and Diplomatic 
Practice: With Introduction to Islamic Law (Tokyo: Data Labo Inc., 1980), p. 76; Sāmī al-Saqqār, 
“Niz ām al-Amān fī al-Sharī‛ah al-Islāmiyyah wa Āwdā‛ al-Musta’minīn”, in Fārūq Hamādah, ed., Al-
Tashrī‛ al-Dawlī fī al-Islām, Nadawāt wa Munāzarāt, No. 70 (Rabat: Kulliyyah al-Ādāb wa al-‛Ulūm 
al-Insāniyyah, 1997), p. 69. 
15 Marcel A. Boisard, Jihad: A Commitment to Universal Peace (Indianapolis, Ind.: American Trust 
Publications, 1988), p. 30. See also Cockayne, “Islam and International Humanitarian Law”, p. 603; 
Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 130. 
16 See Algase, “Protection of Civilian Lives in Warfare”, pp. 249 f. 
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4.2 Non-Combatant Immunity 
Several hadīths are attributed to the Prophet in which he prohibits targeting five 
specific categories of enemy non-combatants, namely, women, children, the aged, 
the clergy and al-‛Asīf (any hired man).17 On the basis of these commands, the jurists 
developed lengthy discussions on who is and who is not a permissible target in war. 
They developed a distinction between two categories of the enemy: al-muqātilah/ahl 
al-qitāl/al-muh āribah (combatants, fighters/warriors) and ghayr al-muqātilah/ghayr 
al-muh āribah (non-combatants, non-fighters/non-warriors).18 The term muqātilah 
comes from the verb yuqātil (to combat, to fight). The term muh āribah comes from 
the verb yuhārib (to fight in war). It is worth adding here that the use of the term 
muqātilah to distinguish combatants from non-combatants dates back to the time of 
Prophet.19 
                                                 
17 See hadīths numbers 17932, 17933, 17934, 17935, 17936 and 17937 in Ah mad ibn al-Husayn ibn 
‛Alī ibn Mūsā al-Bayhaqī, Sunan al-Bayhaqī al-Kubrā, ed. Muhammad ‛Abd al-Qādir ‛Atā (Mecca: 
Maktabah Dār al-Bāz, 1994/1414), Vol. 9, pp. 90 f.; hadīths numbers 2613 and 2614 in Sulaymān ibn 
al-Ash‛ath Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, ed. Muhammad Muhyī al-Dīn ‛Abd al-Hamīd (N.p.: Dār 
al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 3, p. 37; h adīths numbers 2841 and 2842 in Muh ammad ibn Yazīd ibn Mājah, 
Sunan Ibn Mājah, ed. Muhammad Fū’ād ‛Abd al-Bāqī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 2, pp. 947 f.; 
hadīths numbers 8625, 8626 and 8627 in Ahmad ibn Shu‛ayb al-Nasā’ī, Sunan al-Nasā’ī al-Kubrā, 
ed. ‛Abd al-Ghaffār Sulaymān al-Bindarī and Sayyid Kasrawī Hasan (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
‛Ilmiyyah, 1991/1411), Vol. 5, pp. 186 f.; hadīths numbers 9379, 9382 and 9384 in ‛Abd al-Rāziq ibn 
Hammām al-S ana‛ānī, Al-Musannaf, ed. Habīb al-Rahman al-A‛zamī, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-
Islāmī, 1982-3/1403), Vol. 5, pp. 200-202.  
18 See, for example, ‛Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, Tuhfah al-Fuqahā’ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
‛Ilmiyyah, 1984/1405), Vol. 3, pp. 295, 301. Al-Zuhaylī defines a combatant as “anyone who is 
engaged directly or indirectly in the fighting such as enlisted or voluntary soldiers whether in the sea, 
land or air.” See Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām: Dirāsah Muqāranah, 3rd ed.  
(Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998/1419), p. 503; al-Mawdūdī defined combatants as “those who are 
actively engaged in the fighting.” See Abū al-A‛lā al-Mawdūdī, Sharī‛ah al-Islām fī al-Jihād wa al-
‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah, trans. Samīr ‛Abd al-Hamīd Ibrāhīm (Cairo: Dār al-Sah wah, 1985/1406), p. 
171. However, Hammīdullāh defines combatants, according to Islamic law, as “those who are 
physically capable of fighting”, see Muhammad H ammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of State: Being a 
Treatise on Siyar, That is Islamic Notion of Public International Law, Consisting of the Laws of 
Peace, War and Neutrality, Together with Precedents from Orthodox Practice and Preceded by a 
Historical and General Introduction, rev. & enl. 5th ed. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), p. 59. 
19 When Sa‛d ibn Mu‛ādh was called on to arbitrate in the case of Banū Qurayzah in the battle of the 
Ditch, he decreed that all al-Muqātilah (all the men who were able to fight) should be executed. See, 
for example, Muhammad ibn Muslim ibn ‛Ubayd Allah ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī, Al-Maghāzī al-
Nabawiyyah, ed. Suhayl Zakkār (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1981/1401), p. 82; Mahdī Rizq Allah 
Ahmad, Al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah fī Daw’ al-Masādir al-Asliyyah: Dirāsah Tahlīliyyah (Riyadh: 
Markaz al-Malik Faīsal lil-Bihūth wa al-Dirāsat al-Islāmiyyah, 1992/1412), p. 460; ‛Abd al-Hamīd 
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However, the jurists disagreed on who qualifies as a legitimate target in war 
as a corollary of their disagreement on determining the Islamic casus belli.20 
Therefore, the minority position maintained by al-Shāfi‛ī (d. 204/820) and Ibn Hazm 
(d. 456/1064), who advocated that the Islamic casus belli is the unbelief of the 
Muslims’ enemies, is that, apart from women and children, anyone who refuses to 
pay jizyah is a legitimate target in war. Shāfi‛ī adds that it is also impermissible to 
target all the clergy who confine themselves to worship and are not involved in acts 
of hostility. Ibn H azm does not accept the authenticity of all the hadīths that extend 
non-combatant immunity beyond women and children.21 It is worth adding here that 
jurists disliked targeting relatives of fighting men during combat because the Prophet 
had prohibited Abū Bakr from targeting his son during the fight.22  
As for the majority of jurists, who hold that the Islamic casus belli is the 
aggression of the enemy and not his unbelief per se, they extended the list of the five 
categories of non-combatants specifically declared by the Prophet to be immune 
from being targeted in war by applying the juristic methodology of analogy to 
include other kinds of non-combatants. Again, the jurists did not direct much 
attention to justifying the Islamic prohibition of targeting such specific categories of 
people during acts of hostility, but rather focused on enumerating the categories of 
the enemy and distinguishing those who qualified as a legitimate target for fighting 
from those who did not. They were concerned, however, with presenting the Islamic 
                                                                                                                                          
Shākir, Ghazawāt al-Rasūl (Tripoli, Lebanon: Jarrūs Press, 1996/1416), p. 81; Muhammad ‛Izzat 
Darwazah, Al-Jihād fī Sabīl Allah fī al-Qur’ān wa al-Hadīth, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Al-Nāshir, 1990), p. 7. 
20 See Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd, Bidāyah al-Mujtahid wa Nihāyah al-
Muqtasid (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 1, p. 281. 
21 ‛Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Sa‛īd ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah, n.d.), Vol. 7, pp. 
297-299. 
22 See, for example, Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Al-Wajīz fī Fiqh al-Imām al-Shāfi‛ī, ed. ‛Alī Mu‛awwad  
and ‛Ādil ‛Abd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-Arqam ibn Abī al-Arqam, 1997/1418), Vol. 2, p. 190; 
Sobhi Mahmassani, “The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine”, Recueil 
des Cours, Vol. 117, 1966, p. 303; al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 21, p. 54; ‛Alī Muhyī al-Dīn al-Qarah 
Dāghī, “Al-Usus wa al-Mabādi’ al-Islāmiyyah lil-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah”, Scientific Review of the 
European Council for Fatwa and Research, May 2007, Issues 10-11, Part 1, p. 183. 
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bases, namely, the Qur’ān, hadīth, etc., upon which they built their rulings, i.e., who 
is a legitimate target and who is not. These categories can be described as follows: 
 
4.2.1 Women and Children 
Muslim jurists unanimously agree that it is impermissible to target women and 
children in war.23 Jurists often refer to women and children as one category and thus 
tend to treat them as one. However, they focus more on women because they seem to 
expect much less danger from children. Jurists also prohibit targeting a khunthā (a 
hermaphrodite; this term is used in Islamic parlance to refer to a person who looks 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Muh ammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‛rifah, 
[1973]/1393), Vol. 4, p. 240; Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar al-Kabīr, ed. Salāh  al-
Dīn al-Munjid (Cairo: Ma‛had al-Makhtūtāt, n.d.), Vol. 4, p. 1415; Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-
Shaybānī, Al-Siyar, ed. Majid Khadduri (Beirut: Al-Dār al-Muttahidah, 1975), p. 249; Mālik ibn 
Anas, Al-Mudawwanah al-Kubrā (Beirut: Dār Sādir, n.d.), Vol. 3, pp. 6 f.; Ahmad ibn Idrīs al-Qarāfī, 
Al-Dhakhīrah, ed. Muhammad Būkhubzah (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1994), Vol. 3, pp. 397-
401; Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Al-Wasīt fī al-Madhhab, ed. Ahmad Mah mūd Ibrāhīm and Muhammad 
Muhammad Tāmir (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 1997/1417), Vol. 7, p. 19; Ibrāhīm ibn ‛Alī ibn Yūsuf al-
Shirāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab: fī Fiqh al-Imām al-Shāfi‛ī, ed. Zakariyyā ‛Imīrat (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
‛Ilmiyyah, 1995/1416) Vol. 3, p. 277; Yūsuf ibn ‛Abd al-Barr, Al-Kāfī fī Fiqh Ahl al-Madīnah (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1986-7/1407), p. 208; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol. 7, p. 296; Muhammad 
ibn ‛Alī ibn Muhammad al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awtār: Min Ahādīth Sayyid al-Khyār Sharh Muntaqā 
al-Akhbār (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1973), Vol. 8, p. 73; Ahmad ibn ‛Abd al-Halīm ibn Taymiyyah, Al-
Siyāsah al-Shar‛iyyah fī Islāh al-Rā‛ī wa al-Ra‛iyyah (N.p.: Dār al-Ma‛rifah, n.d.), p. 104; ‛Alī ibn 
Muhammad ibn Habīb al-Māwardī, Kitāb al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah wa al-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyyah, ed. 
Ahmad Mubārak al-Baghdādī (Kuwait: Maktabah Dār ibn Qutaybah, 1989/1409), p. 57; Muwaffaq al-
Dīn ‛Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn Qudāmah, Al-Kāfī fī Fiqh al-Imām Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, ed. 
Muhammad Fāris and Mus‛ad ‛Abd al-Hamīd al-Sa‛danī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 2004), 
Vol. 4, p. 125; Muwaffaq al-Dīn ‛Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī: fī Fiqh al-Imām 
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal al-Shaybānī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984-5/1405), Vol. 9, p. 250; Ibn Rushd, 
Bidāyah al-Mujtahid, Vol. 1, p. 280; Ahmad ibn Ghunaym ibn Sālim al-Nafarāwī, Al-Fawākih al-
Dawānī ‛alā Risālah Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1994-5/1415), Vol. 1, p. 399; 
al-Shaykh Nizām, and a group of Indian scholars, Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah: Fī Madhhab al-Imām al-
A‛zam Abī Hanīfah al-Nu‛mān (N.p.: Dār al-Fikr, 1991/1411), Vol. 2, p. 194; Mustafā al-Suyūtī al-
Rahaybānī, Matālib ’Ulī al-Nuhā fī Sharh Ghāyah al-Muntahā (Damascus: Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 
1961), Vol. 2, p. 517; Ih sān al-Hindī, Ahkām al-Harb wa al-Salām fī Dawlah al-Islām (Damascus: 
Dār al-Numayr, 1993/1413), pp. 167 f.; ‛Ārif Khalīl Abū ‛Īd, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Fiqh al-
Islāmī (Amman: Dār al-Nafā’is, 2007), pp. 167-169; Muh ammad Sayyid Tantāwī, “Al-Hukm al-
Shar‛ī fī Ahdāth al-Khalīj”, The Islamic Fiqh Council Journal, Issue No. 5, [1991/1411], p. 59; 
Abdulrahman Muhammad Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad in Classical Fiqh and Modern 
Islamic Thought” (PhD thesis, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1998), pp. 117 f.; Sohail H. 
Hashmi, “Islam, Sunni”, Encyclopedia of Religion and War, ed., Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), p. 219; John Kelsay, “Islamic Law of War”, Encyclopedia of Religion and 
War, ed., Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 224.  
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both male and female) lest this person be a woman.24 The jurists classified anyone 
who had not reached puberty or was under the age of fifteen as a child and thus the 
beneficiary of non-combatant immunity.25 The same age limit is a prerequisite for 
Muslims to join a Muslim army.26 Interestingly, this is the age limit which is also 
given for the protection of children in the Additional Protocol I, 8 June 1977, of the 
Geneva Conventions.27 The jurists deduced this age limit from some hadīths which 
show that the Prophet refused to accept some Muslim male volunteers who were 
aged fourteen at the battles of Badr (Ramadān 2/March 624) and Uh ud (Shawwāl 
3/March 625) and accepted them only when they reached the age of fifteen.28  
 Two justifications are briefly given by the jurists for the prohibition of 
targeting women and children. First, because women and children, according to al-
Ghazālī’s words, “laysūā ahl al-qitāl”29 (are not fit for fighting). Ibn Qudāmah 
phrases his justification slightly differently. He states that the reason for a woman’s 
immunity is that “annahā lā tuqātil”30 (she does not fight). While the first phrase 
may indicate that the justification is women’s physical inability to fight, the second 
indicates that the justification is that normally women do not engage in acts of 
hostility. Al-Shawkānī (d. 1250-1834) plainly phrases the impermissibility of 
                                                 
24 See Mansūr ibn Yūnus ibn Idrīs al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛ ‛an Matn al-Iqnā‛, ed. Hilāl Mis īlh ī 
Mustafā Hilāl (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1981-2/1402), Vol. 3, p. 50; al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 21, p. 
54; al-Shirāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, Vol. 3, p. 277; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Kāfī, Vol. 4, p. 125. 
25 Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, pp. 248 f.; ‛Umar ibn al-Husayn al-Khiraqī¸ Mukhtasar al-
Khiraqī min Masā’il al-Imām Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, ed. Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Al-Maktab 
al-Islāmī, 1982-3/1403), p. 132; Sobhi Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām 
(Beirut: Dār al-‛Ilm lil-Malāyīn, 1972/1392), p. 239. 
26 Maryam Elahi concludes that “the use of [Muslim] children in armed conflicts is in direct 
contravention of the fundamental sources of Islamic law.” Maryam Elahi, “The Rights of the Child 
Under Islamic Law: Prohibition of the Child Soldier”, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 19, 
No. 2, 1988, pp. 265, 274, 279. 
27 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Article 77, available from 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b
079; Internet; accessed 31 August 2009. 
28 Al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 21, pp. 20 f. 
29 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Wasīt, Vol. 7, p. 19. 
30 Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 250. 
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targeting women by “lid a‛fihin” (because of their physical weakness).31 In support of 
his justification that fighting is permitted only against enemy combatants, al-
Shaybānī (d. 189/804-5) quotes the Qur’ānic locutionary act “And fight in the way 
of God those who fight against you” (Qur’ān 2:190).32  
Second, other jurists justify the immunity granted to women and children by 
the principle of mas lahah, since they can be enslaved or exchanged for Muslim 
prisoners of war or for ransom. Despite the different moral grounds upon which these 
two justifications are based, interestingly, al-Ghazālī gives these two justifications in 
the same sentence without any elaboration.33 It can be concluded from this example 
that, in conformity with the nature of Islamic jurisprudence, the jurists were mainly 
concerned with giving Islamic rulings in order to regulate the conduct of Muslims, 
rather than explaining the moral or the philosophical rationale of these laws. 
 Jurists also unanimously agree that women and children forfeit the right to 
non-combatant immunity if they play a part in the actual fighting. Nevertheless, they 
differed on the cases which may justify targeting women and children if they engage 
in war operations. Unlike ‛Abd al-Rahman Awzā‛ī (d. 157/774), the Mālikī jurists, 
including Ibn Sah nūn and ibn Hajar, maintain that if a woman stands  guard over the 
enemy’s army or strongholds, or if she warns the enemy or throws stones at the 
Muslim army, she still cannot be targeted.34 Nonetheless, the Mālikī jurist al-Qarāfī 
(d. 684/1285) adds that if a woman kills a member of the Muslim army with the 
stones she has thrown, then she is to be killed.35 Furthermore, al-Shaybānī advocates 
that if a woman attacks a man, it is permissible for him to kill her, but only in this 
                                                 
31 Al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awtār, Vol. 8, p. 73. See Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, p. 239. 
32 Al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar al-Kabyr, Vol. 4, p. 1415. 
33 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Wasīt, Vol. 7, p. 19. 
34 Ahmad al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, ed. Muhammad ‛Allīsh (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 2, 176; 
Karima Bennoune, “As-Salāmū ‛Alaykum? Humanitarian Law in Islamic Jurisprudence”, Michigan 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, Winter 1994, p. 630. 
35 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 3, p. 399. 
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situation of self-defence. If he manages to capture her, it is impermissible to kill her 
afterwards.36 Although Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) agrees that a woman can be 
targeted in the war if she fights, he maintains that it is undesirable to target children, 
even those who fight.37 Some jurists maintain that if a woman is the queen, or a child 
is the king, of the enemy, then either can be killed if they come to the battlefield in 
order to disperse the enemy.38 Moreover, according to Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah, if a 
wealthy woman spends a good deal of her money on inciting the enemy to fight, then 
she can be killed.39 It should be added here that what the jurists meant by the phrase 
“can be killed” is that such a person can be the target of fighting during the war 
operations. 
 Therefore, most of the jurists prohibit the targeting of women and children in 
war because they are not combatants, though a few jurists still seem to conceive the 
prohibition of targeting women and children solely on the basis of the Prophet’s 
command, without being concerned over the wisdom of this prohibition. Most of the 
jurists deduce the wisdom of this prohibition from the incident when a woman was 
killed during the battle of Hunayn (8/630). When the Prophet found a woman killed 
in the battlefield, he stated “mā kānat hadhih tuqātil” (she was not the one who 
would have fought). When the Prophet questioned the man who killed her, the man 
replied that he had killed her because she tried to snatch his sword in order to kill 
him.40 On the basis of this report, most of the jurists extended the conception of non-
                                                 
36 Al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, p. 1416. 
37 Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, Kitāb al-Jihād wa Kitāb al-Jizyah wa Ahkām al-Muhāribīn min 
Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā’ li-Abī Ja‛far Muhammad Ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, ed. Joseph Schacht (Leiden: 
Brill, 1933), p. 9. 
38 Al-Samarqandī, Tuhfah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 3, p. 295; ‛Abd al-‛Azīz S aqr, ‛Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī 
al-Islām Waqt al-Harb: Dirāsah lil-Qawā‛id al-Munazzimah li-Sayr al-Qitāl, Mashrū‛ al-‛Alāqāt al-
Dawliyyah fī al-Islām 6 (Cairo: Al-Ma‛had al-‛Ālamī lil-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1996), pp. 46-48; al-Shaykh 
Nizām, Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah, Vol. 2, p. 194.  
39 Al-Shaykh Nizām, Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah, Vol. 2, p. 194. 
40 See, for example, h adīth 9383 in al-Sana‛ānī, Al-Musannaf, Vol. 5, p. 201; ‛Abd al-Mun‛im al-
Hifnī, Mawsū‛ah al-Qur’ān al-‛Azīm (Cairo: Maktabah Madbūlī, Vol. 2, 2004), Vol. 2, p. 1901.  
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combatant immunity to include certain other categories of non-combatants,41 as 
illustrated below. Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) uses this report to 
prove that the Islamic justification for war is the belligerence of the enemy and, 
therefore, the prohibition of fighting non-belligerent unbelievers. In other words, Ibn 
Taymiyyah here is refuting al-Shāfi‛ī’s claim that unbelief per se is a justification for 
war.42 He confirms this by adding that if unbelief per se were a justification for war, 
then there would be no such prohibition against targeting unbelieving women in 
war.43 
 
4.2.2 The Aged 
Following the Prophet’s commands, most jurists prohibited targeting the aged, 
though al-Shāfi‛ī and Ibn Hazm permitted them to be targeted if they did not agree to 
pay the jizyah. Al-Sana‛ānī defines the aged who cannot be targeted in war as “the 
one who looks to be in his old age or the one who reaches the age of fifty or fifty one 
years of age”.44 The jurists agree that if the aged support the enemy in planning war 
operations, they can be targeted during the war. In his justification of targeting the 
aged in this case, al-Shirāzī (d. 476/1083) and al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) argue that 
planning the war plays a more important contribution to winning the war than 
fighting itself.45 The jurists based this ruling on the incident of the killing of Durayd 
                                                 
41 For a list of the non-combatants, see Mahmassani, “The Principles of International Law in the Light 
of Islamic Doctrine”, p. 302 f. 
42 Ahmad ibn ‛Abd al-Halīm ibn Taymiyyah, Qā‛idah Mukhtasarah fī Qitāl al-Kuffār wa 
Muhādanatihim wa Tahrīm Qatlihim li-Mujarrad Kufrihim: Qā‛idah Tubayyn al-Qiyam al-Sāmiyah 
lil-H adārah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-Harb wa al-Qitāl, ed. ‛Abd al-‛Azīz ibn ‛Abd Allah ibn Ibrāhīm al-
Zayd Āl Hamad (Riyadh: N.p., 2004/1424), p. 119. 
43 Ibid., pp. 188 f. 
44 Muhammad ibn Ismā‛īl al-Sana‛ānī, Subul al-Salām: Sharh Bulūgh al-Marām min Adillah al-
Ahkām, ed. Muhammad ‛Abd al-‛Azīz al-Khūlī, 4th ed. (Beirut: Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‛Arabī, 1959-
60/1379), Vol. 4, p. 50. 
45 Al-Shirāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, Vol. 3, pp. 277 f.; al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 21, p. 55; al-Buhūtī, 
Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 3, p. 50; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 2, p. 517; see also Ibn Taymiyyah, 
Qā‛idah Mukhtasarah fī Qitāl al-Kuffār, p. 118; Wahbah al-Zuh aylī, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-
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ibn al-Summah, who was brought to the battlefield to plan operations for the battle of 
Hunayn, even though he was over one hundred years of age.46 Since the Prophet 
knew about this incident and did not condemn it, the jurists deduced that it was 
permissible to target the aged in such cases. Nonetheless, al-Shawkānī did not accept 
this deduction: he advocated that there is nothing in the Islamic sources to prove the 
permissibility of targeting an aged person even if he supports the army of the enemy 
in this case.47 
 
4.2.3 The Blind, the Sick, the Incapacitated and the Insane 
Details concerning this category are very scanty. The jurists are in agreement that it 
is impermissible for a Muslim army to target the blind, the sick,48 the incapacitated 
and the insane.49 Al-Thawrī permitted targeting anyone who is incapacitated if he is 
still physically able to fight or if he supports the enemy.50 Concerning the insane, 
Abū Hanīfah adds that if an insane person sometimes regains his sanity, he can be 
targeted when he is in a state of sanity.51 The reason that the jurists did not elaborate 
enough on this category is that apparently there are no Qur’ānic prescriptions or 
                                                                                                                                          
Islam: Muqāranah bi-al-Qānūn al-Dawlī al-Hadīth (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 1981/1401), p. 
71. 
46 Al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awtār, Vol. 8, p. 73; al-Shirāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, Vol. 3, p. 277; Alsumaih, 
“The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, p. 118; T.R. Copinger-Symes, “Is Osama bin Laden’s ‘Fatwa Urging 
Jihad against Americans’ dated 23 February 1998 Justified y Islamic Law?”, in Mashood A. Baderin, 
ed., International Law and Islamic Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 223.  
47 Muhammad ibn ‛Alī ibn Muhammad al-Shawkānī, Al-Sayl al-Jarrār al-Mutadaffiq ‛alā Hadā’iq al-
Azhār, ed. Mahmūd Ibrāhīm Zāyid (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1984-5/1405), Vol. 4, p. 533. 
48 Caliph Abū Bakr prohibited targeting al-marīd (the sick), see hadīth number 17931 in al-Bayhaqī, 
Sunan al-Bayhaqī, Vol. 9, p. 90. 
49 Al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 101; Muwaffaq al-Dīn ‛Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn 
Qudāmah, ‛Umdah al-Fiqh, ed. ‛Abd Allah Safar al-‛Abdalī and Muhammad Dughaylib al-‛Utaybī 
(Taif: Maktabah al-Tarafayn, n.d.), p. 153; Muhammad ibn Yūsuf ibn Abī al-Qāsim al-‛Abdarī, Al-Tāj 
wa al-Iklīl: Sharh Mukhtasar Khalīl, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1977-8/1398), Vol. 3, p. 351; 
Muhammad ibn Muflih, Al-Furū‛, ed. Abī al-Zahrā’ Hāzim al-Qādī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
‛Ilmiyyah, 1997/1418), Vol. 6, p. 197; Mansūr ibn Yūnus ibn Idrīs al-Buhūtī, Sharh Muntahā al-
Irādāt al-Musammā Daqā’iq ’Ulī al-Nuhā Li-Sharh al-Muntahā, 2nd ed. (Beirut: ‛Ālam al-Kutub, 
1996),Vol. 1, pp. 624 f.; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 3, p. 50; al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, 
Vol. 2, p. 176; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 2, pp. 517 f.; al-Hindī, Ahkām al-Harb wa al-Salām, p. 
178. 
50 Saqr, ‛Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah, p. 48. 
51 Ibid. 
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precedents set by the Prophet in this matter. It is therefore the jurists themselves who 
essentially give the ruling on whether it is permissible to target them or not on the 
basis of the harm they can cause to the Muslim army: i.e., whether they can 
physically fight or provide other sorts of support to the enemy’s army.  
   
4.2.4 The Clergy 
The jurists referred to a member of the clergy as rāhib (hermit, monk). In Islamic 
parlance, this term refers to men of religion who devote themselves to worship. They 
are usually described as living in a hermitage. The non-combatant immunity given to 
hermits is based on the Prophet’s commands. Also, in his ten commands to Yazīd ibn 
Abū Sufyān - an army leader -, Abū Bakr reiterated the Prophet’s prohibition against 
targeting hermits but allowed al-shammāsah (the tonsured) to be killed.52 Early 
Muslims explained the reason why Abū Bakr permitted this by the fact that 
“whenever a war starts, the tonsured do fight, unlike the hermits”.53 Thus the 
majority of the jurists based their rulings on the prohibition of targeting hermits in 
war on the commands given by the Prophet and Abū Bakr and also by resorting to 
the principle of analogy which includes any non-combatant, based on the prohibition 
of targeting women. Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah states that the reason for prohibiting the 
targeting of hermits during war is that they are confined to their monasteries and do 
not engage in acts of hostility against Muslims. He adds that the jurists agree that if 
hermits support the army of the enemy, they can be targeted.54 Al-Shāfi‛ī specified 
                                                 
52 See, for example, hadīth number 965 in  Anas ibn Mālik, Muwatta’ al-Imām Mālik, ed. Muhammad 
Fū’ād ‛Abd al-Bāqī (Cairo: Dār Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‛Arabī, n.d.), Vol. 2, p. 447; hadīths numbers 
17904, 17927 and 17929 in al-Bayhaqī, Sunan al-Bayhaqī, Vol. 9, pp. 85, 89 f.; hadīths numbers 9375 
and 9377 in al-Sana‛ānī, Al-Musannaf, Vol. 5, pp. 199 f.; al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 21, p. 58; Ibn 
Anas, Al-Mudawwanah, Vol. 3, p. 7; Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, p. 262. 
53 See hadīth number 17930 in al-Bayhaqī, Sunan al-Bayhaqī, Vol. 9, p. 90; al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, 
Vol. 21, p. 58. 
54 Ahmad ibn ‛Abd al-Halīm ibn Taymiyyah, Majmū‛ Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, 
compiled by ‛Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Qāsim al-‛Āsimī (Cairo: Maktabah ibn Taymiyyah, 
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that he accepted the non-combatant immunity granted to hermits by “following Abū 
Bakr’s command” to his army not to target the clergy.55 Thus the jurists unanimously 
grant non-combatant immunity to all hermits, except for Ibn Hazm, who still 
stipulates that the hermits should either become Muslims or pay the jizyah in order 
not to be a permissible target in war.  
 
4.2.5 Al-‛Asīf, Farmers, Craftsmen and Traders 
‛Asīf (pl. ‛usafā’) means a hired man or an employee. Generally, it refers to a person 
who is hired to do a service. In the war context, it refers to anyone who works for, or 
is paid by, the enemy to do services in the battlefield, for example, as al-Shawkānī 
suggests, “to mind the belongings and the animals, but not engage in fighting.”56 The 
prohibition against targeting this category is based on the h adīths of the Prophet, 
several of which are related to the incident of the woman who was killed in the battle 
of Hunayn. Thereupon, the Prophet sent someone to Khālid ibn al-Walīd with 
explicit commands not to kill a woman, a child or a hired man.57 Therefore, since the 
Prophet prohibited targeting people hired to perform services for the army of the 
enemy in the battlefield, even if it affected the fighting operations, it is obvious that 
targeting any non-combatant is strictly prohibited.58  
 Furthermore, jurists extend non-combatant immunity to include al-hārif al-
mashghūl bi-hirfatih59 (the craftsman who is confined to his craft). Early Muslims 
                                                                                                                                          
n.d.), Vol. 28, p. 660. See also, for example, al-Hindī, Ahkām al-Harb wa al-Salām, p. 178; Alsumaih, 
“The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, p. 119. 
55 Al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, p. 240; al-Tabarī, Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā’, p. 11. 
56 Al-Shawkānī, Al-Sayl al-Jarrār, Vol. 4, p. 532. 
57 See h adīths numbers 2841 and 2842 in Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah, Vol. 2, pp. 947 f.; hadīths 
numbers 8625, 8626 and 8627 in al-Nasā’ī, Sunan al-Nasā’ī al-Kubrā, Vol. 5, pp. 186 f.; hadīths 
numbers 17936 and 17937 in al-Bayhaqī, Sunan al-Bayhaqī, Vol. 9, p. 91.  
58 See Muhammad Khyr Haykal, Al-Jihād wa al-Qitāl fī al-Siyyāsah al-Shar‛iyyah, 2nd ed. (Beirut: 
Dār al-Bayāriq, 1996/1417), Vol. 2, pp. 1246 f.; see also Abū Zahrah, Tanzīm al-Islām lil-Mujtama‛, 
p. 48. 
59 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Wasīt, Vol. 7, p. 20. 
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also extended this immunity to farmers and traders on the enemy side.60 ‛Umar ibn 
al-Khat t āb gives written instructions specifically prohibiting targeting farmers. Zayd 
ibn Wahb reports that they received written instructions from ‛Umar ibn al-Khat t āb 
which read: “Do not steal from the booty; do not betray; do not kill a child; and fear 
God in the farmers”61 “and do not kill them unless they wage war against you.”62 
The phrase “fear God”, chosen by ‛Umar to indicate the prohibition against targeting 
the farmers, typifies the main concern of Muslims during the conduct of war and 
hence the nature of the Islamic law of war, which is to abide by the rules derived, or 
deduced, from the Islamic sources. The aim is to avoid doing something harām, 
(impermissible), namely in this context taking a human soul unjustly, so as to 
deserve God’s punishment in the Hereafter.63 
 The concept of non-combatant immunity is thus grounded in the Prophet’s 
commands. The extensive literature on who may and who may be not targeted in war 
indicates that non-combatant immunity was a full-blown doctrine developed by the 
second/eighth and third/ninth century Muslim jurists.64 Their discussions indicate the 
                                                 
60 See hadīth number 17939 in al-Bayhaqī, Sunan al-Bayhaqī, Vol. 9, p. 91; Khadduri, War and 
Peace, p. 104; Mahmassani, “The Principles of International Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine”, p. 
302; Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, p. 241; Hammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of State, p. 204; 
Hilmi M. Zawati, Is Jihad a Just War? War, Peace, and Human Rights under Islamic and Public 
International Law, Studies in Religion and Society Vol. 53 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 
2001), p. 44; Ali Raza Naqvi, “Laws of War in Islam”, Islamic Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 1, March 1974, 
p. 32; Romahi, Studies in International Law, p. 64; Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 136. 
61 See Ibn Rushd, Bidāyah al-Mujtahid, Vol. 1, p. 281; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 251; al-
Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 2, p. 518; Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 35; Mahmassani, 
Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, p. 242; al-Hindī, Ahkām al-Harb wa al-Salām, p. 178; al-Hifnī, Mawsū‛ah 
al-Qur’ān, Vol. 2, p. 1887. 
62 See hadīth number 17938 in al-Bayhaqī, Sunan al-Bayhaqī, Vol. 9, p. 91; Abū ‛Īd, Al-‛Alāqāt al-
Dawliyyah fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, p. 174. See also al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 3, p. 50; Yūsuf al-
Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li-Ahkāmih wa Falsafatih fī Daw’ al-Qur’ān wa al-
Sunnah (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2009),Vol. 1, p. 736. 
63 See Zayd ibn ‛Abd al-Karīm al-Zayd, Muqaddimah fī al-Qānūn al-Dawlī al-Insānī fī al-Islām (N.p.: 
Comité International Genève, ICRC, 2004), pp. 80 f.; Marcel A. Boisard, “The Conduct of Hostilities 
and the Protection of the Victims of Armed Conflict in Islam”, Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
Autumn 1978, p. 13. 
64 According to Bedjaoui: “This [Islamic] rule that combatants should be spared unnecessary 
suffering, together with the rules for the protection of civilian population and the fundamental 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, already featured in seventh-century slam, 
constitute one of the foundations of humanitarian international law as codified in the 20th century”, 
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distinct nature of Islamic law. Simply put, in the words of Johnson, “The [Islamic] 
position is clear: there is no justification for warfare directed intentionally against 
noncombatants in jihad.”65 Despite the fact that he has written several works on the 
tradition of war in Islam, Kelsay admits here that “the present state of our knowledge 
[Western scholars on the law of war in Islam] is short on details.”66 Fred M. Donner 
adds that “It is still much too early, however, to be able to identify a clear canon of 
fundamental Islamic texts on warfare. Too many texts remain unstudied.”67 In other 
words, this admitted lack of knowledge of the Islamic regulations for the conduct of 
war on the part of Western scholars, despite the fact that these scholars have noted 
that the classical jurists paid the greatest attention to the Islamic jus in bello, is partly 
the simple result of a lack of Islamic texts in European languages.   
 
4.3 Human Shields 
The second major issue dealt with by the jurists is whether it is permissible or not to 
attack enemy combatants if they turn non-combatant individuals into human shields. 
This practice is referred to as tatarrus and the context is that during hostilities, 
enemy combatants, whether inside a fortress or not, may make use of human shields 
to protect themselves from the Muslim army’s attack. In order to attack the enemy in 
the war context of the classical Muslim jurists, the Muslim army would need to use 
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66 Kelsay, Islam and War, p. 60. 
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mangonels (a weapon for catapulting large stones),68 which might lead to casualties 
among non-combatants. In the discussion of this issue, most of the jurists, though not 
all, distinguish between two cases: first, if the enemy combatants take individuals 
who enjoy non-combatant immunity, such as their women, children and the aged as 
human shields; and, second, if the enemy take any Muslim individuals, in general, or 
Muslim prisoners of war, or individuals from ahl al-dhimmah (non-Muslim citizens 
of the dār al-Islām)69 or any individuals who “baynanā wa baynahum amān (belong 
to a country with which we [Muslims] have a peace accord)”.70               
   Concerning the first case, al-Awzā‛ī and the Mālikī jurists argue that it is 
permissible because of military necessity to direct mangonels at the enemy, provided 
that Muslims aim to direct their attack at the combatants and avoid injuring women 
and children.71 In justification of the permissibility of attacking the enemy in this 
case, al-Shirāzī argues that Muslims would be defeated if they stopped fighting,72 
while Ibn Qudāmah argues that the enemy could deliberately resort to turning their 
women and children into human shields to force the Muslim army to stop the war.73  
                                                 
68 See, for example, al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, p. 288; Muhammad ibn Abī al-‛Abbās Ahmad ibn 
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Dārīn wa Atharuh fī Ahkām al-Munākahāt wa al-Mu‛āmalāt, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 
1998/1418), pp. 113-125; al-Hindī, Ahkām al-Harb wa al-Salām, pp. 13-18; ‛Abdur Rahmān I. Doi, 
Sharī‛ah: The Islamic Law (London: Ta Ha, 1984/1404), pp. 426-435; Edward D.A. Hulmes 
“Dhimmis”, in Ian Richard Netton, Encyclopedia of Islamic Civilization and Religion (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2008), p. 144. 
70 Al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 21, p. 60. 
71 Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Kāfī, Vol. 4, p. 126; al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 21, p. 59; al-Māwardī, Al-
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72 Al-Shirāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, Vol. 3, p. 278. 
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 As for the second case, the jurists give two contradictory rulings: according to 
al-Awzā‛ī, the Mālikī jurists, al-Lū’lū’ī, Abū Thawr, al-Layth and Ah mad ibn 
Hanbal, it is impermissible to attack the enemy if they take as human shields 
Muslims, dhimmis or any individuals who belong to a country with which Muslims 
have a peace accord.74 They base this ruling on the Qur’ān “had they [believing 
Muslim men and women] been separated, We would have inflicted a severe 
chastisement on those who disbelieved from among them [the Meccans]” (Qur’ān 
48:25).  
However, the majority of the jurists, including Abū Hanīfah, Abū Yūsuf (d. 
182/798) and al-Thawrī, advocate that it is permissible in this case to attack the 
enemy because of military necessity, provided that the Muslim army intends to direct 
its attack against the combatants and avoid the human shields.75 For al-Māwardī (d. 
450/1058), the military necessity in this case would arise from the risk of a Muslim 
defeat; apart from that, it is impermissible to attack the enemy in these 
circumstances.76 Furthermore, the Andalusian exegete-jurist al-Qurt ubī (d. 671/1272) 
states that the attack is justified solely in cases involving “the absolute and definitely 
clear interest of the Muslims”, namely, avoiding the collapse of the entire Muslim 
nation into the hands of the enemy.77 Other jurists add that, if the Muslim army will 
be defeated if  the human shield is not attacked, it is permissible to attack the human 
shield because of the obligation to protect the lives of the Muslim army. 
Additionally, if the number of the Muslim prisoners of war is very few, it is 
permissible to attack the human shield because the likelihood of injuring the Muslim 
                                                 
74 See, for example, al-Tabarī, Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā’,  pp. 4-8; al-Armanāzī, Al-Shar‛ al-Dawlī, p. 124; 
Haykal, Al-Jihād wa al-Qitāl, Vol. 2, pp. 1331-1334. 
75 See, for example, al-Tabarī, Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā’, pp. 5-7. 
76 Al-Māwardī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, p. 57. 
77 Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Ansārī al-Qurtubī, Al-Jāmi‛ li-Ahkām al-Qur’ān (Cairo: Dār al-Sha‛b, 
n.d.), Vol. 16, pp. 287 f. 
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prisoners is very slight. But if there are a great many Muslim prisoners, then it is 
impermissible to attack, because there is a strong possibility that the Muslims might 
be injured.78  
In such cases, each individual jurist weighed the sanctity of human life 
against the military necessity of winning the war. Some jurists also explored different 
military situations, such as if the enemy were to take the human shield inside a 
fortress or inside a house, in which cases the degree of likelihood of injuring the 
human shield would vary. In such cases, both the permissibility and impermissibility 
of these attacks are advocated. Later generations of jurists restate these different 
positions sometimes without endorsing any of them.  
It is worth adding here that some jurists, such as al-Shaybānī and al-Shāfi‛ī, 
do not distinguish in their discussion of the permissibility of attacking human shields 
between those who enjoy non-combatant immunity and Muslims, dhimmis or any 
individuals who belong to a country with which Muslims have a peace accord. Al-
Shaybānī maintains that it is permissible to attack human shields if the enemy 
combatants take as shields Muslim men, or children or non-combatant “women, the 
aged, children, the blind, the incapacitated or the insane from the dār al-harb.”79     
This typical jurisprudential discourse indicates the impracticality of providing 
a specific position as being representative of Islamic law simply because, in such 
cases, the jurists gave conflicting rulings. Thus, the best approach in the discussion 
of these Islamic legal issues is to relate such rulings to the jurists who advocated 
them. Concerning the application of these rulings, it would be left to the Muslims in 
question to decide which rulings to endorse. The main point to be concluded from the 
discussion of this issue is that most of the jurists override the Qur’ānic injunction 
                                                 
78 Al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 21, p. 60. 
79 Al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar, p. 135. 
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(48:25) on the basis of the principle of Muslim public interest, judging that it would 
be in the interest of the Muslims to attack the enemy even though this might lead to 
casualties among innocent non-combatants, Muslim captives, dhimmis or any 
individuals who belong to a country with which Muslims have a peace accord, 
despite the fact that the Qur’ān gives a different ruling in a similar situation (48:25).  
 
4.4 Night Attack  
The third issue that is strongly linked to the lives of the enemy is bayāt (night attack). 
The term bayāt is defined as arriving for battle in enemy territory during the night.80 
The enemy are taken by surprise because they are not warned of the approaching 
army, first, because it is dark and second, because they may be asleep. The element 
of surprise here is significant because it is against the Islamic rules of combat to 
initiate acts of hostility except as a third option, namely after the enemy’s refusal to 
accept Islam or to conclude a peace treaty with the Muslims.81  
 According to a hadīth narrated by Anas ibn Mālik: “whenever the Prophet 
reached a people by night, he never started an attack until it was morning.”82 
However, according to another hadīth narrated by al-Sa‛b ibn Jaththāmah: “the 
Prophet was asked if it was permissible to attack the enemy by night which may 
result in casualties among women and children. Then, the Prophet replied that they 
                                                 
80 Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, Vol. 1, p. 281; al-Fayyūmī, Al-Mis bāh al-Munīr, Vol. 1, p. 68.   
81 See, for example, Abū Zahrah, Tanzīm al-Islām lil-Mujtama‛, pp. 48 f.; Khadduri, War and Peace, 
pp. 94-101; al-Hindī, Ahkām al-Harb wa al-Salām, pp. 147-152; ‛Umar Ahmad al-Firjānī, Usūl al-
‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām, 2nd ed. (Tripoli, Libya: Dār Iqra’, 1988/1397), pp. 102-104; S aqr, 
Falsafah al-Harb, p. 109; ‛Abd al-Latīf ‛Āmir, Ahkām al-Asrā wa al-Sabāyā fī al-Hurūb al-
Islāmiyyah (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Misrī; Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 1986/1406), pp. 64 f.; 
Mohamed Mokbel Mahmud Elbakry, “The Legality of ‘War’ in Al-Shari‛a Al-Islamiya (The Islamic 
Law) and Contemporary International Law: Comparative Study” (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 
1987), p. 312; Malik Abdulazeez al-Mubarak, “Warfare in Early Islam” (PhD thesis, University of 
Glasgow, 1997), pp. 166-169. 
82 Hadīth number 2785 in Muhammad ibn Ismā‛īl al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‛ al-Sahīh al-Mukhtasar, ed. 
Mustafā Dīb al-Baghā, 3rd ed. (Damascus; Beirut: Dār ibn Kathīr, 1987/1407), Vol. 3, p. 1077. 
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[women and children] are from them [the enemy warriors]”.83 Based on the later 
hadīth, the majority of the jurists permitted attacking the enemy by night,84 though 
some jurists still maintained that it was reprehensible.85 The concern of the man who 
asked the Prophet about the permissibility of the night attack is precisely the 
likelihood of endangering the lives of women and children. Nonetheless, al-Shāfi‛ī 
presumes that the reason the Prophet never initiated an attack by night was to avoid 
being ambushed by the enemy or lest Muslims might mistakenly kill each other 
because of the darkness.86 
The jurists mainly linked the night attack with using mangonels because 
during the night the two armies would not be able to fight hand to hand because of 
the darkness. So, if Muslims were to initiate an attack by night, they would use 
mangonels to direct stones at the enemy, which might injure non-combatants such as 
women and children. Any casualties that might occur among women and children, 
the jurists maintain, are justified solely as collateral damage.87 Here also the jurists 
give no details concerning this issue. They are merely satisfied with stating that it is 
acceptable to attack the enemy by night based on the hadīth narrated by ibn 
Jaththāmah.   
In both issues, tatarrus and bayāt the majority of the classical jurists 
permitted attacking the enemy under the above strict conditions and within specific 
                                                 
83 See, for example, h adīth number 2850 in al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‛ al-Sahīh  al-Mukhtasar, Vol. 3, p. 
1097; hadīth number 1745 in Muslim ibn al-Hajjāj al-Qushayrī, Sahīh  Muslim, ed. Muhammad Fū’ād 
‛Abd al-Bāqī (Beirut: Dār Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‛Arabī, n.d.), Vol. 3, pp. 1364 f.; hadīth number 2839 in 
Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah, Vol. 2, p. 947; see hadīths numbers 9385 and 9386 in al-Sana‛ānī, Al-
Musannaf, Vol. 5, p. 202. 
84 See, for example, al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, p. 252; al-Shirāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, Vol. 3, pp. 278 f.; 
Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 230; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol. 7, p. 296; al-Shawkānī, Nayl 
al-Awtār, Vol. 8, pp. 71 f.; al-Sayyid Sābiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah (Cairo: Al-Fath  lil-I‛lām al-‛Arabī, n.d.), 
Vol. 3, p. 45.  
85 Muhammad ibn ‛Isā al-Tirmidhī, Al-Jāmi‛ al-Sahīh Sunan al-Tirmidhī, ed. Ahmad Muhammad 
Shākir et al. (Beirut: Dār Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‛Arabī, n.d.), Vol. 4, p. 121. 
86 Al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, p. 252.  
87 Al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awtār, Vol. 8, p. 71. 
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war contexts. In these war contexts, attacking the enemy might lead to casualties 
among Muslim prisoners of war or innocent non-Muslim non-combatants as a result 
of directing stones or arrows at the enemy. Some terrorist Muslim groups have 
justified acts of indiscriminate killing of Muslims and non-Muslim non-combatants, 
such as the terrorist attacks currently taking place in Iraq, in order to attack specific 
targets, whether Muslim governments or foreign entities, by drawing an analogy with 
the case of tatarrus.88 Apart from the specific conditions laid down by the majority 
of classical jurists, who permitted attacking human shields or initiating night attacks, 
the analogy here is flawed because the classical jurists were addressing a context of 
war between two armies.  
 
4.5 Mutilation 
At the battle of Uh ud, the bodies of many Muslims including the Prophet’s uncle 
were horrifyingly mutilated, so the Prophet and other Muslims vowed to mutilate the 
enemies’ bodies if they had the chance. Following the Qur’ānic revelation (16:126-
127), as maintained by the majority of the exegetes and jurists, the Prophet 
prohibited mutilation. Among the Prophet’s instructions concerning the conduct of 
Muslims during war are: “do not betray and do not mutilate”.89 Abū Bakr and ‛Umar 
ibn al-Khat t āb passed the same instructions on to their armies. Abū Bakr wrote to 
one of his governors in Hadramaut, Yemen: “Beware of mutilation, because it is a 
                                                 
88 http://www.islamtoday.net/nawafeth/artshow-42-14299.htm; Internet; accessed 13 August 2009; 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-Arabic-
Ask_Scholar/FatwaA/FatwaA&cid=1122528623684; Internet; accessed 27 October 2008; 
http://www.alarabiya.net/programs/2007/11/11/41528.html; Internet; accessed 27 October 2008. 
89 See, for example, hadīth number 966 in Ibn Mālik, Muwatta’, Vol. 2, p. 448; hadīths numbers 1408 
and 1617 in al-Tirmidhī, Sunan al-Tirmidhī, Vol. 2, p. 22, Vol. 4, p. 162; h adīth number 2857 in Ibn 
Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah, Vol. 2, p. 953; hadīth number 2613 in Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Vol. 
3, p. 37; hadīth number 1731 al-Qushayrī, Sahīh  Muslim, Vol. 3, p. 1357; hadīths numbers 9428 and 
8430 in al-Sana‛ānī, Al-Musannaf, Vol. 5, pp. 218, 220. See also for the prohibition of mutilation, 
hadīths numbers 2342 and 5197 in al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‛ al-Sahīh  al-Mukhtasar, Vol. 2, p. 875, Vol. 5, 
p. 2100; Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, p. 124.       
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sin and a disgusting act.”90 According to a hadīth reported by Abū Hurayrah, the 
Prophet instructed the Muslims to avoid the enemy’s face during the fighting.91  
Furthermore, the Prophet forbade the torture and mutilation of animals. 
According to hadīth literature, when the Prophet once passed a group of people who 
were shooting arrows at a sheep, he abhorred their action and added: “do not mutilate 
animals”.92 The Prophet also says: “God curses the one who mutilates animals.”93 
Several hadīths also state that anyone who kills an animal, a bird or certain insects 
unjustly will be held responsible for it on the day of judgement.94 Furthermore, 
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94 See, for example, hadīths numbers 39968 to 39988 in Ibn Husām al-Dīn, Kanz l-‛Ummāl, Vol. 15, 
pp. 15-17; hadīth number 8419 in Ibn al-Athīr, Mu‛jam Jāmi‛ al-Usūl fī Ahādīth al-Rasūl, Vol. 10, pp. 
751 f.  
 220
affirming the absolute prohibition of mutilation, the Prophet forbade mutilation even 
if it was the body of al-kalb al-‛aqūr (rabid dog).95  
 Based on these clear and specific commands of the Prophet, the majority of 
the jurists maintain this strict prohibition of mutilation and torture. However, some 
jurists hold that mutilation is reprehensible rather than totally prohibited. Hence, they 
argue that Muslims can resort to mutilation if the enemy mutilates the bodies of 
Muslims or if it is in the interest of Muslims,96 i.e., if it will lead to winning the war. 
In their discussion of mutilation, the jurists refer to only one case, namely, carrying 
back the head of the enemy’s military leaders to the Muslim territories. It seems that 
this was a practice known in the wars between the Persians and the Byzantines, 
intended as a sign of victory.  
Al-Zuhrī states that it never happened that a severed head was brought to the 
Prophet.97 When the severed head of a Syrian chief army commander called Yannāq 
al-Bit rīq98 was brought to the first caliph Abū Bakr (r. 632-634), he denounced this 
heinous act. When he was told in justification that this was in retaliation because the 
Syrians had done the same to the Muslims, Abū Bakr, significantly, rebuked the 
speaker in the following words: “Are we going to follow the Persians and the 
Romans? We have what is enough: the book [the Qur’ān] and the reports [i.e., 
tradition of the Prophet].”99 Furthermore, Abū Bakr went to the pulpit and addressed 
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the Muslim public concerning this issue confirming that this un-Islamic act is 
“sunnah al-‛ajam”100 (a practice followed among the non-Muslims, lit. foreigners). 
Therefore, Abū Bakr’s reply precisely and exactly indicates the self-binding nature, 
and the core objective, of Islamic law. In other words, following Islamic law is in 
itself an objective for the Muslims, irrespective of their enemy’s behaviour. 
 Nonetheless, despite the explicit prohibition of mutilation by the Prophet and 
his succeeding caliphs, al-Māwardī and al-Shawkānī permit carrying the heads of the 
military leaders of the enemy to the Muslims’ lands, provided that this is in the 
interest of the Muslim army.101 This means that a few jurists compromised on the 
Islamic rules for the sake of the public interest of the Muslims.  
 After the cessation of hostilities, the bodies of the enemy warriors should be 
handed over to the enemy if they require it, otherwise Muslims are to bury them. In 
general, the jurists’ position is in agreement with Article 17 of the first Geneva 
Convention (1949). According to several reports, the Prophet always ensured the 
burial of the dead, irrespective of whether the bodies belonged to the Muslims or 
their enemy.102 Ibn Hazm advocated that it was obligatory for Muslims to bury the 
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enemy dead because if they did not, it would be tantamount to mutilation, which is 
prohibited by the Prophet.103 Nothing should be accepted in return for handing over 
the bodies of the enemies. At the Battle of the Trench, Nawfal ibn ‛Abd Allah ibn al-
Mughīrah died when he attempted to jump the trench with his horse. When the 
Meccans offered payment for receiving the body of Nawfal, the Prophet gave them 
the body and refused their offer.104 Nonetheless, al-Nawawī and Ibn Hajar al-
‛Asqalānī argue that Muslims should not inter the bodies of the enemy, except for 
reasons of public health.105  
 Therefore, to a certain extent, one finds each individual jurist undertaking an 
ongoing process of negotiation between the constraints laid down by the Islamic 
sources on the conduct of hostilities and the military necessity of winning the war.106 
On the one hand, it becomes a hard task for researchers to state the precise position 
of Islamic laws in such cases. On the other, it becomes easy to present Islamic laws 
as, taking the above instances as examples, either a set of humane laws that prohibit 
torture or mutilation, even of a dangerous rabid dog, or as a set of laws that permits 
Muslims to cut off the heads of their enemies’ military leaders. It is thus confirmed 
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that the greatest part of the area of Islamic international law is a collection of 
differing and often contradictory judgements reached by individual jurist-scholars. 
 
4.6 Weapons 
The classical jurists did not devote separate parts of their discussions to the 
permissibility of particular weapons. Although this may sound, prima facie, as if they 
were not concerned with the lethal, destructive or indiscriminate nature of some of 
the weapons, the examination of the Islamic corpus juris proves otherwise. This can 
be easily understood when their war contexts and the kinds of weapons used at the 
time are taken into consideration. The study of the sīrah and classical juristic Islamic 
literature indicates that the normal war context of the early period of Islam consisted 
of warriors using basically swords, lances and arrows107 and of a war being fought 
until one party submitted or left the battlefield.  
 In this specific war context, Muslim jurists are silent on the matter of 
weapons,108 mainly here swords and lances because they were solely used against 
enemy combatants, especially in the light of the prohibition of targeting the specific 
categories of non-combatants discussed above. In other words, this war context 
generally refers to one-to-one fighting situations. Concerning the use of arrows, the 
Mālikī jurists discussed the permissibility of using “poison-tipped arrows”.109 Some 
jurists prohibited shooting the enemy with poison-tipped arrows, while others merely 
disliked the idea of it because the enemy could shoot them back at the Muslims and 
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because there was no precedent for this action in the early Islamic period.110 
However, the Hanafī jurist al-Shaybānī permitted the use of weapons tipped with 
poison, fire or oil because they were more effective in defeating the enemy.111  
 In other, i.e., non-one-to-one fighting situations, the jurists discussed the 
permissibility of using different kinds of weapons including some which are peculiar 
to their war context. To put it more accurately, the jurists discussed these weapons in 
the light of the Prophet’s war contexts simply because, in accordance with the nature 
of Islamic law as reflected in the term siyar, they were developing rulings to regulate 
the conduct of war based primarily on the war context of the Prophet’s time. These 
different war situations include cases of sheltering behind human shields and night 
attack, discussed above. They also discussed specific kinds of weapons in the course 
of their discussion of the issue of destruction of enemy property, considered below. 
In other words, their discussion of the weapons used during the conduct of war are 
specifically linked with, and shaped by, two other issues: namely, first, the likelihood 
of the indiscriminate killing of non-combatants as collateral damage – usually 
specifying women and children, and, second, the destruction of enemy property.  
 In other war contexts that did not consist of one-to-one combat, where the 
enemy retreats inside fortifications, the Muslim jurists discussed the use of three 
specific weapons, mainly, directing mangonels or fire at, or flooding, the enemy 
fortifications. The objective of using such weapons was to ensure the victory of the 
Muslim army by forcing their enemy to surrender, sometimes even before starting to 
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use such weapons, or by causing a degree of destruction to their fortifications and/or, 
thus, causing casualties, probably including non-combatants, that would force the 
enemy to surrender. In the cases of night attack or sheltering behind human shields, 
the jurists gave the various nuanced and contradictory judgements over the 
permissibility of shooting mangonels at the enemy as discussed above. Concerning 
these two cases, there is no precedent to suggest that Muslims were faced with 
similar situations during the lifetime of the Prophet. But the jurists’ discussions were 
merely attempts to advocate Islamic regulations for the Muslims in these cases.  
 In the context of the war situations when the enemy retreats or fights from 
inside fortifications, the majority of the jurists permit targeting the fortifications with 
mangonels. This is based on the precedent from the last battle the Prophet attended, 
al-Tā’if (8/630), when mangonels were claimed to be used for the first time in the 
history of Islam. In this battle, the tribe of Thaqīf retreated to their fortress in al-Tā’if 
after their defeat in the battle of Hunayn, and collected what they needed for fighting 
for a whole year. After besieging Thaqīf for about twenty days, Salmān al-Fārisī 
suggested to the Prophet that they should fire mangonels at them, a weapon Salmān 
introduced to the Prophet as “we use mangonels in Persia to shoot at [enemy] 
fortifications.”112 Apparently, the Muslims did not manage to use mangonels at 
Thaqīf’s fortress because the Muslims who attempted to shoot stones from them 
were stormed with hot iron and arrows, which led to the death of twelve Muslims.113 
                                                 
112 Muhammad ibn ‛Umar al-Wāqidī, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, ed. Muhammad ‛Abd al-Qādir ‛Atā (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 2004/1424), Vol. 2, p. 332; al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, p. 
1468. See also, Muhammad al-Mu‛tasim Billah in Ismā‛īl ibn ‛Umar ibn Kathīr, Al-Sīrah al-
Nabawiyyah (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‛Arabī, 1997), Vol. 4, p. 623. 
113 Al-Wāqidī, Al-Maghāzī, Vol. 2, pp. 332, 240; Muhammad ibn Ishāq, Al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah, ed. 
‛Abd al-Malik ibn Hishām, annotated by Fu’ād ibn ‛Alī Hāfiz (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 
2000), Vol. 4, pp. 74-77; A. Guillaume, trans. The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishāq’s Sīrat 
Rasūl Allāh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 589-591; Ibn Kathīr, Al-Sīrah, Vol. 4, pp. 
622 f.; Muhammad Husayn Haykal, The Life of Muhammad, trans. from the 8th ed. by Isma‛īl Rāgī A. 
al-Fārūqī (N.p.: North American Trust Publication, 1976), p. 423; Adil Salahi, Muhammad Man and 
 226
The Prophet therefore ordered the Muslims to use another “weapon”, i.e., cutting 
down the grapes of Thaqīf to force them to surrender. After some negotiations, the 
grapes were not cut down following the request of Thaqīf, and the Prophet ordered 
the Muslims to retreat and stop the battle.114 
 Concerning the use of fire as a weapon, the jurists give different rulings. 
Based on the Prophet’s prohibition of burning humans with fire: “do not punish the 
creatures of God with the punishment of God”,115 it can be concluded that, as 
Hashmi aptly states, “the deliberate burning of persons, either to overcome them in 
the midst of battle or to punish them after capture, is forbidden.”116 However, 
directing fire at enemy fortifications was also prohibited by some jurists,117 including 
al-Shawkānī, who argued that burning is specifically prohibited,118 although it was 
considered merely reprehensible by Ibn ‛Abbās (d. 68/668) and Mālik ibn Anas (d. 
179/795).119 Furthermore, al-Awzā‛ī (d. 157/774), Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778), al-
Shaybānī (d. 189/804-5), Ibn Qudāmah (d. 620/1223) and Ibn ‛Ābidīn (d. 1252/1836) 
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permitted directing fire at enemy fortifications provided that this was the only way to 
overcome the enemy120 and Abū Hanīfah, al-Shāfi‛ī and al-Kāsānī (d. 587/1191) did 
not stipulate this condition.121  
 Al-Qarāfī states that it is permitted to direct fire at enemy fortifications if 
only combatants - not women and children - are inside, though he hastened to state 
that even in this case it was still prohibited by other jurists.122 Ibn Rushd adds that 
some jurists advocate that, if the enemy starts using fire, then Muslims can use it in 
reciprocity, otherwise it is impermissible.123 Thus, it should be noted here that the 
jurists make a distinction between attacking enemy fortifications with mangonels and 
fire. Moreover, it is worth reaffirming here that mangonels (Arabic manjanīq, a word 
of Persian origin), as defined by the classical jurists, was “a machine for throwing 
big stones.”124 This signifies that the jurists differentiated between weapons, here 
stones, which have limited effects and incendiary weapons, here fire, which could 
lead to unrestricted burning and/or destruction, even if inside specific fortifications. 
In his time, Ibn Qudāmah permitted using mangonels “because it is commonly used 
in fighting and, therefore, became similar to the shooting of arrows.”125 To sum up, 
the classical jurists gave a detailed examination for the use of mangonels and fire 
which could lead to indiscriminate killings in the different war situations relevant to 
the ancient and primitive war contexts of their times. 
 Similarly, using flooding enemy fortifications as a weapon to overcome the 
enemy or force them to surrender is generally ruled on in the same way as the use of 
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fire. It seems that they likened flooding to fire by resorting to analogy since there is 
no precedent in the early period of Islam upon which the jurists would have based 
their rulings. Al-Shaybānī, Ibn al-Humām and Ibn ‛Ābidīn from the Hanafī school 
and Ibn Qudāmah from the Hanbalī school stipulate that flooding enemy 
fortifications is permitted only in case of absolute “military necessity”, i.e., “when it 
is the only way to overcome the enemy.”126 Otherwise, flooding, like using fire, is 
prohibited because it will lead to casualties among the enemy’s women and children 
which is, al-Shaybānī states, “harām shar‛ā” (prohibited by sharī‛ah).127 
Nevertheless, Abū Hanīfah and al-Kāsānī from the Hanafī school and al-Shāfi‛ī 
permitted flooding the enemy fortifications without referring to this condition. 
Al-Shaybānī adds cutting the water supply to the enemy fortifications as a 
weapon, or putting blood or “poison in their water in order to spoil it for them 
[emphasis added]”,128 but poisoning the enemy’s water in order to kill them is 
prohibited.129Thus, it is of paramount importance to clearly state here that what al-
Shaybānī meant is not using these weapons or tactics as weapons of mass destruction 
but, as he states, in order to overcome them and destroy their power “…qahrihim wa 
kasr shawkatihim”.130 In other words, the objective of using these weapons was to 
force those inside the fortifications to surrender, not to kill them on a large scale.131 
This explains why the classical jurists did not devote specific discussions to the 
permissibility of weapons but discussed these ancient weapons in relation to the 
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destruction of enemy property. It is therefore crucial that these juristic rulings are 
understood in their war contexts and according to the intentions of the jurists.  
The most important issue concerning the Islamic jus in bello in modern war 
contexts that has not been adequately studied by modern Muslim scholars is the use 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).132 Among the reasons for the inadequacy of 
such studies by scholars of Islamic law are first, that the Muslim world has not been 
afflicted with the massive scale of human catastrophe as a result of the use of 
weapons, especially WMD, that has been experienced in Europe and certain parts of 
Asia in the twentieth century. Undoubtedly, the experience of tragedies on this scale 
has created a cultural and popular awareness of the danger of WMD, and specifically 
nuclear weapons, especially in Europe, Japan, the USA and obviously among the 
Jewish people, incomparably greater than in the Muslim world. 
 Second, and more importantly, the considerable westernization of the legal 
systems, except family law, of most Muslim countries has largely alienated scholars 
of Islamic law from contributing to the policies and positions of their governments, 
most noticeably on two of the areas treated by their classical predecessors, i.e., 
Islamic governance and Islamic international law. If scholars of Islamic law, like the 
many institutions in the dictatorships of most Muslim countries, were involved in 
shaping policy, greater contributions representative of Islamic law inevitably would 
have been made. More importantly, such contributions would be the criteria against 
which the practices of Muslim countries could be judged Islamically and some of the 
violations of international humanitarian law committed by Muslims could be 
prevented. It should be pointed out that confusing recent practices of individual 
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Muslim dictators with the positions of Islamic law is a mistake common in the 
writings of some Western specialists on the tradition of war in Islam.133  
 In short, contemporary Islamic positions on WMD can be divided generally 
into three main attitudes. First, there are those who totally prohibit the acquisition 
and use of WMD because such weapons lead to the killing of non-combatants and 
inflict unnecessary destruction.134 Second, relying on the principle of reciprocity 
similarly utilized by the classical jurists with regard to primitive weapons, there are 
those who affirm the Islamic prohibition of WMD, on the above grounds, but argue 
that Muslims may possess/use any weapon, including nuclear weapons, only if their 
enemies posses/use them.135 Some Qur’ānic pronouncements are quoted in support 
of this position such as “whoso commits aggression against you, then respond within 
the same degree of aggression waged against you”136 and “if you punish, then punish 
with the same punishment which had been inflicted upon you.”137 Mohamed Mokbel 
Mahmud Elbakry and a certain Ibrāhīm ‛Abd al-Hamīd argue here that if Muslims 
abstain from using a weapon which is used by their enemies, it would be “tantamount 
to committing suicide”, which is prohibited according to the Qur’ān: “do not throw 
                                                 
133 Troy S. Thomas rightly points out that “Despite its humanity; siyar does suffer to the extent that it 
is abused by authoritarian regimes purporting to be guided by Islam and its laws. Regimes claiming 
Islamic legitimacy are often the most grievous violators of siyar.” Troy S. Thomas, “Prisoners of War 
in Islam: A Legal Inquiry”, The Muslim World, Vol. LXXXVII, No. 1, January, 1997, p. 53.   
134 Ibrāhīm Yahyā al-Shihābī, Mafhūm al-Harb wa al-Salām fī al-Islām: Sirā‛āt wa Hurūb 'am 
Tafā‛ul wa Salām? (N.p.: Manshūrāt Mu’assasah Maī, 1990/1399), p. 76; Muhammad‛Arafah, Al-
Khatar al-Nawawī fī Mirāh ‛Ālim ‘Āzharī, supplement to Majalah al-Azhar, June 2004/Rabī‛ al-Ākhir 
1425; Shmuel Bar, Warrant for Terror: Fatwās of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihād (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), p. 72. 
135 See, for example, Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām, p. 102; Ahmad Ghunaym, Al-
Jihād al-Islāmī: Dirāsah ‛Ilmiyyah fī Nus ūs al-Qur’ān wa Sih āh al-Hadīth wa Wathā’iq al-Tārīkh 
(Cairo: Dār al-Hammamī, 1975/1394), p. 80; ‛Abd al-‛Azīz al-Khayyāt, “Al-Islām Dīn al-Salām: 
Mafhūm al-H arb wa al-Salām fī al-Islām”, Islam and the 21st Century, Researches and Facts, the 
Tenth General Conference of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (Cairo: Supreme Council for 
Islamic Affairs, 1999/1420), pp. 334 f. Al-Khayyāt is a former Minister of Religious Endowments in 
Jordan. See also Hashmi, “Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace”, pp. 213 f.; Bar, Warrant 
for Terror, pp. 70 f.; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, pp. 591, 602 f., 726.  
136 Qur’ān 2:194. 
137 Qur’ān 16:126. 
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yourselves into destruction”.138 Moreover, the following advice of Abū Bakr to 
Khālid ibn al-Walīd is quoted in support of this attitude: “If you encounter your 
enemy, then fight them with the same weapon they fight you with”.139 Third, there 
are those who also acknowledge the Islamic prohibition of the use of WMD, but 
argue that Muslims can use these weapons even before their enemies use them 
because some countries stockpile such weapons and use them at will, despite the fact 
that they have signed treaties banning the use of such weapons.140  
Thus, modern Muslim scholars, like their predecessors, weigh the constraints 
on the use of weapons of indiscriminate effect against the necessity of winning the 
war. Despite their different war contexts, the overarching factor for both classical 
and modern Muslim scholars in determining whether Muslims are permitted to 
possess or use any weapon of indiscriminate effect, including WMD, is whether their 
enemies possess or use it. To conclude, the majority of classical and modern Muslim 
scholars have tended to override the Islamic restrictions on the use of weapons that 
lead to indiscriminate killing if their enemies use them, justifying their position by 
the Islamic principle of reciprocity.      
 
4.7 Property Destruction 
The classical jurists laid considerable emphasis on the issue of the destruction of 
enemy property during the course of fighting. Their discussion of this issue also 
typifies the nature of Islamic law, in terms of the bases upon which they advocated 
their rulings and the host of different, sometimes contradictory, rulings generated as 
a result. The jurists based their discussion of this issue upon two conflicting 
                                                 
138 Qur’ān 2:195. 
139 Elbakry, “The Legality of ‘War’ in Al-Shari‛a Al-Islamiya”, p. 320; ‛Ārif Khalīl Abū ‛Īd, Al-
‛Alāqāt al-Khārijyyah fī Dawlah al-Khilāfah, 2nd  ed. (Birmingham: Dar Arqam, 1990), p. 192; Abū 
‛Īd, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 178 f. 
140 Haykal, Al-Jihād wa al-Qitāl, Vol. 2, pp. 1353 f. 
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incidents: the first was the Prophet’s order for the Muslims to cut down the palm 
trees of the tribe of Banū al-Nadīr in 4/625 and the Qur’ānic reference to this incident 
(Qur’ān 59:5). The Prophet gave this order to force Nadīr to surrender during a 
bloodless siege that lasted for six nights and ended without fighting. The second 
incident upon which the jurists based their discussion is Abū Bakr’s ten commands to 
his army commander, which included: “do not cut down fruit-bearing trees; do not 
destroy buildings; do not slaughter a sheep or a camel except for food; do not burn or 
drown palm trees”.141 
 Faced with these two conflicting incidents, the jurists were divided into two 
groups, each with its own way of interpreting or reconciling this contradiction. 
According to the first group, al-Awzā‛ī, Abū Thawr, al-Layth ibn Sa‛d and al-
Thawrī, it is prohibited for the Muslim army to inflict destruction on enemy property. 
Al-Awzā‛ī reconciled the contradiction by arguing that Abū Bakr gave these 
commands based on his knowledge that the Prophet’s order to cut down the palm 
trees of Banū al-Nadīr, was later abrogated. Abū Bakr would not have given any 
commands contrary to the Prophet’s practice because he was the most 
knowledgeable about the Prophet’s practice and the interpretation of the Qur’ān. 
Moreover, al-Awzā‛ī states that Muslim leaders have followed Abū Bakr’s 
prohibition and the Muslim leaders have accepted them.142  
                                                 
141 See, for example, h adīth number 965 in Ibn Mālik, Muwatta’, Vol. 2, p. 447; hadīths numbers 
17904, 17927 and 17929 in al-Bayhaqī, Sunan al-Bayhaqī, Vol. 9, pp. 85, 89, 90; Bennoune, 
“Humanitarian Law in Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 626; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., A Manual on 
International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control Agreements (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
2000), p. 9. 
142 Abū Yūsuf Ya‛qūb ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ansārī, Al-Radd ‛alā Siyar al-Awzā‛ī, ed. Abū al-Wafā al-
Afghānī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, n.d.), p. 85; Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn 
Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer: Bidāyah al-Mujtahid, trans. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, 
reviewed by Mohammad Abdul Rauf (Reading: Garnet, reprint 2002), Vol. 1, p. 461; al-Tabarī, 
Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā’, p. 103; S aqr, ‛Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah, pp. 64-69; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, 
Vol. 1, p. 594; Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 103. 
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 However, according to the second group, the majority of the jurists including 
Abū Hanīfah, Abū Yūsuf, al-Shaybānī, al-Shāfi‛ī, Mālik, and Ibn Hazm, it is 
permissible to cause destruction to enemy property during the course of fighting. 
Abū Yūsuf, al-Shāfi‛ī, and the Mālikī jurists reconciled the contradiction by arguing 
that Abū Bakr gave these commands prohibiting the destruction of enemy property 
because he, they allege, knew that the Muslims would win the battle and so he did 
not want to damage enemy property because he hoped it would be spoils for the 
Muslims.143 Nevertheless, Ibn Hazm accepts Abū Bakr’s prohibition but argues that 
following this prohibition is optional and, for him, both permitting and prohibiting 
the destruction of property are acceptable.144 
 It is worth adding here that al-Shāfi‛ī and Ibn Hazm distinguish between 
lifeless property and animate creatures owned by the enemy. Both al-Shāfi‛ī and Ibn 
Hazm maintain that it is equally permissible either to inflict damage on enemy 
property or to avoid causing damage because, although the Prophet ordered the 
Muslims to cut down the palm trees during the siege of Banū al-Nadīr, he did not 
resort to this tactic on other occasions.145 Al-Shāfi‛ī, however, prefers that the 
Muslim army inflict damage on the lifeless property of the enemy only when the 
enemy is powerful and cannot be overcome because of the strength of their 
fortifications, so that Muslims cannot reach a settlement with them by either 
annexing them to the dār al-Islām (Islamic state) or concluding a peace accord with 
them, i.e., making them part of the dār al-‛ahd.146 
 With regard to living creatures such as horses, cows, bees, etc., it is 
prohibited to cause any damage to them except in cases of military necessity or if 
                                                 
143 Abū Yūsuf, Al-Radd, pp. 86 f.; al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, p. 258; al-Sana‛ānī, Subul al-Salām, 
Vol. 4, pp. 51 f.; Saqr, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah, pp. 63 f.  
144 Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol. 7, p. 294. 
145 Al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, p. 257; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol. 7, p. 294. 
146 Al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, p. 257. 
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they are slaughtered for food. Al-Shāfi‛ī justifies this prohibition of inflicting 
damage on living creatures by arguing that, unlike lifeless property, living creatures 
feel pain and any harm done to them will be unjustifiable torture.147 Al-Shāfi‛ī and 
Ibn Hazm based their distinction between lifeless property and living creatures on the 
Prophet’s hadīth which states that “Whosoever kills a sparrow or any other creature 
bigger in size, will be questioned for this act by God.”148 However, the majority of 
the jurists agree that it is permitted to kill horses or other animals when the enemy 
warriors are fighting while riding them.149 This is because the horse in this case is 
used as military equipment. Additionally, Ibn Hazm and Ibn Qudāmah permitted the 
killing of pigs, because according to Ibn Qudāmah, pigs are “harmful and useless.”150 
 The jurists agree that it is prohibited to drown or burn the enemy’s bees on 
the basis of a hadīth of the Prophet’s narrated by Ibn ‛Abbās.151 Ibn Qudāmah states 
that killing the bees or any other animal, except for food or if the enemy are using it 
for fighting, will be tantamount to the crime described in the Qur’ān as causing 
destruction on the earth (Qur’ān 2:205). Additionally, Ibn Qudāmah here agrees with 
                                                 
147 Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 259, 287. 
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Vol. 14, p. 190; al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awtār, Vol. 8, p. 259, Vol. 9, pp. 13 f.; al-Shawkānī, Al-Sayl al-
Jarrār, Vol. 4, p. 380.  
149 See, for example, al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, p. 259; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol. 7, p. 294; al-
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al-Shāfi‛ī that bees are animate creatures and thus cannot be killed.152 However, the 
jurists allowed taking some of the honey but disagreed over taking all of it because 
this could lead to the death and destruction of the bees.153  
 Concerning the permissibility of inflicting damage on lifeless property during 
the conduct of war, the jurists discussed mainly the destruction of enemy crops,  trees 
and buildings. They also discussed the permissibility for the army to eat and feed 
their animals from the enemy’s resources. The jurists’ discussion of all these 
different kinds of property generates a host of different rulings based on various 
rationales and, therefore, conflicting details about which of these properties can be 
destroyed and when. As for the destruction of buildings and cutting down crops and 
trees, al-Awzā‛ī, Abū Thawr, al-Layth ibn Sa‛d and al-Thawrī prohibited it on the 
basis of Abū Bakr’s commands discussed above. Abū Hanīfah, Abū Yūsuf, Mālik, 
and Ibn Hazm permitted cutting down and burning trees, despite Abū Bakr’s 
command, for the reason given above.154  
 The majority of jurists, however, permitted this sort of destruction provided 
that it was dictated by military necessities, for example, if the trees prevent the army 
from conducting military operations or if the enemy are taking shelter behind them, 
especially inside fortifications. Ibn Qudāmah adds that the Muslim army can resort to 
this sort of destruction in reciprocity.155 Here the jurists voice their rationale in 
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different terms such as public interest,156 military “necessity”,157 weakening the 
enemy158 or, in other words they all mean, winning the war.159 
 Concerning food and fodder, the jurists agree that it is permitted for the 
Muslim army to eat and give fodder to their animals from the enemy territories, but 
“only the necessary quantities.”160 However, al-Zuhrī states that this permission is 
still conditional upon the Muslim commander’s approval.161 This permission is 
justified by military necessity because of the impossibility of buying food and fodder 
from the enemy. The risk of doing otherwise would be very harmful for the Muslim 
army.162  
Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, ex-Member of the International Court of Justice, 
indicates that, under Islamic law, all religious sites are immune from attack.163 
Interestingly, few jurists have considered the question of what a Muslim army should 
do with the enemy’s books and wine if they were found among the spoils. According 
to the Shāfi‛ī jurists and Ibn Qudāmah, if a Muslim army finds books that contain 
statements of unbelief in God, they should be destroyed. Regarding the Torah and the 
Bible, if their leather or paper cannot be used, they are to be destroyed but not 
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burned.164 However, according to al-Shāfi‛ī and Ibn Qudāmah, books that contain 
useful knowledge, such as medicine, language or poetry, etc., should be made use 
of.165 All in all, al-Shāfi‛ī and Ibn Qudāmah’s positions on books contradict the 
Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict.166 As for wine, it should be poured away and, if the Muslims cannot 
make use of the wine containers, they should be also destroyed.167  
It is worth noting here that the jurists’ discussion of the permissibility of 
inflicting damage specifically on pigs, books and wine are entirely based on the 
jurists’ discretion. That is to say, their discussion is not based on Qur’ānic references 
or precedents set by the Prophet. Therefore, a clear distinction should be made 
between the jurists’ rulings based on Islamic sources and the rulings based on their 
personal opinions. The significance of making this distinction is that it indicates that 
a large part of Islamic law is inevitably changeable because Muslim jurists have 
always developed different rulings based on their interpretations and 
contextualization of the texts compared with the ever changing contexts that have 
surrounded jurists throughout history. That is because all the laws advocated by 
Muslim jurists, no matter how contradictory some of them are, and upon whatever 
bases or rationales such laws are founded, are called Islamic laws.    
 
4.8 Quarter and Safe Conduct 
Amān (lit. protection, safety) forms an essential part of the Islamic law of war, but 
the significance of amān in explaining both the Islamic jus ad bellum and the Islamic 
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jus in bello remains almost unexamined in the Western literature. Moreover, it has 
been argued that the concept of amān influenced the medieval European concept of 
safe-conduct.168 Amān can be defined as a contract for the protection for the persons 
and property of enemy belligerents or any other citizen of an enemy state.169 Its 
objective, according to the words of some jurists, is haqn al-dam170 (prevention of 
bloodshed, protection of life). Thus amān, as noted by Peters, describes two forms: 
quarter and safe conduct.171 
 Quarter can be defined as a contract of protection, granted during the actual 
acts of war, to cover the person and property of an enemy belligerent, all of a 
regiment, everyone inside a fortification, the entire enemy army or city.172 This form 
of amān resembles the hors de combat status, defined in Article 41 of the Additional 
Protocol I, 8 June 1977, of the Geneva Conventions in two aspects: first, this form of 
amān indicates that the persons granted this protection have become safe and thus no 
acts of hostilities can be undertaken against them. Second, it indicates that they are 
under the protection of the Islamic state. Surprisingly, unlike the hors de combat 
status referred to above, the classical jurists always describe this form of amān 
granted to enemy belligerents as initiated voluntarily by the Muslims and thus they 
rarely refer to situations when the enemy belligerents request the status of amān. 
They do discuss, however, the situation in which the enemy give up their arms in 
order to resolve the conflict through arbitration. This quarter is granted during war 
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operations in the battlefield. It lasts until the enemy belligerents are escorted to their 
place of safety, or until the expiration of its fixed duration.   
  Safe conduct is a contract of protection granted to any non-Muslim citizen of 
a country that is technically in a state of war with the Islamic state, though not 
necessarily in the process of undertaking hostile action. This form of protection is 
given to any individual who desires to enter the Islamic state for business, education, 
tourism or any other purpose, other than conducting military acts inside the Islamic 
state or spying.  
 Some contemporary Muslim scholars have likened this safe conduct status to 
the “passport” system.173 Indeed, this ancient safe conduct system is similar to the 
visa system in some respects. It is a temporary permission to stay in a foreign 
country and can be renewed after its expiry date.174 Moreover, because a safe 
conduct is a temporary residence permit, its holder is exempt from taxes, unless he 
decides to reside permanently in the Islamic state. It is worth adding here that, 
despite the fact that these two forms of protection, quarter and safe conduct, address 
largely different situations, the jurists discussed both forms under the heading amān. 
In other words, they did not distinguish between these two forms and thus the rules 
advocated by the jurists apply to both. For this reason, the Arabic word amān will be 
used hereafter to refer to both quarter and safe conduct. In addition, the Arabic word 
musta’min will be used to refer to the person who is granted quarter or safe conduct.  
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 The amān system is based on both the Qur’ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet. 
According to the Qur’ān: “And if anyone of the polytheists seeks your protection, 
then protect him until he hears the word of God. Then, afterwards, escort him to his 
place of safety.”175 Several instances indicate that the Prophet gave amān to 
individuals upon the request of some Muslims. The Prophet granted a specific amān 
to Abū Sufyān and a general amān to everyone in Mecca (amnesty)176 who would 
not take up arms against the Muslims on their return to Mecca, in what is known as 
the conquest of Mecca (8/630). These examples of amān, granted here before 
encountering the enemy, signify that those who are granted this status would not be 
targeted unless they initiated aggression. Thus, in one sense amān in this case also 
indicates a “general amnesty”177 granted to the enemy. 
 
4.8.2 Who can grant Amān? 
The jurists distinguish between two kinds of amān: the general amān and the specific 
amān. The general amān is granted by the Muslim head of state or his representative 
to the entire population of a region or a country. The specific amān is granted by any 
Muslim to an individual, or any group of, for example, ten or one hundred, or to 
everyone inside a fortification or to anyone accompanying a caravan. Thus, unlike 
the Muslim head of state, an ordinary Muslim individual cannot grant amān to the 
entire population of a city.178 The jurists generally agree that any adult, sane Muslim 
is entitled to grant amān. They are unanimous that a woman is entitled to the right to 
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give amān, apart from Ibn al-Mājishūn, who argued that the validity of amān granted 
by a woman is conditional upon the approval of the Muslim head of state.179 It is 
worth adding here that the Mālikī jurists Ibn al-Mājishūn and Ibn Habīb maintain that 
the amān granted by any Muslim must be approved by the Muslim head of state.180  
 Concerning the entitlement of non-Muslims to grant amān, the jurists are 
unanimous that non-Muslim citizens of a foreign country are, obviously, not entitled 
to grant amān, but they disagreed over the validity of dhimmis granting amān to 
enemy belligerents during the conduct of war. The majority of the jurists advocate 
that dhimmis are not entitled to grant amān,181 though al-Awzā‛ī maintained that the 
validity of their amān is conditional upon the approval of the Muslim head of 
state.182 However, al-Qarāfī points out that some jurists do validate amān granted by 
dhimmis.183 
 The jurists agree that a slave is entitled to grant amān unconditionally, though 
Abū Hanīfah stipulates that the amān of a slave is valid only if he fights with the 
army.184 According to Abū Zahrah, Abū Hanīfah changed his opinion and approved 
the amān of slaves unconditionally185 when he knew that the second caliph ‛Umar 
                                                 
179 Al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awtār, Vol. 8, p. 181. 
180 Al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām, p. 228; S aqr, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah, p. 84; Zīdān, Ahkām 
al-Dhimmiyyīn, p. 49. 
181 See, for example, al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, p. 284; al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar al-Kabīr, Vol. 1, p. 
257; al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar, p. 143; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 196; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Kāfī, 
Vol. 4, p. 161; Ibn ‛Abd al-Barr, Al-Kāfī fī Fiqh Ahl al-Madīnah, p. 209; Saqr, ‛Al-‛Alāqāt al-
Dawliyyah, pp. 82 f. 
182 Al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awtār, Vol. 8, p. 181.  
183 Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 3, p. 445. See also Zīdān, Ahkām al-Dhimmiyyin, pp. 47 f. 
184 Al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, p. 284; al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar al-Kabīr, Vol. 1, p. 255; al-Shaybānī, Al-
Siyar, p. 143; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 195; al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awtār, Vol. 8, p. 181; 
al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, p. 237; al-Ghazālī, Al-Wasīt, Vol. 7, p. 43; al-Ghazālī, Al-
Wajīz, Vol. 2, p. 194; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, p. 237; Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-
‛Alāqāt, p. 95; Majid Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam: A Study in Muslim International 
Law (London: Luzac & Co., 1940), p. 79; Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 164; Peters, Islam and 
Colonialism, p. 30. 
185 Muhammad Abū Zahrah, “Nazariyyat al-Harb fī al-Islām”, Al-Majallah al-Misriyyah lil-Qānūn al-
Dawlī, 1958, p. 42; quoted in al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām, p. 237.  
 242
ibn al-Khat t āb (r. 634/644), accepted the amān granted by a slave to all the enemy 
inside a fortification.186 
 Concerning the validity of amān granted by children, unlike the majority of 
the jurists, who stipulated that the child must be of age, al-Awzā‛ī validates the amān 
of a child who has reached the age of ten while other jurists disagreed over the 
validity of amān granted by a child who has reached the age of discernment.187 Al-
Shaybānī argued that since the conversion of a discerning child to Islam is valid, 
his/her amān is therefore valid too.188 
 The jurists disagreed over the validity of the amān granted by a Muslim 
prisoner of war to his captors or a Muslim trader during his sojourn in an enemy state 
or a resident of the enemy state who converts to Islam. The majority of the jurists 
maintain that in these cases Muslims are not entitled to grant amān to their captors. 
Like any other contract concluded under duress, the amān in any of these cases is 
null and void.189 However, some jurists disagreed about the validity of amān granted 
by Muslim prisoners of war who are inside enemy territory but not particularly under 
direct duress.190 It worth adding here that in a case where an enemy enters the 
Islamic state with an amān granted by someone who is not entitled to grant it, or in 
other words with an invalid amān, al-Shāfi‛ī indicates that the enemy will be 
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protected with regard to his person and his money, but has to be retuned to his place 
of safety.191  
 
4.8.3 Procedure of Granting Amān 
The jurists are unanimous that any word or phrase which directly or indirectly 
indicates the granting of amān, in Arabic or in any other language, whether spoken 
or in writing, constitutes a valid amān. Moreover, any gesture or word that is rightly 
or even wrongly understood by an enemy combatant as granting him amān entitles 
him to the status of musta’min. Thus, if an enemy assumes, for any reason, that a 
Muslim has given him amān, then the amān is valid, even if the Muslim had no 
intention of granting it.192 Common phrases or words indicating amān are, for 
example, “do not be afraid”, “you are safe”, “drop your weapon”, “stop” or “you are 
in my protection”193 or the Persian word “matras”194 (do not be afraid). 
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 The jurists disagreed over the permissibility of granting amān after the 
capture of enemy belligerents. According to al-Zuh aylī, the Mālikī jurists stipulate 
that enemy belligerents have the right to musta’min status as long as they are not 
captured.195 Some Shāfi‛ī jurists argue that enemy belligerents still can be granted 
amān after their capture, but not after they are handed over to the head of state. The 
Hanafī jurists and al-Awzā‛ī validate the amān granted by any Muslim, even after the 
enemy’s capture, i.e., to enemy prisoners of war, because the Prophet approved the 
amān granted by his daughter, Zaynab, to her husband Abū al-‛Ās  ibn al-Rabī‛ 
during his captivity. 196 Therefore, the amān in this case is not merely granting 
protection but freeing prisoners of war. The jurists who opposed granting amān to 
captives, despite the above precedent set by the Prophet, appear to advocate their 
position on the grounds that an individual Muslim should not have the right to free 
war prisoners and that this responsibility should be left to the Muslim head of state.  
 Furthermore, interestingly enough, Ibn Qudāmah advocates that the mere fact 
of the enemy belligerent’s attempt to peacefully enter Muslim territory entitles him 
to amān. Ibn Qudāmah states that the enemy’s action in itself signifies that he 
assumes he will be safe and this resembles the case of amān granted by a gesture 
from a Muslim.197 In other words, what Ibn Qudāmah is advocating here is that 
enemy belligerents are automatically entitled to the status of amān if they ever 
require it. He thus envisages the case of an enemy belligerent who is captured inside 
Muslim territory and then claims that he came as a musta’min. In this case, Ibn 
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Qudāmah argues that if the enemy was not carrying weapons upon his capture, he is 
entitled to amān because this is an indication that he did not come to commit acts of 
war. This situation is similar to the modern act of carrying a white flag. But if an 
enemy belligerent is caught carrying weapons upon his capture, his claim to amān is 
unacceptable because his weapons indicate that he came as a “warrior”.198  
Moreover, in the case of a Muslim who captures an enemy belligerent and, 
upon their arrival before the Muslim authorities, the captive claims that his captor 
granted him amān while his captor denies doing so, the jurists, according to Ibn 
Qudāmah, put forward three different opinions. The first is that captor’s statement 
should be accepted and the captive’s claim to amān rejected. The second is that the 
captive’s claim should be accepted because his claim may be true and this probability 
is enough justification to save his life, or in other words to grant him amān status. 
The third is that, if the captive possesses weapons and is stronger than his Muslim 
captor, then the captive’s claim to amān should be accepted because this situation 
proves his claim is true. On the other hand, if he is weaker than his captor and his 
weapons are seized from him, this situation proves that his captor’s claim is true.199 
 
4.8.4 Duration and Termination of Amān 
According to the majority of jurists, the duration of amān is one year and no tax is 
required during this period, but if a musta’min decides to stay for more than a year,  
he is required to pay the jizyah, exactly like the dhimmis, the permanent non-Muslim 
citizens of the Islamic state.200 According to al-Zuh aylī, the Hanbalī jurists did not 
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require the payment of jizyah even if the amān contract exceeds the duration of one 
year.201 For al-Shāfi‛ī, the duration of amān should not exceed four months; 
otherwise the payment of jizyah will be required.202 It should be added here that this 
time restriction does not apply to amān granted to women because they are exempt 
from the payment of jizyah.203 If, at any time, a musta’min converts to Islam, the 
amān contract is terminated and he becomes entitled to stay permanently in the 
Islamic state. In this case, the Islamic obligations will be applicable to him, including 
the payment of zakāh and participation in jihād if this is required and if he is 
physically fit. Furthermore, if a musta’min purchases land in the Islamic state and 
starts to pay tax on it, his status changes to that of a dhimmi because this indicates his 
intention to remain permanently in the Islamic state.204 
 A valid amān is thus a binding contract upon Muslims and no Muslim, even 
the head of state, al-Shirbīnī confirms, can revoke it unless the amān proves to be 
detrimental to Muslim interests - if, for example, a musta’min proves to be a spy.205 
Nonetheless, some Hanafī and Mālikī jurists maintain that the amān is not to be 
revoked even if the musta’min proves to be a spy.206 If the amān contract is 
cancelled, a musta’min still enjoys the right of protection until he is conducted back 
to his place of safety.207 The amān contract terminates at the end of its term or upon 
the accomplishment of the mission for which an envoy or a trader has entered the 
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Islamic state. It is worth noting here that the jurists are unanimous that messengers, 
or in modern day terminology ambassadors, diplomats or envoys, are automatically 
entitled to amān status.208 Their protection is incumbent on the Islamic state by 
virtue of the nature of their mission, let alone that they enjoy non-combatant 
immunity.209  
 
4.8.5 The Musta’min’s Rights and Obligations 
It is surprising that the classical jurists did not explicitly specify the obligations of 
the musta’min. In addition to the obligation to respect the law and public order, it 
stands to reason that the musta’min is obliged not to commit any hostile acts inside 
the Islamic territories or spy on the Islamic state. In other words, he should not 
commit any acts detrimental to the interests of the Islamic state, and it is also 
prohibited for him to practise usury.210 The musta’min has the right to purchase and 
export from the Islamic state any commodity, except weapons and slaves, this 
                                                 
208 Al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awtār, Vol. 8, pp. 181-183; al-Shawkānī, Al-Sayl al-Jarrār, Vol. 4, pp. 560 
f.; Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, p. 97; Sābiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, Vol. 3, p. 68; Peters, Islam 
and Colonialism, p. 31; Afīfī, Al-Mujtama‛ al-Islāmī, p. 280; Zīdān, Ahkām al-Dhimmiyyn, pp. 52 f.; 
Bilājī, “Sharī‛ah al-Harb fī al-Sīrah”, pp. 127 f.; Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 141 f.; 
Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, pp. 209 f. 
209 See, for example, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Jāmi‛ al-Fiqh, Vol. 4, p. 93; al-Shirāzī, Al-
Muhadhdhab, Vol. 3, p. 278; Shūmān, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Sharī‛ah, p. 78; al-Saqqār, 
“Niz ām al-Amān”, pp. 91 f.; Afīfī, Al-Mujtama‛ al-Islāmī, pp. 227-229; Abū al-Wafā, Al-Nazariyyah 
al-‛Āmmah, pp. 184-188; Bilājī, “Sharī‛ah al-Harb fī al-Sīrah”, pp. 127 f.; Farhad Malekian, The 
Concept of Islamic International Criminal Law: A Comparative Study (London: Graham & Trotman, 
1994), p. 72; Hashmi, “Islam, Sunni”, p. 219. On the protection, immunity and privileges of diplomats 
in Islamic law, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Protection of Diplomats under Islamic Law”, American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 74, 1980, pp. 609-633; Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 
142; Ahmad ‛Abd al-Wanys Shitā, Al-Usūl al-‛Āmmah lil-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām Waqt al-
Silm: Dirāsah fī Tahlīl Aham Adawāt al-‛Alāqāt al-Khārijiyyah lil-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah, Mashrū‛ al-
‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām 5 (Cairo: Al-Ma‛had al-‛Ālamī lil-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1996), pp. 145-166; 
Pirzada “Islam and International Law”, pp. 215-218; Malekian, The Concept of Islamic International 
Criminal Law, pp. 109-112. For some examples of the protection, immunity and privileges of 
diplomats in the Muslim countries throughout the Islamic history see, Obaidullah Fahad, “Principles 
of Diplomacy in Islam: Privileges and Immunities”, Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. XII, No. 3, Autumn 
1989, pp. 41-48.  
210 Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 167; al-Zuhaylī, Āthār al-Harb fī al-Islām, pp. 250 f.; Saqr, ‛Al-
‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah, p. 89; al-Saqqār, “Nizām al-Amān”, p. 98. 
 248
prohibition obviously being because weapons and slaves will strengthen the 
Muslims’ enemy.211  
The jurists’ discussions of the musta’min’s rights focus primarily on the 
protection of his property and his right of litigation. They are unanimous that if a 
musta’min dies during his stay in the Islamic state, his property must be sent to his 
heirs in his own country. If he has no heirs, Ibn Qudāmah adds, his property will be 
confiscated as spoils of war, but according to al-Qarāfī, it should be returned to the 
authorities in his own country.212 If a musta’min leaves his property in the Islamic 
state and returns to the enemy state to conduct business or to visit his country and 
return to the Islamic state, his amān is still valid with respect to his person and the 
property he left behind. In this case also if he dies in his country, contrary to Abū 
Hanīfah and al-Shāfi‛ī’s position, the money he left behind is to be sent to his heirs in 
the dār al-harb.213 Moreover, if he returns to fight for his country against the Islamic 
state, according to the majority of jurists, apart from al-Awzā‛ī, Abū Hanīfah and al-
Shāfi‛ī, his amān is still valid with regard to his property but not in respect of his 
person.214 Moreover, according to al-Qarāfī, even if a musta’min dies while fighting 
against the Islamic state, his property must be returned to his heirs, but if he is 
captured during the war and then executed, his property becomes spoils of war.215 
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 The musta’min has the right to take Muslims, dhimmis and other musta’mins 
to the Islamic courts. The judge is obliged, according to Hanafīs,216 to settle cases 
related to debts and other disputes because the Islamic state is obliged to protect the 
musta’min against any injustice. However, al-Zuhaylī states that most jurists 
maintain that the Muslim judge can choose whether to adjudicate such cases.217 
In agreement with Article 70 of the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,218 the jurists agree that a musta’min 
cannot be tried for crimes he committed outside the Islamic state, even if he has 
killed a Muslim.219 Thus, the jurists here are unanimous that the Islamic state has no 
jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed by non-Muslims outside its 
territories.220  
 Concerning the jurisdiction of the Islamic state with regard to crimes 
committed by temporary non-Muslim residents of the Islamic state, the musta’mins, 
the majority of the jurists maintain that they are subject to punishment in accordance 
with Islamic law. However, Abū Hanīfah who pioneered the doctrine of restricting 
the jurisdiction of Islamic laws to the crimes committed inside the territories of the 
Islamic state by its permanent citizens, distinguished between two kinds of crimes 
committed by the musta’mins: crimes against the rights of God (huqūq Allah) and 
crimes against the rights of humans (huqūq al-‛ibād). The musta’mins are subject to 
punishment for crimes against the rights of humans, but they are not subject to 
punishment for crimes against the rights of God. For example, if a musta’min kills a 
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Muslim, a dhimmi or another musta’min in the Islamic state, the Islamic punishment 
will be inflicted upon him.221 But if a musta’min commits theft, fornication or 
adultery, Abū Hanīfah and al-Shaybānī state that he is not subject to Islamic 
punishment.222 Rather, in the case of theft, he is obliged to return the stolen property 
because it comes under the category of the rights of humans, but amputation of the 
hand, the Islamic punishment for theft, is not applicable because it is God’s right.  
The Hanafī jurists justified the inapplicability of Islamic punishments for 
crimes committed by temporary residents in the Islamic state by taking the view that 
there is no contract with them that they should become dhimmis and thus agree  to 
become subject to the jurisdiction of the Islamic state.223 This indicates that the  word 
“s āghirūn” in the Qur’ānic phrase: “until they pay the jizyah ‛an yad (willingly) and 
they are s āghirūn (submissive to the Islamic rule)”,224 means that non-Muslims 
become subject to Islamic jurisdiction, as maintained by the majority of Muslim 
scholars,225 not that they are humiliated as some have interpreted it. 
  
4.9 Prisoners of War 
The jurists’ discussion of Islamic rulings on enemy prisoners of war also typifies the 
nature of the greatest part of Islamic law. It should be added here that the jurists’ 
discussion of prisoners of war refers to adult male enemy combatants: women and 
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children who are captured are to be enslaved or exchanged for Muslim prisoners.226 
In accordance with the sources of Islamic law, second/eighth and third/ninth century 
Muslim jurists based their rulings on the Qur’ān and the precedents of the Prophet. 
On the one hand, the Qur’ānic revelation that directly addresses the rulings on the 
prisoners of war commands Muslims to: “set them free either graciously or by 
ransom”.227 Thus, this Qur’ānic command states that Muslims are obliged, after the 
cessation of hostilities, to free their prisoners of war either freely, or in exchange for 
Muslim prisoners of war or for ransom.  
 On the other hand, a few jurists based their ruling on the prisoners of war 
upon the Qur’ānic revelation: “kill the polytheists wherever you find them”,228 and 
the precedents set by the Prophet in his treatment of prisoners of war indicate that  he 
adopted four different courses of action: first, the execution of three Meccans; 
second, releasing prisoners freely; third, setting prisoners free in exchange for 
Muslim prisoners or for money - and some of the prisoners taken at the Battle of 
Badr were set free in exchange for teaching ten Muslim children to read and write;229 
fourth, enslaving prisoners of war. These Qur’ānic references and the Prophet’s 
precedents caused a great controversy among the jurists. 
 The parties to this controversy can, however, be generally divided into three 
main groups: according to the first group, including Ibn ‛Abbās, ‛Abd Allah ibn 
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‛Umar (d. 73/693), al-Hasan al-Basrī (d. 110/728), ‛At ā’,230 Sa‛īd ibn Jubayr (d. 
95/714), Mujāhid,231 and even, according to al-Hasan ibn Muh ammad al-Tamīmī, 
“the consensus of the Prophet’s companions”,232 the Islamic ruling on prisoners of 
war is restricted to releasing them either freely or in exchange for ransom, as 
stipulated in the Qur’ān (47:4). Moreover, this group argues that this verse abrogated 
the other options which were followed by the Prophet, namely, execution and 
enslavement.233 
 The second group, the Hanafī jurists, advocate that the head of state is 
entitled to either execute the prisoners or enslave them in accordance with what is in 
the best interest of the Muslims.234 Thus, in stark contradiction to the first group, 
Abū Hanīfah rejected releasing prisoners freely and exchanging them for Muslim 
prisoners or for ransom,235 i.e., the only two options advocated by the first group. 
Abū Hanīfah’s rejection of these two options is justified by the fear that releasing 
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enemy prisoners, either freely or in exchange for Muslim prisoners, would strengthen 
the enemy.236 However, al-Shaybānī here disagrees with his teacher Abū Hanīfah 
and accepts the exchange of enemy prisoners for Muslim prisoners.237 Moreover, 
some Hanafī jurists advocate that the head of state is also entitled to free the 
prisoners but allow them to stay in the Islamic state and pay the jizyah. They should 
not be allowed to return to the enemy state because they would strengthen the enemy. 
However, Arab polytheists are excluded from this option.238 
 The third group, the majority of the Muslim jurists, including the Shāfi‛īs, the 
Mālikīs, the Hanbalīs, al-Awzā‛ī, Abū Thawr and al-Thawrī, broadened the options 
for the head of state. Depending on what he deems to best serve the interest of the 
Muslims, he is entitled to choose one of the following four options: to execute some 
or all of the prisoners, to enslave them, to set them free or to exchange them for 
Muslim prisoners or for money.239 It is interesting to note here that the second caliph, 
‛Umar ibn al-Khat t āb, prohibited the enslavement of Arabs.240 The Mālikīs added a 
fifth option: prisoners can be permitted to stay in the Islamic state in return for the 
payment of the jizyah.241 It is claimed that Mālik, the eponymous founder of the 
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Mālikī school, unlike the other jurists of his school, rejected the free release of 
prisoners.242 
 The permissibility of the execution of prisoners in principle, as advocated by 
the majority of jurists in cases where it serves the Muslim interest, is based on the 
instances of the execution of three male Meccans: al-Nadir ibn al-Hārith and ‛Uqbah 
ibn Mu‛ayt , taken prisoner at the Battle of Badr (Ramadān 2/March 624) and Abū 
‛Azzah al-Jumahī,243 captured at the battle of Uh ud (Shawwāl 3/March 625). It is 
worth adding here that Abū ‛Azzah was among the prisoners taken at Badr and was 
freed by the Prophet on condition that he would not fight against the Muslims 
again,244 but when he was captured again at Uhud, he was executed. There are no 
other instances of prisoners being executed by Muslims during the Prophet’s 
lifetime. 
 Apart from the doubts that were cast over the authenticity of the reports about 
the execution of the two prisoners taken at Badr and whether they were killed during 
the fighting or after their capture,245 these three individuals were singled out for 
execution from among the seventy prisoners of Badr, obviously not because of the 
fact that they were prisoners of war, but because of their excessive persecution of, 
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and hostility towards, the Muslims during the Meccan period.246 In other words, 
these three individuals were executed because they were guilty of “war crimes”.247 
 Despite all these stark contradictions among the jurists, they unanimously 
agree on one thing: that the ruling on prisoners of war is left to the discretion of the 
head of state. He is to choose from the various options offered by the jurists, 
depending on what best serves the mas lahah. In other words, according to the jurists, 
the mas lahah is the only criterion upon which the head of state is to decide the 
Islamic ruling on the prisoners of war.248 Furthermore, al-Shāfi‛ī stipulates that it is 
prohibited for the head of state to choose to either execute or free some or all of the 
prisoners, unless his choice will serve the mas lahah.249 
 
4.9.1 Treatment of Prisoners 
Most of the Islamic position on the treatment of the prisoners of war is based on the 
incident of the seventy or, according to some biographers, forty-three prisoners250 
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taken at the Battle of Badr. Prior to this incident, a group of Muslims captured two 
Meccans; but apart from that there are no reports of enemy prisoners of war being 
held in captivity251 because all of the battles with the enemies of the Muslims that 
took place during the Prophet’s lifetime ended with either one or both of the parties 
to the conflict leaving the battlefield after the conclusion of a treaty, or the suffering 
of a maximum of few dozen casualties on both sides. During this period, prisoners of 
war were either held in the mosque or divided among the Companions of the 
Prophet.252 When the Prophet divided the prisoners taken at Badr to be housed with 
the Companions, he instructed them to: “Observe good treatment towards the 
prisoners”.253 
 Abū ‛Azīz ibn ‛Umayr ibn Hāshim, one of the prisoners of Badr, narrates 
how the Muslims, following the Prophet’s instructions, treated him well during his 
captivity, as translated by Guillaume, in the following words: “I was with a number 
of the Ansār when they [Muslim captors] brought me from Badr, and when they ate 
their morning and evening meals they gave me the bread and ate the dates 
themselves in accordance with the orders that the apostle had given about us. If 
anyone had a morsel of bread he gave it to me. I felt ashamed and returned it to one 
of them but he returned it to me untouched.”254 Abū al-‛Ās  ibn al-Rabī‛ and al-Walīd 
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ibn al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīrah, from the prisoners taken at Badr, also relate that they 
received the same treatment from their captors.255 
 This noble and altruistic treatment of enemy prisoners of war is described in 
the Qur’ān as follows: “And they feed the needy, the orphans and the captives [out of 
their] food, despite their love for it [or also interpreted as: because of their love for 
God]. Indeed, we feed you for the sake of pleasing God: we do not wish reward or 
gratitude from you.”256 The jurists therefore agree that prisoners should be fed and, 
following the precedent set by the Prophet with one of the prisoners taken at Badr, 
clothed if need be.257 Prisoners should be protected from the heat, cold, hunger, thirst 
and any kind of torture.258 Furthermore, it is prohibited to torture enemy prisoners of 
war to obtain military information. When Mālik was asked about the Islamic ruling 
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on the torture of enemy prisoners to obtain military intelligence about the enemy, he 
replied that he never heard that this could be Islamically permissible.259 
It is important to add here that the jurists commonly agree that it is prohibited 
for the Islamic state to execute enemy hostages under its control, even if the enemy 
slaughtered the Muslim hostages they held. This prohibition is based on the Qur’ānic 
injunction: “No sinful person shall be liable for the sin committed by another.”260 
Here some jurists refer with pride to the precedent of the caliph Mu‛āwiyah ibn Abī 
Sufyān (d. 60/680) when he refused to execute the Roman hostages under his control 
after the Roman emperor had broken the treaty with the Muslims by executing the 
Muslim hostages he held.261 It is worth pointing out here that this precedent does not 
mean that hostage-taking as a military tactic is permissible under Islamic law. But 
this precedent refers to a context in which these hostages were exchanged between 
the Muslim caliph and the Roman emperor in order to ensure that neither of them 
would revoke the peace treaty.  
Similar to the provision of Article 82 of the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,262 the jurists agree that, during 
the prisoners’ captivity or enslavement, members of the same family should not be 
separated; children should not be separated from their parents or grandparents or 
siblings.263 
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The jurists also discussed the legal effect of captivity or enslavement on the 
religion of children and the marriage of one or a couple of wedded prisoners, i.e., if 
one or both of them are held in captivity or enslavement. If children are captured 
alone, i.e., if neither of their parents is captured with them, they are to grow as 
Muslims. But if children are captured with one or both of their parents, then apart 
from al-Awzā‛ī, the majority of jurists agree that they should retain the religion of 
their parents.264 
Concerning the effect of enslavement on marriage, the jurists are unanimous 
that the marriage is dissolved if the wife is captured alone. But if the husband is 
captured alone, then the marriage is not dissolved. If both a husband and a wife are 
captured together then, unlike Abū Hanīfah and al-Awzā‛ī, al-Shāfi‛ī, Abū Thawr, al-
Layth and al-Thawrī argue that the marriage should be dissolved.265 
 Significantly, some jurists discussed what Muslims should do if prisoners 
cannot be transported to the Islamic territories for logistical reasons. The Mālikī 
jurists, according to Peters, “state explicitly that enough food and other necessities 
must be left with them, so that they will not die of hunger or cold. If this obligation 
cannot be fulfilled from seized enemy property, then the Moslem treasury [bayt al-
māl) must provide for this.”266 However, al-Shaybānī holds that the head of state 
should kill the men and hire transportation for the women and children,267  although, 
according to another Hanafī jurist, Ibn Mawdūd, because of the prohibition of killing 
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women and children, they should be left to die. His justification for not saving their 
lives is that the children would grow up and fight against the Muslims, while women 
produce children who will also grow up and fight.268 
 These three juristic opinions are significant in some aspects. Peters here gives 
only the Mālikī jurists’ opinion, which shows the Mālikī ethical stance, while 
Johnson refers only to al-Shaybānī’s opinion, thanks to Khadduri’s translation of al-
Shaybānī’s work. Ibn Mawdūd’s opinion which could easily be argued to be un-
Islamic, is not referred to, at least by Peters and Johnson. This raises the question of 
which of these three opinions, for example, represents the Islamic position, not to 
mention the possible existence of other opinions. The conclusion is that these 
opinions, which are scattered throughout the corpus juris of individual Muslim jurist-
scholars, makes it almost impossible to cover all the juridical opinions on many 
issues. But more importantly, the crucial point here is the grounds upon which these 
jurists advocated their opinions, which are clearly based on pragmatic, political 
concerns about winning the war, not on religious imperatives. This proves that the 
portrayal of the bulk of the jurists’ opinions and judgements as unchangeable holy 
laws, i.e., sharī‛ah, is a fallacy. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
Laws are not created in a vacuum. All laws originate in a particular time and context 
and aim to create and/or regulate specific conduct in order to achieve specific 
objectives. The time and situational factors explain the change of focus of both 
Muslim and Western scholars from the Islamic jus in bello to the Islamic jus ad 
bellum, and vice-versa, throughout history. Classical Muslim jurists focused on the 
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Islamic jus in bello because they wanted to regulate the conduct of Muslims during a 
period in history when war was the normal state of international relations unless a 
peace treaty was concluded between its members. The modern Muslim world has 
undergone radical changes in its political and legal systems which are of no less 
importance than the changes in contemporary international society. Contemporary 
Muslim scholars have done the opposite of their classical predecessors, first because 
international society has come to an agreement on the prohibition of offensive wars, 
and second because they have apparently neglected to focus on addressing the 
Islamic jus in bello in the contexts of modern war, because the dictates of 
international law and the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols satisfy 
the same objectives as those of Islamic law.  
 But the case of Western scholars appears to be more interesting than that of 
their Muslim counterparts. In fact, Islamic law has not received adequate interest in 
Western scholarship. Moreover, as one of the major legal systems of the world, and 
possibly in the area of Islamic family law the most widely used legal system in the 
world, Islamic law has not been utilized as a potential contribution to the world legal 
system. The reasons why Western scholars have ignored the Islamic jus in bello and 
focused on the Islamic jus ad bellum are that, first, they have been motivated by the 
desire to explain the reasons for the spread of Islam and the expansion of the Islamic 
state, particularly during the first century of the history of Islam. Second, many 
technical difficulties confront Western researchers on Islamic law because this area is 
linked to other disciplines, such as Islamic history and Qur’ānic studies. Third, the 
lack of works in European languages adds to the difficulties in the area. Fourth, and 
more importantly, studying the Islamic law of war entails examining the nature of the 
process of forming it.  
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This study of Islamic jus in bello, it is hoped, has cleared some of the 
misunderstandings about the Islamic jus ad bellum. Jihād has usually been portrayed 
in Western literature as a holy war to convert non-Muslims by the sword, or as a war 
to universalize the rule of Islam and plunder, let alone the claim that it was to pursue 
sex. This study of the Islamic jus in bello has indicated that the strict prohibition 
against targeting enemy non-combatants including clergy, on the one hand, and the 
protection granted by virtue of the system of amān to non-Muslim enemy combatants 
and the citizens of enemy states who desire to enter the Islamic state, on the other, 
disprove the claim that jihād is a holy war to convert by force or kill infidels. If that 
were the case, Muslim soldiers would have exterminated their enemy combatants, 
prisoners of war or musta’mins, or stipulated their conversion to Islam as a condition 
for granting them amān. In addition, the mere fact that Islam accepts the payment of 
the jizyah from non-Muslim citizens living in the Islamic state undermines the claim 
that the aim of jihād was to force non-Muslims to convert to Islam.  
The protection granted to the possessions of musta’mins during their stay in 
the Islamic state and the stipulation that these possessions should be repatriated if 
they die or, for some jurists, if they are killed while fighting against the Islamic state, 
to their heirs or the state authorities in their home countries, refutes the claim that 
plunder was a justification for jihād. The justifications and stipulations given by the 
jurists for the permissibility of Muslim soldiers to eat and give fodder to their 
animals using enemy property indicate the sanctity of enemy property. However, 
after the cessation of hostilities, seized enemy property becomes the spoils of war in 
accordance with the tradition of war of that time. 
Moreover, the claim that jihād was used as an instrument for the 
universalization of Islam or Islamic rule is based on one of two false premises: that 
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Islam was spread by force or by “economic desires”,269 such that jihād, in the sense 
of military offensives against non-Muslims, was a tool for ensuring that the message 
of Islam was conveyed, as explained in the previous chapter. The resort to acts of 
hostility came only as a third option after the non-Muslims’ refusal to accept Islam or 
enter into a treaty with the Islamic state to maintain their religion and peaceful 
relations with the Islamic state in return for the payment of the jizyah, or other 
arrangements. This conception of jihād as a militarized mission was dictated by the 
surrounding paradigm of international relations during the specific period in history 
in which this conception of jihād was maintained. This is why modern Muslim 
scholars maintain that jihād in the form of militarized missions “has become 
obsolete”270 and jihād at present should therefore take the form of conveying the 
message of Islam via the Internet, the mass media and any other audio or written 
means of propagating it.271   
The failure in the West to study the nature of Islamic law and the process of 
Islamic legislation has led to the common misconception in Western literature that 
Islamic law, sharī‛ah, is simply a divine and, therefore, unchangeable law system. 
This is perhaps what ‛Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī (1895-1971), described as 
“Undisputedly the master re-builder of Arab law in the twentieth century”,272 meant 
when he notes that some orientalists have assumed that sharī‛ah is rigid and 
unchangeable because they are historians and not jurists.273 In fact, the functionalism 
and pragmatic nature of the law, which characterized the jurists’ discussion of the 
                                                 
269 Jurji, “The Islamic Theory of War”, pp. 333 f. 
270 Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 117; Muhammad al-Atawneh, “Shahāda versus 
Terror in Contemporary Islamic Legal Thought: The Problem of Suicide Bombers”, Journal of 
Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 2008, p. 21. 
271 See Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 117; Mah mūd, “Al-Jihād wa Akhlāqiyyāt al-
Harb fī al-Islām”, p. 859; al-Atawneh, “Shahāda versus Terror”, p. 21. 
272 Amr Shalakany, “Between Identity and Redistribution: Sanhuri, Genealogy and the Will to 
Islamaise”, Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2001, p. 202. 
273 See Muhammad Mustafā Shalabī, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī bayn al-Mithāliyyah wa al-Wāqi‛iyyah 
(Beirut: Al-Dār al-Jāmi‛iyyah, 1982), p. 109.  
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Islamic jus in bello, proves that labelling the Islamic law of war in general as divine 
law is fallacious. 
Muslim jurists operate in a framework which consists of three factors: the 
sources and objectives of the law, on the one hand, and the methodologies for 
pronouncing on the laws, on the other. Studies of Islamic laws should, as this chapter 
attempts to do, indicate these three factors in relation to all Islamic rulings. This 
helps outsiders, not only non-Muslims but also Muslims who are not involved in the 
process of pronouncing on Islamic laws, to understand the objectives and, thus, the 
changeability of some of the laws.  
 But the main characteristic of the Islamic jus in bello is that most Islamic 
rulings are interpreted, deduced or made by individual, independent jurist-scholars. 
Their various interpretations of the intentions of the Islamic sources, and their 
different ways of relating their respective interpretations to changing situations, 
result in the majority of Islamic law developing into contradictory laws, as illustrated 
above. It is worth adding here also that part of Islamic law is hypothetical, in the 
sense that some jurists, mainly of the Hanafī school, imagined specific situations and 
advocated Islamic rulings for them. 
 The emergence of such contradictory juristic rulings should have led Muslim 
jurists to discuss their application in war situations, particularly since the objective of 
Islamic international humanitarian law is to regulate the conduct of Muslims during 
hostilities but, surprisingly, the jurists did not discuss this issue. The fact that they  
were satisfied with simply collecting contradictory rulings, and even sometimes 
reporting contradictory rulings attributed to the same jurist, and at most advocating 
or endorsing certain of them, indicates that the jurists were presenting a spectrum of 
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Islamic juristic rulings rather than specifying the way in which they should be 
applied. 
 These laws cease to be valid if they do not achieve their objectives. If a 
situation changes, the law should change in such a way as to achieve the result that 
was originally intended. This is a juristic principle which the classical jurists call al-
hukm yadūr ma‛a al-‛illah (the ruling evolves with the effective cause).274 Moving 
from theory to practice, this inevitable process of adapting Islamic rulings to 
different situations or making Islamic laws for new situations, requires a body of 
jurists to exercise the ongoing process of ijtihād. At present, the Muslim world has 
tended to exercise collective ijtihād.275 Several juristic research and fatwa councils 
and departments have been established for this purpose throughout the Muslim 
world, Europe and North America.276  
All these attempts to exercise collective ijtihād have been addressing issues 
of contemporary concern to Muslims, including the emergence of Muslim minorities 
living in the West. But “for about a century”277 some voices have expressed concern 
that, in the light of the current world situation and in the interests of Muslims, it is 
necessary to codify and renew Islamic juristic rulings (fiqh) to form a body of 
                                                 
274 See, for example, ‛Abd al-Karīm Zīdān, Al-Wajīz fī Usūl al-Fiqh, 5th ed. (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-
Risālah, 1996/1417), pp. 201-204; ‛Abd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, ‛Ilm Usūl al-Fiqh (Cairo: Dār al-Hadīth, 
2003/1423), pp. 71-75. 
275 See Muhammad al-Disūqī, Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī (Beirut: Dār al-Madār al-Islāmī, 2006), 
pp. 184-192. 
276 To mention few examples, in Egypt the Islamic Research Council was established in 1961; in 
Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, a subsidiary body of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, was established in January 1981. This Academy currently 
contains fiqh experts from forty-three Muslim countries: http://www.fiqhacademy.org; also in Saudi 
Arabia,  in Mecca, the Islamic Fiqh Council, affiliated to the Muslim World League, was established 
on 12 November 1977: http://www.themwl.org/Bodies/default.aspx?l=AR&d=1&bid=2; in the United 
States of America, the Fiqh Council of North America was established in 1986: 
http://www.fiqhcouncil.org/; and also in the United States, the Assembly of Muslim Jurists of 
America: http://www.amjaonline.com/index.php; in Dublin, Ireland, there is the European Council for 
Fatwa and Research, which held its inaugural meeting in London, United Kingdom on 29-30 March 
1977: http://e-cfr.org/en/.          
277 Al-Disūqī, Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, p. 12. 
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Islamic law collected from all the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence.278 This 
codification would ensure the applicability of Islamic law as a legal system which 
can be enforced by the state.279 These voices echo the second/eighth century call by 
Ibn al-Muqaffa‛ (d. 139/756) for the codification of a body of Islamic law.280 
However, Joseph Schacht anticipated the failure of such attempts to codify Islamic 
law. He claimed that “traditional Islamic law… is by its nature incompatible with 
being codified, and every codification must subtly distort it”.281 However, it is 
interesting to add here that, under the sponsorship of the United Nations 
Development Programme, the Republic of the Maldives, a small Muslim country 
located in the Indian Ocean with a constitutional democracy, commissioned 
professor Paul H. Robinson, a leading world specialist in the codification of criminal 
law, to draft its first codified penal law on the basis of the sharī‛ah.282   
                                                 
278 Al-Qaradāwī, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 23-74; Shalabī, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 220 f.; Muhammad, Al-
Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 238 f.; al-Disūqī, Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 145-149. On the renewability 
of the sharī‛ah, see Muhammad, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 83-94. On the meaning of the concept of 
renewing fiqh, see al-Disūqī, Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 35-59. On the renewability of fiqh, see 
al-Qaradāwī, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 83-86. On the renewal of fiqh, see Muhammad, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, 
pp. 215-249. It is worth mentioning here that the ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs in the 
Sultanate of Oman held an international conference under the title “Codification and Renewal in the 
Contemporary Islamic Jurisprudence” in the period between 5-8 April 2008. Information available 
from http://www.maraoman.net/main.asp?ArticleId=62; Internet; accessed 6 June 2008. On what 
Schacht calls, the modification or “re-shaping of Islamic law by modernist jurisprudence” in some 
Muslim countries during the twentieth century, see Joseph Schacht, “Problems of Modern Islamic 
Legislation”, Studia Islamica, No. 12, 1960, pp. 114-129. 
279 See al-Disūqī, Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, p. 145. 
280 Muhammad, Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 234 f. On a few other attempts, including the successful 
Ottoman empire’s, to codify Islamic law throughout Islamic history, see Muhammad, Al-Fiqh al-
Islāmī, pp. 235-237; Schacht, “Islamic Law in Contemporary States”, pp. 133-147; Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Na‛im, “Sharī‛a in the Secular State: A Paradox of Separation and Conflation”, in Peri Bearman, 
Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. Weiss, eds., The Law Applied: Contextualizing the Islamic 
Sharī‛a, A Volume in Honor of Frank E. Vogel. London: I.B. Tauris, 2008, p. 330. On modern 
attempts  to codify the sharī‛ah in certain Muslim countries see, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “The Sharī‛ah: 
A Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules?”, in Nicholas Heer, ed., Islamic Law and 
Jurisprudence (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990), pp. 177-198. 
281 Schacht, “Problems of Modern Islamic Legislation”, p. 108. 
282 Paul H. Robinson, a non-Muslim professor of criminal law – and not a specialist in sharī‛ah – at 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, “has done consulting on criminal code drafting for a 
number of American states and countries in many parts of the world”. Writing on this project 
Robinson and his eleven-member Criminal Law Research Group chosen for this project conclude: 
“While it was a concern that any Shari’a-based code could conflict with international norms, in 
practice it became apparent that the conflict was not as great as many would expect. Opportunities for 
accommodation were available, sometimes through interesting approaches by which the spirit of the 
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It should be mentioned here that the reason for the survival of Islamic law 
throughout the centuries and for the increasing calls among some Muslims for the 
applications of Islamic law283 is that Muslims have willingly resorted to applying to 
themselves Islamic laws chosen from among the various schools of law. This is 
especially the case where Muslim individuals apply Islamic laws to their own 
situation in the areas of acts of worship, morality, family law and financial 
transactions. But, in the light of the growing calls for, and resort to, Islamic law 
among Muslims, on the one hand, and the tendency among Western scholars to 
attribute the behaviour of Muslims to Islam, on the other, it stands to reason that, if 
Islamic law is to be enforced or rightly judged, Muslims must codify an enforceable 
body of Islamic rulings. Moreover, in the area of Islamic international humanitarian 
law, it is illogical to expect Muslims to enforce contradictory rulings. The 
enforcement of Islamic laws therefore requires contemporary Muslim jurists to draw 
                                                                                                                                          
Shari’a rule could be maintained without violating international norms. In the end, this Shari’a-based 
penal code drafting project yielded a Draft Code that bring together justice to Maldivians and also 
provide a useful starting point for penal code drafting in other Muslim countries, especially those with 
an interest in moving toward international norms. But the code drafting project also may have much to 
offer penal code reform in non-Muslim countries, for the structure and drafting forms invented here 
often solve problems that plague most penal codes, even codes of modern format such as those based 
upon the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, which served as the model for most American 
penal codes… While it may seem odd that a draft penal code for a small Islamic island-nation barely 
rising from the Indian Ocean could provide advances in the United States, we think it very much the 
case”, Paul H. Robinson, et al., “Codifying Shari’a: International Norms, Legality & the Freedom to 
Invent New Forms”, 2006; available from 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1104&context=upenn/wps; Internet; accessed 1 May 
2009, p. 61. See also for this codification project, Paul H. Robinson and the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School Criminal Research Group, “Final Report: Penal Law & Sentencing 
Codification Project for the Maldives”, 2 Vols., January 2006; available from 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/draftislamicpenalcode/; Internet; accessed 1 May 2009.   
283 For example, Nik Rahim Nik Wajis, a Malaysian scholar, writes in the introduction of his PhD 
thesis: “Nowadays, Muslims in most Muslim countries are striving in every aspect to revive Sharī‛a 
law. [Moreover, he affirms in his conclusion that] As for all Muslim countries, Sharī‛a law is no 
doubt an ideal law for them and it should be reintroduced.” Nik Rahim Nik Wajis, “The Crime of 
Hirāba in Islamic Law” (PhD thesis, Glasgow Caledonian University, 1996), pp. V, 230. 
Interestingly, Lisa Wedeen adds that: “A fundamental concern of many contemporary Muslims is the 
need to check the arbitrary powers of leaders and institute the rule of law, and strict application of the 
sharia is seen by many as a way of checking tyranny while ensuring procedural justice”, Lisa Wedeen, 
“Beyond the Crusades: Why Huntington, and bin Laden are Wrong”, Middle East Policy, Vol. X, No. 
2, Summer 2003, p. 58. See also al-Disūqī, Al-Tajdīd fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, pp. 167 f. Some 
amendments have been made to partially or wholly re-Islamize the legal systems in Egypt, the Sudan, 
Pakistan, Kuwait, Algeria and Yemen, see Olivier Roy, “Bin Laden: An Apocalyptic Sect Severed 
from Political Islam”, East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 10, Fall 2001, p. 110. 
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up Islamic codes of law, drawing on the contradictory rulings advocated by the 
individual Muslim jurist-scholars throughout history. In many cases, current 
situations, which are no longer those of the classical jurists’ time, will force 
contemporary Muslim jurists to modify the classical rulings or give new ones, but on 
the basis of the same Islamic methodologies and objectives as those pursued by their 
classical predecessors.     
This chapter has shown that the classical Muslim jurists’ discussions of the 
issues presented by war in their time indicate that their overarching concern was the 
fear of taking the life of enemy non-combatants, even as collateral damage. Their 
discussions of the issues of human shields, night attacks and weapons show a striking 
concern not to bring about the indiscriminate killing of innocent non-combatants 
during military operations between the army of the Islamic state and the army of the 
enemy, notwithstanding the limited destructive ability of their primitive weaponry. It 
is evident that the classical jurists developed a full-blown doctrine of non-combatant 
immunity based on specific Islamic sources and aimed at regulating their specific 
war contexts. They developed a complete set of rules to regulate the major issues 
treated in the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols. 
It may be concluded that ignoring the dictates of Islamic laws on the conduct 
of Muslims in war and regarding acts of terrorism committed by bands of Muslims as 
Islamic is doing a major injustice to Islamic law. Indeed, the name of Islam has been 
one of the main victims of this phenomenon. These terrorist acts have targeted 
Muslims in Muslim countries, as well as non-Muslims. In the light of the above 
discussion of the regulations of the use of force in Islamic law, it becomes clear that 
terrorist acts, such as blowing up aeroplanes, buses and trains and thus killing 
innocent civilians, beheadings, kidnapping journalists and humanitarian aid workers 
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are totally prohibited in Islam, let alone the fact that these acts are committed by 
clandestine organizations. Hence, the mistake of considering such terrorist acts as 
Islamically motivated or permitted undermines efforts to tackle this worldwide 
strategic problem, a fact that has recently been recognized by the British government, 
somewhat earlier than the USA administration.284 First, Muslims consider these 
actions as attacks that distort the image of their religion. Second, and more 
importantly, it distracts attention from tackling the root causes of these terrorist acts, 
as argued in the next chapter. 
In fact, a few Western scholars and governments have recognized the 
importance of consulting the sharī‛ah and Muslim scholars as valuable sources in the 
fight against terrorism,285 a historic and strategic shift in the West’s long-held view 
that Islam breeds violence. David Aaron Schwartz concludes that “The Shari’ah 
provides a genuine, workable framework for countering international terrorism… 
Islamic law coordinates, integrates and legislates against that which Western jurists 
                                                 
284 It is interesting to note here that George W. Gawrych, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, warns the West in his conclusion that: “Perversions of Islam by Muslim radicals to justify 
their acts of terrorism against innocent civilians must not prevent the West from admiring the Islamic 
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war”, George W. Gawrych, “Jihad, War, and Terrorism”, available from 
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285 See David Aaron Schwartz, “International Terrorism and Islamic Law”, Columbia Journal of 
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and punishment of Muslim terrorists.” El-Ayouty, “International Terrorism Under the Law”, p. 491; 
see also Ahmad E. Nassar, “The International Criminal Court and the Applicability of International 
Jurisdiction under Islamic Law”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2003, p. 592; 
Copinger-Symes, “Is Osama bin Laden’s ‘Fatwa Urging Jihad against Americans’ dated 23 February 
1998 Justified y Islamic Law?”, p. 214; Ali Ahmad, “The Role of Islamic Law in the Contemporary 
World Order”, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 6, 2001, p. 166. Sherman A. Jackson 
concludes that “encourag[ing] a more informed comparison between Islamic and American legal 
approaches… might point the way to possible avenues of cooperation in a mutually shared interest in 
a safer, better world.” Sherman A. Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition”, The 
Muslim World, Vol. 91, Issue 3-4, September 2001, p. 306. 
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have so far failed to control. The Shari’ah is a resource the West must no longer 
overlook.”286 To mention an example, the USA had already overlooked the role of 
Islamic law before Schwartz published these words. Unfortunately, it apparently 
ignored the advice of Judge Christopher Gregory Weeramantry, Judge of the 
International Court of Justice (1991-2000), to the USA Task Force handling the 
hostage crisis in Iran to research Islamic law regarding this issue. Judge 
Weeramantry explains that had the USA authorities cited the immunity granted to 
diplomats under Islamic law, it would have helped to resolve that crisis.287  
The denunciation by Muslim religious authorities of terrorist acts as 
Islamically forbidden could help to curb the phenomenon of terrorism288 and 
convince some of the perpetrators that what they are doing is strictly prohibited 
according to the dictates of their religion. In fact, some projects have already been 
established for this purpose by Muslim and Western governments. In conclusion, 
Islam is, and effectively can be, a part of the solution, and the problem should not be 
complicated by the accusations, made by some, that it is to blame for a complex 
phenomenon with political, regional and historical dimensions.  
                                                 
286 Schwartz, “International Terrorism and Islamic Law”, p. 652.  
287 Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 166. See also on the role Islamic law could have played in 
resolving the American hostage crisis in Iran, Ahmad, “The Role of Islamic Law”, p. 160. On the 
prohibition of the seizure and detention of American hostages in Tehran under Islamic law, see 
Bassiouni, “Protection of Diplomats under Islamic Law”, pp. 609-633. 
288 See El-Ayouty, “International Terrorism under the Law”, p. 497. Here Major T.R. Copinger-
Symes, British Army, writes: “We [in the West] must also continue to stress that bin Laden’s actions 
run entirely counter to the jus in bello of jihad doctrine, as well as International Law. This must be 
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Urging Jihad against Americans’ dated 23 February 1998 Justified y Islamic Law?”, pp. 229 f.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INTERNAL HOSTILITIES AND TERRORISM 
5.1 Introduction 
The Muslims’ hijrah (flight) from Mecca to Medina in 622 provided the first 
opportunity for Muslims to enjoy freedom of religion as a community and to be able 
to face the common challenges confronting them. Thus, it is no wonder that this 
incident marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar, which is called in Arabic al-
taqwīm al-hijrī (the hijrī calendar).1 After the Prophet’s arrival in Medina, he 
founded a state in this oasis and referred in the Constitution of Medina to some of the 
economic, judiciary and military aspects of this state. No less importantly, this 
Constitution makes both the Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of this state, 
particularly the Jewish community, one single ummah (nation) and stipulates that 
both the Jews and the Muslims should defend Medina in the face of any foreign 
aggression (see Chapter One). It should be added here that there are no reports of 
internal hostilities taking place between the Muslims during the Prophet’s lifetime. 
 On the day after the Prophet’s demise in 11/632, a group of the leading 
figures in the Muslim community, later to be called in Islamic jurisprudence ahl al-
hall wa al-‛aqd, gathered in a place called Saqīfah Banī Sā‛idah to choose the head 
of state who would succeed the Prophet. After some deliberations and negotiations, 
they chose Abū Bakr (d. 13/634).2 Abū Bakr’s early challenge was to deal with the 
first instance of domestic war between Muslims in the history of Islam. But what is 
                                                 
1 See John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), p. 31. 
2 See, for example, ‛Abd al-Rahman ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh Ibn Khaldūn: Al-Musammā Dīwān al-
Mubtadā’ wa al-Khabar fī Tārīkh al-‛Arab wa al-Barbar wa man ‛Āsarahum min Dhawī al-Sha’n al-
Akbar, ed. Khalīl Shih ādah (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2000/1421), Vol. 2, pp. 487-489; ‛Abd Allah ibn 
Muslim ibn Qutaybah, Al-Imāmah wa al-Siyāsah, ed. Khalīl al-Mans ūr (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
‛Ilmiyyah, 1997/1418), Vol. 1, pp. 8-20; Muhammad ibn ‛Abd Allah ibn al-‛Arabī, Ahkām al-Qur’ān, 
ed. Muhammad ‛Abd al-Qādir ‛Atā, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 2002/1424), Vol. 2, 
pp. 416 f. 
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also important here is that, since the establishment by the Prophet of a state in 
Medina, Muslims remained politically unified by an Islamic identity under one or 
more leaders in one form or another until the abolition of the Caliphate on 3 March 
1924.3 According to the jurists, the main duties of the Muslim head of state include 
the protection of the religion of Islam and the interests of the nation, as well as the 
initiation of war.4 Hence, Muslim jurists agree that appointing a head of state is a 
fard kifāyah (a collective duty on the Muslim nation).5  
On the basis of specific precedents in the early Islamic history, jurists give 
four methods for choosing the head of state: first, choosing the head of state by ahl 
al-hall wa al-‛aqd and the general public, following the precedent of the appointment 
of the first caliph, Abū Bakr (r. 632-634); second, designation of the head of state by 
his predecessor, on the basis of Abū Bakr’s designation of his successor, the second 
caliph ‛Umar ibn al-Khat tāb (r. 634/644); third, choosing the head of state from a 
number of candidates nominated by the previous head of state, as happened in the 
                                                 
3 On the abolition of the Caliphate see, Ahmed Mohsen al-Dawoody, “The Intellectual Repercussions 
of the Abolition of the Caliphate in Egypt” (M.A. thesis, Leiden University, 1999). 
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University of Cambridge Oriental Publication No. 37 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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5 See, for example, Muhammad al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī, Al-Iqnā‛ fī H all al-Fāz Abī Shujā‛, ed. Maktab 
al-Buhūth wa al-Dirasāt (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1994-5/1415), Vol. 2, p. 549; al-Māwardī, Al-Ahkām al-
Sultāniyyah, p. 4; Muhammad ibn Abī al-‛Abbās Ahmad ibn Hamzah al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj ilā 
Sharh al-Minhāj (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984/1404), Vol. 7, p. 409; Zakariyyā ibn Muhammad ibn 
Ahmad ibn Zakariyyā al-Ansārī, Asnā al-Matālib fī Sharh Rawd al-Tālib, ed. Muhammad Muhammad 
Tāmir (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 2000/1422), Vol. 4, p. 108; ‛Abd al-Hamīd al-Shirwānī, 
Hawāshī al-Shirwānī ‛alā Tuhfah al-Muhtāj bi-Sharh al-Minhāj (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 9, p. 
74; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, pp. 263 f.; ‛Abd al-Rahman ibn ‛Abd Allah al-Ba‛lī, Kashf al-
Mukhaddarāt wa al-Riyād al-Muzhirāt li-Sharh Akhsar al-Mukhtasarāt, ed. Muhammad ibn Nāsir al-
‛Ajamī (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmiyyah, 2002/1423), Vol. 2, p. 774; Ridā, Al-Khilāfah, p. 18; 
Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li-Ahkāmih wa Falsafatih fī Daw’ al-Qur’ān 
wa al-Sunnah (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2009), Vol. 2, p. 977; David De Santillana, “Law and 
Society”, in Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume, eds., The Legacy of Islam (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1931), p. 295. 
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case of the appointment of the third caliph, ‛Uthmān ibn ‛Affān (r. 644-656), who 
was chosen from among six candidates nominated by the second caliph; and, more 
importantly here, fourth, the usurpation of power or coup d’état, for which the 
precedent is the coup by ‛Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān (r. 685-705) against ‛Abd Allah 
ibn al-Zubayr6 (d. 73/692), who was killed in battle in 73/692.7 
On the one hand, the jurists agree that, once a head of state is chosen or 
successfully manages to establish himself as the ruler, even through usurpation and 
the use of force, then obedience to him becomes an obligation and rebellion against 
him is impermissible.8 Here, the Qur’ān (4:59) and several hadīths are quoted in 
support of obedience to the established ruler and prohibition of rebellion against 
him.9 On the other hand, on the basis of the same Qur’ānic verse (4:59) and hadīth, 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Hāshiyah Radd al-Muhtār, Vol. 4, p. 263; al-Ansārī, Asnā al-Matālib, 
Vol. 4, pp. 109 f.; al-Shirbīnī, Al-Iqnā‛, Vol. 2, p. 550; al-Shirwānī, Hawāshī al-Shirwānī, Vol. 9, pp. 
76-79; Ahmad al-Sāwī, Bulghah al-Sālik li-Aqrab al-Masālik, ed. Muhammad ‛Abd al-Salām Shāhīn 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1995/1414), Vol. 4, p. 220; Muhammad ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl 
Sharh ‛alā Mukhtasar Sayyid Khalīl (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1989/1409), Vol. 9, p. 196; al-Buhūtī, 
Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 159; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, pp. 263 f.; Ridā, Al-Khilāfah, pp. 
41-46; ‛Abd al-Qādir ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī: Muqāranā bi-al-Qānūn al-Wad‛ī 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‛Arabī, n.d.), Vol. 2, pp. 676 f.; Muhammad Sa‛īd Ramad ān Al-Būtī, Al-Jihād 
fī Al-Islām: Kayf Nafhamuh? Wa Kayf Numārisuh?, 5th ed. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2006/1427), p. 
148; Ann K.S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of 
Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists, London Oriental Series, Vol. 36 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), p. 18; al-Dawoody, “The Abolition of the Caliphate”, p. 31; Josef Van Ess, “Political 
Ideas in Early Islamic Religious Thought”,  British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, 
Nov., 2001, pp. 156 f. 
7 Shams al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn ‛Uthmān al-Dhahabī, Al-‛Ibar fī Khabar man Ghabar, ed. 
S alāh al-Dīn al-Munjid, 2nd ed. (Kuwait: Matba‛ah Hukūmah al-Kuwait, 1984), Vol. 1, p. 82; H.A.R. 
Gibb, “‛Abd Allāh b. al-Zubayr”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., Vol. I, pp. 54 f.; H.A.R. Gibb, 
“‛Abd al-Malik b. Marwān”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., Vol. I, pp. 76 f.  
8 See, for example, Muhammad Amīn ibn ‛Umar ibn ‛Ābidīn, Hāshiyah Radd al-Muhtār ‛alā al-Durr 
al-Mukhtār: Sharh Tanwīr al-Absār Fiqh Abū Hanīfah (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2000/1421), Vol. 4, pp. 
264 f.; Muhammad ibn ‛Abd al-Wahhāb, Mukhtasar al-Insāf wa Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, ed. ‛Abd al-‛Azīz 
ibn Zayd al-Rūmī, Muh ammad Biltājī and Sayyid Hijāb (Riyadh: Matābi‛ al-Riyādh, n.d.), p. 723; 
Ahmad ibn ‛Abd al-Halīm ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Khilāfah wa al-Mulk, Min Rasā’il Shaykh al-Islām Ibn 
Taymiyyah 4, ed. Hammād Salāmah and Muhammad ‛Īwīdah, 2nd ed. (Al-Zarqā’, Jordan: Maktabah 
al-Manār, 1994/1414), pp. 9-12; Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, 
MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), p. 78; Muh ammad H ammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of 
State: Being a Treatise on Siyar, That is Islamic Notion of Public International Law, Consisting of the 
Laws of Peace, War and Neutrality, Together with Precedents from Orthodox Practice and Preceded 
by a Historical and General Introduction, rev. & enl. 5th ed. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), 
p. 184; Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, p. 19. 
9 See, for example, h adīths numbers 6659, 6660, 6723, 6724, 6725 and 6726 in Muhammad ibn 
Ismā‛īl al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‛ al-Sahīh  al-Mukhtasar, ed. Mustafā Dīb al-Baghā, 3rd ed. (Damascus; 
Beirut: Dār ibn Kathīr, 1987/1407), Vol. 6, pp. 2591 f., 2612; hadīth number 1844 in Muslim ibn al-
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Muslims are unanimous that a command contrary to the dictates of the sharī‛ah is not 
to be obeyed.10 According to a hadīth: “There is no obedience to a human being in a 
[matter which involves] disobedience to Almighty God.”11 
This chapter will consider the various kinds of internal hostilities referred to 
in Islamic law in order to answer the following questions: (1) does Islamic law, on 
the one hand, give the Islamic state authorities the right to use force against its 
citizens if they disobey the commands issued by the authorities or, generally, in any 
other cases? The answer to this question will indicate the degree of in/tolerance the 
Islamic government should show in dealing with its opponents. On the other hand, 
(2) does Islamic law permit Muslims to rebel against the ruler/s of the Islamic state 
and to use force to change their government if, for example, they are ordered to 
comply with a command contrary to the dictates of Islam or, generally, in any other 
cases? If the answer to any of these questions is in the affirmative, then (3) what are 
the justifications of both the Islamic state authorities and its citizens for the resort to 
                                                                                                                                          
Hajjāj al-Qushayrī, Sahīh  Muslim, ed. Muhammad Fū’ād ‛Abd al-Bāqī (Beirut: Dār Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-
‛Arabī, n.d.), Vol. 3, p. 1472; hadīths numbers 2680 and 2681 in Muhammad ibn Yazīd ibn Mājah, 
Sunan Ibn Mājah, ed. Muh ammad Fū’ād ‛Abd al-Bāqī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 2, p. 995; 
hadīths numbers  7815, 7816 and 7818 in Ahmad ibn Shu‛ayb al-Nasā'ī, Sunan al-Nasā'ī al-Kubrā, 
ed. ‛Abd al-Ghaffār Sulaymān al-Bindarī and Sayyid Kasrawī Hasan (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
‛Ilmiyyah, 1991/1411), Vol. 4, pp. 431 f.; Ibrāhīm ibn ‛Alī ibn Yūsuf al-Shirāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab: fī 
Fiqh al-Imām al-Shāfi‛ī, ed. Zakariyyā ‛Imīrat (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1995/1416) Vol. 3, 
p. 249; Muhammad al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj ilā Ma‛rifah Ma‛ānī Alfāz al-Minhāj 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 4, p. 124; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, pp. 671-673; 
Hammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of State, p. 184; Abdulrahman Muhammad Alsumaih, “The Sunni 
Concept of Jihad in Classical Fiqh and Modern Islamic Thought” (PhD thesis, University of 
Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1998), p. 91 . 
10 Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Khilāfah wa al-Mulk, p. 12; Muhammad Rashīd Rid ā, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-
Hakīm: Al-Shahīr bi-Tafsīr al-Manār, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Manār, 1947-8/1367), Vol. 6, p. 367; 
Muhammad Abū Zahrah, Al-Jarīmah wa al-‛Uqūbah fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī: al-Jarīmah (Cairo: Dār al-
Fikr al-‛Arabī, 1998), p. 130; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, pp. 675 f.; Hammīdullāh, 
Muslim Conduct of State, pp. 184 f.; Bernard Lewis, Islam in History: Ideas, Men and Events in the 
Middle East (London: Alcove Press, 1973), p. 256; Lambton, State and Government in Medieval 
Islam, pp. 19, 313; Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence and Western 
Legal History”, U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 
11, 14. 
11 See, for example, hadīth number 1065 in Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Musnad al-Imām Ahmad Ibn Hanbal 
(Cairo: Mu’assasah Qurtubah, n.d.), Vol. 1, p. 129; hadīth number 279 in Ahmad ibn ‛Alī ibn al-
Muthannā, Musnad Abī Ya‛lā, ed. Husayn Salīm Asad (Damascus: Dār al-Ma'mūn lil-Turāth, 
1984/1404), Vol. 1, p. 241; h adīths numbers 33709 and 33710 in ‛Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn Abī 
Shaybah, Al-Kitāb al-Musannaf fī al-Ahādīth wa al-Āthār, ed. Kamāl Yūsuf al-Hūt (Riyadh: 
Maktabah al-Rushd, 1988-9/1409), Vol. 6, p. 544.  
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war against each other? (4) What are the Islamic laws that regulate the conduct of 
both the Islamic state army and the rebels during war? (5) To what extent do these 
laws that regulate the conduct of Muslims during such a domestic war differ from the 
laws that regulate the conduct of the Islamic state in international armed conflicts, 
i.e., war with the dār al-harb, discussed in Chapter Four? After examining the 
Islamic justifications for the use of force and the laws that regulate the conduct of 
Muslims in both international and internal conflicts, this study will investigate (6) 
whether the classical Muslim jurists treat the issues of international and domestic 
terrorism or not? If the answer is yes, then (7) what constitutes an act of terrorism 
according to Islam? And, last but not least, (8) what is the punishment for terrorists 
and their accomplices under Islamic law?  
 
5.2 Internal Hostilities 
Classical Muslim jurists treat four different kinds of internal hostilities: (1) Fighting 
against al-bughāh (rebels, secessionists); (2) fighting against al-muh āribūn/qutt ā‛ al-
t arīq (bandits, highway robbers, pirates); (3) fighting against ahl al-riddah 
(apostates) and (4) fighting against al-khawārij (roughly, violent religious fanatics).12 
Rulings concerning the use of force against bughāh and muh āribūn are based on the 
Qur’ān and, probably partly for this reason, are discussed in somewhat more detail 
compared to the other two kinds of internal hostilities – mentioned by the jurists only 
in passing – which are based on certain precedents in the first four decades after the 
Prophet’s demise. Clearly the attention paid by the jurists to the first two kinds of 
war is due particularly to the potential harm such hostilities cause to the stability and 
                                                 
12 Depending on al-Māwardī, both Majid Khadduri and Abou El Fadl omit war against al-khawārij 
from this list of the four kinds of internal conflicts (domestic jihād) treated by the classical Muslim 
jurists, see Khadduri, War and Peace,  p. 74; Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, p. 32. See al-
Māwardī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, pp. 74-87. 
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security of the Muslim community. Therefore, the use of force against bughāh and 
muh āribūn are the subject of discussion in this chapter, first, because they satisfy the 
purposes of this study and, second, because they are the principal kinds of domestic 
armed conflicts treated in Islamic law. 
 Concerning war against apostates, some jurists refer to fighting against 
apostate groups because of the unique incidents of fighting waged by the first caliph 
against certain Arab tribes who refused to pay zakāh shortly after the Prophet’s 
demise.13 It should be added here that these tribes did not renounce Islam, but, on the 
basis of their interpretation of a certain Qur’ānic pronouncement (9:103), argued that 
after the Prophet’s demise they were no longer bound to pay zakāh.14 Concerning 
fighting against apostates, al-Shāfi‛ī briefly states that, if a group apostatizes and 
engages in fighting, then the laws of war against ahl al-harb, i.e., international wars, 
apply to them.15 
 As for war against al-khawārij, the word al-khawārij refers to a group of 
Muslims who emerged during the reign of the fourth caliph, ‛Alī ibn Abī Tālib (r. 
656-661). They are defined by the jurists as a group of Muslims who believed it to be 
permissible to attack the lives and property of not only Muslim rulers, but also 
ordinary Muslim citizens, on the basis of a religious interpretation. They held that 
some of the Companions of the Prophet and Muslims who committed a major sin 
were unbelievers. As for the rules of fighting against them, while the majority of the 
                                                 
13 See Sobhi Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām (Beirut: Dār al-‛Ilm lil-
Malāyīn, 1972/1392), p. 202; M. Lecker, “Al-Ridda”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, New ed., Vol. XII, pp. 
692-694; Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, p. 44, 71-74. On apostasy in Islam see, Donna E. 
Arzt, “Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents under Islamic Law”, Wisconsin International Law 
Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1996, pp. 373-376. 
14 See, for example, Muh ammad ibn Ahmad al-Ansārī al-Qurtubī, Al-Jāmi‛ li-Ahkām al-Qur'ān 
(Cairo: Dār al-Sha‛b, n.d.), Vol. 8, p. 244; Ismā‛īl ibn ‛Umar ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‛Azīm 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1980-1/1401), Vol. 2, pp. 386 f.; al-Ans ārī, Asnā al-Matālib, Vol. 4, p. 112. 
15 Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‛rifah, [1973]/1393), Vol. 4, p. 
222. 
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jurists maintain that they are to be treated as rebels, some Hanbalī jurists hold that 
they are to be treated as apostates.16  
 
5.2.1 War against al-Bughāh 
Literally, the noun baghy means injustice or transgression. Hence, the bughāh (sing. 
bāghī) are given this name because of their injustice and transgression,17 which is 
manifested in their resort to violence in order to overthrow the ruler, secede from his 
rule or refuse to comply with an obligation. However, some Shāfi‛ī jurists point out 
that the term baghy here is not a derogatory term. Despite the fact that their 
justification for rebellion is invalid from the perspective of the majority of Muslims, 
classical Muslim jurists explain that the bughāh are excused because, from the 
perspective of the bughāh, they think that their actions are justified. Moreover, the 
condemnation of the bughāh in some hadīths and in the opinions of some jurists 
applies only to those who cannot really be defined as bughāh, i.e., those who do not 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Zayd al-Dīn ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq Sharh Kanz al-Daqā'iq, 2nd ed. (Beirut: 
Dār al-Ma‛rifah, n.d.) Vol. 5, p. 151; Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Hāshiyah Radd al-Muhtār, Vol. 4, p. 262; 
Zakariyyā ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Zakariyyā al-Ansārī, Manhaj al-Tullāb (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1997-8/1418), p. 123; ‛Alī ibn Sulaymān al-Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf fī Ma‛rifah al-
Rājih min al-Khilāf ‛alā Madhhab al-Imām Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, ed. Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqī 
(Beirut: Dār Ihyā' al-Turāth al-‛Arabī, n.d.), Vol. 10, p. 310; Muwaffaq al-Dīn ‛Abd Allah ibn Ahmad 
ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī: fī Fiqh al-Imām Ahmad Ibn Hanbal al-Shaybānī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984-
5/1405), Vol. 9, pp. 3 f., al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 161; ‛Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Sa‛īd ibn 
Hazm, Al-Muhallā (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah, n.d.), Vol. 11, p. 97; Abū Zahrah, Al-Jarīmah, p. 
126; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, pp. 682-684; al-Qarad āwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 1, 
pp. 200 f., Vol. 2, pp. 998-1001; Hammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of State, p. 177; Tamara Sonn, 
“Irregular Warfare and Terrorism in Islam: Asking the Right Questions”, in James Turner Johnson 
and John Kelsay, eds., Cross, Crescent, and Sword:  The Justification and Limitation of War in 
Western and Islamic Tradition (New York: Greenwood, 1990), pp. 135 f.; Arzt, “Heroes or Heretics”, 
pp. 376-378; Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, pp. 47, 80-86; Muhammad Hashim Kamali, 
Freedom of Expression in Islam, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1997), pp. 197-201; 
Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 13; Esposito, Unholy War, pp. 41-43. 
17 See Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛: Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, ed. Mahmūd Matrajī 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2000), Vol. 20, p. 337; al-Shirbīnī, Al-Iqnā‛, Vol. 2, p. 547; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī 
al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, p. 123; al-Ansārī, Asnā al-Matālib, Vol. 4, p. 111; al-Ba‛lī, Kashf al-Mukhaddarāt, 
Vol. 2, p. 774; Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, 197; Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and 
Violence in Islamic Law, paperback ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 37. 
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have a just cause, power or leadership.18 Put differently, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 
728/1328) adds that the term bughāh does not mean that the rebels have committed a 
sin, or that they are sinners, but fighting against them is permitted in order to prevent 
their harm (li-daf‛ dararihim) to security and stability.19 Nonetheless, according to 
Khaled Abou El Fadl “the traditional Hanafī position maintained that the rebels are 
sinners while the traditional Hanbalī view disagreed.”20 
The technical definitions given by the jurists of the four schools identify the 
bughāh as:  
a group of Muslims that possesses some power and organization (shawkah, 
man‛ah, fay’ah) and that gathers, under the command of a leader, to fight 
against a just ruler claiming, whether rightly or wrongly, that they have a 
ta’wīl (just cause, plausible interpretation) for their rebellion, secession or 
non-compliance with an obligation.21 
                                                 
18 Al-Ansārī, Asnā al-Matālib, Vol. 4, p. 112; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, p. 124; al-Ramlī, 
Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 7, p. 402; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 2, pp. 1016 f. 
19 Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Khilāfah wa al-Mulk, p. 89. 
20 Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, p. 238. 
21 See, for example, Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq, Vol. 5, p. 151; ‛Abd Allah ibn Mahmūd ibn 
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(N.p.: Dār al-Fikr, 1991/1411), Vol. 2, p. 283; Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Hāshiyah Radd al-Muhtār, Vol. 4, p. 261; 
al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 20, p. 337; ‛Alī  ibn Muhammad ibn H abīb al-Māwardī, Nas īhah al-
Mulūk, ed. Khid r Muhammad Khidr (Al-Safah, Kuwait: Maktabah al-Falāh , 1983/1403), p. 254; al-
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Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 4, pp. 298 f.; ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 195; Muwaffaq al-Dīn ‛Abd 
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Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, pp. 159, 161; Muhammad ibn Muflih , Al-Furū‛, ed. Abī al-Zahrā' 
Hāzim al-Qādī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1997/1418), Vol. 6, p. 147; Ibrāhīm ibn 
Muhammad ibn ‛Abd Allah ibn Muflih , Al-Mubdi‛ fī Sharh al-Muqni‛ (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 
1979-80/1400), Vol. 9, p. 159; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, p. 262; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol.  11, 
p. 97; Muhammad ibn ‛Alī ibn Muhammad al-Shawkānī, Al-Sayl al-Jarrār al-Mutadaffiq ‛alā 
Hadā'iq al-Azhār, ed. Mahmūd Ibrāhīm Zāyid (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1984-5/1405), Vol. 
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In fact, jurists of the different schools, and even within the same school, phrase their 
definitions differently and omit or emphasise one or more of the essential parts of the 
above definition. For example, most of the jurists stipulate that for a group to qualify 
as bughāh, they should have a leader,22 while the Hanbalī jurist al-Buhūtī (d. 
1051/1641) does not make this stipulation23 and some others do not refer to it at all. 
Also, while some jurists define the bughāh as a group who fight against a just ruler, a 
few maintain that such a group are bughāh even if they fight against an unjust ruler, 
and others are not specific on this point. The issue here is that the varying definitions 
affect who do and who do not qualify as bughāh and hence the treatment they should 
receive, as discussed below.      
A few jurists confuse the bughāh with the khawārij,24 but one of the main 
differences between them is that the bughāh fight only against the ruler and his army, 
unlike the khawārij, who indiscriminately attack all Muslims, civilians or 
otherwise.25 This confusion is presumably caused by the similarities in the historical 
circumstances in which these two categories originated, since they both arose during 
the reign of the fourth caliph. Indeed, certain precedents in early Islamic history 
serve as one of the main sources for discussion of both international and internal 
conflicts in Islam. Al-Shāfi‛ī illustrates this point when he indicates that he derived 
the rules for fighting against polytheists from the Prophet, rules for fighting against 
apostates from Abū Bakr and rules for fighting against rebels from ‛Alī ibn Abī 
                                                                                                                                          
4, p. 558; Abū Zahrah, Al-Jarīmah, pp. 125 f.; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 674; 
‛Abd al-Qādir ‛Awdah, Criminal Law of Islam, trans. Zakir Aijaz (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, reprint 
2005), Vol. I, pp. 113 f.; F.A. Klein, The Religion of Islam, 1st paperback ed. (London: Curzon Press, 
1985), p. 182. 
22 See, for example, al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 20, pp. 348 f.; al-Shirbīnī, Al-Iqnā‛, Vol. 2, p. 547; 
al-Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf, Vol. 10, p. 312; Ibn Muflih, Al-Furū‛, Vol. 6, p. 147; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-
Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 680. 
23 Al-Buhūtī, Al-Rawd al-Murbi‛, Vol. 3, p. 335. 
24 See, for example, ‛Alā al-Dīn al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛ fī Tartīb al-Sharā’i‛, 2nd ed. (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kitāb al-‛Arabī, 1982), Vol. 4, p. 140; Yūsuf ibn ‛Abd al-Barr, Al-Kāfī fī Fiqh Ahl al-Madīnah 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1986-7/1407), p. 222.   
25 Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq, Vol. 5, p. 151; Abū Zahrah, Al-Jarīmah, p. 126. 
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Tālib.26 The importance of these early precedents is particularly clear when it comes 
to the law of rebellion, more than any of the other forms of armed conflict discussed 
in Islamic law.  
However, with regard to the scriptural basis for the law of rebellion, the 
jurists refer only to the following verse: 
And if two parties of the believers fight each other, then bring reconciliation 
between them. And if one of them transgresses against the other, then fight 
against the one who transgresses until it returns to the ordinance of God. But 
if it returns, then bring reconciliation between them according to the dictates 
of justice and be fair. Indeed God loves those who are fair.27  
According to the Tafsīr literature, exegetes explain that the occasion of revelation of 
this verse relates to one of two brawls or fights between a handful of Muslim 
individuals using hands, sticks and shoes.28 Apparently, no casualties were reported 
in either of these two incidents. The interesting point here is that this verse, which 
relates to such a small incident, serves as the scriptural basis for rulings on rebellion, 
secession and war between Muslim countries. In fact, this is the verse upon which 
Muslim scholars advocate that it is permissible for Muslim countries to go to war 
against Iraq – another Muslim country – in order to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi 
                                                 
26 See al-Nawawī, Al-Majmū‛, Vol. 20, p. 337; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, p. 123; ‛Alī  ibn 
Muhammad ibn Habīb al-Māwardī, Al-Hāwī al-Kabīr: Fī Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‛ī Radī 
Allah ‛anh wa huwa Sharh Mukhtasar al-Muznī, ed. ‛Alī Muhammad Mu‛awwad and ‛Ādil Ahmad 
‛Abd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1999), Vol. 13, p. 104; al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-
Muhtāj, Vol. 7, p. 402. 
27 Qur’ān 49:9. 
28 See, for example, Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, Jāmi‛ al-Bayān ‛an Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur'ān (Beirut: 
Dār al-Fikr, 1984-5/1405), Vol. 26, pp. 127-129; Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, Vol. 4, p. 212; al-Qurtubī, Al-
Jāmi‛, Vol. 16, pp. 315 f.; Nasr ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad Abū al-Layth al-Samarqandī, Tafsīr al-
Samarqandī al-Musammā Bahr al-‛Ulūm, ed. Mahmūd Matrajī (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 3, pp. 
309 f.; Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1993), Vol. 7, pp. 560 f.; ‛Abd 
al-Rāziq ibn Hammām al-Sana‛ānī, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, ed. Mustafā Muslim Muh ammad (Riyadh: 
Maktabah al-Rushd, 1980-1/1401), Vol. 3, p. 232; Ahmad Mustafā al-Marāghī, Tafsīr al-Marāghī 
(Cairo: Mustafā al-Bābī al-Halabī, 1946/1365), Vol. 26 p. 130.  
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invasion (August 1990- February 1991).29 This doubtless exemplifies the jurists’ 
tendency to regulate their contexts according to the Qur’ānic injunctions addressing 
such or similar contexts.  
It is worth adding here that jurists of the different schools treat the law of 
rebellion under different chapters: The Hanafī30 jurists treat it under the chapters of 
Siyar or Jihād, while the Shāfi‛īs31 treat it as a separate chapter. Surprisingly, both 
the Mālikī32 and Hanbalī33 jurists treat it under the chapter of Hudūd. Hudūd (sing. 
hadd) refers to the category of punishments for crimes specifically prescribed in the 
Qur’ān or the hadīth. Hudūd crimes fall under the category of God’s rights, i.e., 
society’s rights.34 Thus, it is surprising that, some of the Mālikī and Hanbalī jurists, 
                                                 
29 Muhammad Sayyid Tantāwī, “Al-Hukm al-Shar‛ī fī Ahdāth al-Khalīj”, The Islamic Fiqh Council 
Journal, Issue No. 5, [1991/1411], pp. 68-73; Ahmad ‛Umar Hāshim, “Ma’sāh al-Ghazw al-‛Irāqī wa 
Wājib al-‛Arab wa al-Muslimīn”, The Islamic Fiqh Council Journal, Issue No. 5, [1991/1411], p. 104; 
Husayn Hāmid Hassān, “Hukm al-Sharī‛ah fī Ghazw al-Irāq lil-Kuwayt”, The Islamic Fiqh Council 
Journal, Issue No. 5, [1991/1411], pp. 191-193.  
30 See, for example, ‛Alā' al-Dīn Al-Samarqandī, Tuhfah al-Fuqahā’ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
‛Ilmiyyah, 1984/1405), Vol. 3, pp. 293-315; al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, pp. 97-142; Ibn 
Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, pp. 124-163; Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq, Vol. 5, pp. 76-155; al-
Shaykh Niz ām, Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah, Vol. 2, pp. 188-285; Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Hāshiyah Radd al-Muhtār, 
Vol. 4, pp. 119-260. 
31 See, for example, al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 4, pp. 214-226; al-Shirāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, Vol. 3, pp. 
249-255; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, pp. 123-133; al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 7, 
pp. 402-413. 
32 See, for example, al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 12, pp. 5-206; al-‛Abdarī, Al-Tāj wa al- Iklīl, Vol. 
6, pp. 229-319; al-Hattāb, Mawāhib al-Jalīl, Vol. 6, pp. 230-323; al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, 
pp. 237-358; Muhammad ‛Arafah al-Disūqī, Hāshiyah al-Disūqī ‛alā Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, ed. 
Muhammad ‛Allīsh (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 4, pp. 237-358. However, unlike other Mālikī 
jurists, Ibn ‛Abd al-Barr discusses the laws of fighting against apostates, rebels, khawārij and 
muhāribūn under the chapter of al-Jihād, see Ibn ‛Abd al-Barr, Al-Kāfī fī Fiqh Ahl al-Madīnah, pp. 
205-224. 
33 See, for example, al-Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf, Vol. 10, pp. 150-353; al-Buhūtī, Al-Rawd al-Murbi‛, Vol. 3, 
pp. 304-345; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, pp. 66-188; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, pp. 
158-308. 
34 The other two categories of punishment in Islamic law are the qis ās (lex talionis, retaliation in case 
of killing and wounding) and ta‛zīr (discretionary punishments left to the judgement of the ruler/ 
judge). For the definition of hudūd, see, for example, al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 33; al-
Shaykh Nizām, Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah, Vol. 2, p. 142; Ibn Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 83; al-
Buhūtī, Al-Rawd al-Murbi‛, Vol. 3, pp. 304 f.; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 77; al-
Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, p. 158; Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, pp. 63-68, 83-187; J.N.D. Anderson, 
“Homicide in Islamic Law”, Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4 1951, 
p. 811; ‛Abdur Rahmān I. Doi, Sharī‛ah: The Islamic Law (London: Ta Ha, 1984/1404), pp. 221-228; 
Sulaymān ‛Abd al-Rahman al-Haqīl, Haqīqah Mawqif al-Islām min al-Tatarruf wa al-Irhāb (Riyadh: 
N.p., 2001/1421), p. 143; Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia, 
Studies in Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 8 (Brill: Leiden, 2000), pp. 240 f.; Frank E. Vogel, “The 
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unjustifiably include baghy among the hudūd crimes, which are: (1) 
fornication/adultery; (2) unproved accusation of fornication/adultery; (3) wine 
drinking; (4) theft; (5) hirābah and (6) apostasy.35 The intriguing question here is 
why these Mālikī and Hanbalī jurists treat the law of rebellion under category of 
hudūd crimes particularly since the Qur’ānic verse above does not specify any 
punishment for the act of rebellion, let alone the fact that the act of rebellion is not 
criminalized in Islam, as explained below. Considering a possible answer to this 
question and finding the answers to the first three questions raised in the introduction 
of this chapter require examining the classical jurists’ opinions on the permissibility 
of rebellion in Islam. Answers to all four questions can be sought in the jurists’ 
opinions on this issue. 
 
5.2.1.1 Is Rebellion Permissible in Islamic Law?  
At the outset, it is worth noting here that, first, classical Muslim jurists do not 
directly raise the specific question: Is rebellion permissible in Islam? So no direct or 
an easy answer to this question is given by the jurists. Second, Abou El Fadl, in his 
pioneering work on the area of rebellion in Islamic law, repeatedly affirms that the 
Islamic classical juristic rules on rebellion have been “ignored” in both outsider and 
modern insider scholarship.36 However, in the scant discussions of this question in 
                                                                                                                                          
Trial of Terrorists under Classical Islamic Law”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, 
Winter 2002, pp. 58-61. 
35 It is worth adding here that the Shāfi‛ī jurist Muhammad al-Ghazālī (b. 450/1058 d. 505-1111) also 
adds baghy to the above hudūd crimes. He treats these crimes under: Chapter of the Crimes for 
prescribed Punishments (Kitāb al-Jinayāt al-Mūjbah lil‛qūbāt). However, al-Ghazālī, like all the other 
scholars who do the same, does not give any punishment for baghy. See Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Al-
Wajīz fī Fiqh al-Imām al-Shāfi‛ī, ed. ‛Alī Mu‛awwad and ‛Ādil ‛Abd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-
Arqam ibn Abī al-Arqam, 1997/1418), Vol. 2, pp. 163-182; Muhammad al-Ghazālī, Al-Wasīt fī al-
Madhhab, ed. Ahmad Mah mūd Ibrāhīm and Muhammad Muhammad Tāmir (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 
1997/1417), Vol. 6, pp. 413-512. Also al-Haqīl, a contemporary scholar in Saudi Arabia, includes 
baghy among the above hudūd crimes and claims that the punishment of the crime of baghy is capital 
punishment, see al-Haqīl, Haqīqah Mawqif al-Islām, pp. 143, 150-153. 
36 Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, pp. 5, 8, 20 f. See also Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in 
Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 2. 
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Western literature, certain renowned scholars have given rather clear-cut and simple, 
yet different, answers from those of the classical Muslim jurists considered below.  
Fazlur Rahman claims that Islamic law “prohibits rebellion under almost any 
condition… [thus, he adds that, there is no law] of social or political protest against 
the government in Islam… [Muslim jurists, he reaffirms] prohibited all uprisings 
against an established rule.”37 Likewise, John Kelsay writes: “When is rebellion 
justified? The answer is, almost never.”38 However, Bernard Lewis, simply 
reiterating Khadduri’s position,39 claims that according to the juristic literature, “it is 
clear that what the jurists have in mind is not an attempt to overthrow the regime, but 
merely to withdraw from it and establish an independent state within a certain 
territory. In a word, their concern is not with revolution, but with secession.”40 Thus, 
Rahman and Kelsay agree that Muslim jurists virtually prohibit rebellion, while 
Lewis claims, and before him Khadduri’s treatment mainly suggests, that the jurists 
do not even contemplate the permissibility of overthrowing the regime. Although 
Lewis, like Khadduri, restricts the jurists’ discussions to secession, he does not 
explain whether the jurists prohibit it or not. 
Concerning the classical jurists’ answer to this question, as noted above, the 
jurists agree in principle that, once a person assumes the position of head of state 
either by the choice of the people or by usurpation and the use of force, it is 
impermissible for Muslims to rebel against him. But giving a satisfactory answer to 
this question requires referring to a number of different cases concerning the head of 
state that were addressed by the jurists.  
                                                 
37 Fazlur Rahman, “The Law of Rebellion in Islam”, in Jill Raitt, ed., Islam in the Modern World: 
1983 Paine Lectures in Religion (Columbia, MO.: University of Missouri-Columbia, n.d.), p. 1. 
38 John Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John 
Knox, 1993), p. 88. 
39 Khadduri, War and Peace, pp. 77-79. 
40 Lewis, Islam in History, p. 261. 
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First case: if the head of state fulfils the ten duties of his position, explained 
by the jurists, and maintains justice. Unsurprisingly, the jurists are unanimous that 
there is no need for rebellion against him in this case, even if he assumed the position 
through a coup, because revolting against him, the jurists warn, would lead to fitnah, 
bloodshed, instability and public disorder. 
Second case: if the head of state apostatizes from Islam. The jurists here are 
unanimous that khurūj, rebelling, against the head of state in this case is compulsory, 
Rashīd Ridā (d. 1354/1935) explains.41  
Third case: if the head of state becomes physically or mentally unable to 
carry out the duties of his position – if, for example, he becomes insane, terminally 
ill or if he is captured by enemies. In this case, the head of state is to be deposed and 
a new one is to be appointed in his place.42 If the regime prevents the appointment of 
a new head of state – bearing in mind the jurists’ agreement that it is the collective 
obligation of Muslims to appoint a head of state – it is to be expected that any jurist 
would call for the appointment of a new head of state, even through the resort to 
force, particularly, because all Muslims would be guilty if they remain without a 
head of state.  
Fourth case: if the head of state commands the Muslims to commit a sin or do 
something that absolutely contradicts the sharī‛ah. According to Abou El Fadl, 
Hanafī and some of the Shāfi‛ī and Mālikī jurists permit rebellion against the head of 
state based on the Islamic dictum: no obedience in sin.43 Moreover, Ridā asserts that 
“permitting an act whose prohibition is unanimously agreed upon, such as 
                                                 
41 Rid ā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 6, p. 367. See also Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, pp. 92 f. 
Ibn ‛Ābidīn here only indicates that the ruler is to be deposed and thus did specifically mention that 
Muslims should resort to the use of force in order to overthrow him, see Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Hāshiyah Radd 
al-Muhtār, Vol. 4, p. 264. 
42 See, for example, al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, pp. 132 f.; Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Hāshiyah Radd al-
Muhtār, Vol. 4, p. 264; Hammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of State, p. 184; Lambton, State and 
Government in Medieval Islam, p. 313. 
43 Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 13.  
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adultery/fornication, wine drinking, the annulment of hudūd or a law, which God 
does not permit, is unbelief and apostasy.”44 Therefore, Ridā here links this case to 
the second one. In other words, rebellion in this case, according to him, is 
compulsory.  
 Fifth case: if the head of state is unjust and a tyrant. Only a minority of the 
jurists, including Ibn ‛Uqayl, Ibn al-Jawzī and al-Juwaynī, and later Ridā, permit 
rebellion in this case, but rebellion and the resort to the use of force to overthrow the 
head of state is permitted in this case only after he ignores calls to stop his injustice 
and tyranny. The precedent given by this minority of jurists in support of their 
position in this case is the rebellion of the Prophet’s grandson, al-Husayn, against 
Yazīd ibn Mu‛āwiyah,45 when the former was tragically killed in the battle in 
Muh arram 61/October 680. According to this minority, if the ruler commits injustice, 
destroys the rights of Muslims or does not protect the religion and the interest of the 
Muslim nation, then Muslims are permitted to overthrow him, because he is 
betraying the very purposes for which he was appointed. But according to some 
among this minority, if overthrowing the ruler will lead to fitnah, Muslims should 
apply the juristic principle of “choosing the lesser of two evils”, i.e., choosing which 
is the less harmful – the ruler’s injustice or suffering the consequences of fitnah and 
the shedding of Muslim blood.46 Although these are reasonably convincing 
justifications for rebellion, it should be reaffirmed here that this position is 
                                                 
44 Ridā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 6, p. 367. 
45 Ibn Muflih, Al-Furū‛, Vol. 6, p. 153; al-Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf, Vol. 10, p. 311; Ridā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 
Vol. 6, p. 367. 
46 Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Hāshiyah Radd al-Muhtār, Vol. 4, p. 264; Rid ā, Al-Khilāfah, p. 22; ‛Awdah, Al-
Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 677. 
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maintained by only a tiny minority among the jurists. Moreover, jurists who refer to 
the minority’s position hasten to add the majority’s denunciation of it.47  
According to the majority of the jurists, rebellion against the unjust ruler is 
prohibited in this case, even under the justification of the Islamic principle of 
“enjoining good and preventing evil.” Simply, the jurists here prefer that Muslims be 
patient and endure the injustice and tyranny of the ruler. Their justification for this 
position is clear, however. Rebellion is prohibited because, if Muslims are permitted 
to resort to force in order to overthrow the unjust ruler and appoint another, this will 
lead to fitnah, bloodshed and a state of anarchy during which people’s lives and 
property will not be safe.48  
Thus, the majority of the jurists here base their position on purely pragmatic 
calculations, and disregard the precedent given by the minority of the jurists in 
support of the right of Muslims to overthrow their ruler in this case. In accordance 
with the juristic principle of “choosing the lesser of two evils”, the majority of the 
jurists weighed the damaging consequences of rebellion against the ruler’s injustice 
and strongly advocated, according to their calculations, that rebellion against the 
ruler would lead to more catastrophic consequences than his injustice, i.e., fitnah, 
bloodshed and a state of anarchy. It should be added here that the majority of the 
jurists’ prohibition of rebellion in this case is the result of calculations that reflect 
their genuine concern for the interests of the Muslim nation. In other words, the 
jurists are not giving sanctity to unjust or corrupt regimes, specifically since they 
                                                 
47 Ibn Muflih, Al-Furū‛, Vol. 6, p. 153; al-Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf, Vol. 10, p. 311; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-
Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 677. 
48 Ibn Muflih, Al-Furū‛, Vol. 6, p. 153; al-Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf, Vol. 10, p. 311; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-
Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 677; al-Būtī, Al-Jihād fī Al-Islām, p. 153; Ahmad Mahmūd Krīmah, Al-
Jihād fī al-Islām: Dirāsah Fiqhiyyah Muqāranah (Cairo: al-Dār al-Handasiyyah, 2003/1424), pp. 61 
f. 
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were mainly independent jurist-scholars whose judgements here aimed at ensuring 
the interests of the Muslim nation in accordance with the Islamic principles. 
 Sixth case: more interestingly and significantly, if a person manages to 
overthrow the ruler and establish himself in the ruler’s place through the use of force, 
should he be accepted as the legitimate ruler or should Muslims rebel against him? 
As referred to above, the jurists recognize the usurpation of power or coup d’état as 
the fourth method for the establishment of the head of state. In other words, the 
jurists here legitimize any de facto ruler who comes to power through a rebellion and 
prohibited a revolt against him. This means that the direct prohibition of rebellion 
against the ruler amounts to indirect permission for any future successful rebellion. 
Moreover, the jurists do not criminalize the act of rebellion and even accept and 
legitimate the authority of the successful rebel, but only after it becomes a de facto 
situation. The rationale for this position is, significantly, exactly the same as the 
rationale put forward by the majority of the jurists’ for their adamant prohibition of 
rebellion against the unjust ruler. That is to say that, rebelling against the rebel who 
manages to overthrow the ruler and to take control of power will lead to fitnah, 
bloodshed and a state of anarchy during which people’s lives and property will not 
be safe.49  
 Hence, it is quite evident that the jurists’ overarching concern regarding the 
permissibility of rebellion is the prevention of bloodshed and maintaining stability, 
particularly in the fifth and sixth cases. Remarkably, however, the jurists do not raise 
this concern when it comes to the cases in which the dictates of the sharī‛ah are 
contradicted, or even merely not assuredly protected. For example, in the second and 
third cases, namely, if the head of state apostatizes or becomes permanently unable to 
                                                 
49 Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 5; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 159; al-Rahaybānī, 
Matālib, Vol. 6, p. 264. 
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carry out the duties of the position, obviously there is no assurance that the sharī‛ah 
is protected, let alone if, as in the fourth case, the head of state commands the 
Muslims to commit something which is absolutely against the sharī‛ah.  
Therefore, in answer to the second question posed at the beginning of this 
chapter, it can be concluded here that, yes, the jurists unreservedly permit rebellion 
against the ruler if, first, Muslims are ordered to obey a command contrary to the 
sharī‛ah, as in the fourth case; second, if the ruler does not protect the religion and 
the interests of Muslims, as in the second and third cases; and, for a minority of 
jurists, if he does not maintain justice or the rights of the citizens, as in the fifth case. 
Unlike the unreserved permission for rebellion in these cases, the majority of the 
jurists take a completely different approach in response to the fifth and the sixth 
cases, where their approach can be characterized as reserved, cautious, pragmatic and 
sometimes indirect. In brief, the jurists’ calculation of which is the lesser evil – 
rebellion against the unjust ruler or enduring his injustice – reflects these 
characterizations. Thus, their answer to whether Muslims are permitted to rebel 
against the unjust ruler or not, as it is simply and beautifully put by Abou El Fadl, is: 
“it depends.”50 That is to say, if the good of rebellion outweighs its expected harm, 
then it is permissible, otherwise it is not.          
However, in all cases the jurists’ responses are extremely succinct when it 
comes to the permissibility of rebellion and only a minority of jurists touch upon this 
issue. Some jurists use the terms khal‛ al-imām or ‛azl al-imām (deposing the ruler) 
in reference to situations that do not explicitly indicate whether it is rebellion to 
overthrow the ruler or a peaceful change of regime that is implied, but in most cases, 
the jurists use both these terms in the sense of overthrowing the ruler. This is made 
                                                 
50 Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, p. 331. 
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the more clear since they do not explain how a peaceful change of a regime might 
take place or who should be in charge of this task, and it must be borne in mind that 
most of the classical jurists who compiled the Islamic juristic rules discussed here 
lived under the rule of two dynasties who came to power through rebellions, i.e., the 
Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) and the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258).51 In the cases 
where the jurists explicitly mean rebellion against the ruler, they used the term al-
khurūj ‛alā al-imām (literally, coming out against the ruler), i.e., rebellion against the 
ruler. This caution about being specific is most likely due to the fear of giving any 
unwarranted or misunderstood justification for resorting to the use of force among 
Muslims. Apparently, this is the result of some tragic incidents of civil war among 
the Muslims in the early history of Islam. 
In answer to the first question set out at the beginning of this chapter, by the 
same token, if Muslims are explicitly permitted to rebel against their ruler if they are 
ordered to obey a command contrary to the sharī‛ah, then the Islamic state authorities 
a fortiori have the right to use force if the Muslim citizens insisted on disobeying a 
command given by the state authorities that is explicitly based on the dictates of the 
sharī‛ah. The most obvious example here is the war waged by the first caliph against 
certain Arab tribes who refused to pay zakāh after the Prophet’s demise. But the 
interesting part of the answer to this question lies in cases where Muslim citizens, or 
at least a group of Muslims, disagree with, and start to challenge, the ruler or other 
government officials on the justness or the legitimacy of a command issued by the 
state authorities, or on another issue. The term used by the jurists to describe the 
rebels’ disagreement with the state authorities on the justness or the legitimacy of a 
                                                 
51 On the Umayyad and Abbasid’s conception of the institution of the Caliphate and role of the 
Caliphs, see Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, pp. 59-96. On the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate 
see, Khalid Yahya Blankinship, The End of the Jihād State: The Reign of Hishām Ibn ‛Abd al-Malik 
and the Collapse of the Umayyads (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994). 
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command is that the rebels have a ta’wīl (just cause, plausible interpretation) 
concerning a command issued, or a position taken, by the state authorities. The 
answer in this case can be concluded from the jurists’ discussions of the Islamic jus 
in bello addressing the law of fighting against rebels, discussed below. Significantly, 
their answer indicates the degree of tolerance the Islamic government should show in 
dealing with its internal opponents. Briefly, according to the Islamic regulations on 
fighting against rebels, before resorting to the use of force, the Islamic ruler has to 
send an envoy to engage with the rebels in discussions over the justness or 
legitimacy of their ta’wīl, i.e., their cause for non-compliance with a command, or 
staging a rebellion or secession. In the light of the results of the discussions with the 
rebels, the state authorities either must accept the rebels’ demands and annul the 
command issued by the state and/or correct whatever injustices or illegalities 
perpetrated by the state, or else resort to the use of force to put down their rebellion if 
they do not respond to the state’s demands. 
Therefore, in answer to the third question set out at the beginning of this 
chapter, whether either Islamic state authorities or Muslim citizens can resort to the 
use of force against each other is covered mainly under the following three 
considerations: first, violation of the dictates of the sharī‛ah; second, security, 
stability and public order of the Muslim nation; and third, protection of the citizens’ 
rights and maintenance of justice. On the one hand, the Islamic state may resort to 
the use of force against a group of its citizens under the justification of the latter’s 
persistently violating a sharī‛ah obligation. On the other hand, the same justification 
may also apply to a rebellion if the state imposes on the citizens an obligation that 
contradicts the sharī‛ah. In either case, this justification is based on the Islamic 
dictum: no obedience in sin. Obviously, the Islamic state may use force against 
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rebels under the justification of maintaining security, public order and stability, if the 
rebels resort to violence after the state has reached the conclusion that their demands 
are illegal or unjustifiable. Here the jurists unanimously emphasise that the objective 
of fighting against the rebels is not to eliminate them but to bring them into 
obedience to the ruler and thus prevent fitnah and public disorder.52 It is worth 
recalling here that the majority of Muslim jurists prohibit rebellion against unjust 
rulers under the same justification of maintaining security and public order, and the 
same justification applies to the obligation of the state to use force against bandits, 
highway robbers and pirates, discussed below. Concerning the third justification, a 
minority of jurists permit Muslim citizens to resort to violence to change an Islamic 
government if it has failed to carry out its obligations of protecting Muslims’ rights 
and maintaining justice. 
In the light of the above discussion of the permissibility of rebellion in 
Islamic law and the justifications for the use of force of either the Islamic state or 
Muslim citizens against each other, the answer to the intriguing question of why the 
Mālikī and Hanbalī jurists treat the law of rebellion under the category of hudūd 
crimes remains unknown. Moreover, the fact that Ibn Taymiyyah and some other 
Hanbalī jurists maintain that rebellion is not a sinful act, let alone the Shāfi‛ī jurists 
who argue that the term baghy, the jurists’ technical term for rebellion, is not a 
derogatory term, adds to the mystery of this Mālikī and Hanbalī position. It is to be 
hoped that an answer to this question may still be deduced from the jurists’ 
                                                 
52 See, for example, Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 5; al-Ansārī, Asnā al-Matālib, Vol. 4, p. 113; 
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discussions of the regulations concerning fighting against rebels and, particularly, if 
there is any punishment to be imposed on rebels for using force to overthrow the 
regime or secede from its rule.  
 
5.2.1.2 Regulations Concerning War against Rebels 
As in their approach to international armed conflicts, the jurists discuss the Islamic 
jus in bello against rebels in considerably more detail than is found in their scant 
discussion of the jus ad bellum addressing both the Islamic state’s and the rebels’ 
recourse to the use of force against each other. Before discussing the regulations for 
fighting against rebels, the jurists stipulate certain conditions needed for a Muslim 
group to be legally identified, or more precisely qualified, as rebels, and thereby 
treated accordingly under the Islamic law on rebellion, popularized in the Western 
literature by Abou El Fadl as Ahkām al-Bughāh. Certainly, the reason for stipulating 
these conditions is to make it possible to differentiate the rebels, who are to be 
treated according to a law specific to them, from the other categories of Muslims 
who resort to the use of force such as the khawārij and the muh āribūn. This is 
because the rebels are to receive different treatment from these last two categories 
both during and, more importantly, after the cessation of fighting. But more 
importantly, the aim is to regulate the recourse to the use of force among Muslims by 
ensuring that there are specific legitimate grounds and not to give a blank cheque for 
any citizen to use force against the government.  
 The jurists generally stipulate the following three conditions for a group of 
Muslims to be treated as rebels: First, the rebels must have shawkah/man‛ah/fay’ah, 
force, power and organization. However, the jurists do not agree on the amount of 
force or power that the rebels must possess for the definition to apply. They attempt 
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to set general broad lines for shawkah in terms of the number of rebels and the force 
they possess.53 For example, the Shāfi‛ī jurist al-Shirbīnī vaguely indicates that 
shawkah means that rebels constitute a large number,54 while for al-Mirdāwī from 
the Hanbalī school it means that they are not small in number.55 Some Shāfi‛ī jurists 
state that if a group manages to control a stronghold56 or a town,57 this means that 
they have a shawkah, because, if they manage to control a stronghold or a town, it 
indicates that they have a large number of people and/or military force. Some jurists 
stipulate that the rebels must have a leader to fulfil the requirement of shawkah.58 
But the most practical indication is whether the state needs to call on the army to put 
down their rebellion.59 It is obvious from all these different ways of measuring the 
rebels’ power that what the jurists mean is that rebels must be a unified group who 
have popular support for their act of rebellion or secession and that they are unified 
under the command of a leader. 
The significance of the requirement of shawkah is that it indicates that the 
rebels potentially, though not necessarily, have a just cause and therefore, and more 
importantly, they are not a handful of individuals of criminals, violent religious 
extremists, a clandestine organization or terrorists.60 Moreover, if shawkah were not 
a condition for the status of rebels, any handful of individuals might resort to the use 
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of force against the government under whatever justification they claim, and escape 
punishment.61 Thus, if a group of Muslims who do not have a shawkah but claim that 
they have a just cause, or vice versa, commit murder or destroy any property during 
their recourse to the use of force in a rebellion, they will not be treated under the law 
of rebellion. Therefore, importantly, according to al-Shāfi‛ī, they will be punished 
like any other criminals for the crimes they commit,62 while for Abū Hanīfah and Ibn 
Hanbal they are to be punished according to the law of hirābah, i.e., as highway 
robbers if they commit acts punishable under that law.63  
Second, the rebels must have a ta’wīl, put simply, a justification for the 
recourse to rebellion. This justification relates to what the rebels claim to be illegal 
decisions taken, or any injustice inflicted upon them, by the government. The rebels’ 
interpretation or explanation of this justification may be based on religious or 
political grounds or it may be simply a complaint of injustice inflicted upon them.64 
It is worth reaffirming here that there is sometimes no clear distinction between what 
is based on religious and what is based on purely political considerations and that in 
many cases the religious and political considerations, as well as the dictates of 
justice, overlap in Islamic theory and practice.  
Importantly, the jurists agree that it is not necessary that the rebels’ claim 
regarding illegal or unjust decisions issued by the government should be true or 
valid. Some jurists do stipulate that the rebels’ interpretation should be plausible and 
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that if it is blatantly and obviously false, they will not be treated as rebels,65 but 
according to the majority of jurists, the mere fact that the rebels believe that their 
justification for rebellion to be valid gives them the right to recourse to rebellion, 
provided that the other conditions are fulfilled. This stance indicates the jurists’ 
concern not to leave the judgment of  the validity of the rebels’ justifications for 
rebellion in the hands of their opponents, i.e., the state authorities. More importantly, 
the jurists’ leniency, which is manifested in acknowledging the potential validity of 
the rebels’ justifications, is explained by drawing a parallel with the mistakes made 
by jurists.66 Jurists who make mistakes in their judgements nevertheless, 
undoubtedly do their utmost to reach the right judgement and obviously, in their own 
opinion, believe their judgements to be right. Likewise, in the opinion of the rebels 
their justifications for rebellion are right, and this is considered by the jurists to be 
reasonable grounds for the right to rebellion, if the other conditions are met. This is 
despite the fact that jurists tend to suggest that rebels’ justifications are likely not to 
be valid, possibly because the rebels’ opinion is still that of the minority. But this 
leniency does not amount to a licence for an immediate resort to violence because, 
before the initiation of acts of violence, the state should approach the rebels in order 
to address the causes for which they intend to resort to violence so that a potential 
conflict might be prevented through negotiation and reconciliation.  
Significantly, the word ta’wīl is specifically used by the jurists here because, 
in one sense, it means ‘interpretation’, which is used in cases where matters are not 
conclusively and absolutely clear. This means that different understandings and 
interpretations of, or in other words, disagreements on, such cases are not unwelcome 
for investigations. Thus, the rebels’ disagreement with the government on its 
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allegedly un-Islamic or unjust decision is considered by the majority of the jurists as 
reasonable grounds for resorting to rebellion, provided that the rebels have popular 
support, shawkah, because, if shawkah were not required, individuals would invent a 
ta’wīl to justify their recourse to violence. On the other hand, it stands to reason that, 
if a group of Muslims have a shawkah but do not provide a ta’wīl for resorting to 
violence, they will be treated as criminals, not rebels. 
Third, there must be an act of khurūj, rebellion against the head of state or 
other state authorities. Some Mālikī jurists restrict khurūj to acts of rebellion against 
the head of state alone, while others also include his deputy.67 Khurūj (literally: 
‘coming out against’) means the use of force to overthrow the head of state and 
install another in his place. Here some jurists distinguish between using force to 
overthrow a head of state who is appointed in accordance with one of the first three 
methods of appointing the head of state listed above, and one who has reached this 
position through a coup, the fourth method. Al-Nawawī permits rebellion to 
overthrow a head of state who has come to power through a coup, but not if he has 
been appointed by one of the other methods.68 Al-Nawawī here is advocating what is 
to some extent an equivalent of the world’s increasing tendency towards what is 
nowadays called the prohibition of the violent overthrow of democratically elected 
governments.69 Other jurists explain that if a group attempts to violently overthrow 
the head of state, not because of his injustice but because they claim that they have 
the right to rule, then the head of state has the right to put down their rebellion and 
the masses should support him against such rebels.70  
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Thus, the main point here is that, for an act of khurūj to be treated under the 
law of rebellion, there must be a mughālabah (conflict, fighting, use of force), or in 
the words of the Hanafī jurist Ibn Najīm, that taking of a town by force.71 Therefore 
the rebels, as described by ‛Allīsh, are al-muqātilah72 (the combatants) who use 
violence against the ruler and “therefore, whoever disobeys the ruler without 
resorting to the use of force is not a rebel.”73 Hence, other forms of disobedience to 
the ruler, such as peaceful or passive disobedience, do not render the ruler’s 
opponents rebels.74 According to ‛Awdah; Mālik, Shāfi‛ī, Ibn Hanbal and the 
Zāhirīs, the actual use of violence is necessary in order for opponents of the state to 
be classified as rebels, while for Abū Hanīfah they become rebels as soon as they 
assemble in preparation for fighting. It is worth noting here that Abū Hanīfah’s 
decision is based on purely pragmatic military considerations, because if the head of 
state waits until the rebels actually use force, he may not be able to mount a defence 
against their attack.75    
However, Abou El Fadl argues that for most medieval jurists “a passive act of 
non-compliance” with an obligation qualifies as an act of rebellion and is therefore, 
subject to the law of rebellion.76 But this argument is not supported by what Abou El 
Fadl claims is the opinion of most medieval jurists and so the significance of his 
insistence on this argument is unclear. This argument is based on a false premise 
because the law of rebellion, according to the majority of jurists, applies only once 
                                                 
71 Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq, Vol. 5, p. 152. 
72 ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 195. 
73 ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 195. Kamali notes here that the rebel’s action is legally treated as 
rebellion: “only when it is accompanied by force which challenges the authority of the imām”, 
Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam, p. 199. See also Ilesanmi, Simeon O. “Just War Theory in 
Comparative Perspective: A Review Essay”, Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000, p. 151.  
74 Al-Hattāb, Mawāhib al-Jalīl, Vol. 6, p. 278; ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 195; ‛Awdah, Al-
Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 687. 
75 ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, pp. 688 f. See also Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in 
Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 20. 
76 Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence”, pp. 13, 19, 25. 
 298
the rebels actually use force or, according to Abū Hanīfah, once they assemble to 
fight. Practically speaking, to borrow the example given by Abou El Fadl, “if a group 
of Muslims refuse to pay taxes, this is an act of khuruj (assuming that there is a 
ta’wil and shawka). There are two options, the state can force such a group to pay 
taxes and not apply ahkam al-bughah. Alternatively, the state can force such a group 
to pay taxes and apply ahkam al-bughah.”77 Concerning the second option, 
according to the law of rebellion, the state cannot use force against such a group, as 
Abou El Fadl himself notes,78 unless it has determined that the reasons  for their 
refusal to pay taxes are illegitimate and unless the group use violence or assemble for 
it, as shown above.  
 If the three conditions referred to above are met by any Muslim group that 
attempts to use violence to overthrow the ruler, or to secede from his rule, or to reject 
the application of the law, the ruler should send an envoy to ask them the reasons for 
their rebellion. If the rebels prove that an injustice has been inflicted upon them, the 
state should remove the injustice, and if they have any disagreement with or 
misunderstanding about one of the ruler’s commands or positions, the state should 
clarify the misunderstanding and explain its position to the rebels. If the rebels still 
insist on resorting to force after the injustice has been removed and the state’s 
position has been clarified, the rebels should be advised to abandon their 
determination to use violence and to return to being obedient to the ruler. It is 
interesting to note here that some jurists add that, if the rebels pay no heed to this 
advice, the state should call on them to attend a munāz arah, a public debate, to 
determine who is right and who is wrong. If the rebels reject all these procedures, 
they should be warned that the state will use force to put down their rebellion. 
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Finally, if all these attempts to prevent potential civil conflict peacefully through this 
process of negotiation and reconciliation fail, the state is left with no option but to 
use force to put down the rebellion after the rebels initiate acts of violence, according 
to the majority of the jurists, or, according to Abū Hanīfah, once they assemble to 
fight.79 
 If the rebels ask the ruler to give them a period of time to reach a decision 
about whether to resort to the use of force or to cancel their plans for rebellion, the 
decision should be left to the discretion of the ruler. If the ruler believes that the 
rebels are sincere in asking for this period of time so that they can reconsider their 
decision, he should give them the period of time they have asked for, but if the ruler 
believes that asking for this period of time is a strategy so that they can regroup or 
have more time to receive military reinforcements, the ruler should not give them 
this period of time.80    
 It is interesting to note here that this Islamic process of preventing a potential 
civil conflict coincides in some respects with the current international approach to 
resolving civil conflicts through negotiation and reconciliation, as Kirsti Samuels 
explains in her case study of the almost decade-long civil conflict in Sierra Leone 
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which began in 1991.81 Nevertheless, significantly, the classical jurists give two 
different reasons for obligating the Islamic state to follow this peaceful approach in 
resolving civil conflicts: first, this is what the Qur’ānic verse (49:9) dictates and, 
second, this is the approach followed by the fourth caliph, ‛Alī ibn Abī Tālib, in 
resolving civil conflicts during his reign, namely the battles of al-Jamal 36/656 and 
al-Nahrawān 38/ 658.82 These reasons exemplify the importance of the scriptural 
basis and early Islamic precedents in formulating Islamic laws. 
In answer to the fourth question posed at the beginning of this chapter, if a 
military confrontation with the rebels becomes inevitable, the Islamic state army 
must abide by the rules regulating this kind of domestic conflict. It is striking to note 
that the jurists tend to apply these rules to the conduct of one party to the conflict, the 
Islamic state army, but not to the other, the rebels. In other words, the jurists fail to 
include the rebels in the obligation to follow these rules and neither do they develop 
any particular set of rules to regulate their conduct during the war, unless the jurists 
mean to imply that the rebels too are expected to abide by the same rules as the state. 
In their discussions of the Islamic jus in bello governing war against rebels, classical 
Muslim jurists address the main issues treated under the regulations governing 
international armed conflicts, discussed in Chapter Four. The main difference 
between the laws governing international wars and those that apply to internal 
hostilities, particularly in this instance war against rebels, is a number of laws 
relating to post war issues, such as the liability of the rebels for the destruction of 
lives and property, the collaboration of the rebels with the dār a-harb, and the taxes 
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collected and judgments passed by the rebels during their secession or control of a 
town or a village. 
 
5.2.1.2.1 Non-Combatant Immunity  
As with the rules of international armed conflicts, the jurists agree that non-
combatants accompanying the rebels during war operations, such as women, 
children, the aged, the wounded and the blind, cannot be targeted.83 But if, for 
example, women, farmers or slaves engage in the fighting, they can be targeted, 
exactly as in international armed conflicts.84 As for the rebel fighters, the Shāfi‛ī and 
Hanbalī jurists maintain that they can be targeted only when they are actually 
fighting (muqbilīn), i.e., when they are attacking. In other words, the “rebels could 
not be pursued if in rout”85 or if they are escaping (mudbirīn). Hence, if the rebels 
lay down their arms, escape from the combat, or are in any other hors de combat 
situation as a result, for example, of being injured or captured, they cannot be 
killed.86 It is only if these rebels, in the words of the Hanafī jurists, join another 
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group in order to continue the fighting or, in the words of the Mālikī jurists, 
constitute a danger to the state army, that they can be pursued and/or killed.87  
Concerning the rebels’ collaboration with the dār a-harb, some Shāfi‛ī jurists 
advocate that, if a part of the dār a-harb that has a peace treaty with the Islamic state 
collaborates with the rebels and fights alongside them against the Islamic state, this 
revokes the peace treaty.88 Moreover, if the rebels conclude a treaty granting amān, 
quarter and safe conduct, with the dār al-harb on condition that the latter will 
support the rebels in the fighting against the Islamic state, this treaty will be binding 
only on the rebels and not on the Islamic state. But if the rebels conclude such a 
treaty without stipulating the military support of the dār al-harb in the fighting 
against the Islamic state, the treaty is binding on both the rebels and the Islamic 
state.89  
 
5.2.1.2.2 Indiscriminate Weapons 
The jurists’ discussions of the use of weapons in war against the rebels address solely 
the permissibility of the use of indiscriminate weapons such as mangonels (a weapon 
for catapulting large stones),90 fire, flooding and poisoning. This reflects the same 
concern shown by the jurists in their discussions of the use of weapons in war against 
non-Muslims, discussed in Chapter Four. The main concern of the jurists’ 
discussions of the use of weapons in both domestic and international conflicts is the 
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risk to the lives of non-combatants through the use of such indiscriminate weapons. 
Here the jurists are divided into three groups concerning the permissibility of using 
these weapons in military actions against rebels. First, the Shāfi‛ī jurists prohibit 
them.91 Second, the Hanbalī jurists also prohibit them, except in cases of military 
necessity92 or in reciprocity.93 Third, the Hanafī and Mālikī jurists permit the use of 
indiscriminate weapons, although some Mālikī jurists add that this permission is 
valid only if there are no women or children among the rebels.94 
 It is worth adding here that the jurists of the four schools unanimously agree 
that it is not permitted for the state army to use weapons confiscated from the rebels 
to fight against them, except in cases of dire military necessity.95 The Hanafī jurist 
‛Alā al-Dīn al-Kāsānī (d. 587/1191) explains that confiscated weapons are the 
property of the rebels and, therefore, the state has no right to use them except in 
cases of military necessity,96 unlike weapons and property seized from non-Muslims 
in international armed conflicts, which become spoils of war. But in any case, 
whether the state army use the rebels’ weapons in cases of military necessity or not, 
                                                 
91 Al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 7, p. 407; al-Ansārī, Asnā al-Matālib, Vol. 4, p. 115; Abou El 
Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 20. 
92 Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 7; al-Buhūtī, Al-Rawd al-Murbi‛, Vol. 3, p. 336; al-Buhūtī, 
Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 163; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, p. 268; Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and 
Violence, p. 160. 
93 Al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 163; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, p. 268; Khadduri, War 
and Peace, p. 79; Hammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of State, p. 181; Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and 
Violence, p. 160. 
94 Al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar, p. 231; al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 141; Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-
Rā’iq, Vol. 5, p. 152; Ibn Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 161; al-Shaykh Nizām, Al-Fatāwā al-
Hindiyyah, Vol. 2, p. 284; al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 12, p. 8; al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 
4, p. 299; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol. 11, p. 116; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 
693; Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 20. Ibn Hazm permits the use of 
mangonels or other shooting weapons, but prohibits the use of fire or flooding in the fighting against 
the rebels because these will lead to indiscriminate casualties among the civilians. See Ibn Hazm, Al-
Muhallā, Vol. 11, p. 116. 
95 See, for example, al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar, p. 229; al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 141; Ibn 
Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 162; al-Shirbīnī, Al-Iqnā‛, Vol. 2, p. 549; al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, 
Vol. 12, pp. 11 f.; al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, pp. 299 f.; al-Disūqī, Hāshiyah al-Disūqī, Vol. 
4, pp. 299; ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 201; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 11; al-
Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf, Vol. 10, p. 314; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 164; al-Rahaybānī, 
Matālib, Vol. 6, p. 270; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol.  11, p. 102; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-
Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 695. 
96 Al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 141. See also Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol.  11, p. 104. 
 304
these weapons and any other property confiscated from them during the war must be 
returned to them after the cessation of hostilities.97   
 Therefore, despite the limited destructive capacity of the above mentioned 
primitive indiscriminate weaponry, the jurists’ discussion of these weapons proves 
that their overarching concern is protecting the lives of innocent civilians. With the 
exception of the Hanafīs, the jurists commonly agree on the prohibition of the use of 
these indiscriminate weapons against rebels. But the point here is that the Hanafī 
position, which breaks the consensus of the jurists on this issue, can be exploited to 
sanction the use of modern indiscriminate weaponry, which can have catastrophic 
consequences for the civilian population. This example, which typifies the 
disagreement of the jurists with regard to the larger part of Islamic law, underlines 
the importance of the current calls for the codification of Islamic law and the need 
for the exercise of continuous ijtihād to take into consideration the different and ever 
changing world contexts when Islamic rulings are pronounced. 
 
5.2.1.2.3 Prisoners and Hostages 
Only some jurists of the Hanafī school give the ruler permission to either execute 
detained rebels or keep them in detention for as long as the rebels still have a 
shawkah, i.e., for as long as they constitute a danger to the state army,98 but they do 
argue that it is preferable that rebels are kept in detention until after the rebellion 
                                                 
97 Al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar, p. 229; al-Samarqandī, Tuhfah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 3, p. 313; al-Kāsānī, 
Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 141; Ibn Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 162; al-Shirbīnī, Al-Iqnā‛, Vol. 
2, p. 549; al-Māwardī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, p. 82; al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 12, pp. 11 f.; al-
Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, pp. 299 f.; al-Disūqī, Hāshiyah al-Disūqī, Vol. 4, p. 299; ‛Allīsh, 
Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 201; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 11; al-Mirdāwī, Al-Ins āf, Vol. 10, 
p. 314; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 164; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, p. 270; Ibn Hazm, 
Al-Muhallā, Vol.  11, p. 102; Abū Zahrah, Al-Jarīmah, p. 131; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, 
Vol. 2, p. 695; ‛Awdah, Criminal Law of Islam, Vol. I, p. 119; Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 72; 
Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, p. 211; Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, p. 
238; Hashmi, “Islam, Sunni”, p. 219. 
98 Al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 141; Ibn Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 161; ‛Awdah, Al-
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comes to an end.99 The remaining majority of jurists maintain that after the cessation 
of hostilities, the captured rebels “could not be executed”;100 they must be 
unconditionally released, although some still stipulate that they should be released 
only after the rebels no longer have a shawkah.101 This means that no trials or 
punishments await the rebels after the cessation of hostilities; in fact, the jurists make 
it clear that the rebels are simply to be set free.102 Moreover, some Shāfi‛ī jurists add 
that if the dār al-harb captures and, consequently, enslaves a group of Muslim 
rebels, it is the Islamic state’s obligation to fight the rebels’ captors until they are 
liberated, provided that the Islamic state has the military capability to engage in a 
war with their captors.103     
Concerning hostages, the jurists here unanimously agree that the state cannot 
execute them, even if the rebels kill the hostages they have taken.104 This is based on 
the Qur’ānic dictum: “No sinful person shall be liable for the sin committed by 
another.”105 It is worth recalling here that the same ruling also applies in 
international armed conflicts, (see Chapter Four).106 In this regard, the jurists refer to 
the precedent of the caliph Mu‛āwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān (d. 60/680) when he refused 
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to execute the Roman hostages under his control after the Roman emperor had 
broken the treaty with the Muslims by executing the Muslim hostages he held.107 
 
5.2.1.3 Legitimacy of the Secessionists’ Rule 
It is interesting to find that the jurists of the four schools discuss the legitimacy of the 
rebels’ rulings during their control over a territory of the Islamic state, i.e., before the 
Islamic state manages to retake it from the rebels. Here the jurists focus mainly on 
two issues: the legitimacy of the zakāh and other forms of taxes collected by the 
rebels from the population of such a territory, and the court rulings passed by judges 
appointed by the rebels. The jurists of the four schools unanimously agree that none 
of the taxes collected by the rebels can be re-collected from the population of such a 
territory.108 The Shāfi‛ī jurists, al-Shirbīnī and al-Ramlī, justify this by noting that 
the re-collection of these taxes would cause hardship to the population.109 Al-Kāsānī 
gives a different justification, however: these taxes, al-Kāsānī argues, are paid to the 
Islamic state in return for the protection it provides to its population and, therefore, 
the state cannot re-collect these taxes because during the period of the rebels’ control 
over the territory, the state provided no protection for its population.110 But the 
Hanbalī jurist, al-Rahaybānī, justifies the impermissibility of re-collecting the taxes 
by merely indicating that this is what the fourth caliph did after retaking Basra from 
the rebels.111 
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pp. 700 f.  
109 Al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, p. 125; al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 7, p. 405. 
110 Al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 142. 
111 Al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, p. 271. 
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 More interestingly, all the court rulings issued by judges appointed by the 
rebels in any matter, such the application of hudūd punishments, marriage, divorce or 
financial transactions, will not be null and void after the state retakes the territory 
from the rebels as long as the rulings issued by these judges do not contradict Islamic 
law. But if these rulings do contradict Islamic law, then they are null and void, al-
Shaybānī (d. 189/804-5) adds.112 Moreover, it is interesting to note that the jurists do 
not contemplate the possibility of requiring the rebels to return to the state authorities 
the taxes they collected before the state retook control. This maybe explained, 
according to al-Kāsānī’s logic, by arguing that the rebels deserve these taxes in 
return for their protection of the population, which also includes the maintenance of 
law and order. This full recognition of the rulings of the rebels and their judges, 
provided that they do not contradict Islamic law, proves that the rebels are not treated 
under Islamic law as criminals or terrorists.                    
 
5.2.1.4 Liability for Destruction of Lives and Property 
The most important issue in the discussion of the law of rebellion in Islam is the 
question of whether or not the rebels and/or the state are liable for the destruction of 
lives and property they cause during the course of an armed rebellion. The 
significance of the question of whether, specifically, the rebels are liable or not for 
the damage they cause during their recourse to violence is an indication of whether 
the jurists criminalize the recourse to armed rebellion or not. The jurists unanimously 
agree that the soldiers of the state army, understandably, are not liable for the 
                                                 
112 See, for example, al-Shaybānī, Al-Siyar, p. 243; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, p. 125; al-
Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 7, p. 405; al-Ansārī, Asnā al-Matālib, Vol. 4, pp. 112 f.; al-‛Abdarī, 
Al-Tāj wa al- Iklīl, Vol. 6, p. 279; Ibn ‛Abd al-Barr, Al-Kāfī fī Fiqh Ahl al-Madīnah, p. 222; al-Dardīr, 
Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, p. 300; al-Disūqī, Hāshiyah al-Disūqī, Vol. 4, p. 299; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-
Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 12; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 166; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-
Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 702; Hammīdullāh, Muslim Conduct of State, pp. 179 f. 
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damage they cause to the lives and property of the rebels. This is obviously because 
it is the state’s obligation to maintain security and stability. But the mere fact that the 
classical jurists discuss whether the state is liable or not for any such damage they 
cause to the rebels indicates that the jurists endeavour to regulate the state’s use of 
violence against the rebels and to make any violations subject to the law. More 
interestingly, however, the jurists are also almost unanimous in the opinion that the 
rebels are not liable for any damage they cause to lives and property during the 
course of the armed rebellion. That is to say, the rebels are not held criminally 
responsible for any killings or destruction of property directly linked to the 
rebellion.113 It nevertheless follows that the rebels will be liable for any deaths or 
destruction they cause before or after the rebellion or, in other words, that are not 
dictated by the military necessity of battle during the rebellion.114 By the same token, 
the state soldiers are also liable for any such killings or destruction.115 It is worth 
bearing in mind here that the jurists are referring to rebels who have a ta’wīl, a just 
cause for the rebellion in their opinion,116 because obviously those who resort to 
                                                 
113 Al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 141; al-Samarqandī, Tuhfah al-Fuqahā’, Vol. 3, pp. 313 
f.; Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq, Vol. 5, p. 154; Ibn Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 162; al-Shaykh 
Nizām, Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah, Vol. 2, p. 284; al-Shirāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab, Vol. 3, p. 253; al-
Shirbīnī, Al-Iqnā‛, Vol. 2, p. 549; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, p. 125; al-Māwardī, Al-
Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, p. 82; al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 7, p. 405; al-Ansārī, Asnā al-Matālib, 
Vol. 4, p. 113; Ibn ‛Abd al-Barr, Al-Kāfī fī Fiqh Ahl al-Madīnah, p. 222; al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, 
Vol. 12, p. 10; al-S āwī, Bulghah al-Sālik, Vol. 4, p. 222; al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, p. 300; 
Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, pp. 8 f.; al-Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf, Vol. 10, pp. 316 f.; Ibn Muflih, Al-
Furū‛, Vol. 6, pp. 149 f.; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 165; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, 
p. 270; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol. 11, p. 105; Abū Zahrah, Al-Jarīmah, p. 131; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ 
al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 698; al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 2, pp. 1010 f.; Hammīdullāh, 
Muslim Conduct of State, p. 180; Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence”, pp. 17 f., 
21; Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, p. 238; Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal 
Tradition”, p. 302. 
114 Al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, p. 125; al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 7, p. 405; al-
Māwardī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, p. 82; Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence”, 
pp. 17 f., 21; Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition”, p. 302. 
115 Al-Ghazālī, Al-Wajīz, Vol. 2, p. 164; al-Shirbīnī, Al-Iqnā‛, Vol. 2, p. 549; al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-
Muhtāj, Vol. 7, p. 405; al-Ba‛lī, Kashf al-Mukhaddarāt, Vol. 2, p. 775. 
116 Abū Zahrah, Al-Jarīmah, p. 131. 
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violence without a justification will certainly be held liable for any killings or 
destruction they cause.117 
 The fact that the jurists unanimously agree that rebels are not liable for any 
killings or destruction they cause during the course of the rebellion proves that rebels 
are not treated as criminals and are even elevated to the same status as the soldiers in 
the state army, provided they have a justification for their rebellion and popular 
support. Moreover, the rebels must not target non-combatants or civilians or cause 
any wanton destruction not dictated by the military necessity. This immunity of the 
rebels from liability for the deaths and damage to property that they cause is a 
privilege given exclusively to rebels because, in their view, their rebellion has a just 
cause. Undoubtedly, this treatment of rebels indicates that Islamic law permits the 
recourse to rebellion against an Islamic government if a considerable part of its 
people believes that their government is committing injustice or wrongdoing. In fact, 
the recognition of the people’s right to resort to rebellion, and the magnanimity with 
which the classical Muslim jurists deal with the rebels, prove that, under Islamic law, 
the citizens of the Islamic state are entitled to challenge the tyranny, injustice and 
oppression of their government.                 
 
5.2.1.5 Punishment for Rebellion? 
This generous treatment of rebels under classical Islamic law stands in stark contrast 
to the treatment of rebels in the Western tradition of war. Throughout history, rebels 
in the West were treated as criminals because they were seen as a threat to the 
political order and stability, Kelsay explains.118 Thus, according to Abou El Fadl, the 
punishment of political criminals in pre-nineteenth century French and German laws 
                                                 
117 See, for example, al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, p. 300. 
118 Kelsay, Islam and War, pp. 78-81. 
 310
included the confiscation of the offenders’ property and the banishment of their 
families.119 In France, he adds, the confiscation of the offenders’ property was 
abolished in the revised penal code of 28 April 1832 and “the death penalty was 
abolished for some political offenses in 1848. [Nevertheless, it] … was re-introduced 
for violent political crimes in the wake of World War II.”120 Despite the fact that the 
classical Muslim jurists, like their Western counterparts, were most concerned about 
the danger of instability and the shedding of blood, they never criminalized the 
recourse to rebellion. This leads Kelsay to conclude that: “Islamic thinkers 
prefigured (by nearly a thousand years) Lieber’s conclusion that participation in a 
rebellion does not, in and of itself, make one a criminal.”121 The jus ad bellum and 
the jus in bello governing the recourse to rebellion in Islam serve as mechanisms that 
ensure, first, that those who resort to rebellion against the state have a potential just 
cause and some degree of popular support. These differentiate rebels from criminals. 
Second, these mechanisms attempt to limit the use of force during the course of the 
rebellion. 
 Thus, in contrast to their Western counterparts, Muslim rebels’ cannot forfeit 
their money and property122 and, as explained above, the state cannot even use the 
rebels’ weapons to fight against them except in cases of dire military necessity. 
Furthermore, any weapons or other property confiscated from the rebels during the 
war must be returned to them after the cessation of hostilities. More importantly, any 
rebels detained during the course of an armed rebellion must be set free after the 
cessation of hostilities, unless they are likely to regroup or join another group in 
order to continue the fighting. All the above discussion proves beyond doubt that, 
                                                 
119 Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 4. 
120 Ibid., pp. 5 f. 
121 Kelsay, Islam and War, p. 93. 
122 See Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 21. 
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under Islamic law, there is no punishment for the recourse to armed rebellion123 and 
any deaths or destruction caused by the rebels during the course of the rebellion, 
provided that these killings or damage were directed at military or government 
targets with the aim of achieving the objective of the rebellion, i.e., overthrowing the 
government. This lack of punishment for rebels also increases the mystery and leaves 
unanswered the intriguing question of why the Mālikī and Hanbalī jurists treat the 
law of rebellion under the category of hudūd crimes, specifically since hudūd crimes, 
by definition, are crimes for which specific punishments are prescribed in the Qur’ān 
or the hadīth. 
 Concerning the fifth question posed at the beginning of this chapter on the 
differences between the jus in bello norms regulating international armed conflicts 
and those regulating domestic conflicts, the most salient differences are, first, the 
prohibition of the confiscation of the rebels’ property and weapons, while in 
international conflicts the enemy’s property becomes spoils of war. Second, the 
jurists are unanimous in the view that rebels are to be set free after the cessation of 
fighting, but regarding prisoners of war in international conflicts, the jurists give the 
ruler various options, such as freely releasing them or exchanging them for Muslim 
prisoners or ransom, as maintained by one group of jurists, or executing or enslaving 
them, according to a second group of jurists, or all of the above options for a third 
group.124 Third, captured rebels and their families cannot be enslaved, unlike 
captured enemy combatants in international armed conflicts. Fourth, the Islamic state 
should not accept the support of non-Muslims in fighting against Muslim rebels, in 
contrast to international conflicts, where the Islamic state can accept the support of 
                                                 
123 According to the words of Abou El Fadl: “There is no legal penalty for rebellion, and the rebel is 
fought only because of the necessity of maintaining order and stability”, Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and 
Violence, p. 157. See also Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition”, p. 302. 
124 See Chapter Four. 
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non-Muslims.125 Concerning the most salient similarities, the principle of non-
combatant immunity and the rules for the treatment of hostages are almost exactly 
the same in both domestic and international conflicts.   
Studies of the law of war in Islam in both insider and outsider literatures have 
mainly focused on international war, i.e., jihād against non-Muslims. Too little 
attention has been given to the study of internal hostilities under Islamic law, despite 
the fact that after the liberation of the Muslim countries from European occupation, 
civil conflicts or what is now called by some “jihād against the near enemy”, i.e., the 
regimes of Muslim countries, has become the dominant form of the use of force in 
the Muslim world.126 Apart from politically motivated inter-Muslim state conflicts, 
the use of violence against the regimes in Muslim countries has been motivated by 
the desire to Islamize such countries by establishing an Islamic government and the 
application of Islamic law.127 In this regard, a small pamphlet entitled “Al-Farīdah 
al-Ghā’ibah” has received much attention in Western scholarship, partly because, 
unlike the vast majority of modern Islamic literature, it has been translated into 
English, by the Dutch scholar Johannes J.G. Jansen under the title “The Neglected 
                                                 
125 It is worth noting here that it is mainly the Mālikī jurists who make this comparison between the 
rules of fighting against rebels and against unbelievers, al-kuffār. See from the Mālikī jurists, for 
example, al-‛Abdarī, Al-Tāj wa al- Iklīl, Vol. 6, pp. 276 f.; al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 12, p. 9; al-
Disūqī, Hāshiyah al-Disūqī, Vol. 4, p. 299; al-Sāwī, Bulghah al-Sālik, Vol. 4, p. 222; ‛Allīsh, Minah  
al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 200; Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, p. 198. See from the Shāfi‛ī jurists, al-
Māwardī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, pp. 80-82. 
126 Current Western literature focuses mainly on the study of the fundamentalist or terrorist groups and 
organizations, while ignoring the Islamic legal treatment of their ideas, as discussed below. Because 
of his background as a Lebanese Christian who has lived in both the Muslim world and the West, the 
following excellent works of Fawaz A. Gerges are the most illuminating for understanding the nature, 
history and mentality of these groups. See, Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went 
Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Fawaz A. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist: 
Inside Muslim Militancy (Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt, 2006); Fawaz A. Gerges, “Understanding the Many 
Faces of Islamism and Jihadism”, Nieman Reports, Summer 2007, 61, 2, p. 7. See also, for example, 
Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern 
World (Cambridge: Policy Press, 1994); Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam, trans. 
Anthony F. Roberts (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002); Gilles Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, trans. Jon 
Rothschild, New Preface ed. (London: Saqi, 2005).     
127 In the words of Hashmi, “The focus of [contemporary] fundamentalist argument on war is thus 
inward, aimed at transforming allegedly hypocritical Muslim societies into true Islamic communities, 
led by true Muslim leaders”, Hashmi, “Islam, Sunni”, p. 221. See also Gerges, The Far Enemy, pp. 9-
12. 
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Duty”, i.e., jihād.128 The author of this pamphlet, who coined the dichotomous terms 
‘the near enemy’/‘far enemy’, is Muhammad ‛Abd al-Salām Faraj, an electrical 
engineer and graduate of Cairo University, who was executed on 15 April 1982 for 
his alleged role in the assassination of President Sadat of Egypt.129  
The main theme of this pamphlet is the resort to jihād against regimes in 
Muslim countries in order to establish a genuinely Islamic government.130 Thus, 
Faraj claims that overthrowing regimes in Muslim countries (the near enemy) should 
take priority over liberating the holy land in Jerusalem from the far enemy, i.e., the 
non-Muslim enemy.131 Apart from this novel claim, the pamphlet contains no solid 
arguments or any other clear thesis. As some have noted, it consists mainly of a 
collection of quotations, mostly from Ibn Taymiyyah, the Qur’ān and Hadīth.132 The 
ideas in the pamphlet are rejected as heretical by prominent scholars, and they also 
show the lack of a correct understanding, and even the proper use, of the Arabic 
language.133 But the core point, and hence the core criticism, of the pamphlet is that 
                                                 
128 See J.J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in 
the Middle East (New York: Macmillan, 1986); see also J.J.G. Jansen, “The Creed of Sadat's 
Assassins: The Contents of 'The Forgotten Duty' Analysed”, Die Welt des Islam, New Series, Bd. 25, 
No. 1/4. 1985, pp. 1-30.  
129 Jansen, “The Creed of Sadat's Assassins”, p. 1; Gerges, The Far Enemy, pp. 9-12, 44.  
130 Muhammad ‛Abd al-Salām Faraj, “Wathīqah al-Farīdah al-Ghā’ibah”, published in Rifaat Sayed 
Ahmed, Al-Nabī al-Musallah (1): Al-Rāfidūn (London: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1991), pp. 127-129; 
Muhammad ‛Abd al-Salām Faraj, “Al-Farīdah al-Ghā’ibah”, published in Al-Fatāwā al-Islamiyyah 
min Dār al-Iftā’ al-Misriyyah (Cairo: Al-Ahram Commercial Prints, 1993/1414), Vol. 10, pp. 3762 f.; 
Muhammad ‛Abd al-Salām Faraj, “Translation of Muhammad ‛Abd al-Salām Faraj’s Text Entitled 
Al-Farīdah Al-Ghā’ibah”, trans. J.J.G. Jansen in his, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s 
Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 162-166. See 
also Muhammad ‛Imārah, Al-Farīdah al-Ghā'bah: ‛Ard wa Hiwār wa Taqyym (Cairo: Dār Thābit, 
1982/1402), pp. 12-16; Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, p. 200; Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of 
Jihad”, pp. 4, 296, 298. It is worth adding here that Sohail H. Hashmi notes that “Jihad in the 
contemporary fundamentalist discourse has emerged as an instrument not for the diffusion of the faith, 
but for its defence against a host of home-grown enemies who are blamed for Muslim weakness in the 
international arena.” See Sohail H. Hashmi, “International Society and its Islamic Malcontents”, 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 20, 1996, p. 19. 
131 Faraj, “Wathīqah al-Farīdah al-Ghā’ibah”, p. 136; Faraj, “Al-Farīdah al-Ghā’ibah”, p. 3775; Faraj, 
“Translation of Muhammad ‛Abd al-Salām Faraj’s Text Entitled Al-Farīdah Al-Ghā’ibah”, pp. 192 f. 
See Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, p. 12; Alsumaih, “The Sunni Concept of Jihad”, p. 299. 
132 See Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, pp. 200, 203; Jansen, The Neglected Duty, pp. 4 f. 
133 See Jād al-Haqq ‛Alī Jād al-Haqq, “Kutayyib al-Farīdah al-Ghā’ibah wa al-Radd ‛alaiyh”, in Al-
Fatāwā al-Islamiyyah min Dār al-Iftā’ al-Misriyyah (Cairo: Al-Ahram Commercial Prints, 
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it applies Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwa allowing fighting against the Tartars to current 
Muslim leaders.134 For Faraj, current Muslim rulers, like the Tartars, do not apply 
Islamic law. Hence, the Muslim “Rulers of this age are in apostasy from Islam. They 
were raised at the tables of imperialism, be it Crusaderism, or Communism, or 
Zionism”, Faraj claims.135 The significance of Faraj’s pamphlet is that its claims sum 
up and, in fact, characterize the main struggle of the Muslim world since its 
independence. It is an internal struggle between various trends that want to re-
Islamize their de-Islamized societies and their regimes, which are seen as agents of 
non-Muslim foreign powers. That is to conclude here that, first, apart from the 
liberation of occupied Muslim territories, warfare in the Muslim world has been 
directed inward. In other words, civil conflicts and domestic terrorism will remain 
the dominant form of the use of force in the Muslim world, at least in the near future. 
Second, one of the main reasons for the potential continuation of this internal 
struggle is the absence of true and genuine experience of democracy in a large part of 
the Muslim world. This means, third, that democracy and/or a framework for a 
peaceful process of negotiation with opponents of the regime before they resort to 
violence, as is secured for the bughāh under classical Islamic law, could have 
prevented a large number of these opponents from becoming terrorists.                     
 
                                                                                                                                          
1993/1414), Vol. 10, pp. 3724-3759; ‛Imārah, Al-Farīdah al-Ghā'bah: ‛Ard wa Hiwār wa Taqyym. 
See also Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 4. 
134 Jād al-Haqq, “Kutayyib al-Farīdah al-Ghā’ibah wa al-Radd ‛alaiyh”, pp. 3746 f.; ‛Imārah, Al-
Farīdah al-Ghā'bah: ‛Ard wa Hiwār wa Taqyym, pp. 47-56. See Jansen, The Neglected Duty, p. 4; 
Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, pp. 200-203; Salwa Muhammad El-Awa, Al-Jamā‛ah al-
Islāmiyyah al-Musallahah fī Misr: 1974-2004 (Cairo: Maktabah al-Shurūq al-Dawliyyah, 2006/1427), 
p. 89.  
135 Faraj, “Translation of Muhammad ‛Abd al-Salām Faraj’s Text Entitled Al-Farīdah Al-Ghā’ibah”, 
p. 169; Faraj, “Wathīqah al-Farīdah al-Ghā’ibah”, p. 130; Faraj, “Al-Farīd ah al-Ghā’ibah”, p. 3765. 
See also Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, p. 203.   
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5.2.2 Battle against al-Muhāribūn/Qut t ā‛ al-Tarīq 
The second most important kind of domestic conflict is the battle against qutt ā‛ al-
t arīq/al-muhāribūn (bandits, highway robbers, pirates). Here, the state uses force 
against a group of citizens of the Islamic state who commit the crime termed “qat‛ 
al-tarīq” by both the H anafīs136 and the Shāfi‛īs137 and termed “al-hirābah” by the 
Mālikīs138 and the Hanbalīs.139 A few jurists, mainly of the Hanafī school, also call 
this crime “al-sariqah al-kubrā” (the great theft).140 The basis of the Islamic 
treatment of this sort of domestic violence is wholly scriptural. According to the 
Qur’ān: 
Indeed, the retribution for those who yuhāribūn (make war upon) God and 
His Messenger and strive to make fasād141 (destruction, damage) in the land 
is that they be killed or [emphasis added here and below] gibbeted or have 
their hands and feet amputated from opposite sides or they be banished from 
the land; this is a degradation for them in this world and in the Hereafter they 
will receive a grave chastisement. Excluded [from this retribution] are those 
                                                 
136 See from the Hanafī school, for example, Muh ammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abī Sahl al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb 
al-Mabsūt (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‛rifah, n. d.), Vol. 9, pp. 195-205; al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, 
pp. 90-97; Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq, Vol. 5, pp. 72-76. 
137 See from the Shāfi‛ī school, for example, al-Ansārī, Manhaj al-Tullāb, p. 128; al-Ghazālī, Al-
Wajīz, Vol. 2, pp. 177-179; al-Ghazālī, Al-Wasīt, Vol. 6, pp. 491-503.  
138 See from the Mālikī school, for example, al-‛Abdarī, Al-Tāj wa al- Iklīl, Vol. 6, pp. 314-317; al-
Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, pp. 348-352; al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 12, pp. 123-140; al-
Hattāb, Mawāhib al-Jalīl, Vol. 6, pp. 314-317; ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, pp. 335-348. 
139 See from the Hanbalī school, for example, Ibn Qudāmah, ‛Umdah al-Fiqh, p. 149; al-Mirdāwī, Al-
Insāf, Vol. 10, pp. 291-299; Ibn Muflih, Al-Mubdi‛, Vol. 9, pp. 144-154; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-
Qinā‛, Vol. 6, pp. 149-154. 
140 See, for example, al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Mabsūt, Vol. 9, pp. 133, 176, 195; Ibn Mawdūd, Al-
Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 109; Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq, Vol. 5, p. 72; Ibn ‛Ābidīn, Hāshiyah Radd al-
Muhtār, Vol. 4, p. 116. See also Mohamed S. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative 
Study (Indianapolis, Ind.: American Trust Publications, 1993), p. 12; Nik Wajis, “The Crime of 
Hirāba in Islamic Law”, p. 63.  
141 Most of the translators of the meaning of the Qur’ān translate the concept fasād here as corruption 
or mischief, but the meaning of fasād in this verse is far different from these translations, as can be 
learnt from the occasion of the revelation of this verse, as shown below.    
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who repent before you capture them; and be sure that God is All-Forgiving 
All-Merciful.142 
Exegetes relate several different occasions of revelation for these two verses. Among 
these occasions, according to some reports, these verses address a group of People of 
the Book who broke a peace treaty with the Prophet and caused fasād in the land, 
while according to other reports they address a group of polytheists. But most of the 
exegetes maintain that these verses address a group from the clan/s of ‛Uraynah 
and/or ‛Ukal who came to the Prophet and adopted Islam. When they asked the 
Prophet to support them, he gave them some “charity’s camels” and sent with them a 
Nubian shepherd called Yāsir. Several days later, they apostatized and cut off the 
hands and feet of the shepherd and inserted thorns into his eyes until he died and then 
they stole the camels and escaped. Some sources add that, in their escape, they 
terrorized the streets (akhāfūā al-sabīl).143 After they were captured, the Prophet 
planned to serve them as they had served the shepherd, while in other sources he 
actually did so. In this context, most of the exegetes and jurists maintain that these 
two verses revealed to the Prophet the punishment for such criminals.144 
                                                 
142 Qur’ān 5:33-34. 
143 Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, Vol. 2, p. 50.  
144 See on the occasion of revelation of these two verses, for example, al-Tabarī, Jāmi‛ al-Bayān, Vol. 
6, pp. 205-210; Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, Vol. 2, pp. 49-51; al-Qurtubī, Al-Jāmi‛, Vol. 6, pp. 147-150; 
Muhammad ibn ‛Abd Allah al-Zarkashī, Sharh al-Zarkashī ‛alā Mukhtasar al-Khiraqī, ed. ‛Abd al-
Mun‛im Khalīl Ibrāhīm (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 2002/1423), Vol. 3, p. 136; Muhammad 
ibn ‛Umar al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr aw Mafātīh al-Ghayb (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 
2000/1421), Vol. 11, p. 169; al-Samarqandī, Bahr al-‛Ulūm, Vol. 1, p. 410; al-Suyūtī, Al-Durr al-
Manthūr, Vol. 3, pp. 66-68; al-Sana‛ānī, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, Vol. 1, p. 188; ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 
9, p. 337; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 124; al-Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf, Vol. 10, pp. 291 f.; al-
Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 150; Ibn ‛Abd al-Wahhāb, Mukhtasar al-Insāf, p. 721; Ibn 
Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol. 11, pp. 300 f.; Muh ammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd, Bidāyah 
al-Mujtahid wa Nihāyah al-Muqtasid (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), Vol. 2, p. 340; Ridā, Tafsīr al-Manār, 
Vol. 6, pp. 352-355; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 639; Nik Wajis, “The Crime of 
Hirāba in Islamic Law”, pp. 61-63; Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, pp. 47-53. 
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 Irrespective of which of these several incidents is the authentic occasion of 
revelation and irrespective of the many discrepancies in the incident145 maintained by 
most of the exegetes to be the occasion of revelation of these two verses, Muslim 
jurists are unanimous in their view that these verses are the basis of the treatment and 
punishment of the law of hirābah/qat ‛ al-tarīq in Islam.146 Hence this text is known 
as the hirābah verse. The term hirābah comes from the verb yuhāribūn, used in the 
verse above, which is derived from the noun harb (war). Thus, it denotes here that 
the perpetrators of this crime wage war against society.147 However, the H anbalī 
jurists Ibn Muflih (d. 763/1362) and al-Buhūtī (d. 1051/1641) indicate that this term 
is derived from the verb harab, meaning to despoil or take wealth by force.148  
Concerning the technical juristic definition of hirābah, the jurists commonly 
agree on the following main characteristics of the perpetrators of this crime as: 
a group of Muslims who under the threat, or use, of arms attack or merely 
intimidate or terrorize their victims in order to overtly and forcefully rob, kill 
or merely terrorize their victims.149  
                                                 
145 It is worth adding here that Abou El Fadl repeatedly affirms that this so-called ‛Uraynah incident 
was invented by the Umayyads (r. 661-750) for political purposes, i.e., to sanction a harsh punishment 
against their political enemies. See Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, pp. 53, 59, 61. 
146 However, strangely enough, Muhammad Sa‛īd al-‛Ashmāwī, an Egyptian former judge and author 
of books on Islam, denies the law of hirābah altogether. He holds that the hirābah verse refers only to 
those who fight against the person of the Prophet and God’s religion and, therefore, does not warrant 
applying the punishment prescribed in it to any others, including highway robbers. See Muhammad 
Sa‛īd al-‛Ashmāwī, Usūl al-Sharī‛ah, 4th ed. (Cairo: Madbūlī al-Saghīr, 1996/1416), pp. 128-130.    
147 Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, p. 140. 
148 Ibn Muflih, Al-Mubdi‛, Vol. 9, p. 144; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 150; Rid ā, Tafsīr 
al-Manār, Vol. 6, p. 356. See Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (Beirut: Librairie Du 
Liban, 1968), Vol. 2, p. 540. 
149 For the definition of hirābah see, for example, al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 90; al-
Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Mabsūt, Vol. 9, p. 195; Ibn Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 122; Ibn ‛Ābidīn, 
Hāshiyah Radd al-Muhtār, Vol. 4, pp. 113-116; al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 6, p. 152; al-Māwardī, Al-
Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, p. 84; al-‛Abdarī, Al-Tāj wa al- Iklīl, Vol. 6, p. 314; al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-
Kabīr, Vol. 4, p. 348; al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 12, p. 123; al-Hattāb, Mawāhib al-Jalīl, Vol. 6, p. 
314; ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 335; Ibn Qudāmah, ‛Umdah al-Fiqh, p. 149; al-Zarkashī, Sharh  
al-Zarkashī, Vol. 3, p. 137; al-Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf, Vol. 10, p. 291; al-Buhūtī, Al-Rawd al-Murbi‛, Vol. 
3, p. 330; Ibn Muflih, Al-Furū‛, Vol. 6, p. 137; Ibn Muflih, Al-Mubdi‛, Vol. 9, p. 145; al-Buhūtī, 
Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 150; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, p. 251; Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-
Tabarī, Kitāb al-Jihād wa Kitāb al-Jizyah wa Ahkām al-Muhāribīn min Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā’ li-
Abī Ja‛far Muhammad Ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, ed. Joseph Schacht (Leiden: Brill, 1933), p. 251; Ibn 
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However, the jurists of the different schools typically differ on the nuances of the 
definitions of hirābah. The Hanafīs focused on the taking of money by force as the 
usual objective of this crime and the fact that it causes people to feel intimidated 
about using roads where highwaymen are active. This focus may be the result of Abū 
Hanīfah’s restricting the application of the law of hirābah to certain crimes 
committed in the desert or in unpopulated areas, discussed below.  
The Shāfi‛ī and Hanbalī jurists emphasise the element of the criminals’ use of 
arms – Hanbalīs add even a stick or a stone – mujāharah150 (overtly, openly, unlike 
thieves and other criminals). This shows a sort of mukābarah, a determination on the 
part of the criminals to challenge the state authorities.151 Here both the Shāfi‛ī and 
Hanbalī jurists agree with their Hanafī counterparts that the criminals depend on a 
sort of force, expressed by the Hanafī and Shāfi‛ī jurists by the terms man‛ah152 and 
shawkah (power)153 which the criminals possess, and by the Hanbalīs in terms of 
arms. Again, it is worth bearing in mind that this whole discussion addresses a crime 
in which the victims are ordinary innocent civilians who are attacked or terrorized in 
a context where they are helpless (lā yalhaquhum al-ghawth).154 Furthermore, the 
victims are not attacked or terrorized because of any wrongdoing on their part. It is 
interesting to note that some Shāfi‛ī jurists mention in their definition of this crime, 
                                                                                                                                          
Rushd, Bidāyah al-Mujtahid, Vol. 2, p. 340; Rid ā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 6, p. 358; Abū Zahrah, Al-
‛Uqūbah, pp. 141-148; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, pp. 639-641; Nik Wajis, “The 
Crime of Hirāba in Islamic Law”, pp. 63 f.; Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, p. 253; Jackson, 
“Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition”, p. 295; Vogel, “The Trial of Terrorists under 
Classical Islamic Law”, pp. 58 f. 
150 Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, pp. 124 f. See also Rid ā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 6, pp. 358 f.; 
Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, pp. 146 f. 
151 On this point, Abū Zahrah argues that “every crime which involves the use of organized force is a 
challenge to the rightful authorities; and this challenge is considered, undoubtedly, muhārabah Lillah 
wa Rasūluh [i.e., hirābah]”, Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, p. 156. See also al-Haqīl, Haqīqah Mawqif al-
Islām, p. 146. 
152 Ibn Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, pp. 121, 123; al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. 11, p. 169. 
153 From the Shāfi‛ī school, see al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 8, p. 3; al-Ansārī, Asnā al-Matālib, 
Vol. 4, p. 154; al-Ghazālī, Al-Wajīz, Vol. 2, p. 177; al-Ghazālī, Al-Wasīt, Vol. 6, pp. 492-494. See also 
Rid ā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 6, pp. 356, 366. 
154 Al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 8, p. 4; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, pp. 124 f. 
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along with the taking of money by force or murder, the term irhāb,155 the same word 
used in modern Arabic for terrorism, as one of the intentions behind this crime. 
More than any of the other schools,156 the Mālikī jurists explicitly emphasise 
the importance of the element of spreading terror among the victims as a principal 
intention behind this crime, even, these Mālikī jurists add, if the criminals do not 
intend to rob their victims.157 The example often given by the Mālikī jurists here to 
elucidate this element is that a group of criminals may attempt to intimidate a group 
of people or an individual from taking a certain route to Syria, for example.158 Here 
also the Mālikī jurists state that the victims of such a crime are rendered helpless.159 
Interestingly, the Mālikī jurists include under the law of hirābah the crimes of killing 
by stealth, poisoning and armed burglary, because the victims are helpless. For 
example, if a criminal lures a child or a man to enter a place from which rescue is not 
feasible so that he can rob and kill the victim, the criminal will be punished under the 
law of hirābah. Similarly, if a criminal breaks into a house by night and prevents its 
inhabitants from calling for help – or poisons someone, al-Qarāfī adds, – in order to 
steal their money, he will be also punished under the law of hirābah.160 
Furthermore, the jurists’ discussion of the scene of the crime of hirābah 
further indicates the importance of the fact that the criminals render their victims 
                                                 
155 Al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 8, p. 3; al-Shirwānī, Hawāshī al-Shirwānī, Vol. 9, p. 157. 
156 Nik Wajis, “The Crime of Hirāba in Islamic Law”, p. 70; Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the 
Islamic Legal Tradition”, pp. 297 f. 
157 See, for example, al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 12, p. 125; al-Hattāb, Mawāhib al-Jalīl, Vol. 6, p. 
314; al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, p. 348; al-Disūqī, Hāshiyah al-Disūqī, Vol. 4, p. 348; 
‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 340; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol.  11, p. 97; Abū Zahrah, Al-
Jarīmah, p. 126; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, pp. 639 f.; Nik Wajis, “The Crime of 
Hirāba in Islamic Law”, pp. 63, 70; Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition”, p. 
297. 
158 Al-‛Abdarī, Al-Tāj wa al- Iklīl, Vol. 6, p. 314. 
159 See, for example, al-Hattāb, Mawāhib al-Jalīl, Vol. 6, p. 314; al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, 
p. 348; ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 335; Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, p. 143. 
160 See, for example, al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 12, p. 123; al-‛Abdarī, Al-Tāj wa al- Iklīl, Vol. 6, 
p. 314; al-Dardīr, Al-Sharh al-Kabīr, Vol. 4, pp. 348 f.; al-Disūqī, Hāshiyah al-Disūqī, Vol. 4, p. 349; 
‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, pp. 338 f.; Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, Vol. 2, p. 51; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-
Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 641. See also from the Shāfi‛ī school, al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 8, 
p. 4. 
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helpless as a central element in this crime. A corollary of this element is the 
spreading of terror (irhāb, ikhāfah) among the victims. Unlike the rest of the jurists 
of the four schools, Abū Hanīfah and a few Hanbalī jurists restrict the application of 
the law of hirābah to certain crimes committed in the desert and unpopulated 
areas.161 Abū Hanīfah’s rationale is that the victims cannot be rescued in these 
places,162 whereas in cities, villages or other populated areas, they can be rescued or 
helped (yalhaquhum al-ghawth)163 by the police or members of the public. 
Accordingly, if criminals rob a victim in populated areas, they are punished as 
thieves, not under the law of hirābah.164   
 He also stipulates that the crime must be committed at a certain distance 
from populated areas in order for the criminals to be punished under the law of 
hirābah.165 Using the same rationale, Sherman A. Jackson notes that Abū Hanīfah 
excludes women from being tried under the law of hirābah because they “were 
incapable, by their very constitution, of bringing about widespread fear and 
helplessness [emphasis added].”166 
The remaining majority of the jurists of the four schools apply the law of 
hirābah to the crimes committed in both populated and unpopulated areas alike. This 
is simply because the Qur’ānic text addressing this law does not restrict its 
application to unpopulated areas and, significantly, they add that criminals who 
                                                 
161 See, for example, al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 92; al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 6, p. 152; 
Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 124; al-Zarkashī, Sharh al-Zarkashī, Vol. 3, p. 137; Ibn Muflih, 
Al-Mubdi‛, Vol. 9, p. 146; Ibn ‛Abd al-Wahhāb, Mukhtas ar al-Insāf, p. 721; al-Tabarī, Ikhtilāf al-
Fuqahā’, p. 251; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā, Vol. 11, p. 303; Ibn Rushd, Bidāyah al-Mujtahid, Vol. 2, p. 
340; Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-‛Alāqāt, p. 199; Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, pp. 142-146; ‛Awdah, 
Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, pp. 644 f.; El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 9; Nik Wajis, 
“The Crime of Hirāba in Islamic Law”, pp. 69 f. 
162 Al-Māwardī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, p. 87; El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 9; Jackson, 
“Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition”, p. 296. 
163 Ibn Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 123; al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. 11, p. 170. 
164 See, for example, al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. 11, p. 170. 
165 Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq, Vol. 5, p. 72; Ibn Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 123; ‛Awdah, Al-
Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 644. 
166 Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition”, p. 297. See also al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb 
al-Mabsūt, Vol. 9, pp. 197 f.; Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, p. 149. 
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commit this crime in populated areas are more deserving of the severe punishment of 
hirābah than those who commit it in the desert. Al-Sarakhsī, al-Shāfi‛ī and Ibn 
Taymiyyah justify this by stating that the fact that those who commit this crime in 
populated areas, where people feel secure since they can be helped in cases of 
danger, shows that they are more dangerous than those who commit it in the desert, 
because they dare to overtly challenge the public and the state authorities. 167 
Concerning Abū Hanīfah’s position, the Hanafī jurists al-Sarakhsī and Ibn Mawdūd 
point out that Abū Hanīfah restricted hirābah to unpopulated areas because during 
his time, people used to carry arms in populated areas for their protection, but they 
say that this is no longer the case,168 so that, unlike during Abū Hanīfah’s time, 
people are helpless because they do not carry arms. It is worth adding here regarding 
the location where hirābah is committed, that the Hanbalī jurists, al-Buhūtī, al-
Rahaybānī and al-Ba‛lī, apply the law of hirābah to such crimes committed at sea. 
They argue that the Qur’ānic verse addressing hirābah is general, i.e., it does not 
specify the place where it is committed.169 Interestingly, this means that the current 
Somali pirates and armed robbers at sea off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden 
who have been causing a serious threat to international shipping170 can be tried under 
the law of hirābah.      
                                                 
167 Al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Mabsūt, Vol. 9, p. 201; al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 6, p. 152; al-Māwardī, Al-
Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, p. 87; Ibn Muflih, Al-Mubdi‛, Vol. 9, p. 146; Ahmad ibn ‛Abd al-Halīm ibn 
Taymiyyah, Al-Siyāsah al-Shar‛iyyah fī Islāh al-Rā‛ī wa al-Ra‛iyyah (N.p.: Dār al-Ma‛rifah, n.d.), p. 
71; Ibn ‛Abd al-Wahhāb, Mukhtasar al-Insāf, p. 721; Ridā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 6, p. 359; ‛Awdah, 
Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, p. 645; Nik Wajis, “The Crime of Hirāba in Islamic Law”, p. 
70. 
168 Al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Mabsūt, Vol. 9, p. 201; al-Kāsānī, Badā’i‛ al-Sanā’i‛, Vol. 7, p. 92; Ibn 
Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 123; Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, pp. 144 f. 
169 Mansūr ibn Yūnus ibn Idrīs al-Buhūtī, Sharh Muntahā al-Irādāt al-Musammā Daqā'iq Ulī al-Nuhā 
li-Sharh al-Muntahā, 2nd ed. (Beirut: ‛Ālam al-Kutub, 1996),Vol. 3, p. 381; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-
Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 150; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, Vol. 6, p. 251; al-Ba‛lī, Kashf al-Mukhaddarāt, Vol. 2, 
p. 770. 
170 On 2 December 2008, the Security Council unanimously adopted the resolution 1846 (2008) which 
authorizes states and regional organization for a period of twelve months to pursue pirates and use 
“‘all necessary means’… to fight piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali coast.” Available 
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Thus, in all the jurists’ elaborations and deliberations on defining the nature 
of hirābah, the central element in this crime is: unjustly attacking and/or spreading 
terror among innocent civilians who have done them no wrong and are not their 
enemies. The jurists express this central element by using various terms. For 
example, regarding the context of hirābah, the jurists explain that the criminals 
attack their victims mujāharah (overtly, publicly, openly) and 
mukābarah/mughālabah (forcefully) in a context in which the victims lā yalhaquhum 
al-ghawth (cannot be rescued). Regarding the motives behind hirābah, the jurists 
indicate that the akhdh al-māl (taking money) or ikhāfah/irhāb (intimidation, 
terrorism) are the main objectives of this crime. In conclusion, the classical Muslim 
jurists’ definitions of hirābah coincide in certain respects with the most salient 
elements of the current phenomenon of terrorism, particularly domestic terrorism, as 
shown below.  
 
5.2.2.1 Modern Forms of Hirābah 
The hirābah verse describes the acts of this crime as (1) making war upon God and 
His Messenger and (2) striving to make fasād (destruction, damage) in the land. The 
“making of war upon God and his Messenger” is understood by the jurists to mean, 
as explained in the definitions of hirābah above and in its punishments discussed 
below, killing and/or cutting off limbs of innocent civilians in the specific contexts 
described above – armed robbery on land for most jurists and also at sea for some 
Hanbalīs – or spreading terror among civilians. Interestingly, al-Qurtubī (d. 
671/1272) explains that the Qur’ān metaphorically refers to hirābah as a war against 
God and His Messenger as an indication of the enormity of harming people in the 
                                                                                                                                          
from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sc9514.doc.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 March 
2009.    
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sight of God. Similarly, he adds, the Qur’ān also metaphorically refers to charity 
given to the poor as given to God (Qur’ān 2:245),171 as an indication of the great 
reward God gives to those who help the poor. The Malaysian researcher Nik Rahim 
Nik Wajis points out in his PhD thesis “The Crime of Hirāba in Islamic Law”, that 
the classical “jurists seem to ignore the most important element of hirāba, i.e., 
causing destruction (fasād), in their definitions.”172 In fact, the concept of fasād in 
the hirābah verse, as the exegetes commonly agree, is the description173 of the nature 
of the crimes treated under the law of hirābah – such as terrorising the street, armed 
robbery, killing, zinā174 (rape) and destruction175 – and the effects they have on the 
victims and society as a whole. Significantly, al-Tabarī and al-Suyūt ī used the 
Qur’ānic metaphorical expression yuhlik al-harth wa al-nasl176 (destroy crops and 
progeny) to refer to the sort of wanton destruction the crime of hirābah inflicts on 
human lives and property.177 Obviously, the sort of primitive, wanton destruction 
depicted in the writings of the classical Muslim jurists is unimaginably limited 
compared with the degree of wanton and indiscriminate destruction modern 
weaponry can inflict on the human lives and property.  
 Since the forms of fasād, destruction of the human lives and property, change 
with time and place,178 certain scholars explicitly argue for including specific crimes 
                                                 
171 Al-Qurtubī, Al-Jāmi‛, Vol. 6, p. 150. See also al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. 11, p. 169; Abū 
Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, pp. 140 f. 
172 Nik Wajis, “The Crime of H irāba in Islamic Law”, p. 66. It is worth noting that Nik Wajis 
translates the concept fasād here “causing destruction”, although he used the word “mischief” in 
translating the same concept in the hirābah verse.   
173 Ridā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 6, pp. 357 f. 
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the others accompanying them. See Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, pp. 154 f. 
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176 Qur’ān 2:245. 
177 Al-Tabarī, Jāmi‛ al-Bayān, Vol. 6, p. 211; al-Suyūtī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr, Vol. 2, p. 70. See also 
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under the law of hirābah. For example, Rashīd Rid ā (d. 1354/1935) adds “rape or 
abduction for the purposes of obtaining a ransom”,179 while Shaykh Abū Zahrah 
(1898-1974) adds: assassination of politicians and businessmen, robbery and 
sabotage committed by clandestine organizations such as mafia gangs (‛isābāt al-
lisūs ) and terrorist organizations in America and Europe.180 Nik Wajis (b. 1963) adds 
terrorism and drug trafficking.181 Furthermore, ‛Abd al-‛Azīz ibn ‛Abd Allah ibn 
Muh ammad Āl al-Shaykh (b. 1943), the current Grand Muftī of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and head of the Committee of Senior Scholars and the Department of 
Scholarly Research and Fatwa in Saudi Arabia,182 includes among the crimes to be 
punished under the law of hirābah: “[terrorist] explosions and hijacking airplanes, 
ships, trains, etc.”183 The Islamic Fiqh Council184 Statement on Terrorism, signed by 
a group of world-renowned Muslim scholars, adds that “the perpetrators of, and 
accomplices who plan, finance, supply weapons for, or propagate, such terrorist acts 
receive the deterrent punishments prescribed in the hirābah verse (Qur’ān 5:33).”185 
In response to the statements of these scholars, indeed, rape, robbery and certain 
forms of terrorism are already treated under the law of hirābah by the classical 
jurists, as shown above. But arguably the crimes of abduction for ransom, organized 
assassinations and drug trafficking could reasonably be treated under the law of 
hirābah on the grounds that abduction for ransom causes at least intimidation and 
terror to the victims and their families, while organized assassinations and drug 
trafficking inflict damage on the lives of individuals and society as a whole.    
                                                 
179 Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, p. 337.  
180 Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, pp. 147 f. 
181 Nik Wajis, “The Crime of Hirāba in Islamic Law”, p. 225. 
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  Abou El Fadl (b. 1963) argues that, theoretically, the concept of fasād “could 
be applied to a wide range of activities including anything from writing heretical 
poetry to raping and pillaging.”186 However, leaving theory aside and addressing the 
crime of hirābah, he recognizes – as did Abū Zahrah several decades before him – 
that “the Qur’ān limits corruption on the earth [fasād] to the destruction [emphasis 
added here and below] of property, such as crops or, perhaps, the economic system, 
and the destruction of lives”.187 That is to conclude that the particular concept of 
fasād as a description, and an element, of the crime of hirābah is confused to a 
certain extent by the use of the same term, fasād, to mean “corruption” in the sense 
of political corruption, economic corruption, etc. This confusion may be the reason 
for Frank E. Vogel’s unwarranted distinction between hirābah and fasād in the earth 
as two different crimes.188 Referring to fatwa number 148 issued on 24-8-1988/12-1-
1409 by the Committee of Senior Saudi Scholars,189 Vogel states: “Interestingly, it is 
this crime of ‘corruption,’ [fasād] and not hiraba, that is used in present-day Saudi 
Arabia to punish domestic terrorism.”190 In fact, this fatwa does not make this 
distinction. It advocates that the perpetrators of terrorist acts such as killing, sabotage 
and hijacking airplanes deserve the death penalty because these terrorist acts 
constitute fasād in the earth and that the danger of such terrorists is greater than that 
of highway robbers.191     
Thus, identifying the crimes that constitute the particular fasād intended in 
the Qur’ānic and juristic treatment of the law of hirābah is important because this 
                                                 
186 Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, p. 48. 
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avoids any unwarranted inclusion of other crimes under this law. In other words, 
confusing acts of fasād (destruction) committed in the particular context of hirābah 
with other acts of destruction committed in different contexts, such as during a 
rebellion, is a major error because the acts of destruction in these two contexts are 
treated under two different laws. This element of causing destruction associated with 
the crime of hirābah might be one of the reasons for the confusion between hirābah 
and rebellion because destruction of lives and property takes place in both cases. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to add here that Husayn Hāmid Hassān (b. 1932), 
former professor of Islamic Law at Cairo University, argued that force should be 
used to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion because this invasion is classified in 
Islam as an act of baghy (war between Muslim groups or states) or, strangely 
enough, hirābah.192 It is unclear why Hassān wants to apply the punishments of 
highway robbery to the Iraqi regime here, but what is more perplexing is that he 
classifies this invasion as both baghy and hirābah at the same time.193 This confirms 
that there is a certain degree of confusion in the writings of some scholars between 
the laws of rebellion and highway robbery.          
 
5.2.2.2 Rules of Fighting against al-Muhāribūn 
A few jurists enumerate five differences between the rules of fighting against 
muh āribūn and those for fighting against rebels. First, concerning the rules of 
engagement, the state army soldiers may deliberately attempt to kill the muh āribūn 
during combat, but they cannot deliberately attempt to kill rebels during combat 
because the objective of fighting against rebels is merely to bring them under 
obedience to the ruler, as shown above. Second, muh āribūn can be pursued and 
                                                 
192 Hassān, “Hukm al-Sharī‛ah fī Ghazw al-Irāq lilkuwayt”, p. 193. 
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targeted if they escape during combat. They must be killed or captured because, 
third, unlike rebels, they are liable for the damage they inflict on the lives and 
property during combat. Fourth, captured muhāribūn may be imprisoned, while 
rebels are to be set free after the cessation of fighting, as shown above. Fifth, any 
taxes collected by muh āribūn from the public will be re-collected, unlike taxes 
collected by rebels.194 These stark differences illuminate the fact that muh āribūn are 
treated under Islamic law as pure criminals in contrast to rebels, who are treated as 
just warriors.  
Strangely enough, concerning the rules for fighting against muh āribūn, Majid 
Khadduri claims that the head of state “has the choice of treating them on the same 
footing as the bughāt (singular, bagh[y]) or being more lenient to them, depending on 
the degree of the seriousness of their conduct.” 195 In fact, the two sources upon 
which Khadduri bases this observation, namely al-Māwardī and Hammīdullāh,196 list 
the five differences mentioned above, which clearly indicate, contrary to what 
Khadduri claims, harsher rules of engagement with, and treatment of, muh āribūn. In 
addition, unlike enemy combatants who are unbelievers (al-kāfir al-muh ārib), or 
obviously any other enemy combatants, muhāribūn cannot be given quarter even if 
they ask for it,197 because they must either surrender to the state authorities or be 
captured or killed in combat. Moreover, Khadduri also seems to confuse rebels with 
muh āribūn somewhat. In his extremely brief treatment of these two kinds of internal 
hostilities, he refers to fighting against rebels as jihād against dissension/dissenters198 
and fighting against muh āribūn once as jihād against secession and once as jihād 
                                                 
194 See Al-Qarāfī, Al-Dhakhīrah, Vol. 12, p. 9; al-Māwardī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, p. 86; al-
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against deserters and highway robbers.199 Aside from the fact that Khadduri basically 
restricts the meaning of baghy to secession rather stating that it also means the 
violent overthrow of a ruling regime and warring between Muslims, the muh āribūn 
are certainly not secessionists, but pure criminals or – as he says – “highway 
robbers”.200 Moreover, it is not clear what he means by labelling them “deserters”. 
 
5.2.2.3 Punishment of H irābah 
In addition to “a grave chastisement” in the Hereafter, the hirābah verse prescribes 
four specific punishments for muhāribūn in this world: execution, salb (gibbeting), 
amputation of a hand and a foot from opposite sides, or nafy 
(banishment/imprisonment). Thus, the punishment for hirābah is classified as a 
hudūd punishment because it is mentioned in the Qur’ān.201 However, this does not 
preclude the usual disagreements among the jurists. The jurists’ interpretations of 
these Qur’ān-prescribed punishments produced two sets of disagreements among the 
jurists: the first set of disagreements concerns the intended meaning and application 
of these punishments, particularly s alb and nafy. The second set of disagreements 
concerns the implementation of these four punishments, i.e., the acts for which, or 
the criminals for whom, each of these punishments is prescribed. 
On the first set of disagreements, concerning s alb, Ibn Taymiyyah explains 
that it means placing the criminals on a high place so that people can see them and, 
thus, know about the crimes they have committed.202 Abou El Fadl states that 
“crucifixion [the usual translation for s alb] meant the hanging or tying of a person or 
corpse to the bark of a tree. It did not mean nailing or placing someone on a 
                                                 
199 Ibid., pp. 74, 79. 
200 Ibid., p. 79. 
201 See El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 8. 
202 Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Siyāsah al-Shar‛iyyah, p. 70. 
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cross.”203 That is to emphasize here, as Abou El Fadl attempts to show and as 
explained below, that the meaning of s alb, as a punishment used in Islamic law 
exclusively for the crime of hirābah, does not carry the same meaning associated 
with s alb al-Masīh (crucifixion of Christ). This is why the word gibbeting is used 
here in the sense of “displaying the criminals convicted of hirābah tied on a high 
place before or after execution for a period of time” as a translation for s alb instead 
of its usual translation as “crucifixion” to avoid any confusion of these two different 
meanings.  
Significantly, the objective of gibbeting criminals, as indicated by the jurists, 
is to publicize their actions and the punishments they receive in order to deter other 
criminals.204 However, typically, the jurists disagree on the duration of gibbeting and 
whether criminals should be gibbeted before or after execution. The Hanafīs, Shāfi‛īs 
and Mālikīs hold that criminals should be gibbeted for three days, while the Hanbalīs 
argue that criminals should be gibbeted until the objective of gibbeting is achieved, 
without determining any duration.205 Moreover, al-Shāfi‛ī and the majority of the 
Hanbalīs jurists maintain that the criminal should be gibbeted after execution because 
this is the order given in the hirābah verse and gibbeting – keeping the criminal tied 
to a tree or a khashabah (a piece of wood) for the duration/s mentioned above before 
execution – is a sort of torture, which is prohibited by the Prophet. In addition, al-
Shāfi‛ī, al-Tahāwī and Ibn Qudāmah also reject gibbeting before execution because 
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this is similar to mutilation, which is also prohibited by the Prophet.206 However, al-
Awzā‛ī (d. 157/774), the majority of the Hanafīs and the Mālikīs maintain that the 
criminal is to be gibbeted before execution because gibbeting is a punishment and 
only living human beings are to be punished, not the deceased.207 It is worth 
mentioning here that the Mālikīs advocate that adding gibbeting to execution is left 
to the discretion of the ruler since execution alone is sufficient, if the ruler so 
chooses.208  
Regarding the meaning of nafy as a punishment for hirābah, the jurists give a 
host of different meanings for it: (1) for Anas ibn Mālik and al-Hasan al-Basrī (d. 
110/728), it means that the criminals must be exiled from dār al-Islām; (2) while for 
‛Umar ibn ‛Abd al-‛Azīz (d. 101/720) and Sa‛īd ibn Jubayr (d. 95/714) it means 
sending the criminals into exile to a different town within dār al-Islām; (3) the 
Hanafīs and Shāfi‛īs maintain that it means imprisonment until the criminals repent, 
without determining the period of imprisonment, though some argue for a period of a 
year; (4) for the Mālikīs it means both imprisonment and exile until repentance; (5) 
the Hanbalīs, strangely enough, hold that it means that the criminals should be kept 
incessantly in exile, i.e., without letting them settle in any place until they repent 
because they may return to highway robbery if they settle anywhere and (6) it is even 
reported that some literally understand nafy (from the land) to mean execution.209          
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Interestingly, the second set of disagreements is over interpretations of the 
meaning of the Arabic preposition aw (or) separating each of these punishments. In 
fact, this preposition caused a major division among the jurists into two groups. The 
first, the majority of the jurists, including the Hanafīs, Shāfi‛īs and Hanbalīs, 
maintain that “or” in this verse indicates a certain sort of tartīb (order) for these 
punishments in accordance with the crimes committed. Thus, in their view, first, if a 
criminal kills and robs his victim – the jurists of all schools are unanimous here – he 
must be executed. In addition, Shāfi‛īs and Hanbalīs add that the criminal must be 
gibbeted, while according to some Hanafīs the judge has the right to decide whether 
to add gibbeting and/or amputation of the right hand and left foot. Second, if a 
criminal only kills his victim without robbing him, he must only be executed. Third, 
if a criminal only robs his victim, his right hand and left foot must be amputated. It is 
worth adding here that the Hanafīs, Shāfi‛īs and Hanbalīs, though not the Mālikīs,210 
stipulate that the property taken must exceed the nisāb (value) of one dinār/ten 
dirhams for the Hanafīs,211 or ¼ dinār for the majority,212 the equivalent of about 
$16.94 according to Jackson’s calculations.213 Significantly, although the same value 
is stipulated for the punishment of the crime of theft, the punishment for theft is the 
                                                                                                                                          
Zayla‛ī, Tabīīn al-Haqā'q: Sharh Kanz al-Daqā'q (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmī, 1895-6/1313), Vol. 
4, p. 179; Ibn Najīm, Al-Bahr al-Rā’iq, Vol. 5, p. 73, Vol. 6, 307; al-Ramlī, Nihāyah al-Muhtāj, Vol. 
8, p. 5; ‛Abd Allah ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, Risālah Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (Beirut: Dār al-
Fikr, n.d.), p. 127; ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 341; al-Māwardī, Al-Hāwī, Vol. 13, pp. 355 f.; 
Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, p. 129; al-Zarkashī, Sharh al-Zarkashī, Vol. 3, p. 140; al-Buhūtī, 
Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 153; al-Mirdāwī, Al-Insāf, Vol. 10, pp. 298 f.; al-Rahaybānī, Matālib, 
Vol. 6, p. 255; Ibn Muflih, Al-Mubdi‛, Vol. 9, p. 151; Ibn ‛Abd al-Wahhāb, Mukhtasar al-Insāf, pp. 
721 f.; al-Ba‛lī, Kashf al-Mukhaddarāt, Vol. 2, p. 772; al-T abarī, Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā’, p. 255; al-
Māwardī, Al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah, p. 85; Ibn Rushd, Bidāyah al-Mujtahid, Vol. 2, p. 341; al-Rāzī, 
Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. 11, p. 171; Rid ā, Tafsīr al-Manār, Vol. 6, p. 361; Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, 
pp. 157-159; ‛Awdah, Al-Tashrī‛ al-Jinā’ī al-Islāmī, Vol. 2, pp. 648 f.; Mahmassani, Al-Qānūn wa al-
‛Alāqāt, p. 200; Khadduri, War and Peace, pp. 79 f.; El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 12. 
210 ‛Allīsh, Minah al-Jalīl, Vol. 9, p. 340. See also Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, p. 156. 
211 Al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Mabsūt, Vol. 9, p. 200; Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Uqūbah, pp. 133, 156. 
212 Al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, Vol. 6, p. 152; al-Shirbīnī, Mughnī al-Muhtāj, Vol. 4, p. 181; al-Ghazālī, Al-
Wasīt, Vol. 6, p. 495; Ibn Qudāmah, Al-Mughnī, Vol. 9, pp. 128 f.; al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 
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amputation of the thief’s right hand, while the punishment for taking the same 
amount in a robbery is the amputation of both the right hand and the left foot. In 
other words, the punishment is doubled here because of the elements associated with 
the crime of hirābah, most notably al-Sarakhsī mentions, mujāharah.214 
Furthermore, if a group of criminals rob their victim, Abū Hanīfah and al-Shāfi‛ī 
stipulate that each criminal’s share of the stolen property must exceed this specified 
value, though for Ibn Hanbal it is suffice to amputate the right hand and left foot of 
all the criminals if the taken property exceeds this value.215 Fourth, if a criminal 
neither kills nor robs but merely terrorizes the victim, he must be 
exiled/imprisoned.216 The majority of the jurists in this group depend for this 
particular order of punishments on a report attributed to Ibn ‛Abbās (d. 68/668) that 
supports it,217 although few hold that Angel Gabriel told the Prophet about this 
order.218  
The second group, the Mālikīs and the jurists of the extinct Zāhirī school in 
addition to al-Hasan al-Basrī, ‛Atā’ and Mujāhid, maintain that “or” in the hirābah 
verse indicates a sort of takhyīr, i.e., giving the judge the option of sentencing 
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Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā‛, Vol. 6, p. 150; al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. 11, p. 170; Abū Zahrah, 
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criminals to any of the four prescribed punishments, except in cases where they have 
killed their victims. As referred to above, in cases of murder, the criminal must be 
executed and gibbeting can be added if the judge so chooses. In any other cases, 
which do not involve killing, the judge has the authority to choose any of the four 
punishments prescribed in the hirābah verse. But in his choice of punishments, the 
judge should use his discretion to act in the interest of society by choosing the 
punishment that may stop each criminal from committing hirābah again. Hence, the 
Mālikīs explain that, if the criminal is skilled at planning the crime, he is to be 
executed because amputation of his right hand and left foot would not prevent the 
harm he could do, i.e., his ability to plan crimes again, while if the criminal has the 
physical strength to carry out the crime but not the intellectual ability to plan it, then 
his right hand and left foot are to be amputated because this will prevent him from 
offending again. By the same logic, if the criminal neither has the intellectual ability 
to plan the crime nor the physical strength to carry it out, then he is to be exiled or 
given a discretionary punishment.219 Thus, according to the second group, the 
punishment for hirābah must be decided according to the intellectual and physical 
abilities of the criminal, and not according to the crimes he committed as maintained 
by the first group of jurists. 
One of the most important questions concerning the crime of hirābah is 
whether or not the Islamic state has the jurisdiction to inflict the punishment for 
hirābah if it is committed by Muslim criminals outside the territories of the Islamic 
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state. In accordance with the two conflicting positions of the Muslim jurists on the 
issue of the jurisdiction of the Islamic state over crimes committed by Muslims 
outside its territories, on the one hand, the Hanafīs restrict the punishment for 
hirābah to crimes committed by Muslims or dhimmis (permanent non-Muslim 
citizens of the Islamic state) inside the territories of the Islamic state. But they 
disagree on the application of the punishment if the crime is committed inside the 
Islamic state by temporary non-Muslim residents, musta’mins. The Hanafīs also 
stipulate that the victims must be Muslims or dhimmis, because the possessions of an 
enemy belligerent who is given temporary quarter or safe conduct (al-harbī al-
musta’min) are not permanently inviolable. Moreover, if the crime is committed 
outside the Islamic state or even inside a territory controlled by Muslim separatists 
(bughāh), the head of the Islamic state has no authority to inflict the hirābah 
punishment on the criminals if the case is brought to him, because the crime occurred 
outside the control, and therefore the jurisdiction, of the Islamic state. But Muslim 
separatists certainly have the authority to apply the punishment for the crime of 
hirābah if it occurs inside the territories under their control.220 On the other hand, the 
Shāfi‛īs, Mālikīs, Hanbalīs and Zāhirīs maintain that the punishment for hirābah 
must be inflicted whenever the criminals are Muslims or dhimmis and the victims are 
Muslims or dhimmis, even if the crime occurs outside the territories of the Islamic 
state.221 
Thus, to partially answer Vogel’ question: “What would be the course of 
events if alleged perpetrators of the September 11 terrorist attacks were tried before a 
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court that applied solely classical Islamic law?”,222 – assuming the perpetrators were 
still alive, it depends first on which school of Islamic law such a court applies. 
According to the above two positions on the jurisdiction of Islamic law over crimes 
committed outside the Islamic state, these criminals, or any Muslim perpetrators of 
acts of hirābah committed outside the Islamic state, cannot be tried before an Islamic 
court that applies the Hanafī school of law for the reason given above, but if the court 
applies the Shāfi‛ī, Mālikī or Hanbalī schools of law, these criminals can be tried and 
punished if proven guilty, provided that they are Muslims or dhimmis and the victims 
are Muslims or dhimmis. This means that for the majority of Muslim jurists, the 
perpetrators of the September 11 terrorist attacks could be tried in an Islamic court 
and receive the severe hirābah punishment if proven guilty because they are 
Muslims and among the victims there were Muslims and perhaps permanent non-
Muslim citizens of an Islamic state.  
The interesting question here now is whether accomplices in the crime of 
hirābah can be tried under the law of hirābah. This question also divides the 
classical jurists into two groups. The majority of jurists – the Hanfīs, Mālikīs, 
Hanbalīs and Zāhirīs –  maintain that all accomplices who play any supporting role 
in the crime of hirābah such as spying, for example, without directly taking part in 
the acts of killing, robbing, terrorizing, etc., receive exactly the same h add 
(prescribed) punishment as those who actually commit these acts. Accomplices 
deserve the same punishment because their contributions are essential for the success 
of the crime and those who actually commit the crime depend on these contributions. 
The other rationale also given by some jurists is that the accomplices should suffer 
the same punishment as the actual perpetrators just as they share the outcome of their 
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crime. Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah confirms that if one among a group of muh āribūn kills a 
victim while the rest are merely supporting him, then according to the majority of 
jurists the whole group should be executed even if there are 100 of them. However, 
al-Shāfi‛ī argues that accomplices who have only a supporting role in committing the 
crime, without actually taking part, should not receive the punishment prescribed in 
the hirābah verse for the actual perpetrators, but rather a discretionary punishment 
and imprisonment. Similarly, if some among a group of muh āribūn kill their victims 
while others only rob them, all of the group should be punished for both killing and 
robbing; that is, they should receive the death penalty and gibbeting, according to the 
majority. But according to al-Shāfi‛ī, each member of the group would receive a 
punishment commensurate with the specific crime he committed.223 
 Therefore, based on the opinion of the majority of the jurists, Vogel rightly 
states that “an accomplice who helped the September 11 hijackers smuggle weapons 
onto the aircraft, or advised them by radio from the ground, might be indictable as a 
participant in hiraba and be liable to the same penalties as those who flew the 
planes.”224 Furthermore, according to the Islamic Fiqh Council Statement on 
Terrorism, referred to above, anyone who financed the September 11 hijackers, 
planned or even advocated their terrorist acts, should be tried and punished exactly 
like the hijackers themselves. To sum up here, a judge who follows the Hanafī school 
of law would not try the accomplices in this particular terrorist incident because it 
occurred outside the jurisdiction of the Islamic state, but a judge who follows the 
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Hanbalī or Mālikī school would try them and sentence the accomplices to death, 
while a judge who follows the Shāfi‛ī school would merely impose a discretionary 
punishment and imprisonment. 
 The nature of the crime of hirābah makes its punishment the severest 
punishment in Islam225 because this crime, Abū Zahrah explains, includes three main 
criminal elements: (1) challenging the state authorities by committing the crime 
publicly using organized force; (2) premeditated intention to commit the crime and 
(3) the many criminal acts committed such as killing, armed robbery, rape,226 harm 
to the economy227 and terrorism. Thus, the punishments of the amputation of both the 
hand and foot, and gibbeting, are not prescribed for any crime in Islam except 
hirābah. Moreover, Vogel points out that hirābah is “peculiar” in inflicting the same 
punishment on the accomplices as on the perpetrators, because “Ordinarily hudud 
crimes apply only to those who directly [mubashara] commit the elements of the 
crime.”228 Additionally, ‛Awdah and Anderson note, as explained below, that 
execution of the muhārib if he kills his victim is compulsory and the victim’s family 
has no right to waive the execution here because it is God’s right/ society’s right, 
unlike killing in non-hirābah contexts, where the victim’s family are entitled to 
waive the execution altogether by completely pardoning the killer or by accepting 
payment of blood-money.229 All this confirms that punishment of hirābah is the 
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severest because it constitutes not only an aggression against the individual victims, 
but also an attack on the security, peace and economy of society as a whole. 
 However, although the harshest rules of engagement in any military 
confrontation regulated in Islamic law, whether international or domestic, are those 
that deal with fighting muh āribūn, and although after their capture they receive the 
severest punishment prescribed in Islam, the hirābah verse states that their 
punishment is to be dropped if they repent and surrender themselves to the 
authorities before they are captured. Importantly, repentance must occur before their 
capture because, first, this proves that their repentance is genuine and not a deception 
to avoid punishment and, second, this encourages the criminals to repent and thus 
stop their acts of hirābah.230  
However, the jurists commonly agree that what is to be dropped is only the 
part of the punishment categorized as hudūd Allah, i.e., the four Qur’ān-prescribed 
punishments for this crime (execution, gibbeting, amputation and 
exile/imprisonment) because these are the huqūq Allah (the rights of God), and that 
the authorities are not entitled to drop the part of the punishment categorized as 
huqūq al-‛ibād/al-ādamiyyin231 (the rights of the humans, or according to Jackson’s 
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translation, civil liability),232 because only the victims themselves or their heirs are 
entitled, if they so choose, to remit the part of the punishment which falls under the 
second category. Therefore, if a group of muh āribūn kill, injure, amputate or rob 
their victims, the victims, or their heirs if the victims are killed, are entitled to 
demand or remit talion. So, if the perpetrators repent, the heirs of the murdered 
person are entitled to demand the execution of the killers, accept the payment of 
blood-money, or pardon them freely, because after the culprits have repented and 
turned themselves in to the authorities, the punishment falls into the second category 
of punishment in Islam, i.e., qis ās (lex talionis, retaliation) and is no longer under the 
category of hudūd. Likewise, the victims or their heirs are entitled to demand 
reimbursement of any stolen money and retaliation for injuries/amputations, or to 
remit talion in all of these cases. 
 
5.3 Terrorism 
One of the most important current issues in the study of Islam is the relationship 
between the terrorist acts perpetrated by Muslims, both domestic and international, 
and the teachings of Islam, particularly jihād. The implications for this issue are not 
merely scholarly or polemical, but also – and more importantly nowadays – political, 
military, and related to intelligence and security as well. This explains the recent 
involvement of some Western politicians,233 military234 and intelligence officers and 
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institutions,235 as well as journalists,236 in discussions about the relationship between 
the teachings of the religion of Islam and these terrorist acts. The majority of the 
discussions of this issue in the West attribute the causes of these terrorist acts to 
“Islamic extremism” and not, as Tony Blair argues,237 to certain regional conflicts 
and occupation of certain Muslim countries – which are the reasons given by the 
terrorists themselves.238 Of this majority also, Melvin E. Lee, “a sea captain and a 
nuclear engineer in the United States Navy”, argues that “Islamist terrorism” 
targeting the US is not motivated by US policies but by Islam itself, particularly 
jihād. Therefore, he suggests that “Only Islam’s fundamental reform will resolve the 
conflict.”239  
Interestingly, it is worth adding here concerning the September 11 terrorist 
attacks that, Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand point out that, unlike in Europe, in 
the US media “All the evidence pointing to the political dimensions of the [9/11] 
attacks was ignored if not actively deleted from the leading headlines.”240 Thus, 
tracing some of these “ignored”, evaded241 or “denied”242 political and historical root 
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causes of the September 11 attacks, Abdeen Jabara asserts that “Speaking before 
congress and elsewhere, President Bush ludicrously attempted to explain the 
motivation behind the attacks as opposition to American freedom and democracy.”243 
David Ryan explains that Bush’s rhetoric linking the terrorists’ hatred of America to 
freedom and democracy was “thoroughly misguided” because it did not advance 
understanding of the root causes and true nature of the problem, but united American 
society and “facilitated” the military response.244 That is to say that, “blaming 
Islam”245 or, at best, its misinterpretation by extremists, for motivating such terrorist 
acts is easier than investigating the reasons for each terrorist incident and 
acknowledging that these terrorist actions are reactions to decisions taken by political 
leaders of Muslim or non-Muslim countries concerning particular conflicts or the 
occupation of specific countries. Interestingly, Graham E. Fuller, former vice 
chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA and a renowned Western 
expert on the Muslim world, expresses it in similar terms:  
Islam is not the cause of such problems [i.e., tensions between East and the 
West, terrorism]. It may seem sophisticated to seek out passages in the Koran 
that seem to explain ‘why they hate us.’ But that blindly misses the nature of 
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the phenomenon. How comfortable to identify Islam as the source of ‘the 
problem’; it’s certainly much easier than exploring the impact of the massive 
global footprint of the world’s sole power.246 
In fact, it is “comfortable” for each party to a conflict to blame the other party in 
general or the other party’s religion for motivating acts of unjust war or terrorism 
because this makes each party feel psychologically that their religion and history are 
morally superior. Moreover, this relieves them of the psychological burden of 
belonging to the religion, culture or nationality of the party convicted, or even merely 
controversially accused, of committing genocide or massacres – even if such 
atrocities were committed hundreds or thousands of years ago. Here history plays an 
important part in shaping the relationship between different countries: identification 
of the nature of atrocities committed in the past, namely genocides or massacres, let 
alone identifying whether such atrocities were committed by one party or by both 
parties to a conflict, strongly affects inter-state relations at present. The most notable 
examples here are the Turkish-Armenian, the French-Algerian and, more recently, 
the Sudan-Darfur conflicts.  
Because of “the highly charged political and emotional” nature of the issue of 
terrorism, Colin Wight insightfully points out that one of the problems in terrorism 
studies is the unwarranted “claims that any attempt to explain the root causes of 
terrorism is to excuse it.”247 But, as Ryan affirms, it is impossible to understand, let 
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alone tackle, the problem of terrorism without its contextual causes.248 Furthermore, 
investigating the root causes of terrorism might mean in some cases that those who 
create these root causes may share part of the blame. A prime example here is the 
root causes of suicide bombings. The findings of the study by Robert A. Pape, the 
leading world authority on suicide terrorism,249 of worldwide suicide terrorist attacks 
since 1980 confirm that: 
suicide terrorism is mainly the product of foreign military occupation… It is 
not, as the conventional wisdom holds, mostly a product of religious 
extremism independent of political circumstances.250 
His study also shows that “the world leader in suicide terrorism is the Tamil Tigers in 
Sri Lanka, a group that adheres to a Marxist/Leninist ideology”.251 The highly 
charged political, psychological and emotional nature of the treatment of terrorism in 
general, and suicide terrorism in particular, is reflected in the reactions to Pape’s 
findings. David Bukay, of the University of Haifa, insists that occupation is not the 
root cause but the religion of Islam and particularly jihād.252 More specifically, 
Robert Spencer claims that the Qur’ānic promise (9:111) “of Paradise to those who 
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‘kill and are killed’ for Allah”253 is the cause of such terrorist acts. Based on research 
on the Kashmir crisis, Amritha Venkatraman of the Delhi Policy Group in India 
argues that the Qur’ān, its extreme interpretations and particularly jihād are the 
causes of terrorism.254  
In fact, identifying the nature and root causes of terrorism and, consequently, 
the way it is treated politically are largely influenced by the background or 
discipline, not to mention the interests, of those studying or treating it. A brief survey 
of the discussions of terrorism in various disciplines shows the chaos that exists in 
identifying its nature and root causes. In other words, specialists in religious studies, 
sociologists, psychologists, economists, etc., usually interpret the nature and roots 
causes of terrorism from the perspective of the theories and methodologies of their 
disciplines and in so doing, in many cases, they misrepresent the nature and causes of 
this phenomenon.255 For example, Loretta Napoleoni, an economist who has 
authored some works on terrorism, argues that both the Crusades and the modern 
jihād/terrorism are “motivated far more by economic factors than by religious 
fervor.”256 Colonel Laurence Andrew Dobrot also identifies economic factors – 
mainly economic deprivation in the Muslim countries – as the first of three root 
causes for terrorism, in addition to the Western exploitation of the Muslim World 
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and US foreign policy.257 However, Olivier Roy argues that: “International Islamic 
terrorism is a pathological consequence of the globalisation [and in another place he 
adds Westernization and immigration] of the Muslim world rather than a spillover of 
the Middle Eastern conflicts.”258 On the basis of an assessment of Usama bin 
Laden’s personality, Maria T. Miliora strangely concludes that bin Laden, following 
the model of the Prophet Muhammad, is waging an apocalyptic war against the 
United States to bring global victory to Islam as, Miliora wrongly alleges, did the 
Prophet in the seventh century.259 Admittedly influenced by Daniel Pipes’ 
analysis,260 Patrick Sookhdeo adamantly, but unreasonably, argues that “Unless the 
militant interpretation of Islamic sources is recognised as the basic cause of Islamic 
terrorist activities, there is little hope of a lasting solution.”261 These few examples 
are given here to show that, as far as the root causes of such terrorist acts are 
concerned, unless the perpetrators and accomplices of such acts reveal them, police 
and intelligence officers usually have more reliable sources of information on the 
causes of each incident than the predictions and hypotheses of researchers and 
journalists. Thus, for the study of cases of terrorism labelled as “Islamic terrorism”, it 
is of paramount importance that both the root causes of these acts and the position of 
Islamic law regarding them should be taken into consideration for any objective 
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study or political treatment of the issue. Put differently, in the words of M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, “The control of its [terrorism, in general] manifestations depends on 
international cooperation, but its prevention requires addressing its causes.”262  
The flaw in the unfounded claims that link incidents of terrorism to the 
religion of Islam is that they tend, practically speaking, to whitewash the effects of 
occupation and hence to deny the political dimensions of these terrorist acts by 
simply blaming certain Qur’ānic verses or radical interpretations of Islam. 
Furthermore, such claims blur the distinction between the root causes of terrorism 
and the rationales, which may be couched in religious terms or based on religious 
interpretations, for the resort to violence. In other words, identifying the 
perpetrators/victims and the place/time of such terrorist acts can explain why they 
take place. But the claims that Islam, the Qur’ān or jihād motivate terrorism certainly 
fail to explain why the perpetrators target specific victims at specific times and 
places. Moreover, the same root causes create the same terrorist acts, irrespective of 
whether the justifications for them are couched in religious, secular or nationalist 
rationales or otherwise. Nonetheless, such claims sometimes find resonance with the 
widely held belief in the West that religions have historically motivated violence, but 
the danger the claims in scholarly and popular literature, as well as the mass media, 
that commonly attribute the causes of terrorism to Islam is that, ironically, they make 
the same mistake as that made by the Muslim terrorists who portray themselves as 
fighting a defensive war263 “to liberate Al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy sanctuary” – in 
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Palestine and Saudi Arabia respectively – from: the religiously and economically 
motivated occupations of the enemy they describe as “Jews and Crusaders.”264  
  This is not to say that these terrorists do not resort to Islam to sanction their 
terrorist acts, but ignoring the real causes behind these terrorist acts and presenting 
them as religiously motivated is, indeed, misleading. Because instead of the exact 
nature of this phenomenon being described so that its roots can be tackled, it is 
simply portrayed as a “clash of civilizations/culture”, a battle of “values”, “ideas” or 
“ideologies”. More importantly, this misrepresentation of the nature and root causes 
of these terrorist acts complicates the treatment of the issue by identifying the 
“civilization”, “culture”, “values”, “ideas” or “ideologies” attributed to the religion 
of Islam as the enemy or the cause of this conflict. This is because, first, Muslims all 
over the world find that their religion is being wrongly considered to be the enemy of 
others in this so-called ‘war’ and, second, this misrepresentation of the nature and 
root causes of these terrorist acts in itself adds a religious dimension to the overall 
nature of the conflict.  
  Fortunately, United States President Barack Obama recently corrected the 
misrepresentation of this issue during his first visit to a Muslim country as US 
president. In an address to the Turkish Parliament on 6 April 2009, President Obama 
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simply and emphatically asserts: “Let me say this as clearly as I can: the United 
States is not and never will be at war with Islam.”265 Significantly, out of the whole 
of the President’s speech, this exact phrase made major headlines in newspapers in 
different parts of the world such as Turkey, Lebanon, Qatar, UK, USA and China.266 
Moreover, on 4 June 2009, Obama reiterated exactly the same phrase in a historic 
speech addressed to the Muslim world from Cairo University: “America is not -- and 
never will be -- at war with Islam.”267 This statement indicates the concern of 
President Obama to avoid the negative impact of attributing such terrorist acts to the 
Islamic faith on US relations with the Muslim world. But over a year earlier, 
elegantly and more emphatically, the caption of an article entitled “A World without 
Islam” by Fuller in the Foreign Policy argues: 
What if Islam had never existed? To some, it’s a comforting thought: No 
clash of civilizations, no holy wars, no terrorists. Would Christianity have 
taken over the world? Would the Middle East be a peaceful beacon of 
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democracy? Would 9/11 have happened? In fact, remove Islam from the path 
of history, and the world ends up exactly where it is today.268  
Of the many different approaches to the study of terrorism – just like the 
study of war – such as those of political science, sociology, psychology, ethics, 
economics, etc., the legal approach is the most important in tackling this issue, but, 
disappointingly, the world has failed from the 1920s until the present to agree on a 
universally accepted legal definition of terrorism.269 Strangely enough, however, 
some argue that reaching a legal definition for terrorism “is not really necessary… 
[nor] would even be beneficial.”270 This failure constitutes one of the major problems 
in the study and treatment of the subject. According to the words of Jack P. Gibbs “it 
is no less ‘manifestly absurd’ to pretend to study terrorism without at least some kind 
of definition of it. Leaving the definition implicit is the road to obscurantism.”271 
This lack, or disbelief in the necessity of a consensus on an accepted legal definition 
of terrorism is presumably due to primarily both political and legal apprehensions.272 
The catching cliché coined by US president Ronald Reagan: “one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter” partially reflects what Golder and Williams call “the 
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inescapably political nature” of terrorism.273 This political dimension of the 
treatment of terrorism or the “shortage of political will” is the barrier to developing a 
legal system that can effectively combat terrorism, Keith Suter affirms.274 That is to 
say that, if a consensus is reached on a legal definition of terrorism, then judging 
whether someone is a terrorist or a freedom fighter will be determined according to 
that definition, irrespective of who is judging.275 The legal apprehension, which is 
also partly political, is that the acts, methods, elements, nature and motivations that 
constitute terrorism change with time and circumstances. Thus, understandably 
enough, there is a danger that accused terrorists may escape punishment for terrorism 
if their actions do not fit within the exact, universally accepted legal definition of 
terrorism that is called for. These political and legal apprehensions, which have 
partially hindered the arrival at a legal consensus on a definition of terrorism, appear 
to assume that, once a definition is accepted, it could not be changed, but, since 
terrorism is an ever changing phenomenon, partly because of the different root 
causes creating it, defining it and legislating against it must address these changes. In 
other words, defining what constitutes “terrorism” should be a continuing 
endeavour276 since the nature, acts, methods, tactics, and motives of terrorists 
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throughout history have been changing, and most probably will continue to change – 
unfortunately more catastrophically.277   
Moreover, one of the problems to be overcome in reaching a legal definition 
of terrorism is to determine whether the specific acts committed by the culprits can 
be tried under the laws of terrorism or should be tried as other crimes, such as 
murder, hijacking, sabotage, hostage-taking, etc. It appears that this depends 
somewhat on the motives of the perpetrators. According to Geoffrey Levitt of the US 
Department of State’s Office of Combating Terrorism: “Not all hijackings, 
sabotages, attacks on diplomats, or even hostage-takings are ‘terrorist’; such acts 
may be done for personal or pecuniary reasons or simply out of insanity.”278 But the 
motives of the perpetrators of such heinous crimes should not dictate whether they 
are to be punished as terrorists or otherwise. Thus, Alex P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman 
appear to agree here that the motives of terrorists “do not have to be part of a 
definition” of terrorism.279 Determining the nature of a crime and therefore the 
severity of its punishment should be based on the seriousness of the crime, the degree 
of harm and the severity of the injuries it inflicts upon its victims and society as a 
whole. The mere fact of associating terrorism primarily with political motivations280 
indicates the tendency to give a harsher punishment to the enemies of the state or of 
those in government rather than the fulfilment of justice, irrespective of who are the 
                                                 
277 Here M. Cherif Bassiouni writes: “Terrorism has existed, in one form or another, in many societies 
for as long as history has been recorded. The differences between its various manifestations, however, 
have been as to methods, means, and weapons. As the means of terrorism available to inflict 
significant damage to society improve, the harmful impact of terrorism increase. And as weapons of 
mass destruction become more accessible, the dangers to the world community increase”, Bassiouni, 
“Legal Control of International Terrorism”, p. 83.   
278 Levitt, “Is ‘Terrorism’ Worth Defining?”, p. 115. 
279 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, p. 100. 
280 According to the words of Todd Sandler: “To qualify as terrorism, an act must be politically 
motivated; that is, the act must attempt to influence government policy at home or abroad. Incidents 
that are solely motivated for profit and do not directly or indirectly support a political objective are not 
considered to be terrorism”, Todd Sandler, “Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism”, The 
World Economy, Vol. 26, Issue 6, 2003, p. 780. 
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victims and the motivations of the criminals. Although the crime of hirābah 
distinguishes between the crimes of killing or inflicting bodily damage upon the 
victims and the same criminal acts committed in the context of the crime of hirābah, 
it does not base this distinction upon the motives of the culprits281 or who are the 
victims: as long as the elements of the crime of hirābah exist, the culprits are 
punished accordingly.   
Therefore, this study strongly advocates the necessity of reaching a world 
consensus on a legal definition of terrorism282 and establishing an international legal 
body283 that will be responsible for trying at least perpetrators of international 
terrorism and, no less importantly, the perpetrators of state terrorism and those 
involved in state-sponsored terrorism.284 But as for the position of Islamic law on 
                                                 
281 See Abou El Fadl, “Islam and the Theology of Power”, p. 31. 
282 Tiefenbrun states that “It is hard to believe that a word like ‘terrorism,’ which is used so frequently 
these days in different contexts and in casual, colloquial, political, and legal discourses, does not have 
a universally-accepted definition. It is not enough to say, as United States Supreme Court Justice 
Potter Stewart one said of pornography, ‘we know it when we see it.’ Terrorism must be 
deconstructed to distinguish between domestic and international terrorism, state-sponsored and non-
state sponsored terrorism, and terrorism per se and legal revolutionary violence that falls within the 
law of war… [Therefore, writing in 2003, Tiefenbrun confirms that] The time has come to take a more 
active approach to defining the term terrorism”, Tiefenbrun, “A Semiotic Approach to a Legal 
Definition of Terrorism”, pp. 358, 388. Golder and Williams agree that “Today, it is clearly necessary 
to develop a coherent legal description of terrorism”, Golder and Williams, “What is ‘Terrorism’? 
Problems of Legal Definition”, p. 271. Jörg Friedrichs persuasively argues that a universally accepted 
legal definition of terrorism will help the international society fight against terrorism and will curb the 
hegemonic power to determine who is the terrorist, see Jörg Friedrichs, “Defining the International 
Public Enemy: The Political Struggle behind the Legal Debate on International Terrorism”, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, 2006, pp. 69-91.  
283 It is interesting to find that M. Cherif Bassiouni, writing in 2002 following the September 11 
attacks, expressed the same idea. In the words of a world leading expert in the area, Bassiouni 
suggests: “If we want to put an end to the forms of violence that we call terrorism, then we need an 
effective international legal regime [emphasis added] with enforcement capabilities that can, as 
Aristotle once said, apply the same law in Athens as in Rome”, Bassiouni, “Legal Control of 
International Terrorism”, p. 103. 
284 On state terrorism see, Suter, “September 11 and Terrorism”, pp. 22-25. On the difference between 
state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism see, Bassiouni, “Legal Control of International 
Terrorism”, pp. 84 f. Regarding the importance of trying those behind state-sponsored terrorism, 
Bassiouni also agrees and even more emphatically warns that: “The exclusion of state actors’ unlawful 
terror-violence acts from inclusion in the overall scheme of terrorism control highlights the double 
standard that non-state actors lament and use as a justification for their own transgression.” Even more 
disappointingly, Bassiouni reveals that “governments have avoided developing an international legal 
regime to prevent, control, and suppress terrorism, preferring instead the hodgepodge of thirteen 
treaties that currently address its particular manifestations. The absence of a coherent international 
legislative policy on terrorism is consistent with the ad hoc and discretionary approach that 
governments have taken toward the development of effective international legal responses to 
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acts of terrorism perpetrated by Muslims, it stands to reason that classical Islamic 
law, in particular, and modern Islamic legal bodies and specialist in Islamic law – 
who in turn rely on classical Muslim jurists – are the sources to be used in 
investigating this question. It is essential to determine whether such terrorist acts are 
Islamically justifiable by judging them according to Islamic law itself and not merely 
accepting at face value the terrorists’ justifications for their acts as Islamic. That is to 
say, the terrorists’, or any other Muslims’, interpretations of Islam should be judged 
according to Islam itself and not vice versa. Islam should not be blamed when it is 
misinterpreted, just as, for example, international law is not blamed when states or 
non-state actors give a manipulated or distorted interpretation of it to justify illegal 
offensive wars or military operations. Moreover, when international law is misused 
to justify offensive war, it is never identified or blamed as the root cause for such 
war, as is regrettably the case with Islam.285 
 Despite the particular necessity for a scholarly Islamic legal treatment of 
terrorism, especially since some allegedly attribute the causes of terrorism 
perpetrated by Muslims to Islam, “there has yet to appear a solid Islamic legal 
treatment of terrorism”,286 Jackson rightly notes. An Islamic legal treatment of 
                                                                                                                                          
terrorism”, Bassiouni, “Legal Control of International Terrorism”, p. 102. Furthermore, he explains 
that “the United States has consistently opposed such a [comprehensive convention on terrorism] 
since 1972, ostensibly so that it can pick and choose from these disparate norms those that it wishes to 
rely upon. Above all, the United States does not want to have an effective multilateral scheme that 
would presumably restrict its unfettered political power to act unilaterally”, Bassiouni, “Legal Control 
of International Terrorism”, p. 92. Similarly, Friedrichs strongly argues that some Western countries, 
the United States, in particular, and the United Kingdom have “opposed a definition of terrorism as 
being counter-productive and called for practical measures instead”, Friedrichs, “Defining the 
International Public Enemy”, p. 74. Friedrichs explains this the lack of a definition is advantageous 
for the United States because in this way it can determine who are the terrorists and who are not “on a 
case-by-case basis”, Friedrichs, “Defining the International Public Enemy”, pp. 69 f., 70, 88-90.    
285 For example, the Bush’s doctrine, referring to President George W Bush’s justification for the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the basis that Iraq was causing “potential” national security threats to the 
United States, is still challenged to be “incompatible with international legal constraints on resort to 
force”, see Nicole Deller and John Burroughs, “Jus ad Bellum: Law Regulating Resort to Force”, 
Human Rights Magazine, Winter 2003, Vol. 30, Issue 1, p. 8.     
286 Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition”, p. 293. It should be mentioned here 
that this article of Jackson remains the best treatment of terrorism from the Islamic legal perspective 
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terrorism is lamentably lacking in Western literature, because of the highly technical, 
archaic and contextual nature of classical Islamic law. But more importantly, any 
attempt to study terrorism from the perspective of Islamic law will face the general 
problem in terrorism studies which Wight describes as follows: “It is difficult to 
research something that seems to defy definition: where should one start; where 
should one finish?”287 That is to say, in order to answer the sixth question posed at 
the beginning of this chapter on whether classical Muslim jurists treated terrorism – 
international and domestic – or not, terrorism itself must be clearly defined. Over 
three decades ago Alex P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman of the University of Leiden 
identified 109 definitions of terrorism. Now, the number of these definitions can be 
expected to have increased. Yet, Bassiouni, the co-founder of the field of 
international criminal law, maintains that terrorism “has never been satisfactorily 
defined”,288 despite the fact that many countries throughout the world currently have 
their own definitions. In addition to the United Nations’ definition,289 each of the 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Australia and South Africa, 
                                                                                                                                          
of the works studied here. Vogel’s short Essay is a laudable contribution to the discussion of the 
punishment of terrorists in Islamic law see, Vogel, “The Trial of Terrorists under Classical Islamic 
Law”, pp. 53-64. 
287 Wight, “Theorising Terrorism”, p. 99. Roberta Senechal De la Roche points out to the same 
problem for the scientific study of terrorism from the sociological perspective in the following words: 
“Without a useful definition of terrorism, a theory of the subject [i.e., terrorism] is not even possible. 
How do we identify a case of terrorism? What characteristics distinguish it from other collective 
violence?”, Roberta Senechal De la Roche, “Toward a Scientific Theory of Terrorism”, Sociological 
Theory, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium, Vol. 22, No. 1, March 2004, p. 1. 
288 Bassiouni, “Legal Control of International Terrorism”, p. 101. Professor Zdzislaw Galicki of the 
University of Warsaw adds here that “the question of defining international terrorism remains the 
most difficult and unsatisfactorily solved for all engaged in the process of elaboration of antiterrorist 
treaties, either universal or regional”, Zdzislaw Galicki, “International Law and Terrorism”, The 
American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 48, No. 6, February 2005, p. 745. 
289 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 54/109 defined terrorism on 9 December 1999 
as: “Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of 
persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever 
the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature, 
that may be invoked to justify them”, Tiefenbrun, “A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of 
Terrorism”, pp. 375-379. See also on the United Nations’ efforts to define and concluding treaties 
against terrorism, Suter, “September 11 and Terrorism”, pp. 27-31. 
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among other countries, have their own definition/s of terrorism.290 In the United 
States alone there are several definitions: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
the Department of State and the Department of Defense, each have their own 
definition of terrorism. This has led Susan Tiefenbrun to conclude that “In the United 
States there is a general confusion about what constitutes terrorism”,291 which 
consequently has “engendered considerable puzzlement”,292 William H. Lewis 
explains.   
In an attempt to give a possible answer to the sixth question posed at the 
beginning of this chapter, the following three definitions adopted by the three US 
institutions mentioned above will be considered here as the yardsticks by which to 
determine whether the classical Muslim jurists treated terrorism or not. First, 
according to the FBI definition, terrorism is:  
“the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives.”293 
                                                 
290 For the definitions of terrorism in these countries see, for example, Golder and Williams, “What is 
‘Terrorism’? Problems of Legal Definition”, pp. 275-286; Tiefenbrun, “A Semiotic Approach to a 
Legal Definition of Terrorism”, pp. 363-375. 
291 Tiefenbrun, “A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism”, p. 363. Tiefenbrun adds 
that “The absence of a generally-accepted definition of terrorism in the United States allows the 
government to craft variant or vague definitions which can result in an erosion of civil rights and the 
possible abuse of power by the state in the name of fighting terrorism and protecting national 
security”, Tiefenbrun, “A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism”, p. 364. Therefore, 
if such absence of an accepted definition of terrorism in the US can lead, or more accurately have 
already led, to the abuse of power in this country, then the possibility is far greater that power will be 
abused if this anarchy of defining terrorism still exits throughout the whole universe.     
292 William H. Lewis, “The War on Terror: A Retrospective”, Mediterranean Quarterly, Fall 2002, p. 
27. 
293 Definition available from the FBI website: http://denver.fbi.gov/nfip.htm; Internet; accessed on 7 
May 2009. See also , for example, Paul Butler, “Foreword: Terrorism and Utilitarianism: Lessons 
from, and for, Criminal Law”, The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 93, No. 1, 
Autumn 2002, p. 3; William H. Lewis,  “The War on Terror: A Retrospective”, p. 27; Arthur H. 
Garrison, “Terrorism: The Nature of its History”, Criminal Justice System, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 2003, p. 
40; Jackson, “Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition”, p. 295; Sarah Gordon and Richard 
Ford, “Cyberterrorism?”, Computers and Security, Vol. 21, No. 7, 2002, pp. 637 f.; Tiefenbrun, “A 
Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism”, p. 367; Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, “What is 
Terrorism? Redefining a Phenomenon in Time of War”, Peace and Change, Vol. 30, No. 2, April 
2005, pp. 233 f. 
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Second, according to the Department of State definition, terrorism is:  
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience. The term International terrorism means 
terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.”294  
Third, according to the US Department of Defense, terrorism is: 
“the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; 
intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of 
goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.”295 
The following diagram explains the main seven elements of the definition of 
terrorism according to these three institutions: 
 
Institution FBI Department of State Department of Defense 
Act use of force/violence use of violence threat/use of violence 
Description unlawful premeditated calculated 
Direct 
target/victim persons/property non-combatants  
Culprit  sub-national groups/clandestine agents  
Intention  intimidate/coerce influence inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate 
Indirect 
target/victim anyone an audience=anyone governments/societies 
Objective/ 
goal/motive political/social political political/religious/ideological
 
                                                 
294 See, for example, Sharp, “The Use of Force against Terrorism”, p. 38; William H. Lewis,  “The 
War on Terror: A Retrospective”, p. 27; Gordon and Ford, “Cyberterrorism?”, p. 638; Garrison, 
“Terrorism: The Nature of its History”, p. 40; Alison Elizabeth Chase, “Legal Mechanisms of the 
International Community and the United States Concerning State Sponsorship of Terrorism”, Virginia 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 45, No. 1, Fall 2004, p. 50; Tiefenbrun, “A Semiotic Approach to a 
Legal Definition of Terrorism”, pp. 367 f. 
295 Grob-Fitzgibbon, “What is Terrorism? Redefining a Phenomenon in Time of War”, p. 233; 
William H. Lewis, “The War on Terror: A Retrospective”, p. 27. See also Gordon and Ford, 
“Cyberterrorism?”, p. 638. 
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These three definitions show certain similarities between the crime of hirābah and 
terrorism. In fact, hirābah satisfies most of the elements of terrorism mentioned in 
these definitions. The culprits’ use of force, or merely the threat to use it according to 
the Mālikīs, is criminal, unlawful, premeditated and calculated. Their direct 
targets/victims are non-combatants and their possessions. The element of 
intimidation is a core element in the crime of hirābah and its perpetrators are even 
sometimes referred to as street terrorisers. The punishment of the perpetrators of 
hirābah who merely intimidate their victims without causing any other harm to them 
is exile/imprisonment, according to the majority of the jurists, or any of the following 
four prescribed punishments as chosen by the judge according to the Mālikīs: 
execution, gibbeting, amputation of a hand and a foot from opposite sides or 
banishment/imprisonment. This means that the mere act of intimidation is a severely 
punished crime under Islamic law. Although the various schools express it in 
different ways, the element of intimidation/coercion/influence is particularly explicit 
in the writings of the Mālikīs: the example given by the Mālikīs above about causing 
fear and intimidation to prevent people from taking a certain road indicates that 
causing fear and terror here is intended to achieve a certain goal. Obviously, unlike 
most cases of hirābah, there is no pecuniary goal here because, if the perpetrators 
had such goal, they would have wanted the opposite, i.e., that their indirect 
target/victims would use the road so that they could rob them. Thus, no matter how 
the intended goal in this example might be described, it parallels the acts of terrorism 
intended to achieve any of the four objectives named in the above three definitions, 
i.e., political, social, religious or ideological. But it is evident from these three 
definitions that “terrorism” is mainly politically motivated. The political motivations 
of terrorism dominate the three definitions, while the Department of State definition 
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restricts terrorism to politically motivated violence. Restricting terrorism to acts of 
violence motivated by these four objectives means that those who commit the same 
unlawful acts of massive indiscriminate, premeditated use of violence against 
innocent civilians, but for economic or other motivations, are not terrorists and 
therefore cannot be punished accordingly. That is to say, the current international 
approach to the determination of what constitutes terrorism is limited to these 
particular motivations rather than by the nature of the acts themselves – the 
indiscriminate and widespread acts of extreme violence against innocent civilians – 
irrespective of the motivations of the perpetrators. 
 Contrary to the current international approach to terrorism, the classical 
Muslim jurists’ elaborations on what constitutes hirābah focused primarily on 
identifying the particular acts punishable under the law concerning this crime and the 
context in which it occurs. Apart from robbing their victims, killing innocent 
civilians, causing bodily damage or injuries, or the mere act of intimidating the 
victims without committing any of the above, all these acts punishable under the law 
of hirābah represent the classical Muslim jurists’ primitive equivalent of present-day 
terrorism. But more than these acts, the contexts in which the core elements of these 
acts of hirābah occur remarkably describe the nature of present-day terrorist acts. In 
both hirābah and terrorism, the culprits target innocent civilians who have 
committed no wrongdoing against them. Although both the perpetrators of hirābah 
and present-day terrorists possess some force, in terms of the weapons they use or the 
number of their groups, they attack their victims in an underhand way. They both 
remain clandestine groups of terrorisers, who attack their innocent civilian victims in 
situations where they are in no position to defend themselves. Furthermore, and more 
importantly, the victims of hirābah and present-day terrorism are attacked in a 
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context in which (lā yalhaquhum al-ghawth) they are helpless. This element of 
helplessness – a core element in hirābah – brings to mind the situation of the victims 
of present-day terrorist explosions: whether the victims are travelling through the 
desert or unpopulated areas, as during the classical Muslim jurists’ era, or, as 
happens today, on board a plane, train, bus, etc., walking on the streets or even sitting 
in their homes, victims are attacked or blown up in situations where they are 
defenceless and helpless in the face of the armed attackers and hidden explosives. 
Therefore, it may be concluded here that the answer to the sixth question is in 
the affirmative – classical Muslim jurists did treat terrorism as it was practised in 
their own times. The forms, acts and motives of terrorism then differed considerably 
from those of the present-day, but the nature and core elements of terrorism, at least 
according to the above three definitions, show striking similarities between hirābah 
and today’s terrorism. However, the classical Muslim jurists’ discussions of the 
punishment for hirābah reveal that they limit this hadd punishment to such terrorist 
actions, whether domestic or international, in which both the perpetrators and victims 
are Muslims or dhimmis. The four schools of Islamic law agree that this must be the 
case in order for the perpetrators to be punished for their actions under Islamic law. 
The Hanafīs stipulate further that such terrorist acts must occur within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Islamic state, while the Shāfi‛īs, Mālikīs, Hanbalīs and Zāhirīs 
punish the culprits even if the crime occurs outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Islamic state as long as both the criminals and victims are Muslims or dhimmis. 
Certainly, this does not mean that such terrorist actions which fall outside of the 
hirābah punishment are not prohibited, but merely means that these Qur’ān-
prescribed punishments are inapplicable if these particular conditions are not 
fulfilled. Ibn Mawdūd states that if a Muslim enters dār al-harb with an amān, then it 
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is prohibited for him to do any harm to their person or property, because this will be 
a treason which is prohibited in Islam.296   
The answer to the seventh question set at the beginning of this chapter, on 
what constitutes acts of terrorism in Islam is, in contrast to the current international 
attempts to define what constitutes terrorism, clear and precise and almost agreed 
upon by Muslim jurists. The main reason for this clarity and agreement is that, as 
referred to above, classical and modern Muslim jurists determined what constituted 
the terrorism of their time by enumerating the acts committed against the victims of 
terrorism and the contexts in which these acts occurred.297 Moreover, it is also clear 
that the punishment of the culprits of each of these terrorist acts is commensurate to 
the criminal acts committed, according to the majority of jurists, or, according to the 
Mālikīs, based on the intellectual and physical abilities of the culprits. The answer to 
the seventh question can therefore be found in the answer to the eighth question, 
about the punishment of terrorists and their accomplices. In other words, the answer 
to the seventh and eighth questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, on what 
constitute acts of terrorism and the punishment of terrorists and their accomplices in 
Islamic law, can be found in the rules for the punishment for hirābah, discussed 
above. It is worth recalling here that in addition to the specific acts enumerated by 
the classical Muslim jurists, some modern Muslim scholars have added certain 
                                                 
296 Ibn Mawdūd, Al-Ikhtiyār, Vol. 4, p. 144. 
297 It is interesting to add here that modern Muslim scholars follow the same approach of their 
classical predecessors in defining what constitutes terrorism: They define what terrorism is by 
mentioning the acts committed by the terrorists against their victims. According to The Islamic Fiqh 
Council definition of terrorism, as given in English in the appendix of Issue 17 of The Islamic Fiqh 
Council Journal, “Terrorism is an atrocity committed by individuals, groups or states against the 
human being (his religion, life, mind, property and honour). It includes all forms of intimidation, 
harming, threatening and killing without a just cause and all acts of banditry and violence that take 
place in the wake of an individual or collective criminal plan aimed at spreading the terror among 
people by exposing their life, liberty or security to danger, including the harm inflicted to the 
environment or to a public or private utility, or exposing one of the national or natural resources to 
danger.” The Islamic Fiqh Council, “Resolutions of the Islamic Fiqh Council”, The Islamic Fiqh 
Council Journal, Issue No. 17, 2004/1425, p. 34.    
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modern actions which also constitute this crime, such as abduction, sabotage, 
organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorist explosions and the hijacking of planes, 
trains, etc.     
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The law of rebellion in Islam shows that the classical Muslim jurists successfully 
managed to cautiously develop a legal framework to fulfil the difficult task of 
safeguarding both the Islamic obligation to apply Islamic law and achieve justice on 
the one hand, and to maintain stability and security on the other. The current failure 
to achieve this at present is one of the reasons for the instability and backwardness of 
a large part of the modern Muslim world. The law of rebellion in Islam produces a 
framework that regulates the relationship between the regime governing the Islamic 
state and its internal opponents. As shown above, this framework takes into 
consideration the balance between the obligations to apply the rule of Islamic law 
and to prevent bloodshed among Muslims. Once the three conditions discussed 
above are fulfilled in a group of rebels, it is an indication that they may have a just 
cause that the regime must deal with in accordance with the framework guaranteed 
for them in Islam. This framework obligates the regime to engage in discussions with 
its opponents and address their complaints, which indicates the necessity of resolving 
potential conflicts peacefully.298 But more significantly here, the proposal by some 
classical Muslim jurists that a munāz arah (a public debate) should be held between 
the regime and the would-be rebels if all attempts to convince the latter to abandon 
their plans to use force fail, is an extremely generous one and surpasses what any 
                                                 
298 It is worth adding here that the Egyptian terrorist group know as al-Jamā‛ah al-Islāmiyyah gave 
up, and renounced, their use of violence, in a number of publications following a series of fifteen 
attempts of discussions over a decade and a half between the leaders of this group and Egyptian 
government officials, religious scholars and police officers, see El-Awa, Al-Jamā‛ah al-Islāmiyyah. 
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democratic government at present can offer to its would-be rebels. Indeed, this last 
attempt to avoid civil war in Islam by inviting the public to judge who is right and 
who is wrong between the regime and the would-be rebels is similar to the debates 
between presidential candidates in modern democracies. Moreover, the public was 
supposed to judge on the basis of that debate without resorting to the polls; a method 
any classical Muslim jurists would have found practically convenient and would 
have strongly recommended in such situations.299 That is to conclude that the 
classical Muslim jurists offered the political opponents of the regime a remarkable 
degree of tolerance300 and developed at least a theoretical framework to ensure 
peaceful and democratic conflict resolution.  
 Despite the fact that a few Muslim countries claim to have adopted a wholly 
Islamic system of law, while the others have adopted an amalgam of Islamic and 
Western laws, not a single Muslim country appears to apply the Islamic law of 
rebellion.301 Understandably, any regime in the Muslim world at present would find 
this law, in the form in which it was developed by the classical Muslim jurists, too 
lenient to the extent of even encouraging their political opponents to resort to armed 
rebellion to overthrow them. But the degree of freedom granted to political 
opponents in many Muslim countries to challenge the tyranny and policies of their 
regimes at present cannot be compared to what the classical Muslim jurists 
endeavoured to guarantee for them,302 particularly with respect to the law of 
                                                 
299 Al-Qaradāwī advises contemporary Muslims here that they should utilize the peaceful democratic 
methods of change which prevent fitnah and destruction, see al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād, Vol. 2, p. 
1067. 
300 See Abou El Fadl, “Islam and the Theology of Power”, p. 30. 
301 See Abou El Fadl, “Political Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence”, p. 27; Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and 
Violence, p. 337. 
302 It is worth adding here, in the words of Lisa Wedeen, that: “A fundamental concern of many 
contemporary Muslims is the need to check the arbitrary powers of leaders and institute the rule of 
law, and strict application of the sharia is seen by many as a way of checking tyranny while ensuring 
procedural justice”, Wedeen, “Beyond the Crusades: Why Huntington, and bin Ladin, are Wrong”, p. 
58. 
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rebellion. Criticising rulers, whether presidents or ruling families/kings, of certain 
Muslim countries at present leads to jail. It is a punishable crime in some Muslim 
countries to insult “the royal entity” or even specific institutions such as the army 
and the judiciary.303 Such criminal offences would seem to be unimaginable for the 
classical Muslim jurists. If “insulting” in itself, were a criminal offence, then there is 
no need for, nor Islamic grounds that would warrant, laws that punish those who 
insult particular individuals or institutions differently from those who insult other 
members of society. 
 The second major contribution that Islamic law can make not only to present 
Muslim societies but also to the international society at large lies in the treatment of 
terrorism. Specifically here, because the classical Muslim jurists’ approach to the 
determination of what constitutes terrorism can be a useful approach to defining what 
terrorism is – a task the world has failed so far to complete. The punishment of the 
perpetrators and accomplices of terrorism is the severest punishment stipulated under 
Islamic law, partly because it endangers the security, economy and stability of the 
entire society; it is not merely an attack on the lives and property of the individual 
victims alone. The punishment of terrorists in Islam is therefore classified as God’s 
right because any citizen of a society – and indeed the entire society – can be a 
                                                 
303 For example, in June 2006, according to the BBC: “Two Egyptian journalists have been sentenced 
to a year’s imprisonment for defaming President Hosni Mubarak”, BBC, “Egypt journalists get jail 
terms”, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5118876.stm; Internet; accessed 
26 May 2009; Also In Kuwait in April 2009: “a candidate standing in the parliamentary election has 
been arrested for publically criticising the ruling al-Sabah family”, BBC, “Kuwait ‘Arrests critic of 
Sabah’”, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8008589.stm; Internet; accessed 
25 May 2009. In October 2006: “A military court in Egypt has jailed a nephew of the assassinated 
President Anwar Sadat on charges of insulting the army and spreading disinformation”, BBC, 
“Sadat’s nephew receives jail term”, available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6104214.stm; Internet; accessed 26 May 2009. Also, in 
Turkey, according to the words of a French ambassador to Turkey from 1988 to 192: “Any public 
criticism of the military (in the press, for example) found to be ‘insulting’ can result in prison 
sentences of up to six years”, Eric Rouleau, “Turkey’s Dream of Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
79, No. 6, November/December 2000, p. 107.  
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victim of their actions, which cause ikhāfah (intimidation), fasād (destruction) and 
‛adam ghawth (helplessness). 
 But since the concept of what constitutes a society and its national security in 
today’s globalized world changes – and the Muslim world is no exception to this – 
laws and legal doctrines should change in order to address these changes, particularly 
since classical Muslim jurists lived under a unified Islamic state, unlike today’s 
world where one third of Muslims live as minorities in the non-Muslim world. In 
addition, in the current changed, globalized and inter-dependent world, a classical 
Muslim jurist would have found that the maslahah (public interest) of the Muslim 
world now requires a universally accepted legal definition and a universal treaty 
tackling the common challenge of terrorism because the security of Muslims and 
their protection from the danger of terrorism is also globalized, like their current 
international society. It is therefore no wonder, on the one hand, that the Islamic Fiqh 
Council’s definition of terrorism omits any mention of the religion or nationality of 
the culprits and victims of terrorism or the territory in which the terrorist acts occur. 
This definition states that: “Terrorism is an atrocity committed by individuals, groups 
or states against the human being…”304 This definition contradicts the classical 
Muslim jurists’ approach which restricts the punishment for hirābah to crimes in 
which both the culprits and the victims are Muslims or dhimmis, as explained above. 
 On the other hand, it is not surprising either that, in stark contradiction to the 
theory of the clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, David Miliband, the 
British Foreign Secretary, has recently called for a coalition between the West and 
the Muslim world. On 21 May 2009, in a speech at the Oxford Centre for Islamic 
Studies, he argued for building coalitions “to pursue common interests” of 
                                                 
304 The Islamic Fiqh Council, “Resolutions of the Islamic Fiqh Council”, p. 34. 
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maintaining security and facing “the threats from climate change, terrorism, 
pandemics and financial crisis.”305 Such wise foreign policies aimed at the 
maintenance of international peace must be based on, and accompanied by, a just and 
equitable international legal system fee from the pressures and control of the big 
powers. In conclusion, the maintenance of international peace requires the 
establishment of justice, which necessitates an ever developing international legal 
system with a mechanism that ensures the application of international law and the 
punishment of its violators. 
 
                                                 
305 David Miliband, “Our Shared Future: Building Coalitions and Winning Consent”, available for 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=18130489; Internet; accessed 29 
May 2009. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has shown that the Islamic law of war has been interpreted and developed 
throughout its history by independent individual Muslim jurist-scholars. A few of 
them have indeed shaped this centuries-long process of interpretation, reasoning, 
disagreement over, and application of jihād in the changing world that has been the 
context in which this process has taken place. It is only these few individuals who 
have made genuine attempts and offered explanations of the nature and objectives of 
jihād based on their interpretations of the Qur’ān and the tradition of the Prophet, the 
primary sources of Islamic legislation. No less importantly, even fewer individuals 
have addressed the issue of the application of jihād in differing world situations and 
have not merely related and discussed earlier opinions. These individuals are the sort 
of scholars who have both the courage to challenge and reinterpret accepted opinions 
and deep insight into both the sources of Islam and the realm of its application. This 
shows that the Islamic law of war throughout its history has been a living entity that 
has attempted to achieve certain objectives (Islamic jus ad bellum) and which has 
been regulated by certain rules (Islamic jus in bello). 
In the process of the formulation of the Islamic law of war, disagreements 
and varying interpretations become inevitable since this is a characteristic of any 
human endeavour. Recognizing this simple human fact about such a human 
endeavour is not difficult. But since this human endeavour is related in this case to a 
law that is derived partly from religious sources, many insiders and outsiders have 
ignored this simple fact and thus have assumed the opposite and, in fact, have not 
only overlooked but have even strongly denied that achieving the objectives of jihād 
takes different forms in different situations. Thus, to answer one of the core questions 
of this study about the nature of jihād, this study has shown that the examination of 
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the incidents of war between the Muslims and their enemies during the Prophet’s 
lifetime, the Qur’ānic justifications for war and the opinions of the majority of 
classical and modern Muslim jurists and scholars, confirms that jihād is a defensive 
war. It is justified in cases of aggression against the Muslim nation and fitnah, i.e., 
the persecution of Muslims. These two justifications indicate that jihād is a just war 
which aims at stopping aggression or protecting the religious freedom of Muslims. 
The fact that these two justifications for jihād in the sense of armed conflict are 
derived from the teachings of a religion does not render jihād a “holy war”, unless 
the term “holy” refers to any activity based on religious justifications, including 
defensive war. 
This kind of defensive war is called jihād al-daf‛ which is a fard ‛ayn 
(personal duty of every capable person). But the main reason for the confusion and 
controversies about the nature of jihād is that the same word is used for another kind 
of jihād called jihād al-talab (military campaigns to convey the message of Islam in 
non-Muslim territories). Jihād al-talab does not necessarily involve armed 
confrontations. This kind of jihād refers to the campaigns initiated by the Islamic 
state after the Prophet’s demise in the first century of the Islamic era, known as al-
futuhāt al-Islāmiyyah (the Islamic openings). According to the rules of this kind of 
jihād, Islam is to be offered to non-Muslims; if they reject it, a form of agreement is 
to be concluded by which they pay jizyah to the Islamic state in return for the 
protection the Islamic state provides for them against any foreign aggression. If they 
reject these two options, armed confrontation becomes the third. Jurists explain that 
the Islamic state should undertake this kind of jihād at least once a year if it has the 
capability to do so. Importantly, Muslim jurists agree that the aim of resorting to this 
kind of militarized missionary campaigns was to convey the message of Islam to 
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non-Muslims. Thus, the Islamic state resorted to this kind of preaching because the 
freedom to preach Islam in non-Muslim territories was not secured at that time. 
Shaykh Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī explains that the Islamic state resorted to this kind of 
jihād “in order to break down the barriers”, i.e., the non-Muslim regimes, preventing 
people from listening to the message of Islam.1 
This kind of militarized missionary activity has become unnecessary because 
there are today no such barriers preventing Muslim preachers from entering non-
Muslim territories to preach Islam. Moreover, Muslims can now preach Islam to non-
Muslims without physically travelling to non-Muslim territories. This is why most 
modern Muslim scholars agree that, in addition to defensive war to stop aggression 
and to liberate Muslim occupied territories, jihād at present takes the form of 
preaching Islam using the Internet, the mass media, written publications and other 
such missionary methods. It is remarkable that, despite the fact that preaching Islam 
is so important that the Islamic state was supposed to resort to war if needs be to 
fulfil this task, no Muslim country at present appears to meet the objective of this 
kind of jihād, i.e., preaching Islam. 
This shows that determining the nature of jihād depends on which kind of 
jihād is being considered and which period in history is being studied. Jihād al-daf‛ 
is simply a defensive war, while jihād al-talab at the present time means missionary 
activities. Thus, at present, jihād in the sense of armed conflict refers to a defensive 
just war justified in cases of aggression and persecution of Muslims. This applies to 
jihād in both international and domestic armed conflicts alike, whether jihād in 
international armed conflicts refers to war against non-Muslim territories according 
to the classical Islamic conception of the state system, or to conflicts with another 
                                                 
1 Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li-Ahkāmih wa Falsafatih fī D aw’ al-Qur’ān 
wa al-Sunnah (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2009), Vol. 1, pp. 54 f. 
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Muslim country according to the modern nation-state system. The other key 
justification for jihād in domestic armed conflicts is the violations of the rules of the 
sharī‛ah. That is, apart from cases of aggression against Muslims, resorting to war 
has been justified in order to preach Islam, if needs be, during certain periods in 
history, or to stop the religious persecution of Muslims, or to prevent the violation of 
the sharī‛ah in Muslim countries, thus indicating that the justification for war in 
Islam has evolved around protecting the freedom to practice, apply and preach Islam.  
These particular justifications may give an indication of some of the 
situations that may justify the use of force, from an Islamic perspective, in the future. 
Indeed, these justifications explain the fact that recent incidents of, or calls for, the 
use of force by Muslims have been targeting regimes in Muslim countries mainly 
because of the total or partial absence of the application of the sharī‛ah, or merely the 
violation of its rules. That is to say, internal hostilities or acts of terrorism targeting 
regimes in Muslim countries, i.e., “jihād against the near enemy”, may be a dominant 
kind of use of force by Muslims, apart from the liberation of occupied territories. 
This points to the need for Muslim countries to tackle this issue, which may cause 
unrest in their societies. The current acts of violence associated with Islamist groups 
demanding the application of the sharī‛ah in Gaza,2 Pakistan, Nigeria and Somalia 
are cases in point. 
Concerning the preaching of Islam, it seems inconceivable that Muslims at 
the present time may think of it, much less the application of the sharī‛ah in a non-
Muslim country, as a justification for the use of force against non-Muslim countries. 
Indeed, the freedom to practise Islam is more secure in some non-Muslim countries 
than in a few Muslim countries. All these new realities are reasons for the 
                                                 
2 Shahdī al-Kāshif, “Maqtal Za‛īm al-Salafiyyah al-Jihādiyyah”, available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2009/08/090814_mr_gaza_imarah_tc2.shtml; Internet; 
accessed 15 August 2009.  
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phenomenon called “jihād against the near enemy”. This is in line with the opinion of 
the majority of classical Muslim jurists that unbelief in itself is not a justification for 
going to war, but only the aggression of non-Muslims against Muslims and their 
hostility towards the preaching of Islam. It is these justifications that determine the 
Muslims’ recourse to jihād, and whether a war is to be waged or not, and who is the 
enemy, is determined accordingly. 
As referred to above, Islamic law treats numerous aspects of human activity, 
including acts of worship, family law, financial transactions, international relations, 
etc. A common and major mistake in this regard is to assume that, since Islam treats 
these aspects, all of its rules are unchangeable. Some of the rules are intended to 
achieve certain objectives and thus they change with changing of situations in order 
to achieve the same objectives, as shown above in the case of jihād. In addition, the 
fulfilment of mas lahah (public interest) is one of the objectives of the law.3 The 
confusion between sharī‛ah and fiqh, discussed in Chapter Three, which has led to 
the common error in Western literature of labelling Islamic laws as sacred and 
unchangeable sharī‛ah, i.e., divine law, has complicated the study of many fields 
related to the study of Islam, simply because the opinions and rules given by a given 
Muslim jurist or scholar are presented as permanent laws of Islam, i.e., sharī‛ah. 
This study has shown the wide range of disagreements among Muslim 
exegetes and jurists both in the interpretations of Islamic sources and, as a 
consequence, in the laws advocated in consequence. Thus, Chapter Four, in 
particular, has indicated that a key characteristic of Islamic law is the disagreements 
and contradictory rules advocated by classical Muslim jurists. In the process of 
                                                 
3 According to David De Santillana, Islamic law “divine in its origin, human in its subject-matter, has 
no other end but the welfare of man [or what he calls the public weal [maslaha].” David De 
Santillana, “Law and Society”, in Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume, eds., The Legacy of Islam 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), p. 290. 
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formulating the Islamic rules regulating the conduct of Muslims during international 
armed conflict, independent, individual Muslim jurist scholars have interpreted the 
Islamic sources and, on the one hand, attempted to infer the intention that lies behind 
them, and, on the other, tried to discover how the military necessity of winning the 
war, i.e., the mas lahah, may be accomplished. The conflicting rules advocated by the 
many jurists of the various schools of Islamic law necessitate, first, the continuous 
exercise of collective ijtihād and, second, a codification of Islamic rulings, if Islamic 
law is to be applied in differing situations or feasibly and fairly judged.  
Put differently, in terms of the application, what would a Muslim army or a 
group of fighters, who are hypothetically supposed to abide by the Islamic jus in 
bello norms, do when faced by the contradictory rulings advocated by the jurists 
regarding, for example, the permissibility of the use of certain weapons, attacking the 
enemy by night, or using non-combatant individuals as human shields? It stands to 
reason that particular rulings would be chosen, since it is irrational, and even 
practically impossible, that a regular state army, or even an organized group of 
fighters, would be left to adopt contradictory rulings regulating their actions in war. 
Moreover, because of the absence of a codification of Islamic rulings, some terrorist 
Muslim groups have justified the indiscriminate killing of innocent Muslim and non-
Muslim civilians by drawing an analogy with the case of tatarrus, human shields. 
Such misinterpretation of the classical Muslim jurists’ treatment of this issue could 
have been prevented if there were a codification of Islamic rulings on the subject 
drawn up in accordance with the consensus of an international body of Muslim 
jurists. Furthermore, such a codification would be able fairly to represent Islamic law 
and thus minimise the possibility of Islam being selectively presented in ways that 
are often described as either apologetic or prejudiced. 
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In fact, the main finding of this study, unexpectedly however, is the enormous 
contribution that the Islamic law of war, jihād, may make towards international peace 
and security in the modern world, particularly if such a codification were 
accomplished. Concerning the justifications for war in international armed conflicts, 
the agreement of classical and modern Muslim jurists and scholars that jihād is 
justified only in cases of aggression against, and persecution of, Muslims, jihād al-
daf‛, indicates that Muslims are prohibited from waging war for other reasons. More 
importantly here, it indicates that Muslim countries at present are, indeed, obliged, 
according to the Qur’ānic prescription (4:75-76), to go to war to rescue oppressed 
Muslims – an obligation al-Qarad āwī also extends to oppressed non-Muslim 
minorities in the light of this text. It is worth adding here that this obligation a 
fortiori extends to include oppressed Muslims living in Muslim countries. 
One of the objectives even of the first/seventh century al-futuhāt al-
Islāmiyyah, according to prominent Muslim scholars such as Abū Zahrah and al-
Zuhaylī, was the liberation of non-Muslim peoples from the oppression of the 
Romans and the Persians.4 According to this logic, Muslims are obliged to go to war 
if they have the capability of rescuing oppressed non-Muslim peoples. Theoretically, 
this would impose a religiously binding obligation on Muslim countries to participate 
in the efforts of the international society to stop massacres and genocides, even if the 
victims are non-Muslims. 
Concerning the justifications for going to war in non-international armed 
conflicts, the Qur’ānic prescription (49:9) that justifies the use of force to stop inter-
                                                 
4 Muhammad Abū Zahrah, Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām (Cairo: Al-Dār al-Qawmiyyah lil-
Tibā‛ah wa al-Nashr, 1964/1384), p. 32; Wahbah al-Zuh aylī, “Islam and International Law”, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 858, June 2005, pp. 279 f.; Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, 
Al-‛Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islam: Muqāranah bi-al-Qānūn al-Dawlī al-Hadīth (Beirut: Mu’assasah 
al-Risālah, 1981/1401), pp. 127-129. See also Hilmi M. Zawati, Is Jihad a Just War? War, Peace, and 
Human Rights under Islamic and Public International Law, Studies in Religion and Society, Vol. 53 
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), p. 49.  
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Muslim fighting and bring about reconciliation between the warring parties places 
modern-day Muslim countries under a religious obligation to participate in putting an 
end to such conflicts. The severe restrictions laid down by classical Muslim jurists on 
the violent overthrow of established Muslim regimes may have contributed to saving 
Muslims throughout history from the scourge of civil wars, but at the same time they 
did not propose a practical Islamic mechanism for changing regimes by peaceful 
means or for deciding who should be in charge of such a mechanism, although they 
did provide a possibility for change of regime in a peculiar case referred to below. 
The problem here is that this cautious position of the classical Muslim jurists may be 
abused to support contemporary corrupt and tyrannical regimes, although their 
treatment of the regulations for the use of force against rebels attempts to avoid this 
problem – but only once an act of armed rebellion is about to take place. 
Concerning the contribution the Islamic regulations for war in international 
armed conflicts can make in the modern world, it must first be said that the mere fact 
that these rules are self-imposed indicates the great influence they may have on the 
conduct of Muslims in war. Chapter Four indicates that the overarching concern of 
the classical Muslim jurists’ exhaustive treatment of the Islamic rules regulating the 
conduct of Muslims in international armed conflicts was to protect the lives of enemy 
non-combatants. They developed a full-blown doctrine of non-combatant immunity 
and thus have weighed the prohibition on the indiscriminate killing of enemy non-
combatants, even sometimes as collateral damage, against the military necessity of 
winning the war, as is evidenced from their discussions of the issues of human 
shields, night attacks and certain kinds of primitive indiscriminate weapons. The 
nuanced restrictions, and in some cases prohibition, of the use of primitive 
indiscriminate weapons (namely, mangonels, fire and flooding) advocated by 
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classical Muslim jurists are the basis on which modern Muslim scholars advocate the 
Islamic prohibition of the possession of WMD. However, the enemy’s 
possession/use of such indiscriminate weapons – whether ancient or modern – has 
been advocated by Muslims as a justification for the possession/use of these weapons 
on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. This Islamic position shows the need for 
reaching a global agreement on the prohibition of the possession of WMD by any 
member of the international society based on the fact that the possession of these 
weapons by some members may lead others to attempt to possess it.  
Some contemporary scholars have concluded that the Islamic rules governing 
the conduct of Muslims in war “In many respects… actually supersede[s] the Geneva 
Convention.”5 In the words of Saleem Marsoof, Judge in the Sri Lankan Court of 
Appeal, these rules are “more elaborate and just than even the rules contained in 
modern international conventions and protocols containing the principles of the 
modern International Humanitarian Law”.6 The potential contribution these humane 
Islamic jus in bello norms could provide to the international society’s efforts to 
humanize international armed conflicts would undoubtedly have been greater if 
modern Muslim scholars had addressed the same concerns as their classical 
predecessors in the light of the modern war situations. Indeed, the inadequate 
utilization of the Islamic potential contribution to the international system, which has 
been noted by some scholars,7 is due to the fact that, first, Islamic scholars, unlike 
their classical predecessors, no longer show adequate concern to address 
contemporary issues, particularly regarding Islamic governance, criminal law and 
                                                 
5 Troy S. Thomas, “Prisoners of War in Islam: A Legal Inquiry”, The Muslim World, Vol. LXXXVII, 
No. 1, January, 1997, p. 52. 
6 Saleem Marsoof, “Islam and International Humanitarian Law”, Sri Lanka Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 15, 2003, p. 27. 
7 Muhammed Muqtedar Khan, “Islam as an Ethical Tradition of International Relations”, in Abdul 
Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk and Ayse S. Kadayifci, eds., Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam 
(Lanham MD: University Press of America, 2001), p. 73. 
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international law. The legal systems covering these areas in most Muslim countries 
have been replaced by Western legal systems.  
Second, the state domination of religious institutions has weakened public 
trust in some state-salaried Islamic scholars, which in turn has contributed to the 
emergence of a host of fundamentalist groups who have their own extreme 
interpretations and applications of Islam. This situation has proved to be catastrophic. 
To mention just a few examples of relevance here, recent acts of terrorism committed 
by Muslims indiscriminately killing innocent civilians, Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike, violate the absolute Islamic prohibition of targeting any enemy non-
combatants, including women, children, the aged, the clergy, etc., let alone the 
prohibition on imperilling the lives of civilians even during war operations. 
Furthermore, even if such acts are aimed at military targets, the prohibition still 
applies because the use of force in Islam must take place under the legitimate 
authority. 
As for the contribution the Islamic regulations for war may make in domestic 
armed conflicts, the Islamic law of rebellion provides a framework that can serve as a 
good mechanism for resolving internal conflicts peacefully, democratically and 
through negotiation. It ensures that the dictates of the sharī‛ah are not violated and 
gives the people the right to put an end to injustice and oppression on the part of the 
ruling regime, even if they have to resort to armed rebellion, but only after peaceful 
attempts to address and satisfy the rebels’ complaints and demands have failed. 
Interestingly and unexpectedly, the Islamic law of rebellion shows a remarkable 
degree of tolerance for the internal opponents of an Islamic state, recognising the 
causes that may drive them to armed rebellion. This degree of tolerance for and 
recognition of opponents of the state is secured only after they fulfil three conditions 
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whose objectives are, first, to ensure that there is potentially a valid case for a just 
resort to the use of force against the state and, second, not to give a blank check to 
any individual or a group of individuals to resort to violence. It is ironic that classical 
Muslim jurists provided this well-developed framework, which secures this degree of 
tolerance for opponents of the Islamic state and gives them the right to challenge and 
change the regime only when they are about to resort to armed rebellion. In other 
words, it is surprising that the Islamic mechanism for a form of democracy and a 
change of regime is provided in the Islamic law of rebellion. In fact, this is a result of 
the pragmatic and cautious attitude of the majority of classical jurists, which in most 
cases gives priority to the prevention of the shedding of blood among the Muslims 
over the maintenance of justice and the rights of citizens. 
Regarding the Islamic treatment of terrorism, the classical Muslim jurists’ 
approach, which defines hirābah/terrorism according to the specific acts and the 
contexts in which they are perpetrated, may be a useful approach for achieving a 
universally accepted legal definition of terrorism, which is necessary if the 
international community is determined to fight this phenomenon irrespective of who 
its perpetrators and victims are. The severest punishment provided under Islamic law 
for the perpetrators of and accomplices in acts of terrorism is a reflection of the 
danger this phenomenon poses to the security and economy of society as a whole. 
The recent acts of terrorism perpetrated by Muslims in some non-Muslim countries 
appear to be generally unthinkable to classical Muslim jurists, even if committed 
against citizens of enemy states and during war operations. Jurists have secured total 
protection for the person and property, even of enemy combatants under the amān 
system if they enter the Islamic state and do not commit acts of hostility. Likewise, 
jurists explain that it is prohibited for Muslims to commit any acts of aggression 
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inside enemy territories because this is a violation of the amān contract – the 
equivalent of today’s visa system – they were given. In addition, all acts of force that 
endanger the lives of enemy non-combatants or cause the destruction of their 
property during war operations are strictly regulated and are prohibited in most cases 
under Islamic law, although some jurists allow for the inevitability of collateral 
damage in cases of military necessity or reciprocity. Furthermore, taking the lives of 
animals unjustly, i.e., not for food, and torturing or slaughtering them inhumanely, is 
prohibited in Islamic law. It is worth recalling here al-Shāfi‛ī and Ibn H azm’s 
prohibition of inflicting damage on animate creatures owned by the enemy during 
war operations, which is explained, according to al-Shāfi‛ī, by the fact that, unlike 
lifeless property, living creatures feel pain and any harm done to them will be 
tantamount to torture, which is prohibited in Islam.8 This Islamic prohibition of, and 
severest punishment for, terrorism should serve as a counter terrorism approach, 
particularly if Muslim terrorists claim that their actions are Islamically justifiable. 
The term “Islamic terrorism” is thus a misnomer. 
In conclusion, this study of all the various forms of the use of force in both 
international and domestic armed conflicts establishes that the Islamic law of war 
prohibited the resort to violence except in defence against aggression and to defend 
the religious freedom of Muslims, and, in domestic armed conflicts, to achieve the 
rule of the sharī‛ah. The restrictions placed on the conduct of war indicate the 
sanctity of protecting the lives of enemy non-combatants, their property and the 
environment. These restrictions on the resort to, and conduct in, war aimed at, and in 
fact should achieve, the saving and protection of human lives and religious freedom 
and the prevention, or in case of a justified war alleviation, of the scourge of war. 
                                                 
8 Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‛ī, Al-Umm, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‛rifah, [1973]/1393),Vol. 4, pp. 
259, 287; ‛Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Sa‛īd ibn Hazm, Al-Muhallā (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah, n.d.), Vol. 
7, pp. 294-296. 
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This conclusion is the result of the examination of the literature – i.e., the theory put 
forward by Muslims – studied here, but whether or not the practice of Muslims 
throughout history corresponds with it requires further study. In fact, there is a bad 
need for a study of the Islamic legal-ethical treatment of the current use of violence 
by Muslims in both domestic and international conflicts. 
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